Bohn v. Bohn

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION - 1
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
______________________________________________________
In Re:
Bankruptcy Case
SPENCER WILLIAM BOHN, 	No. 04-41735
Debtor.
______________________________________________________
HEATHER BOHN,
Plaintiff, 	Adv. Proceeding No. 04-6226
vs.
SPENCER WILLIAM BOHN,
Defendant.
______________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
______________________________________________________
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1 Plaintiff actually filed two identical pleadings titled “Motion for Pretrial
Hearing and Judgment” on March 10 and 17, 2005, a “Proposed Exhibit/Witness List” on
March 11, 2005, and two supporting memorandums. Docket Nos. 11, 12, 13, 15, 16. In
the interests of justice, and because the parties are acting without the benefit of counsel,
the Court will liberally construe the pleadings and deem Plaintiff’s motion and
supporting papers a motion for summary judgment, and the Proposed Exhibit list as an
affidavit. The motion and supporting documents fulfilled all of the requirements of Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56, made applicable by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7056, for a summary judgment
motion. Although Defendant did not file a reply, it appears he may have submitted
discovery responses opposing Plaintiff’s motion. See Docket Entries for April 13, 2005,
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION - 2
Appearances:
Heather Bohn, Meridian, Idaho, Pro Se Plaintiff.
Spencer William Bohn, Idaho Falls, Idaho, Pro Se Defendant.
Background
Plaintiff Heather Bohn argues that the judgment she was awarded by
a state court in the amount of $1,193.00 against Defendant Spencer Bohn, a
Chapter 7 debtor, should be excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5).
She contends that the debt represents Defendant’s pro rata share of their children’s
day care expenses which he was responsible to pay under the parties’ divorce
decree. Although Defendant concedes that he was required to pay a portion of his
children’s day care expenses, he denies that he is obligated for this debt because
Plaintiff allegedly violated the terms of the decree.
The Court conducted a hearing on Plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment1 on April 20, 2005. After hearing oral argument from both pro se
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and Plaintiff’s Reply, Docket No. 17 (indicating Defendant’s discovery responses
objected to Plaintiff’s motion).
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION - 3
parties, the Court took the issues under advisement. Docket No. 18. After
carefully considering the submissions and contentions of the parties, the Court
concludes that Plaintiff is entitled to partial summary judgment, and that a portion
of the debt is excepted from discharge.
Undisputed Facts
Plaintiff and Defendant were divorced by the state court pursuant to
terms included in a Judgment and Decree of Divorce entered on October 1, 2003.
Proposed Ex. List, Ex. 1 at 6–16, Docket No. 13. The divorce decree contained
the following regarding payment of child care costs:
Child Care Costs: The Defendant [Mr. Bohn]
shall pay to Plaintiff [Ms. Bohn] his pro rata share of
the child care costs for the parties’ minor children.
The party who initially pays the child care costs on
behalf of the children will be reimbursed by the other
party in an amount equal to the reimbursing party’s
Idaho Child Support Guidelines pro rata percentage,
currently 54%, and continuing each month thereafter.
This reimbursable amount is to be paid within thirty
(30) days of receiving documentation showing the
child care costs incurred on behalf of the children.
Plaintiff shall give the Defendant the right of first
refusal for providing child care services while Plaintiff
is working.
Proposed Ex. List, Ex. 1 at 7–8, Docket No. 13.
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2 The Court takes judicial notice of Defendant’s bankruptcy case filing under
Fed. R. Evid. 201, and treats the contents of Defendant’s bankruptcy petition and
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION - 4
Plaintiff and Defendant have three minor children. Plaintiff placed
the children in child care while she attended college during the 2003–2004 school
year. Two of the children attended the Boise State University Children’s Center,
while the third child attended the “Y-Kids” facility at the YMCA. Pl.’s Exs. A,
AA. Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s pro rata share of the child care expenses
incurred during this period, which she paid, amounted to $1,114.81. Pl.’s Ex. A.
When Defendant did not reimburse her, Plaintiff filed a small claims
complaint against him sometime prior to August 2004. Defendant did not defend,
and the state court entered a default judgment against him on September 2, 2004,
awarding Plaintiff $1,083.00 in damages and $110.00 in costs, for a total judgment
of $1,193.00. Proposed Ex. List, Ex. 1 at 5, Docket No. 13. While the judgment
does not specify the basis for the award, and Plaintiff did not submit a copy of the
complaint she filed, Plaintiff has alleged, and Defendant does not deny, that the
award represents the amount of child care costs the court found Defendant owed.
Compl., ¶ 4, Docket No. 1; Ans., ¶ 4, Docket No. 3.
On August 13, 2004, after commencement of the state court action,
but prior to entry of the default judgment, Defendant filed for relief under Chapter
7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Bankr. Case No. 04-41735, Docket No. 1. 2 In his
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schedules as admissions under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2). See In re Kaskel, 269 B.R. 709,
715 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2001); In re Moore, 01.4 I.B.C.R. 147, 149 n.7 (Bankr. D. Idaho
2001) (treating schedules as admissions).
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION - 5
Schedule F, Defendant lists Plaintiff’s debt in the amount of $1,118.00 and
characterizes it as a “daycare contribution.” Bankr. Case No. 04-41735, Docket
No. 1.
Arguments of the Parties
Defendant’s primary defense for his failure to pay the child care
expenses, and the reason for insisting that the debt should be discharged, is
premised upon the language in the divorce decree giving him the “right of first
refusal for providing child care services while Plaintiff is working.” He claims
that at the time, he informed Plaintiff of his availability to care for his children and
asked to do so rather than placing them in professional child care. By refusing his
requests, he argues, Plaintiff violated the terms of the divorce decree. Therefore,
he concludes, he does not owe Plaintiff the debt.
While agreeing with Defendant’s interpretation of the language in
the divorce decree, Plaintiff disputes Defendant was “available” for the entire
period of time she was required to attend college. In addition, Defendant was
contemplating a move to accept a new job at the time and Plaintiff alleges that his
impending move, combined with his recent remarriage, threatened the stability of
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MEMORANDUM OF DECISION - 6
any care he could provide. Under these circumstances, Plaintiff contends she was
justified in rejecting Defendant’s suggestion that he should care for the children.
Disposition
A. Summary Judgment Standard.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), made applicable in adversary proceedings by
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7056, instructs that:
Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law. A summary judgment,
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue
as to the amount of damages.
In the context of a motion for summary judgment, the Court may not weigh the
evidence or draw inferences from the record. Rather, the Court should decide only
whether there are any material facts in dispute, and whether the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Perry v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n ND (In
re Perry), 03.2 I.B.C.R. 128, 129 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2003) (internal citations
omitted).
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MEMORANDUM OF DECISION - 7
B. Stay Violation.
Although not argued, the parties’ pleadings as well as the exhibits
offered in support of Plaintiff’s motion raise the issue of a potential stay violation.
See Compl., ¶ 3, Docket No. 1; Ans., ¶ 3, Docket No. 3; Proposed Ex. List, Ex. 1
at 5, Docket No. 13. Because the Court has an independent duty to uphold the
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, it will address this issue even though the
parties have not. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (allowing the Court to issue any order
necessary to carry out the provisions of Title 11).
The filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as a stay that arises
automatically to prohibit, among other things, the continuation of judicial
proceedings against the debtor that were commenced before the bankruptcy case.
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1). Normally, that would include a state court small claims
action against the debtor to collect a prebankruptcy debt. There are, however,
statutory exceptions to the operation of the stay.
One exception covers actions for the “collection of alimony,
maintenance, or support from property that is not property of the estate.” 11
U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(B). “This exception to the automatic stay reflects a
congressional policy to except the enforcement of child support obligations from
the effect of the bankruptcy stay.” In re Martin, 04.3 I.B.C.R. 131, 132 (Bankr. D.
Idaho 2004) (citing In re Cora, 96.1 I.B.C.R. 25, 27 n.6 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1996)).
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MEMORANDUM OF DECISION - 8
The bankruptcy estate does not include an individual Chapter 7 debtor’s
postpetition earnings. Id. (citing In re Burton, 85 I.B.C.R. 282, 282 (Bankr. D.
Idaho 1985)). In this instance, provided Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant was a
support debt, Plaintiff’s continuation of the small claims action against Defendant
after he filed his bankruptcy petition, and the state court’s entry of judgment
against him, would not violate the automatic stay.
Whether an obligation constitutes support is a question of federal
law. Id. (citing Norris v. Norris (In re Norris), 95 I.B.C.R. 233, 234 (Bankr. D.
Idaho 1994), in turn citing Shaver v. Shaver, 736 F.2d 1314, 1315–1316 (9 th Cir.
1984)). Here, clearly, the expenses the state court directed that Defendant pay
constitute support. The child care costs are directly related to the care and well-
being of Defendant’s children while the custodial parent is working. Defendant
does not deny that he owed a pro rata share of child care expenses under the
parties’ divorce decree, and he did not deny that the judgment debt of $1,083
represented the amount of support he owed.
However, the additional amount of $110.00 awarded to reimburse
Plaintiff for her costs in bringing the state court suit is problematic. In reviewing
the considerations outlined by the Court in Martin for determining whether an
award of attorney fees and costs constitutes support, the primary consideration is
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MEMORANDUM OF DECISION - 9
whether the state court made findings relating to the language in the divorce
decree, and whether the court awarded costs and fees based upon the relative
resources and needs of the parties. Martin, 04.3 I.B.C.R. at 132–133.
In this case, the state court made no findings relating to its award of
costs for Plaintiff. The divorce decree provides that each party was to bear their
own attorney fees and costs during the pendency of the divorce, and only allowed
Plaintiff to be reimbursed should Defendant contest the matters in the decree.
Proposed Ex. List, Ex. 1 at 12, Docket No. 13. Defendant, by allowing a default
judgment to be entered against him, did not contest Plaintiff’s action to enforce the
decree. Therefore, in the absence of any findings by the court and against the
backdrop of the divorce decree that determined each party should bear their own
costs, the award of costs is not in the nature of support.
Because the costs awarded by the state court do not constitute
support, this aspect of the state court’s judgment violates the automatic stay.
Actions taken in violation of the automatic stay are void. In re Nat’l Envtl. Waste
Corp., 129 F.3d 1052, 1054 (9 th Cir. 1997) (citing In re Schwartz, 954 F.2d 569,
571–72 (9 th Cir. 1992)). Because the judgment clearly allocated a separate amount
as costs, that portion of the judgment debt is void and unenforceable. The
$1,083.00 portion of the judgment awarded to Plaintiff for child care expenses
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3 The Court notes that the amount Plaintiff claims is owed in Ex. A is $31.81
more than the amount awarded by the judgment. The difference is inconsequential. To
the extent the difference represents additional obligations incurred after entry of
judgment and after the filing of the bankruptcy petition, those amounts would be
postpetition obligations unaffected by Defendant’s bankruptcy filing. See 11 U.S.C. §
101(10) (defining a creditor as an entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose
before the filing of the petition). If the amount represents prepetition child care costs,
Plaintiff did not establish that Defendant owes any more than the amount awarded in the
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION - 10
was not affected by the stay, as the amount could have been entered without a cost
award.
C. The Debt is Nondischargeable.
Although the Court considers the debt to represent a support
obligation for purposes of the exception to the automatic stay under
§ 362(b)(2)(B), the debt may still be subject to discharge unless an exception
applies. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) excepts from discharge in a case under Chapter 7
any debt
to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for
alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such spouse
or child, in connection with a separation agreement,
divorce decree or other order of a court of record . . . .
The creditor bears the burden of proof in an action under § 523(a)(5). Mallo v.
Mallo (In re Mallo), 03.3 I.B.C.R. 196, 197 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2003) (citing Stocks
v. Calo (In re Calo), 97.3 I.B.C.R. 87, 88 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1997)).
Plaintiff has established and Defendant does not contest that the debt
represented by the damage award of $1,083.00 3 is a debt for the support of
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judgment.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION - 11
Defendant’s children, and that the judgment was obtained in order to enforce the
terms of the parties’ divorce decree. The divorce decree obligates Defendant to
pay a pro rata share of the parties’ child care costs. Defendant, in his schedules,
represented that he owed a debt to Plaintiff of $1,118.00 for his “daycare
contribution.” Defendant did not deny the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint that
the judgment was obtained in order to enforce the terms of the parties’ divorce
decree regarding payment for child care expenses. Compl., ¶ 4, Docket No. 1;
Ans., ¶ 4, Docket No. 3. And Plaintiff introduced exhibits showing the bills she
received from and paid to the children’s care providers, which amounted to
roughly the amount the court awarded in its judgment. Ex. A, AA.
Defendant’s arguments concerning whether Plaintiff violated the
terms of the divorce decree in incurring the debt all amount to a collateral attack
on the validity of the state court judgment. Because Defendant should have
litigated those issues in state court, but elected not to do so, these arguments can
not be raised now in defense of Plaintiff’s complaint to determine whether the debt
should be declared nondischargeable. This Court declines Defendant’s invitation
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4 The Court observes that the parties’ divorce decree gave Defendant a “right of
first refusal” if Plaintiff required child care while she was working. It is clear that the
child care expenses in this case were incurred while Plaintiff was attending school, not
working. Again, whether the provision in the divorce decree making Defendant liable for
a share of the costs even applied under these circumstances is an issue beyond the
purview of this Court.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION - 12
to review the validity of the state court judgment. 4 If Defendant feels there are
good grounds to attack that judgment, he is free to return to state court to do so.
Conclusion
The Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in
part. The portion of the state court judgment awarding $1,083.00 to Plaintiff for
child care expenses was not entered in violation of the automatic stay, and that
amount of the judgment debt is excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(5). The
remaining portion of the state court judgment for court costs is void and
unenforceable. A final judgment will be entered.
Dated: May 3, 2005
Honorable Jim D. Pappas
United States Bankruptcy Judge
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