USA v. Swann, Jr et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff, 	Case No. 25-cr-1043-CJW
vs.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS
STEPHEN LAMAR SWANN, JR.,
Defendant.
____________________
I. 	INTRODUCTION
On October 22, 2025, the Grand Jury returned an Indictment charging Defendant
with one count of Conspiracy to Distribute a Controlled Substance in violation of 21
U.S.C. Sections 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), and 846, one count of Distribution of a
Controlled Substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sections 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C), and
one count of Aiding and Abetting the Possession with Intent to Distribute a Controlled
Substance in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 2 and 21 U.S.C. Sections 841(a)(1) and
841(b)(1)(C). (Doc. 4.)
The matter before me is Defendant’s motion to suppress. 	(Doc. 34.) 	Defendant
seeks to suppress: all evidence seized from the search of Defendant’s University Avenue
residence on June 25, 2025 (see inventory at Ex. B, pgs. 19-13), two blue iPhones, and
any evidence derived from the iPhones. (Id.) The Government filed a timely Response.
(Doc. 38.) 	In the response, the Government states that it “does not intend on admitting
evidence obtained from Defendant’s iPhones, so it does not resist [D]efendant’s motion
to suppress the evidence” and the “Court should grant [D]efendant’s motion to suppress
evidence obtained from [D]efendant’s iPhones as the government does not resist because
it does not intend on admitting any of that evidence during its case-in-chief.” (Id. at 10.)
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The Government reiterated this position at the hearing, noting that it could not get into
one of the iPhones and the other iPhone did not contain anything helpful to the
Government’s case. 	The Honorable C.J. Williams, Chief United States District Court
Judge, referred the motion to me for a Report and Recommendation. I held a hearing on
Defendant’s motion to suppress on January 7, 2026. (Doc. 42.)
At the hearing, the Government did not offer any exhibits or call any witnesses;
however, the following Defendant’s Exhibits were admitted without objection:
A. Case Supplemental Report from Investigator Chad Leitzen;
B. Seach Warrant dated June 25, 2025; and
C. Case Supplemental Report from Officer Brian Wullweber.
Defendant’s Exhibit E, information about Defendant’s legitimate contacts in
Chicago, was also admitted over objection by the Government.
For the following reasons, I respectfully recommend that the District Court deny
Defendant’s Motion to Suppress.
II. 	FINDINGS OF FACT
In the absence of testimony and due to the nature of the parties’ arguments, I will
turn to the June 25, 2025 Search Warrant Application for the University Avenue residence
for a statement of the facts.
In the Search Warrant Application Affidavit, Investigator Chad Leitzen1 set forth
the following information:
1. Over the course of the past several years the Dubuque Drug Task Force
(DDTF) 	has 	received 	information 	from 	several 	different 	sources
advising 	that 	[Defendant] 	and 	some 	of 	his 	associates 	are 	heavily
involved 	in 	selling 	drugs, 	specifically 	cocaine 	and 	marijuana 	in
Dubuque. 	Some of the tips also stated that Swann or his associates are
in possession of firearms.
1 Inv. Leitzen is employed by the Dubuque Police Department and is currently assigned to the
Dubuque Drug Task Force. (Doc. 34-3 at 5; Def. Ex. B.)
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2. During the early part of June 2025, I, Inv. Leitzen received a tip from
a subject who wished to remain anonymous due to fear of retaliation.
The anonymous tipster hereinafter referred to as confidential source
(CS) stated that [Defendant] is living with [H.B.] and her very young
children at [a residence on] University Avenue, Dubuque, Iowa. . . .
CS stated [Defendant] drives [H.B.’s] white Honda Pilot. CS knew the
license plate number to be [XXX XXX], which comes back to a white
2015 Honda Pilot registered to [H.B.] . . . of [XXXX] University
Avenue, Dubuque, Iowa. . . . 	CS stated [Defendant] is a major
distributor of cocaine, marijuana, Xanax pills, and fentanyl pills in
Dubuque which he brings to Dubuque from out of town. 	CS stated
[H.B.] is also involved in helping [Defendant] sell the drugs. CS stated
[Defendant] is also in possession of a handgun.
3. In the middle of June 2025 confidential informant #1152 (hereinafter
referred to as CI) stated that CI buys a large quantity of cocaine on a
regular basis from a subject CI knows as Jordan Hefel2 who lives in
Galena, IL. 	CI stated Hefel is the middleman for the drug deal. 	CI
stated CI contacts Hefel and asks for the cocaine. 	Hefel then contacts
his drug supplier and sets up the drug deal. 	Usually within a relatively
short period of time, CI, Hefel, and the drug supplier all meet in a public
place within the city limits of Dubuque during the daytime hours for the
drug deal to take place. 	CI stated each of them arrive in separate
vehicles. 	CI stated Hefel retrieves the cocaine from the drug supplier
and brings it to CI. 	Hefel takes a small portion of the cocaine as his
payment for orchestrating the drug deal. 	CI gives Hefel the money for
the cocaine which Hefel then gives to the drug supplier. They then part
ways. 	CI stated that same scenario has played out several times over
the course of about the past six months.
4. During the middle of June 2025,3 CI, working at the direction of the
DDTF, set up a drug deal with Hefel requesting cocaine. 	Hefel set it
up with his drug supplier and they agreed to meet in a public location in
2 I have not anonymized the record regarding Co-Defendant Hefel.
3 While the warrant application does not specify the date of this controlled purchase (also called
an “undercover operation”), Inv. Leitzen’s report describes the events as occurring on June 19,
2025. (Def. Ex. C at 3.)
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Dubuque. 	The DDTF set up surveillance at the public location during
the undercover operation. 	CI arrived and parked in the parking lot. 	A
short time later, Hefel arrived and parked in the parking lot. He exited
his vehicle and began looking around as if he were looking for someone.
A short time later, the aforementioned white 2015 Honda Pilot bearing
Iowa license plates [XXX XXX] (hereinafter referred to as target
vehicle) arrived and parked next to Hefel’s vehicle. A white female was
driving the target vehicle and a black male was sitting in the passenger
seat. 	I observed the black male and was able to positively identify him
as [Defendant].
5. During the undercover operation, [Defendant] exited the target vehicle
and met with Hefel for a short time. 	[Defendant] then reached into the
target vehicle and retrieved an item. 	He handed that item to Hefel.
Hefel immediately walked to CI’s vehicle and handed that item to CI.
That item was a plastic bag containing cocaine. 	CI handed Hefel the
money that was agreed upon for the undercover purchase. 	Hefel was
then 	observed 	walking 	back 	to 	the 	target 	vehicle 	and 	handing
[Defendant] the undercover buy money. 	The target vehicle left a short
time later.
6. DDTF surveillance units followed the target vehicle after the undercover
purchase. 	The target vehicle went to a store for a few minutes then
returned directly to [the] University Avenue [residence]. 	[Defendant]
was observed walking in the front door of [the] University Ave.
[residence] at which time surveillance was ended.
7. Although CI did not see Hefel’s drug supplier on the day of the
undercover purchase, CI stated CI has seen him before. 	CI stated CI
would certainly be able to recognize him if CI were to see him again.
CI described the drug supplier as a short light-skinned black male with
short hair who is in his late 20s or early 30s. Following the undercover
operation, I showed CI a photo lineup containing photos of six different
subjects resembling [Defendant’s] general physical description. 	CI
viewed the photo lineup and was able to positively identify [Defendant]
from the photo lineup as being Hefel’s drug supplier.
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8. The 	day 	following 	the 	undercover 	purchase, 	DDTF 	investigators
reviewed City of Dubuque traffic cameras and located a camera that
faces toward [XXXX] University Ave. Although the traffic camera does
not show the front of the residence, it does show the end of the parking
lot where the target vehicle is normally parked. 	During the timeframe
of the undercover operation the day before, the target vehicle was
observed backing out of the parking lot at [XXXX] University Ave. 	A
short time later, it arrived at the agreed-upon meeting location.
9. As part of the investigation into [Defendant], I entered license plate
number [XXX XXX] into Flock and learned that it left Dubuque on June
19, 2025 at 6:47 am. 	It passed an automated license plate reader
(ALPR) in the Chicago, IL area at 10:35 am and was back in Dubuque
at 2:20 pm. 	I know that the ALPR in the Chicago area that the target
vehicle passed is approximately three hours and fifteen minutes from
Dubuque. 	Based on the timing and locations provided by Flock, the
target vehicle could not have spent much more than an hour in the
Chicago area before returning to Dubuque.
10. In a further review of Flock, I noticed that the target vehicle made a
trip toward the Chicago area on June 13th and returned to Dubuque
seven hours and ten minutes later. 	Although the only ALPRs that the
target vehicle passed on that trip in Illinois were in the Rockford, IL
area it is believed that the vehicle likely went to Chicago and just did
not pass a location with an ALPR. 	The trip before that was June 6th
where the vehicle was gone for less than six hours. The trip before that
was May 28th.
11. On June 20 2025, based on the information listed above, I applied for
and was granted a search warrant allowing officer to affix a GPS mobile
tracking device to the target vehicle to monitor its movements. 	That
GPS mobile tracking device was affixed to the target vehicle on June
21, 2025 during the early morning hours.
12. On June 25 2025, at approximately 6:03 am, the target vehicle left
Dubuque headed toward Chicago, IL. 	A female subject positively
identified by photograph as [H.B.] was observed to be driving the
vehicle. 	She drove to directly to the area of Posen, IL just south of
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Chicago, IL. She arrived at that location at approximately 9:51 am. At
approximately 	10:20 	am, 	the 	vehicle 	began 	heading 	back 	toward
Dubuque.
13. I know, based on my training and experience as well as conversations
I have had with other law enforcement officers, that short-term trips to
source cities are indicative of someone making that trip for the purpose
of acquiring drugs. I know that it is extremely uncommon for someone
to make a six and one half hour round trip in a vehicle for a social visit
which lasts less than thirty minutes. I believe the likelihood that [H.B.]
acquired a large quantity of drugs in Chicago to transport back to
Dubuque for resale is very high.
14. Based on my training and experience, I know that subjects who are
involved in the distribution of drugs often acquire the drugs in bulk
amounts for a relatively cheap price. Those subjects then break the bulk
quantities of drugs down into smaller personal use amounts which are
then sold to drug users for a profit.
15. I am also aware that drug dealers often keep bulk quantities of drugs at
their residence. 	The drug dealers often meet drug customers at a
location away from their residence in order to sell them a small quantity
of drugs for a profit. Drug dealers typically only bring a relatively small
quantity of drugs from their residence to the meeting location to help
protect them from having the drugs being stolen by drug users or rival
drug dealers. It also helps protect the drug dealers from being captured
by law enforcement and having all of their drugs seized.
16. Based on the facts gathered during this investigation, I believe there
will 	likely 	be 	cocaine, 	marijuana, 	drug 	paraphernalia, 	packaging
material, firearms, and possibly other drugs inside the residence of . . .
University Avenue. . . . 	I also believe [Defendant] will likely be in
possession of a firearm and/or ammunition inside of that residence.
17. I know, based on my training and experience, that it is illegal for a
convicted felon to be in possession of a firearm ammunition and/or
explosive devices. I know, based on this investigation, that [Defendant]
has been convicted of several felony-level offenses including controlled
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substance 	violations, 	burglary, 	possession 	of 	a 	weapon, 	armed
robbery/no firearm, aggravated unlawful use of a weapon/vehicle, and
delivery of marijuana.
18. The Dubuque Drug Task Force respectfully requests permission to
search the residence of [XXXX] University Avenue . . . for any of the
items sought with this search warrant application.
19. The Dubuque Drug Task Force respectfully requests permission to
search the person of [Defendant] for any of the items sought with this
search warrant application.
(Def. Ex. B.) 	In the Search Warrant Application, the following property was identified
to be seized:
1. Any and all controlled substances which are possessed in violation of
Chapter 124.401 State Code of Iowa.
2. Any and all drug paraphernalia consisting in part of and including but
not limited to: Straws, mirrors, hypodermic syringes, razor blades,
cotton, spoons, aluminum foil, cutting agents, scales, and any other
material associated with the processing and packaging of illicit drug
sales and/or use; any and all documents that may relate to illicit drug
sales and trafficking; [and] any money or other proceeds that may have
come from drug trafficking.
3. Any and all open, closed, locked and unlocked containers, packages,
and/or safes which are capable of concealing any of the items sought
with this search warrant application.
4. Any and all books, records, receipts, notes, ledgers, and other papers
relating to the transportation, ordering, purchase, or distribution of
controlled substances.
5. Any and all firearms ammunition and or explosive devices.
(Id.)
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Defendant’s Exhibit E tends to show that H.B. made a trip to a Schaumburg,
Illinois in a white SUV to deliver Defendant’s son to the child’s mother. The remainder
of Exhibit E tends to show Defendant’s legitimate contacts with the Chicago area, to wit:
his family has interest in parcel of real property there and connection to Midwest Tint
Academy.
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	The Parties’ Arguments
Defendant argues that the search warrant application for the University Avenue
residence lacks probable cause. 	Specifically, Defendant argues that the search warrant
application “fails to explain why police believed that there might be any evidence there.”
(Doc. 34-1 at 7.) Defendant points out that Inv. Leitzen’s affidavit “does not allege that
any drug deals took place at the residence, nor does it provide any information from
sources that anyone was keeping drugs at the residence.” 	(Id.) 	Defendant also argues
that the Leon good faith exception does not apply in this matter. 	Defendant maintains
that because the affidavit failed to explain “with any specificity why evidence of drug
dealing 	might 	be 	found 	at” 	the 	University 	Avenue 	residence, 	the 	issuing 	judge
“abandoned the judicial role and authorized a warrant on which no reasonable officer
could rely.” 	(Id. at 13.) 	Defendant also suggests that the search warrant application is
so lacking in indicia of probable cause that belief in the existence of probable cause is
unreasonable. 	(Id. at 12.) 	Further, Defendant suggests that by failing to particularize
the place to be searched or the thing to be seized, the search warrant is facially deficient,
and a reasonable officer would not presume the warrant to be valid. (Id. at 12-13.)4
4 I read Defendant’s particularity argument to apply almost entirely to the seizure and search of
the iPhones which is now moot. At page 12-13 of his brief, is Defendant’s only discussion about
“particularity” regarding his residence; however, this simply repeats the argument that the
application lacks specificity about why evidence might be found there.
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The Government argues that the search warrant for the University Avenue
residence was supported by probable cause. (Doc. 38 at 5.) The Government maintains
that based on the totality of the circumstances outlined in Inv. Leitzen’s affidavit, there
were “sufficient facts to establish a fair probability that contraband would be discovered
in [ ] the residence.” 	(Id. at 7.) 	Alternatively, the Government argues that the Leon
good faith exception is applicable. (Id. at 8.)
B. 	Relevant Law
“The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment requires that warrants (1) be
issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, (2) contain a ‘particular[ ] descri[ption of]
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized,’ and (3) be based ‘upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation.’” 	United States v. Skarda, 845 F.3d
370, 375 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Clyburn, 24 F.3d 613, 617 (4th Cir.
1994), in turn quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV). “A magistrate judge may issue a search
warrant ‘upon a showing of probable cause to believe that the legitimate object of a search
is located in a particular place.’” 	Skarda, 845 F.3d at 376 (quoting Steagald v. United
States, 451 U.S. 204, 213, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981)). 	“Probable cause
exists when, viewing the totality of the circumstances, ‘there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’” United States v.
Reed, 921 F.3d 751, 757 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230,
238 (1983)); see also United States v. Evans, 4 F.4th 633, 636 (8th Cir. 2021) (“Probable
cause is a fair probability that . . . evidence of a crime will be found in the location to be
searched”) (quoting United States v. LaMorie, 100 F.3d 547, 552 (8th Cir. 1996))). “In
assessing whether a warrant is sufficiently particular, [courts] consider the purpose for
which the warrant was issued, the nature of the items to which it is directed, and the total
circumstances surrounding the case.” United States v. Ivey, 91 F.4th 915, 918 (8th Cir.
2024) (citation omitted). 	The particularity requirement “is one of ‘practical accuracy
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rather than a hypertechnical one.’” 	Id. (quoting United States v. Schave, 55 F.4th 671,
675 (8th Cir. 2022)). 	“Common sense” drives the inquiry into whether probable cause
exists, and the ultimate determination cannot be “readily, or even usefully, reduced to a
neat set of legal rules.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231-32 (1983). “‘[T]his practical
and common-sensical standard’ is based on ‘the totality of the circumstances.’” United
States v. Zamora-Garcia, 831 F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir. 2016) (alteration in original)
(quoting Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 244 (2013)).
It is not this Court’s place to determine whether affidavits supporting search
warrants are supported by probable cause. 	“[A]fter-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the
sufficiency of an affidavit should not take the form of de novo review. 	A magistrate’s
determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts.”
Gates, 462 U.S. at 236 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also United
States v. Hallam, 407 F.3d 942, 948 (8th Cir. 2005) (“In reviewing the issuance of a
warrant, a district court need not make a de novo inquiry into the existence of probable
cause.”). “The Fourth Amendment requires that the issuing ‘magistrate had a substantial
basis for concluding that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing.’” 	United
States v. Maccani, 49 F.4th 1126, 1130 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 236);
see also United States v. Johnson, 848 F.3d 872, 876 (8th Cir. 2017) (“The role of a
reviewing court is to ensure the magistrate issuing the warrant ‘had a “substantial basis
for concluding that probable cause existed”’”) (quoting United States v. Colbert, 828
F.3d 718, 726 (8th Cir. 2016), in turn quoting United States v. Garcia-Hernandez, 682
F.3d 767, 771 (8th Cir. 2012))). 	“When the issuing magistrate relies solely on a
supporting affidavit in determining probable cause, . . . ‘only that information which is
found within the four corners of the affidavit may be considered in determining the
existence of probable cause.’” 	United States v. Saddler, 19 F.4th 1035, 1039 (8th Cir.
2021) 	(quoting 	United 	States 	v. 	Roberts, 	975 	F.3d 	709, 	713 	(8th 	Cir. 	2020)).
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“The issuing court’s probable cause determination ‘should be paid great deference by
reviewing courts.’” 	Johnson, 848 F.3d at 876 (quoting United States v. Brewer, 588
F.3d 1165, 1170 (8th Cir. 2009)).
The substantial basis standard requires that the issuing judge “make a practical and
common-sense” determination, based only on the circumstances set forth in the affidavit,
that the totality of the circumstances point to “a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” United States v. Kail, 804 F.2d
441, 444 (8th Cir. 1986) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238). 	“Not only may an issuing
judge ‘draw reasonable inferences from the totality of the circumstances in determining
whether probable cause exists to issue a warrant, . . . law enforcement officers may make
reasonable inferences in preparing affidavits in support of a warrant.’” 	United States v.
Brackett, 846 F.3d 987, 992 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Thompson, 210
F.3d 855, 860 (8th Cir. 2000)). 	“[T]here is no requirement that an affiant have first-
hand knowledge of every allegation he includes in his affidavit.” United States v. Fiorito,
640 F.3d 338, 346 (8th Cir. 2011). Conclusory statements, however, “made by affiants
fail to give the issuing magistrate a substantial basis for determining probable cause
exists.” 	United States v. Summage, 481 F.3d 1075, 1077-78 (8th Cir. 2007). 	“In
addition to probable cause that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found, ‘there
must [also] be evidence of a nexus between the contraband and the place to be searched.’”
United States v. Randle, 39 F.4th 533, 536 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v.
Tellez, 217 F.3d 547, 550 (8th Cir. 2000)). 	This requires “‘a “nexus” between the
evidence to be seized and the place to be searched, considering “the nature of the crime
and the reasonable, logical likelihood of finding useful evidence.”’” Schave, 55 F.4th at
676 (quoting United States v. Smith, 21 F.4th 510, 515 (8th Cir. 2021), in turn quoting
United States v. Johnson, 848 F.3d 872, 878 (8th Cir. 2017)).
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Defendant bears the burden of proving the warrant was issued without probable
cause. 	See Carter v. United States, 729 F.2d 935, 940 (8th Cir. 1984) (“As a general
rule, the burden of proof is on the defendant who seeks to suppress evidence”) (citing
United States v. Phillips, 540 F.2d 319 (8th Cir. 1976)); United States v. McGuire, No.
CR 13-40058, 2013 WL 5516192, at *3 (D.S.D. Oct. 1, 2013) (“A movant seeking to
suppress evidence under a regularly issued warrant has the burden to show that the
warrant 	was 	issued 	without 	probable 	cause”) 	(quoting United 	States 	v. 	Sierra–
Garcia, 760 F. Supp. 252, 262 (E.D.N.Y. 1991)), R. & R. adopted, 2013 WL 6449893
(D.S.D. Dec. 10, 2013). 	“In doubtful or marginal cases, the resolution of the Fourth
Amendment question should be determined to a large extent by the preference accorded
to searches based upon warrants.” 	United States v. Leichtling, 684 F.2d 553, 555 (8th
Cir. 1982) (quoting United States v. Christenson, 549 F.2d 53, 55 (8th Cir. 1977)); see
also United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965) (“Although in a particular
case it may not be easy to determine when an affidavit demonstrates the existence of
probable cause, the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely
determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants.”).
C. 	Analysis
1. 	Was there probable cause for the search warrant for the University
Avenue residence?
The application expressly requested permission to search the University Avenue
residence 	for 	controlled 	substances, 	drug 	paraphernalia, 	records 	relating 	to 	the
distribution of controlled substances, and firearms, ammunition, and explosive devices.
Inv. Leitzen checked that these items are “property which has been obtained in violation
of the law,” “property which is illegally possessed,” “property used or possessed with
the intent to be used as a means of committing a public offense or concealed to prevent
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an offense from being discovered,” and “property relevant and material as evidence in a
criminal prosecution.” In summary, the affidavit sets forth the following:
a. 	Over several years, law enforcement had received information from
multiple sources that Defendant was involved in selling drugs in
Dubuque and Defendant possessed firearms.
b. In June 2025, Inv. Leitzen received information from a CS that
Defendant lived with H.B. at the University Avenue residence and
drove H.B.’s vehicle.
c. 	The CS also told Inv. Leitzen that Defendant was involved in drug
distribution and possessed a handgun. 	Additionally, the CS stated
that H.B. was also involved with Defendant in selling drugs.
d. In June 2025, a CI informed Inv. Leitzen that regularly bought
cocaine from Jordan Hefel, who was the middleman for the CI’s
drug purchases. The CI explained that he would contact Hefel, Hefel
would contact his supplier, and then set up a drug deal in a public
place. 	The CI stated that he, Hefel, and the drug supplier would
arrive at the agreed upon place in separate vehicles. 	Hefel would
retrieve the cocaine from the drug supplier, bring the cocaine to the
CI, the CI would give Hefel money for the cocaine, and Hefel would
give the money to the drug supplier.
e. 	In June 2025, law enforcement, using the CI, had the CI set up a
controlled drug purchase involving the CI, Hefel, and the drug
supplier. 	The parties arrived at the agreed upon meeting place in
separate vehicles, including Defendant with H.B. in H.B.’s vehicle.
Defendant was sitting in the passenger seat and Inv. Leitzen, who
was surveilling the controlled by identified Defendant.
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f. 	During the controlled drug purchase, Defendant gave Hefel a bag
containing cocaine, Hefel gave the bag to the CI, the CI gave Hefel
money, and Hefel gave the money to Defendant.
g. Law enforcement followed Defendant after the controlled purchase
and a short stop at a store, the Defendant returned to the University
Avenue residence.
h. After the controlled buy, Inv. Leitzen showed the CI a photo lineup
of six different subjects resembling Defendant and the CI was able
to positively identify Defendant as the drug supplier.
i. 	Law 	enforcement 	reviewed 	Dubuque 	traffic 	cameras 	from 	the
timeframe of the controlled drug purchase and observed H.B.’s
vehicle leaving the parking lot for the University Avenue residence
and a short time later arriving at the agree-upon meeting place.
j. 	Using license plate readers for H.B.’s vehicle, Investigator Leitzen
learned that on June 19, 2025, H.B.’s vehicle left Dubuque at 6:47
am went to Chicago and returned to Dubuque at 2:20 p.m., meaning
the vehicle was in Chicago for about an hour. Earlier in June H.B.’s
vehicle also made two short trips to Chicago (7 hours and 10 minutes
and less than 6 hours, respectively).
k. On June 20, 2025, Inv. Leitzen applied for and received a warrant
allowing him to affix a GPS mobile tracking device to H.B.’s
vehicle. 	On June 25, 2025, the vehicle, driven by H.B., left
Dubuque at 6:03 a.m., arrived in Posen, IL, a town south of
Chicago, at 9:51 a.m., and began heading back to Dubuque at 10:20
a.m.
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l. 	Inv. Leitzen stated: “I know based on my training and experience
. . . that short-term trips to source cities are indicative of someone
making that trip for the purpose of acquiring drugs. 	I know that it
is extremely uncommon for someone to make a six and one half hour
round trip in a vehicle for a social visit which lasts less than thirty
minutes. 	I believe the likelihood that [H.B.] acquired a large
quantity of drugs in Chicago to transport back to Dubuque for resale
is very high.”
m. Inv. Leitzen also stated that, based on his training and experience,
he 	knows 	that 	individuals 	involved 	in 	drug 	distribution 	“often
acquire the drugs in bulk amounts” and “then break the bulk
quantities of drugs down into smaller, personal use amounts which
are then sold to drug users for a profit.
n. Further, Inv. Leitzen stated: “I am also aware that drug dealers often
keep bulk quantities of drugs at their residence. 	The drug dealers
often meet drug customers at a location away from their residence in
order to sell them a small quantity of drugs for a profit. Drug dealers
typically only bring a relatively small quantity of drugs from their
residence to the meeting location to help protect them from having
the drugs being stolen by drug users or rival drug dealers. 	It also
helps 	protect 	the 	drug 	dealers 	from 	being 	captured 	by 	law
enforcement and having all of their drugs seized.”
o. Lastly, Inv. Leitzen stated: “Based on the facts gathered during this
investigation, I believe there will likely be cocaine, marijuana, drug
paraphernalia, 	packaging 	material, firearms, 	and 	possibly other
drugs inside the residence of [XXXX] University Avenue[.]”
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(Def. Ex. B)
Defendant is correct that the “affidavit does not allege that any drug deals took
place at the residence, nor does it provide any information from sources that anyone was
keeping drugs at the residence.” 	However, this is not a case where the conclusion that
controlled substances may be found at a dealer’s residence is based solely on Inv.
Leitzen’s 	training 	and 	experience 	– 	although 	his 	affidavit 	certainly 	includes 	such
information. Here, there is plausible information that Defendant and his significant other
are involved in drug trafficking. 	More specifically, Defendant is seen leaving his
residence immediately before the controlled buy and he returns to it soon afterward. 	It
is not unreasonable to infer that a known drug supplier, who had a history of taking
multiple 	short 	trips 	to 	a 	source 	city 	in 	June 	2025 	(the 	month 	pertinent 	to 	this
investigation), and who left his residence and directly proceeded to the location of a
controlled drug purchase would have drugs at his residence. 	Judges “may draw
reasonable inferences from the totality of the circumstances in determining whether
probable cause exists to issue a warrant.” 	United States v. Thompson, 210 F.3d 855,
860 (8th Cir.2000). 	Moreover, Inv. Leitzen also opined that based on his training and
experience that such facts along with the other facts outlined in the affidavit were
consistent with drug suppliers keeping drugs in their residence. Obviously, the affidavit
need not establish Defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, only probable cause to
believe that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found at the University Avenue
residence.
Defendant’s concern that the application “provided no reason to believe that police
would 	find 	‘straws, 	mirrors, 	hypodermic 	syringes, 	razor 	blades, 	cotton, 	spoons,
aluminum 	foil, cutting 	agents, 	scales, 	and any 	other material associated 	with the
processing and packaging of illicit drug sales and/or use’” is misplaced. 	(Doc. 34-1 at
7.) 	Preceding the language quoted by Defendant in the application, it states that the
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property to be seized is “[a]ny and all drug paraphernalia consisting in part of and
including but not limited to.” As discussed above, based on the totality of the information
in the affidavit, including that Defendant is a known drug supplier and distributor, it is
not an unreasonable inference that drug paraphernalia would be found at the University
Avenue residence. 	The fact that the application lists examples of drug paraphernalia,
“but not limited” to those examples, does not defeat probable cause for the issuance of
the search warrant.
Finally, at the hearing, Defendant introduced Defendant’s Exhibit E, which was
admitted over objection. 	Defendant’s Exhibit E contains various records showing that
Defendant has legitimate ties to Chicago. 	The fact that Defendant can offer legitimate
reasons to visit Chicago does not mean the Court cannot consider also the information in
the search warrant application or affidavit which tends to suggest criminal behavior in
assessing probable cause. 	Probable cause is determined by looking solely at the four
corners of the affidavit. 	See Saddler, 19 F.4th at 1039. 	Moreover, common sense
supports Inv. Leitzen observation detailed in the affidavit that, based on his training and
experience, individuals generally do not make a 6.5-hour round trip to a source city and
only spend an hour or less in that source city multiple times in a month, especially if that
individual was visiting relatives.
Accordingly, based on the totality of the circumstances outlined above, and paying
great deference to the issuing court’s probable cause determination in the search warrant,
I find that the issuing judge had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause
existed and that there was a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime would
be found at the University Avenue residence. 	See Reed, 921 F.3d at 757; Johnson, 848
F.3d at 876; Kail, 804 F.2d at 444. 	I also find that the requisite “nexus” between the
evidence to be seized and the place to be searched was established in the search warrant.
See Schave, 55 F.4th at 676. Thus, I find that there was probable cause for the June 25,
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2025 search warrant for the University Avenue residence, Defendant’s Exhibit B.
Therefore, I recommend that the motion to suppress be denied.
2. 	Is the Leon good faith exception applicable?
Alternatively, if the Court determines that the search warrant for the University
Avenue residence lacked probable cause, the Leon good faith exception should be applied
to make the evidence inadmissible.
Under the good faith exception articulated in United States v. Leon, even if a
reviewing court determines substantial evidence to issue a warrant is absent, the court
should not suppress evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant if the officers
executing the search warrant acted in objectively reasonable reliance on the issuance of
the warrant by a neutral magistrate or judge. 	468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984); United States
v. Houston, 665 F.3d 991, 994-95 (8th Cir. 2012). 	“In making this determination, we
ask ‘whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have known that the search was
illegal despite a judge’s issuance of the warrant.’” 	United States v. Lopez-Zuniga, 909
F.3d 906, 909 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Jackson, 784 F.3d 1227, 1231
(8th Cir. 2015)).
Under the “good-faith exception,” if a law enforcement officer’s reliance on a
warrant was objectively reasonable, the evidence seized pursuant to an invalid warrant
will not be suppressed. 	United States v. Proell, 485 F.3d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 2007).
Proell noted that Leon identified four scenarios where it is not objectively reasonable for
the executing officer to rely on a warrant issued by a magistrate:
(1) when the affidavit or testimony supporting the warrant contained a false
statement made knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard for
its truth, thus misleading the issuing judge; (2) when the issuing judge
“wholly abandoned his judicial role” in issuing the warrant; (3) when the
affidavit in support of the warrant is “so lacking in indicia of probable cause
as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable”; and (4)
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when the warrant is “so facially deficient” that no police officer could
reasonably presume the warrant to be valid.
Id. at 431 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 923; United States v. Puckett, 466 F.3d 626, 630
(8th Cir. 2006)).
Leon explained that “[s]earches pursuant to a warrant will rarely require any deep
inquiry into reasonableness, for a warrant issued by a judge normally suffices to establish
that a law enforcement officer has acted in good faith in conducting the search.” 	468
U.S. at 922 (quotations omitted). 	Nevertheless, “in some circumstances the officer will
have no reasonable grounds for believing that the warrant was properly issued.” 	Id. at
922-23 (footnote omitted). 	“For the Leon exception to apply when the warrant is based
on evidence obtained through a Fourth Amendment violation, [law enforcement’s]
prewarrant conduct must have been ‘close enough to the line of validity to make the
officers’ belief in the validity of the warrant objectively reasonable.’” 	United States v.
Cannon, 703 F.3d 407, 413 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Conner, 127 F.3d
663, 667 (8th Cir. 1997)). 	If the prewarrant conduct is clearly illegal, however, the
exception does not apply. 	Cannon, 127 F.3d at 413.
None of the four scenarios contemplated by Leon apply here. There is no evidence
that the affidavit in support of the search warrant contained any false statements or that
the issuing magistrate judge was misled in any way. 	Contrary to Defendant’s assertion,
here is no evidence that the issuing magistrate judge “wholly abandoned” his or her
judicial role in issuing the search warrant. As discussed above, the judge made common
sense and reasonable inferences based on the totality of the circumstances in finding that
the search warrant application and affidavit were supported by probable cause. See Kail,
804 F.2d at 444; Thompson, 210 F.3d at 860. Also, contrary to Defendant’s contentions,
and as discussed above, based on the affidavit in support of the warrant application, the
issuing 	judge 	had 	a 	substantial 	basis 	and 	made 	“a 	practical 	and 	common-sense”
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determination, based on the totality of the circumstances, that “a search would uncover
evidence of wrongdoing” and/or contraband; and therefore, the affidavit was not “so
lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely
unreasonable.” See Kail, 804 F.2d at 444; Maccani, 49 F.4th at 1130; Proell, 485 F.3d
at 431. 	Finally, there is no allegation or evidence that the warrant is “so facially
deficient” that a police officer could not reasonably presume that the warrant was valid.5
Thus, I find that law enforcement’s conduct was close enough to the line of validity to
justify law enforcement’s belief that the search warrant was objectively reasonable. 	See
id. Accordingly, as an alternative, I recommend that Defendant’s motion to suppress be
denied under the Leon good faith exception.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully recommend the District Court deny
Defendant’s Motion to Suppress. 	(Doc. 34.)
Objections to this Report and Recommendation in accordance with 28 U.S.C.
Section 636(b)(l) and Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b) must be filed within fourteen (14) days of
the service of a copy of this Report and Recommendation. 	Objections must specify the
parts of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made, as well as the
parts of the record forming the basis for the objections. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 59. Failure
to object to the Report and Recommendation waives the right to de novo review by the
district court of any portion of the Report and Recommendation as well as the right to
appeal from the findings of fact contained therein. United States v. Wise, 588 F.3d 531,
537 n.5 (8th Cir. 2009).
5 In his brief, Defendant argues that the warrants for the cell phones, which are not at issue here,
were “facially deficient,” but he does not make that argument with regard to the instant search
warrant for the University Avenue residence.
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DONE AND ENTERED at Cedar Rapids, Iowa, this 13th day of January, 2026.
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