Crist v. Raubenheimer, et al.

SUCCESSIVE REVIEW ORDER BY SCREENING JUDGE - 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
DAMON VICTOR CRIST,
Plaintiff,
v.
DEPUTY LOUIS RAUBENHEIMER and
DEPUTY B. FRANKS,
Defendants.
Case No. 1:25-cv-00317-AKB
SUCCESSIVE REVIEW ORDER BY
SCREENING JUDGE
Plaintiff is an inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action.
The Court previously reviewed Plaintiff’s complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A,
determined that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and allowed Plaintiff
an opportunity to amend. See Init. Rev. Order, Dkt. 8.
Plaintiff has now filed an Amended Complaint. Dkt. 11. The Court retains its screening
authority under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b).
1. Federal Claims
The Amended Complaint is not substantively different from the initial complaint. Compare
Compl., Dkt. 3, with Am. Compl., Dkt. 10. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to remedy the deficiencies
in the initial complaint with respect to his retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as set forth
in Claim One of the Amended Complaint. Am. Compl. at 4–6. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss
these claims, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A, for the reasons explained in the Initial Review
Order.
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SUCCESSIVE REVIEW ORDER BY SCREENING JUDGE - 2
2. State Law Claims
In Claims Two and Three of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts state law claims of
assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress.1 Am. Compl. at 6–7. For the reasons that
follow, the Court concludes these claims are also implausible and will dismiss them under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A.
Plaintiff claims that Defendant Raubenhaimer assaulted him by becoming enraged,
screaming in Plaintiff’s face, using profanity, telling Plaintiff that Raubenheimer could make
Plaintiff’s “life a living Hell,” throwing a chair in Plaintiff’s direction, and running around a table
“into Plaintiff’s position.” Am. Compl. at 2–3. To state a colorable civil assault claim under Idaho
law, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) the defendant “acted intending to cause a harmful or
offensive contact with the person of the plaintiff or a third person, or an immediate fear of such
contact,” and (2) as a result, “the plaintiff feared that such contact was imminent.” Hammer v. Ribi,
401 P.3d 148, 152 (Idaho 2017). The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the plaintiff’s fear of
harmful or offensive contact must be “reasonable.” Id. (Idaho 2017) (quoting William L.
Prosser, Law of Torts 40 (4th ed. 1971)).
Plaintiff’s assault claim is implausible because, even assuming Raubenheimer acted with
an intent to cause fear, the Amended Complaint does not support an inference that Plaintiff’s fear
was reasonable. As the Court previously explained with respect to Plaintiff’s federal claims,
Raubenheimer’s alleged conduct may have been unprofessional, see Init. Rev. Order at 6, but that
does not mean it constituted an assault under Idaho law. Prisons are chaotic places, and inmates
and guards verbally spar fairly often. The allegations in the Amended Complaint simply do not
1 The Court did not previously review the merits of Plaintiff’s state law claims because the lack of a
plausible federal law claim led the Court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. See Init. Rev.
Order at 8.
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SUCCESSIVE REVIEW ORDER BY SCREENING JUDGE - 3
plausibly suggest that a reasonable inmate would fear imminent harmful or offensive contact in
the situation described by Plaintiff.
Plaintiff also asserts that he suffered emotional distress from Raubenheimer’s aggressive
demeanor and Franks’s alleged “mock[ing]” of Plaintiff. Am. Compl. at 3. A plaintiff must
establish four elements to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Idaho law:
“(1) the conduct [of the defendant] must be intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct must be extreme
and outrageous; (3) there must be a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the
emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress must be severe.” Evans v. Twin Falls Cnty., 796
P.2d 87, 97 (Idaho 1990). The fourth factor, that the distress must be severe, requires that “the
distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.” Id. (quoting
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46 cmt. j). To show severe distress, the plaintiff must establish
that he “incurred … physical damage,” was “hampered in the performance of [his] daily
functions,” or “suffered a severely disabling emotional response” to the defendant’s conduct.
Davis v. Gage, 682 P.2d 1282, 1288 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984).
Plaintiff’s claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress are implausible for two
reasons. First, Defendants’ conduct was not extreme or outrageous, as the Court has already
explained with respect to Plaintiff’s assault claim. Second, Plaintiff’s vague and generalized
allegations of emotional distress do not give rise to a reasonable inference that any distress
experienced by Plaintiff was so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.
See Evans, 796 P.2d at 97. The Amended Complaint does not plausibly allege that Plaintiff
suffered physical injury or a severely disabling emotional response or that he was hampered in the
performance of his daily functions as a result of Defendants’ conduct. See Davis, 682 P.2d at 1288.
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3. Conclusion
Although pro se pleadings must be liberally construed, “a liberal interpretation of a civil
rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey
v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Because Plaintiff has
already been given the opportunity to amend and still has failed to state a plausible claim for relief,
the Court will dismiss the Amended Complaint with prejudice and without further leave to amend.
See Knapp v. Hogan, 738 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 2013) (“When a litigant knowingly and
repeatedly refuses to conform his pleadings to the requirements of the Federal Rules, it is
reasonable to conclude that the litigant simply cannot state a claim.”).
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED:
1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Review the Amended Complaint and Motion to Take Judicial
Notice (Dkt. 9) is GRANTED.
2. The Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Therefore, for the reasons stated in this Order and the Initial Review Order (Dkt. 8),
this entire case is DISMISSED with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
& 1915A(b)(1).
3. Because this case has been dismissed, Plaintiff’s Motion for Stay upon Further
Proceedings (Dkt. 11) is DENIED AS MOOT.
DATED: February 10, 2026
_________________________
Amanda K. Brailsford
U.S. District Court Judge
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