USA v. Dickerson

M EMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
DAVID CHARLES DICKERSON,
Defendant.
Case No. 2:25-cr-000185-AKB
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER
Pending before the Court are Defendant David Charles Dickerson’s Motion to Dismiss
(Dkt. 17) and Motion to Stay/Hold Proceedings in Abeyance (Dkt. 18). Having reviewed the record
and the parties’ submissions, the Court finds that the facts and legal argument are adequately
presented and that oral argument would not significantly aid its decision-making process, and it
decides the motions on the briefing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b). For the reasons set forth below, both
motions are denied.
BACKGROUND
On June 17, 2025, a grand jury indicted Dickerson for Unlawful Possession of a Firearm
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Dkt. 2). He pleaded not guilty and is on pretrial supervision.
On July 28, 2025, he filed both a motion to dismiss, arguing § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional under
the Second Amendment, and a companion motion to stay/hold proceedings in abeyance (Dkt. 18).
The United States objects to both motions (Dkts. 19, 20).
LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allows a party to “raise by pretrial
motion any defense, objection, or request that the court can determine without a trial on the merits.”
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Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(1). A motion to dismiss is generally “capable of determination” before trial
if it involves questions of law rather than fact. United States v. Nukida, 8 F.3d 665, 669 (9th Cir.
1993). Although the court may make preliminary factual findings necessary to decide legal
questions, it may not invade the jury’s province. Id. An issue raised in a pretrial motion must be
decided before trial if it is “entirely segregable” from the evidence to be presented at trial. United
States v. Shortt Acct. Corp., 785 F.2d 1448, 1452 (9th Cir. 1986).
A defendant may seek dismissal of an indictment on the grounds that the statute authorizing
the charge is unconstitutional. Such a challenge may be either a facial or an as-applied attack. To
succeed on a facial attack, the moving party must demonstrate “no application of the statute could
be constitutional.” Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609 (2004). A facial challenge is the “most
difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be valid.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S.
739, 745 (1987). Conversely, an as-applied challenge is based on a developed factual record and
the statute’s application to the defendant. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 414 (1974).
ANALYSIS
Dickerson moves to dismiss the indictment on the ground that § 922(g)(1), as applied to
him, violates the Second Amendment. He argues that under New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v.
Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), and United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), the Government must
identify a “relevantly similar” historical analogue for permanently disarming non-violent felons
who have completed their sentences (Dkt. 17 at 4-13.) He posits the Government has not done so
and makes four principal points.
First, he argues the modern federal felon-in-possession statute is a 20th-century creation,
with the first such law appearing in 1938 and the categorical ban not arriving until 1961 and 1968.
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Second, he contends the founding-era punishments cited in United States v. Duarte, 137 F.4th 743
(9th Cir. 2025) (en banc)—death and forfeiture—are not firearm regulations and, thus, fail Bruen’s
“why/how” test. Third, he asserts that at founding the definition of “felony” was narrower, so it is
historically inaccurate to equate all modern felons with those once deemed dangerous. Finally, he
contends District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), left open the constitutionality of
felon-in-possession prohibitions, and that Heller’s reference to “longstanding prohibitions” was
dicta, not a holding (Dkt. 17 at 13-16).
Further, most relevant here, Dickerson argues that Duarte was decidedly incorrectly
because it misapplied Bruen by accepting ahistorical analogues, overstated Heller’s dicta, and
ignored individualized circumstances. Because the Ninth Circuit has acknowledged a circuit split
regarding the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) and because Duarte’s mandate is stayed pending a
certiorari petition, Dickerson contends the Court should hold his motion to dismiss in abeyance
(Dkts. 17, 18, 21).
In response, the Government notes that the Ninth Circuit has held that historical tradition
supports categorically disarming felons without the need for individual assessments and that
§ 922(g)(1) “is constitutional in all its applications.” Duarte, 137 F.4th at 761, 767. Further, it notes
that Duarte is binding authority on this Court and forecloses Dickerson’s challenge (Dkt. 20 at 2-
3).
A. 	Motion to Stay/Hold Proceedings in Abeyance
The Court declines to stay this case. District courts have inherent discretion to stay
proceedings. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997). That discretion, however, must be
exercised with attention to the competing interests of the parties and the public. Here, two
considerations weigh decisively against a stay.
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First, Duarte remains binding precedent in the Ninth Circuit. Even though its mandate is
stayed, once the en banc court issued its opinion, district courts became bound to follow it. Yong
v. I.N.S., 208 F.3d 1116, 1119 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000). This Court has no authority to await the Supreme
Court’s potential disposition before applying Duarte’s holding.
Second, the public’s and the defendant’s interest in a speedy trial outweighs any benefit of
delay. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). As other courts have observed, extended delays risk stale
evidence, faded memories, and diminished confidence in the administration of justice. Exercising
its discretion, the Court refuses to stay this case in light of those interests and Duarte’s binding
nature. Accordingly, the Court denies Dickerson’s motion to hold these proceedings in abeyance.
B. 	Motion to Dismiss
Duarte forecloses Dickerson’s constitutional challenge. The Ninth Circuit in Duarte held
that the Nation’s historical tradition supports a categorical disarmament of felons, violent or not,
without the need for individualized inquiry. 137 F.4th at 758-61. Under Duarte, § 922(g)(1) is
constitutional in all its applications. Id. at 761. While Dickerson offers an extensive critique of
Duarte’s historical reasoning and urges a different application of Bruen and Rahimi, this Court is
not free to disregard controlling Ninth Circuit precedent. See In re Zermeno-Gomez, 868 F.3d 1048,
1052 (9th Cir. 2017). Duarte binds all district courts in this Circuit “unless and until overruled by
a body competent to do so.” Id. Accordingly, the Court denies Dickerson’s motion to dismiss.
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons:
1. 	Defendant David Charles Dickerson’s Motion to Stay/Hold Proceedings in Abeyance
(Dkt. 18) is DENIED.
2. 	Dickerson’s Motion to Dismiss Indictment (Dkt. 17) is DENIED.
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3. 	The Court will issue a separate order setting this case for trial and establishing the deadlines
to govern the case.
October 27, 2025
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