Idaho Organization of Resource Councils et al v. Labrador et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
IDAHO ORGANIZATION OF RESOURCE
COUNCILS; THE ALLIANCE OF IDAHO;
A.M.R.; L.M.C.; M.S.; W.G.C.; and
J.R.B.M.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
RAUL LABRADOR, in his official capacity
as Attorney General of the State of Idaho, et
al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 1:25-cv-00178-AKB
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER
Pending are four motions including Plaintiffs A.M.R., L.M.C., M.S., W.G.C., and
J.R.B.M.’s Motion to Proceed in Pseudonym (Dkt. 5); Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Under
Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (Dkt. 44); Certain Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Complaint Under
Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (Dkt. 86); and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6) (Dkt. 90). Having reviewed the record and the parties’ submissions, the Court finds that
the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented, and that oral argument would not
significantly aid its decision-making process, and it decides the motions on the parties’ briefing.
Dist. Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(1)(B); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b) (“By rule or order, the court
may provide for submitting and determining motions on briefs, without oral hearings.”).
BACKGROUND
On March 27, 2025, Idaho’s Immigration Cooperation and Enforcement Act (the “ICE Act”
or the “Act”), Idaho Code §§ 18-9001 – 9013, went into effect. The Act creates two new criminal
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offenses at issue here: “illegal entry from foreign nation” (“Illegal Entry”) and “illegal reentry by
certain aliens” (“Illegal Reentry”) (collectively “the challenged offenses”). I.C. §§ 18-9003, 18-
9004. The Act’s Statement of Purpose provides that the Act “fulfills Idaho’s commitment to
support the Trump administration in the identification, detainment, and deportation of dangerous
illegal aliens found in Idaho.” House Bill 83 “Statement of Purpose.” The Act applies to “aliens”
as defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1101, which provides an alien is any person who is “not a citizen or
national of the United States.”1 I.C. § 18-9002(1); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3).
Under the Act, an alien commits the offense of Illegal Entry if the alien “enters or attempts
to enter this state at any location other than a lawful port of entry or through another manner of
lawful entry.” I.C. § 18-9003(1). Meanwhile, an alien commits a violation of Illegal Reentry if the
alien “enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in this state after the person: (a) [h]as been
denied admission to or excluded, deported, or removed from the United States; or (b) [h]as
departed from the United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or removal is
outstanding.” I.C. § 18-9004(1).
The enforcement of both Illegal Entry and Illegal Reentry is limited by an independent
crime requirement. Namely, law enforcement may only enforce a violation of either of the
challenged offenses “when a person is detained or investigated for suspected commission of an
independent crime under title 18, Idaho Code, excluding this chapter, or under chapter 27, title 37,
Idaho Code.” I.C. §§ 18-9003(3); 18-9004(4). Title 18, referred to in the independent crime
requirement, contains eighty-nine different chapters covering a wide range of criminal offenses
including, for example, crimes involving violence, theft, public order, and sexual offenses. Chapter
1 	Because the ICE Act refers to “aliens” and relies on the federal definition of that term, the
Court likewise uses the term “alien” in its decision to avoid confusion.
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27, Title 37 contains the Uniform Controlled Substances Act and, among other things, prohibits
the possession, delivery, and manufacture of controlled substances.
Immediately upon the Act becoming effective, Plaintiffs filed a putative class action
complaint. Plaintiffs include the Idaho Organization of Resource Councils (“IORC”), an
organization whose members include alien, seasonal migrant workers who travel between Idaho
and other states; the Alliance of Idaho (“Alliance”), an organization which provides legal services,
including to clients who it alleges would be subject to prosecution under the Act; and five aliens,
A.M.R., L.M.C., M.S., W.G.C., and J.R.B.M. (collectively the “Individual Plaintiffs”), who travel
between Idaho and other states. Plaintiffs allege three claims for relief, including that the
challenged offenses are (1) preempted by federal law under the Supremacy Clause; (2) violate the
Commerce Clause; and (3) violate the Due Process Clause (Dkt. 1).
With their complaint, Plaintiffs also filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining
order (“TRO), for provisional class certification, and for a preliminary injunction to preclude the
Act’s enforcement (Dkts. 1-3). At the same time, they moved for class certification and to proceed
anonymously (Dkts. 4, 5). Ultimately, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary
injunction enjoining the enforcement of §§ 18-9003 and 18-9004 and provisionally certifying two
classes, including the Entry Class and the Reentry Class (Dkt. 84). In its preliminary injunction
decision, the Court ruled that, among other things, the Individual Plaintiffs and IORC have
standing, although Alliance’s standing is questionable (id. at 4-16); the doctrine of unclean hands
does not bar Plaintiffs’ claims (id. at 17-18); and Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of
their preemption and due process claims (id. 19-28).
Originally, Plaintiffs asserted their claims against Defendant Raul Labrador, Idaho’s
Attorney General, and thirteen elected county prosecuting attorneys in Idaho (Dkt. 1). After
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Defendants filed their first motion to dismiss (Dkt. 44), Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint
asserting their claims against the remaining elected prosecuting attorneys in Idaho (collectively
Prosecuting Attorney Defendants) (Dkt. 47; Dkt. 90-1 at 3). Other than adding these defendants
and three new paragraphs regarding the Act’s legislative history, the allegations and claims in
Plaintiffs’ amended complaint remain the same as those in their original complaint (compare
Dkt. 1 with Dkt. 47).
After Plaintiffs filed their amended complaint, the original Defendants renewed their
motion to dismiss and filed another motion to dismiss on behalf of the newly added Prosecuting
Attorney Defendants (Dkts. 86, 90). In support of their motions, Defendants renew many of the
same arguments the Court has already addressed in its preliminary injunction decision. Defendants
essentially concede this fact (Dkt. 93 at 2 (“Defendants have certainly renewed some of their
arguments for preservation purposes.”). Meanwhile, Plaintiffs largely rely on the Court’s
preliminary injunction decision to oppose Defendants’ motion. Because the Court addressed many
of Defendants’ arguments in its preliminary injunction decision, it does not reiterate those rulings
to the extent Defendants are simply “renewing” their arguments for “preservation purposes.”
Rather, the Court incorporates the analysis in its preliminary injunction decision to the extent it is
not inconsistent with this decision, and it focuses its analysis on those arguments which are new
and not addressed in the preliminary injunction decision.
ANALYSIS
A. 	Legal Standard
1. 	Rule 12(b)(1)
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides a defendant may move to
dismiss an action for “lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.” Courts “have an independent obligation
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to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500,
514 (2006); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). A motion to dismiss for lack of
standing is properly brought under Rule 12(b)(1) because standing is a jurisdictional matter. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing standing and must clearly allege
facts demonstrating each element of standing. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016).
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion challenging standing, the court must accept all material
allegations as true and construe them in the plaintiff’s favor. Chandler v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co.,
598 F.3d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 2010).
2. 	Rule 12(b)(6)
A dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate where a complaint “fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure requires only a short and plain statement of the claim, showing the plaintiff is
entitled to relief and giving the defendant fair notice of plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon
which it rests. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Although a complaint
challenged by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss “does not need detailed factual allegations,” it
requires “more than labels and conclusions.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “[A] formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id.
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a claim requires a complaint to have enough factual
basis which, if true, states a plausible claim for relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content allowing the court to draw a reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. The plausibility standard is
not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility a defendant
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has acted unlawfully. Id. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a
defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement
to relief.’” Id. at 557.
B. 	Motions to Dismiss
Defendants have three pending motions to dismiss (Dkts. 44, 86, and 90). Defendants’ first
motion (Dkt. 44) addresses Plaintiffs’ original complaint (Dkt. 1). Defendants acknowledge that
Plaintiffs’ amended complaint moots this first motion (Dkt. 86-1 at 2). After Plaintiffs filed their
amended complaint, Defendants filed a second motion to dismiss on behalf of the original
Defendants (id.). Defendants’ second motion is both substantially identical to their first motion
and, also, expressly incorporates the first motion’s arguments (compare Dkt. 44-1 with Dkt. 86-1).
Then, Defendants filed a third motion on behalf of the Prosecuting Attorney Defendants newly
named in Plaintiffs’ amended complaint (Dkt. 90). Because Defendants’ arguments in these
motions are either duplicative or overlapping, the Court addresses them jointly. To the extent the
Court does not address Defendants’ renewed arguments, which it previously addressed in its
preliminary injunction decision (Dkt. 84), it adopts those rulings here.
1. 	Individual Plaintiffs’ Standing Under Driehaus
To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must show (1) an injury in fact; (2) sufficient
causal connection between the injury and the conduct of which he complains; and (3) a likelihood
a favorable decision will redress the injury. Issacson v. Mayes, 84 F4th 1089, 1095 (9th Cir. 2023).
“[A] recurring issue for federal courts is determining when the threat of enforcement creates a
sufficient injury for a party to have standing to bring a pre-enforcement challenge to a law.”
Tingley v. Ferguson, 47 F.4th 1055, 1067 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing three-part test for pre-enforcement
standing in Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158 (2014)). To establish pre-
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enforcement standing under Driehaus, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he intends “to engage in a
course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest”; (2) the challenged statute
arguably proscribes the intended future conduct; and (3) the threat of future enforcement is
substantial. Driehaus, 573 U.S. at 161-64; see also Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights. Comm’n,
220 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 2000) (applying principles Driehaus outlines).
The Court previously ruled that the Individual Plaintiffs met their burden of establishing
standing under the three-prong Driehaus test (Dkt. 84 at 5-12). Defendants renew their challenge,
arguing again that the Individual Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the Driehaus test. In support, Defendants
make many of the same arguments they previously raised. (See Dkt. 86-1 at 6-12; Dkt. 90-1 at 6-
10). As previously noted, to the extent the Court has already addressed Defendants’ arguments, it
does not address them again here. It does, however, address Defendants’ new arguments and
additional case law.
a. 	Affected Constitutional Interest
Defendants make two arguments that the Individual Plaintiffs have not identified a
“constitutional interest” to satisfy the first prong of the Driehaus test. First, Defendants rely on
Kumar v. Koester, 131 F.4th 746 (9th Cir. 2025), to argue that an alleged violation of the Due
Process Clause is not a constitutional interest (Dkt. 86-1 at 8-9). In Kumar, two Hindu professors
challenged California State University’s use of the word “caste” to define race or ethnicity as a
protected class. Id. at 749-50. The professors alleged the use of this word violated, among other
things, the Due Process Clause because it was vague. Id. at 748. The Ninth Circuit concluded the
professors had satisfied the first Dreihaus prong because they alleged an intention to engage in a
course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest: namely, they “are practicing
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Hindus” and “[p]racticing one’s religion is a protected First Amendment activity that satisfies the
first prong.” Id. at 752.
Based on this ruling, Defendants argue that “Plaintiffs must allege a course of conduct that
is arguably affected with a constitutional interest” and that they “lack a constitutionally protected
right to travel” (Dkt. 86-1 at 8). The Individual Plaintiffs, however, do not rely on a constitutional
right to travel in support of their Due Process claim. Rather, they allege that Illegal Entry violates
their right under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which protects against vague
criminal penalties (Dkt. 47 at ¶¶ 92-105).
Contrary to Defendants’ argument, Plaintiffs’ Due Process claim provides a constitutional
interest which satisfies the first Driehaus prong. The Due Process Clause under the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits a state from “depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of the law,” and it protects all persons within the United States, including aliens who are
here unlawfully. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). As the Ninth Circuit has ruled, a
due process challenge under the “void-for-vagueness” doctrine is a sufficient constitutional interest
to establish pre-enforcement standing. Isaacson, 84 F.4th at 1098-99 (“A void-for-vagueness
challenge is rooted in the Due Process Clause. . . . The district court’s suggestion that due process
challenges, including vagueness challenges, cannot be reviewed before enforcement . . . is also
incorrect. . . . Plaintiffs satisfy the first Driehaus prong’s requirement.”). Accordingly, the Court
concludes Kumar is inapplicable in this case because it does not address an alleged vague criminal
penalty under the Due Process Clause.
Second, Defendants also argue the Court “ignores a key point” in Valle del Sol v. Whiting,
732 F.3d 1006, 1012, 1017 (9th Cir. 2013), to conclude that the Individual Plaintiffs have shown
a constitutional interest which satisfies the first Driehaus prong (Dkt. 86-1 at 10). Specifically,
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Defendants argue “Valle del Sol does not stand for the proposition that the Supremacy Clause can
serve as a basis for satisfying the first Driehaus prong” (Dkt. 86-1 at 10). In support, Defendants
note that the plaintiff in Valle del Sol was a pastor, who “provide[d] shelter to persons who seek
sanctuary in her church.” 732 F.3d at 1015. Based on this fact, Defendants argue that “the clear
import [of Valle del Sol] is that the pastor intended to engage in a course of conduct arguably
related to her free exercise rights under the First Amendment” (Dkt. 86-1 at 10). Contrary to
Defendants’ arguments, however, the Ninth Circuit never ruled the pastor’s constitutional interest
under Driehaus was her First Amendment right. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit appears to have excepted
the pastor’s claims in Valle del Sol from a First Amendment analysis. See 732 F3.d at 1020
(applying facial vagueness analysis “[o]utside the First Amendment context”).
Contrary to Defendants’ assertion, courts have routinely reviewed challenges to state
criminal laws which allegedly violate the Supremacy Clause. See, e.g., Kansas v. Garcia, 589 U.S.
191, 195 (2020) (reviewing appellants’ Supremacy Clause challenge against their state prosecution
based on preemption by federal immigration laws); United States v. Texas, 794 F. Supp. 3d 427,
444 (W.D. Tex. July 21, 2025) (“[B]ecause [plaintiffs] allege that harm results from a statute
preempted by federal law and thus violative of the Supremacy Clause, the injury is constitutionally
cognizable. That is sufficient to establish injury-in-fact.”); St. Luke’s Health System, Ltd., v.
Labrador, 782 F. Supp. 3d 954, 967 (D. Idaho Mar. 20, 2025) (rejecting “the recent suggestion . .
. that the statute at issue in a pre-enforcement challenge ‘must ostensibly prohibit the exercise of a
specific constitutional right’” and concluding that “because [plaintiff’s] compliance with [federal
law] in these circumstances implicates the Supremacy Clause, that conduct carries a constitutional
interest”); Puente Arizona v. Arpaio, 76 F. Supp. 3d 833, 850 (D. Ariz. 2015) (finding Driehaus’s
“constitutional 	interest” 	requirement 	is 	“satisfied 	when 	a 	plaintiff 	challenges 	a 	law 	on
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constitutional grounds,” such as the “Supremacy Clause”), rev’d in part, vacated in part on other
grounds, 821 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2016). Accordingly, the Court rejects Defendants’ argument that
an alleged violation of the Supremacy Clause does not satisfy the first Driehaus prong.
b. 	Proscribed Conduct
Defendants also challenge the Individual Plaintiffs’ showing under the second Driehaus
prong, which requires a challenged offense arguably proscribes their conduct. Defendants argue
the Individual Plaintiffs do not have standing to challenge Illegal Entry because “none of [them]
have alleged that they have entered Idaho at the Canadian border or directly from a foreign country
by aircraft.” (Dkt. 86-1 at 6). In support, Defendants characterize Illegal Entry as applying in only
“two circumstances,” i.e., where an alien enters Idaho from Canada or from a foreign country via
aircraft but not through a port of entry (id. at 5). This characterization of Illegal Entry, however,
ignores the statute’s plain language, which provides that an alien commits Illegal Entry if he
“enters or attempts to enter this state at any location other than a lawful port of entry.” I.C. § 18-
9003(1) (emphasis added). Obviously, “any location” is broader than the Canadian border or an
airport. Defendants’ strained interpretation of Illegal Entry does not defeat Plaintiffs’ standing to
challenge Illegal Entry.
c. 	Credible Threat of Enforcement
Related to this strained interpretation of Illegal Entry, Defendants also challenge the
Individual Plaintiffs’ showing under the third Driehaus prong, requiring a credible threat of
prosecution. In support, Defendants rely on Idaho Federation of Teachers v. Labrador, No. 1:23-
cv-000353-DCN, 2024 WL 3276835 (D. Idaho July 2, 2024). In that case, the plaintiffs were the
university professors and teachers’ unions who challenged Idaho’s No Public Funds for Abortion
Act (NPFAA). Id. at *1. The NPFAA provides that no person who receives public funds may use
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those funds to promote abortion. Id. at *2. The plaintiffs argued that the NPFAA violated their
First Amendment right and was unconstitutionally vague. Id. After plaintiffs sued, Idaho’s
Attorney General issued an opinion letter opining that academic speech regarding abortion, even
if favorable to abortion, does not fall within the NPFAA and will not be prosecuted. Id.
Specifically, the opinion letter stated the NPFAA “does not prohibit employees of institutions of
higher education from engaging in abortion related speech as part of their academic teaching or
scholarship, even if the teaching or scholarship could be viewed as supporting abortion.” Id. at
*10. In other words, the Attorney General disavowed the statute’s application in the context of the
academic speech for an entire category of individuals, i.e., “employees of institutions of higher
education.” Id.
Defendants argue that “this case is on all fours with Idaho Federation of Teachers” because
“Defendants have affirmatively declared that Plaintiffs . . . are not subject to prosecution under the
ICE Act” (Dkt. 93 at 4). Defendants’ argument fails, however. Unlike Idaho Federation of
Teachers, the Attorney General has not issued a formal opinion letter disavowing the enforcement
of the ICE Act against all aliens. Rather, here Defendants have simply offered a strained
interpretation of Illegal Entry to undermine the Individual Plaintiffs’ standing to challenge the
provision. Adopting Defendants’ argument that they can disavow a plaintiff’s standing to
challenge a law would simply and very likely result in piecemeal litigation by other similarly
situated aliens who are not named plaintiffs in this case. Accordingly, the Court declines to
construe Defendants’ interpretation of Illegal Entry as a disavowal of the ICE Act’s enforcement.
d. 	Causation
Defendants also argue that the Court should dismiss the Prosecuting Attorney Defendants
because the Individual Plaintiffs cannot trace their alleged injuries to these Defendants (Dkt. 86-1
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at 15-16; Dkt. 90-1 at 10-11). “To satisfy the causality element for Article III standing, [p]laintiffs
must show that the injury is causally linked or ‘fairly traceable’ to the [defendants’] alleged
misconduct.” Wash. Environ. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1141 (9th Cir. 2013). “The line of
causation between the defendant’s action and the plaintiff’s harm must be more than attenuated.”
Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 867 (9th Cir. 2012) (Pro, J.
concurring). Causation will “not fail simply because it has several links, provided those links are
not hypothetical or tenuous and remain plausible.” Wash. Environ. Council, 732 F.3d at 1141-42.
Defendants argue that the Prosecuting Attorney Defendants “lack any connection” to the
Individual Plaintiffs; “there is no substantial threat of enforcement” either from the Prosecuting
Attorney Defendants in the counties in which they reside or the other Idaho counties;2 and for this
reason, the Prosecuting Attorney Defendants should be dismissed (Dkt. 86-1 at 16; Dkt. 90-1 at
10). In support, Defendants rely on Seyb v. Members of Idaho Bd of Med., No. 1:24-cv-244-BLW,
2025 WL 963957 (D. Idaho March 31, 2025). In that case, an Idaho physician, who provided
medically indicated abortions, challenged Idaho’s bans on abortion and named all Idaho’s county
prosecutors as defendants. Id. at *2, 6. Although all county prosecutors had the authority to enforce
the abortion bans, it was undisputed that the physician only provided abortions in Ada County and
had no intention of providing abortions in any other county. Id. at *6. For this reason, the Court
stated it was “not convinced that there was a necessary causal link between [the physician’s] injury
and the other county prosecutors,” and it ruled that “the casual link between [the physician’s]
injury—risk of prosecution—and the [remaining] 43 county prosecutors [was] not sufficiently
2 	The Individual Plaintiffs who reside in Idaho reside in Twin Falls, Jerome, and Cassia
Counties (Dkt. 47 at ¶¶ 26, 28-29; Dkt. 86-1 at 15). Defendants’ causation challenge does not
appear to be related to the Prosecuting Attorney Defendants from these counties (see, e.g., Dkt. 86-
1 at 16 (arguing ten Prosecuting Attorney Defendants should be dismissed); Dkt. 90-1 at 10
(arguing thirty-one Prosecuting Attorney Defendants should be dismissed)).
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plausible to warrant joining all county prosecutors.” Id. Accordingly, the Court dismissed all the
prosecutors except the Ada County Prosecuting Attorney. Id.
Seyb is distinguishable from this case. Unlike Seyb, where a single physician was acting in
Ada County, a Prosecuting Attorney Defendant in any county could conceivably prosecute any
Individual Plaintiff who might happen to be traveling in the county. That an Individual Plaintiff
may travel outside their county of residence provides a causal link to the other counties in Idaho.
Moreover, Defendants admit that the Prosecuting Attorney Defendants’ “primary duties are to
independently oversee prosecution of crimes committed within the boundaries of their respective
counties” (Dkt. 90-1 at 10 n. 3). None of the Prosecuting Attorney Defendants have disavowed the
Act or represented that they do not intend to prosecute the challenged offenses. Moreover, the
Court has provisionally certified a statewide class (Dkt. 84). Accordingly, the Court concludes that
a causal link has been established for purposes of this stage of litigation.
e. 	Individual Plaintiffs’ Standing to Challenge Illegal Reentry
Finally, Defendants argue that only one of the five Individual Plaintiffs has standing to
challenge Illegal Reentry because four of the Individual Plaintiffs have not alleged that they have
illegally reentered the United States (Dkt. 86-1 at 6). Defendants, however, do not dispute that
J.R.B.M. has standing to challenge Illegal Reentry; and Plaintiffs implicitly concede L.M.C. and
W.G.C. lack standing to challenge Illegal Reentry.
At issue, then, is whether A.M.R. and M.S. have alleged facts adequate to show they could
be subject to Illegal Reentry. In support of Plaintiffs’ argument that A.M.R. and M.S. have standing
to challenge Illegal Reentry, Plaintiffs rely on their amended complaint (Dkt. 92 at 7) (citing
Dkt. 47 at ¶¶ 25, 27). Regarding A.M.R., the amended complaint alleges that A.M.R. “signed a
document [in 2009] agreeing to be removed from the United States” and “entered the United States
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again without inspection in 2010” (Dkt. 47 at ¶ 25) (emphasis added). Because A.M.R. clearly
alleges she has previously been removed from the United States, she has standing to challenge
Illegal Reentry. See Idaho Code § 18-9004(a) (criminalizing reentry after removal). Regarding
M.S., however, the amended complaint only alleges that M.S. “entered the United States without
inspection in March 1992 but left the country in 1998” and her “most recent entry without
inspection into the United Sates [sic] was in 2000” (Dkt. 92 at 7) (citing Dkt. 47 at ¶¶ 25, 27).
These allegations are insufficient to subject M.S. to Illegal Reentry. Accordingly, the Court finds
J.R.B.M. and A.M.R. have standing to challenge Illegal Reentry but M.S., L.M.C., and W.G.C. do
not have standing.
2. 	IORC’s Association Standing
Defendants also renew their arguments that IORC lacks association standing (Dkt. 86-1 at
13-14). In support, they argue that the “Individual Plaintiffs lack standing” and that the “IORC
never names any member” who would be subject to prosecution for the challenged offenses (id. at
14). As this Court previously noted, the IORC has satisfied the test for associational standing
(Dkt. 84 at 13) (citing Am. Unites for Kids v. Rousseau, 985 F.3d 1075, 1096 (9th Cir. 2021)
(stating test for associational standing). Contrary to Defendants’ argument, the Individual Plaintiffs
have standing, as discussed above and in the Court’s preliminary injunction decision; IORC has
alleged Individual Plaintiffs are members (Dkt. 47 at ¶ 16); and the Individual Plaintiffs have each
attested they are IORC members (Dkt. 3-4 at ¶ 3; Dkt. 3-5 at ¶ 3; Dkt. 3-6 at ¶ 3; Dkt. 3-7 at ¶ 3;
Dkt. 3-8 at ¶ 3). Accordingly, the Court rejects Defendants’ renewed argument challenging
IORC’s associational standing.
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3. 	Alliance’s Organizational Standing
At the preliminary injunction stage, the Court deferred resolution of whether Alliance had
organizational standing, although it noted Alliance’s standing based on the record at that time was
“questionable” (Dkt. 84 at 15). The Court noted that an organization may have standing “to sue on
[its] own behalf for injuries [it has] sustained.” Food & Drug Admin. v. All. for Hippocratic Med.,
602 U.S. 367, 393 (2024) (citing Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 n.19 (1982)).
The organization “must satisfy the usual standards for injury in fact, causation, and redressability
that apply to individuals.” Id. at 369. The Ninth Circuit has previously found “organizational
standing” when a defendant’s behavior has “frustrated [the organization’s] mission and caused it
to divert resources in response to that frustration of purpose.” Nielsen v. Thornell, 101 F.4th 1164,
1169-71 (9th Cir. 2024) (explaining “diversion-of-resources” theory of organizational standing),
as amended (July 8, 2024); contra Arizona All. for Retired Americans v. Mayes, 117 F.4th 1165
(9th Cir. 2024) (overruling Nielsen’s diversion-of-resources theory), reh’g en banc granted,
opinion vacated, 130 F.4th 1177 (9th Cir. 2025).3
This Court has previously acknowledged the nuances of the “diversion-of-resources”
theory for organizational standing. See March for Our Lives Idaho v. McGrane, 749 F. Supp. 3d
1128, 1138 (D. Idaho 2024) (citing All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 393-95 and noting there
is no “categorical rule allowing standing whenever an organization diverts its resources in response
to a defendant’s actions”) (internal quotations omitted). Generally, an “organization’s mere desire
to act (and in the process spend resources) to oppose a policy cannot confer standing to challenge
3 	An en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit heard oral argument in Arizona All. for Retired
Americans v. Mayes, Case No. 22-16490, on June 25, 2025, but an en banc opinion has not yet
issued. The Ninth Circuit’s decision in that case may impact this decision.
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[a] policy.” Nielsen, 101 F.4th at 1170 n.2. Rather, the plaintiff must show a defendant’s actions
affected and interfered with its “core business activities.” Alliance for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S.
at 395.
Alliance’s allegations in the amended complaint remain the same as those in the original
complaint (compare Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 17-24, 92-94 with Dkt. 47 at ¶¶ 17-24, 83-85). Alliance alleges
its mission is to “provide[] low-cost immigration legal services” to families in Blaine County,
Idaho, and the surrounding communities” (Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 18-19). Alliance contends the Act would
hinder its “ability to fulfill its core mission” by making it more costly to reach clients detained
under the Act; require it to hire additional attorneys familiar with state criminal laws; and require
it to overhaul existing programs (id. at ¶ 22; Dkt. 40 at 6). In other words, Alliance contends the
Act makes Alliance’s “effective representation impossible” because it “subjects [its] clients to
arrest and detention far from the Alliance’s offices” (Dkt. 40 at 8).
The Court previously noted that, if Alliance’s anticipated expenses due to the Act fall under
“business activities,” these allegations may be enough to establish organizational standing. See,
e.g., East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Biden, 993 F.3d 640, 664 (9th Cir. 2021) (finding
organizations had standing because they diverted resources to help refugee clients counteract new
asylum rules). If, however, the expenses are merely “advocacy” expenses incurred to oppose the
Act, then the allegations are insufficient to confer organizational standing. See, e.g., Free Speech
Coalition v. Knudsen, 754 F. Supp. 3d 1037, 1056 (D. Montana 2024) (finding interest group
lacked organizational standing because there was “no sense in which [the challenged statute] can
be said to directly injure the organization[‘s] pre-existing core activities, apart from the plaintiffs’
response to that [statutory] provision”) (internal citations omitted).
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Defendants argue Alliance’s allegations do not establish standing because “any increased
expenses associated with [its] clients are based upon [its] independent decisions as to which clients
it chooses to represent” (Dkt. 86-1 at 15). Alliance responds that under the Act “it will be more
costly and time-consuming to reach [its] existing clients, extremely difficult to secure evidence
that can make or break the clients’ case, and very challenging to communicate with clients” and
that “these [are] injuries to [its] ‘core business activities’” (Dkt. 92 at 8).
The Court agrees that Alliance’s allegations appear more akin to business activities than
advocacy expenses. Accepting the allegations as true for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6), the Court
concludes Alliance has alleged standing. Standing, however, “must be supported at each stage of
the litigation in the same manner as any other essential elements of the case, and what suffices at
the Rule 12(b)(6) stage may not be sufficient at later stages of the proceedings when the facts are
tested.” Syed v. M-I, LLC, 853 F.3d 492, 499 n.4 (2017) (cleaned up). Anticipated Ninth Circuit
authority in Arizona All. for Retired Americans, however, may change this analysis going forward.
4. 	Unclean Hands Doctrine
The Court previously rejected Defendants’ argument that the equitable doctrine of unclean
hands bars Plaintiffs from asserting their claims (Dkt. 84 at 16-18). Defendants renew this
argument based on their continued reliance on Nat’l Coal. of Latino Clergy, Inc. v. Henry, No. 07-
CV-613-JHP, 2007 WL 4390650, at *1 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 12, 2007) (“Henry”) (Dkt. 86-1 at 15-
17; see also Dkt. 90-1 at 11-12). In Henry, the district court created “a new, and narrow, prudential
limitation on standing,” where any “illegal alien, in willful violation of federal immigration law,
is without standing to challenge the constitutionality of a state law, when compliance with federal
law would absolve the illegal alien’s constitutional dilemma.” 2007 WL 4390650, at *9. No other
court, however, has adopted this new prudential limitation on standing recognized in Henry.
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Moreover, Henry fails to acknowledge that aliens are persons entitled to protection under the Due
Process Clause. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982) (“Aliens, even aliens whose
presence in this country is unlawful, have long been recognized as ‘persons’ guaranteed due
process by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”). For the reasons explained in its preliminary
injunction decision, the Court again rejects Defendants’ argument that the unclean hands doctrine
bars Plaintiffs’ claims.
5. 	Failure to State a Claim
a. 	Preemption
Defendants argue Plaintiffs’ first claim, asserting that federal law preempts the challenged
offenses, fails to state a claim. In support, Defendants argue that the challenged offenses are neither
field nor conflict preempted (Dkt. 86-1 at 18-19). In addressing Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary
injunction, the Court concluded that “Plaintiffs have shown they are substantially likely to succeed
on the merits of their claim that federal law preempts the challenged offenses of Illegal Entry and
Illegal Reentry” (Dkt. 84 at 25). This conclusion foreclosures Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs
fail to state a claim under the Supremacy Clause.
b. 	Dormant Commerce Clause
In their second claim, Plaintiffs alleges that the challenged offenses violate the Commerce
Clause because they impermissibly regulate people’s entry into Idaho and their movement across
state and international borders and, therefore, impose unacceptable burdens on commerce (Dkt. 47
at ¶ 93). Defendant moved to dismiss this claim, arguing that the challenged offenses “do not
implicate the dormant commerce clause” (Dkt. 86-1 at 19).
The Constitution provides that Congress may “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. “Although
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it is an affirmative grant of power to Congress, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Commerce
Clause to impliedly preclude certain state laws that restrain interstate commerce.” Peridot Tree
WA, Inc. v. Wash. State Liquor & Cannabis, Nos. 24-3481, 24-7196, 2026 WL 17170, at *4 (Jan.
2, 2026). “This negative aspect of the Commerce Clause prevents the States from adopting
protectionist measures and thus preserves a national market of goods and services.” Id.
As Plaintiffs note, the Supreme Court has concluded that “the federal commerce power
surely encompasses the movement in interstate commerce of persons as well as commodities”
(Dkt. 92 at 11) (citing United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758-59 (1966)). See also Edwards v.
People of State of California, 314 U.S. 160, 172 (1941) (“[I]t is settled beyond question that the
transportation of persons is ‘commerce,’ within the meaning of that provision.”). Regardless,
Plaintiffs cite no authority suggesting that the challenged offenses violate the dormant Commerce
Clause. While they cite City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978), that case
addresses a state law prohibiting the importation of waste into New Jersey. Id. at 618. It does not
address a situation like this case.
As the Ninth Circuit has recently noted, courts should use extreme caution “when
considering whether to invalidate state laws under the court-inferred dormant Commerce Clause.”
Peridot, 2026 WL 17170, at *5. Absent authority ruling that state regulations of immigration, like
the ones at issue here, violate the dormant Commerce Clause, this Court declines to conclude the
challenged offenses implicate the dormant Commerce Clause. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Commerce
Clause claim is dismissed for failure to state a claim.
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c. 	Vagueness
Finally, Defendants argue that “Plaintiffs’ facial vagueness claim fails on the merits”
(Dkt. 86-1 at 21). This argument fails, however, for the reasons discussed in the Court’s decision
granting Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction (Dkt. 84 at 27).
C. 	Motion to Proceed in Pseudonyms
The Individual Plaintiffs request permission to proceed pseudonymously “because they
fear criminal prosecution, social stigma, and retaliation by government and private actors if their
identities are revealed (Dkt. 5-1 at 2). Rule 10(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
“the title of the complaint must name all of the parties.” Rule 17(a) also provides that “an action
must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.” “The normal presumption in litigation
is that the parties must use their real names.” Doe v. Kamehameha Sch./Bernice Pauahi Bishop
Est., 596 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2010). “This presumption is loosely related to the public’s right
to open courts and the right of private individuals to confront their accusers.” Id. (citations
omitted).
The Ninth Circuit, however, has identified three situations in which a court may permit a
plaintiff to proceed using a pseudonym, including when: (1) identification creates a risk of
retaliatory physical or mental harm; (2) anonymity is necessary to preserve privacy in a sensitive
and highly personal matter; and (3) disclosure would compel a plaintiff to admit illegal conduct
creating a risk of criminal prosecution. Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058,
1068 (9th Cir. 2000). Further, the Ninth Circuit has ruled that in determining whether to allow a
party to proceed anonymously over the opposing party’s objection, a court must balance five
factors, including: (1) the severity of the threatened harm; (2) the reasonableness of the anonymous
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party’s fears; (3) the anonymous party’s vulnerability to such retaliation; (4) the prejudice to the
opposing party; and (5) the public interest. Kamehameha Sch., 596 F.3d at 1042.
Defendants do not oppose Plaintiffs’ request to proceed in pseudonym for purposes of the
early stages of the litigation (Dkt. 45 at 3). They oppose the request, however, “to the extent [the
Individual Plaintiffs] seek to hide their identities from the Court and from Defendants” going
forward, arguing they are “entitled to test [the] Individual Plaintiffs’ assertions” (id). On reply,
Plaintiffs simply state that “if the need for limited disclosure to Defendants does arise at a later
state of the proceedings, the parties and the Court can determine an appropriate way to handle this
issue in a way that protects all parties’ interests” (Dkt. 85 at 2).
Here, the Individual Plaintiffs’ request to proceed in pseudonym meets at least two of the
situations envisioned by the Ninth Circuit: A disclosure of their identities would compel them to
admit illegal conduct creating a risk of prosecution, and their identification in the public record
may create a risk of harm. For those reasons, the Court will allow the Individual Plaintiffs’
identities to remain anonymous for purposes of the public record in this case. To the extent the
disclosure of their identities to defense counsel is necessary to proceed in discovery, the Court
orders the parties to meet and confer to reach an agreement protecting all the parties’ interests.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby ORDERS:
1. 	Plaintiffs A.M.R., L.M.C., M.S., W.G.C., and J.R.B.M.’s Motion to Proceed in
Pseudonym (Dkt. 5) is GRANTED.
2. 	Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (Dkt. 44);
Certain Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Complaint Under Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (Dkt. 86);
and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (Dkt. 90) are GRANTED
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IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Specifically, Plaintiffs’ Claim Two under the Commerce
Clause is DISMISSED under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Defendants’ motions to
dismiss are DENIED in all other respects.
January 23, 2026
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