Spriestersbach v. State of Hawaii

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF HAWAII
JOSHUA SPRIESTERSBACH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
STATE OF HAWAII, 	CITY AND
COUNTY OF HONOLULU, OFFICER
ABRAHAM K. BRUHN, 	DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC SAFETY, 	OFFICE OF THE
PUBLIC DEFENDER, NIETZSCHE LYNN
TOLAN, MICHELLE MURAOKA, LESLIE
MALOIAN, JACQUELINE ESSER, JASON
BAKER, MERLINDA GARMA, SETH
PATEK, DR. JOHN COMPTON, DR.
MELISSA VARGO, DR. SHARON TISZA,
HAWAII STATE HOSPITAL, DR.
ALLISON GARRETT, 	JOHN/JANE DOES
1-20,
Defendants.
CIV. NO. 21-00456 LEK-RT
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANT ALLISON GARRETT, M.D.’S MOTION TO DISMISS
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FILED OCTOBER 18, 2023 (ECF 250)
Before the Court is Defendant Allison Garrett, M.D.’s
(“Dr. Garrett”) Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint Filed
October 18, 2023 (ECF 250), which Dr. Garrett filed on
November 1, 2023 (“Motion”). [Dkt. no. 262.] Plaintiff Joshua
Spriestersbach (“Spriestersbach”) filed his memorandum in
opposition on December 29, 2023, and Dr. Garrett filed her reply
on January 12, 2024. [Dkt. nos. 299, 308.] On December 29, 2023,
Defendants Office of the Public Defender, Nietzsche Lynn Tolan,
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Michele Muraoka, Lesley Maloian, Jason Baker, and Seth Patek
filed a statement of no position as to Dr. Garrett’s Motion.
[Dkt. no. 296.]
This matter came on for hearing on February 12, 2024. 1
Dr. Garrett’s Motion is hereby granted in part and denied in
part for the reasons set forth below. The Motion is granted
insofar as all of Spriestersbach’s claims against Dr. Garrett
are dismissed, and the Motion is denied insofar as the dismissal
is without prejudice.
BACKGROUND
Spriestersbach filed his original Complaint on
November 21, 2021. [Dkt. no. 1.] The operative pleading is his
October 18, 2023 First Amended Complaint (“Amended Complaint”).
[Dkt. no. 250.] This Court previously issued an order addressing
some of Spriestersbach’s claims in the original Complaint. See
Order: Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant City and
County of Honolulu’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings;
Granting Defendant Dr. Sharon Tisza’s Motion to Dismiss
Complaint; and Granting Defendants Dr. John Compton and
Dr. Melissa Vargo’s Substantive Joinder in Defendant Dr. Sharon
1 Dr. Garrett’s Motion was heard with three other motions,
which will be addressed in separate orders.
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Tisza’s Motion to Dismiss Complaint, filed 8/18/22 (dkt.
no. 151) (“8/18/22 Order”). 2
The case arises from Spriestersbach’s May 11, 2017
arrest and prosecution for crimes committed by Thomas R.
Castleberry and Spriestersbach’s subsequent detention and civil
commitment until January 17, 2020. See Complaint, filed 11/21/21
(dkt. no. 1), at ¶¶ 2, 4. Relevant to the instant Motion, the
claims in the Amended Complaint are: 3
-a Title 42 United States Code Section 1983 claim against
Defendant City & County of Honolulu (“the City”) and
Dr. Garrett, alleging violations of Spriestersbach’s rights
under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution (“Count I”); [Amended Complaint at pg. 43;]
-a Section 1983 claim against the City and Dr. Garrett alleging
violations of Spriestersbach’s due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment (“Count II”);
-a false imprisonment claim against Dr. Garrett (“Count VIII”);
-a negligence claim against Dr. Garrett (“Count IX”);
-a medical malpractice claim against Dr. Garrett (“Count X”);
-an intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) claim
against Defendants Nietzsche Lynn Tolan, Michele Muraoka,
Lesley Maloian, Jason Baker, and Seth Patek (collectively
“Individual PD Defendants”), the City, and Dr. Garrett
(“Count XI”); and
2 The 8/18/22 Order is also available at 622 F. Supp. 3d
948.
3 The claims that are not alleged against Dr. Garrett and
Spriestersbach’s claims against Doe Defendants 1-20 are not
relevant to his claims against Dr. Garrett and will not be
addressed in this Order.
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-a negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”) claim
against the City, the Individual PD Defendants, and
Dr. Garrett (“Count XII”).
Only the factual allegations relevant to
Spriestersbach’s claims against Dr. Garrett will be addressed in
this Order.
On May 11, 2017, Honolulu Police Department (“HPD”)
officers arrested Spriestersbach based upon a bench warrant
issued for Thomas R. Castleberry, and Spriestersbach was
transported to HPD’s Central Police Station. [Amended Complaint
at ¶ 79.] The arrest report listed “Joshua Spriestersbach” as
the defendant and included his state identification number,
birth date, and social security number. The arrest report also
listed “Thomas R. Castleberry” as an alias, with Thomas
Castleberry’s social security number. [Id. at ¶¶ 99-100.] On May
12, 2017, Spriestersbach was transported to the State of Hawai`i
First Circuit Court (“state court”) and later to Defendant
Department of Public Safety’s Oahu Community Correctional Center
(“OCCC”). [Id. at ¶ 142.]
Defendant Nietzsche Lynn Tolan, a Deputy Prosecuting
Attorney (“Tolan”), was appointed to represent Spriestersbach. 4
He told Tolan that he was not Thomas Castleberry and that he had
4 The case was State of Hawai`i v. Thomas R. Castleberry,
Case No. 1PC-06-1-001421 (“Castleberry Criminal Case”).
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not committed the crimes committed by Thomas Castleberry. Tolan
requested, and the state court granted, a three-doctor panel to
evaluate Spriestersbach and to determine whether he was fit to
proceed in the case against him as Thomas Castleberry. 5
Spriestersbach was held at Defendant Hawai`i State Hospital’s
facility (“HSH”) under the name Thomas R. Castleberry while the
competency evaluations and hearings were pending. [Id. at
¶¶ 146-49.]
At all times relevant to this case, Dr. Garrett was
employed as a doctor by Defendant State of Hawai`i at HSH. She
is being sued in her individual capacity. [Id. at ¶ 18.]
Spriestersbach alleges Dr. Garrett “failed to verify [his]
identity when he was transferred from O.C.C.C. to H.S.H. Despite
having treated [Spriestersbach] previously and having access to
[his] medical records and identifying information, H.S.H. staff
and doctors failed to review their own files and records to
verify [his] identity.” Id. at ¶ 150; see also id. at ¶ 152
(alleging Spriestersbach “had been an occasional patient at
5 The three doctors appointed to the panel were Dr. John
Compton, Dr. Melissa Vargo, and Dr. Sharon Tisza (collectively
“the Examiner Defendants”). [Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 16, 148.]
The Amended Complaint refers to them as the “Medical
Defendants,” [id. at pg. 2 n.1,] and as the “Individual
Psychiatric and Psychological Defendants,” [id. at ¶ 16].
Spriestersbach’s claims against the Examiner Defendants were
dismissed with prejudice. See 8/18/22 Order, 622 F. Supp. 3d at
971.
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H.S.H. under his real name – Joshua Spriestersbach – since at
least 2002”). Throughout the time that he was being evaluated at
HSH under the name Thomas R. Castleberry, Spriestersbach
“continually advised [the Examiner Defendants] and other staff
at H.S.H. of his real name and identity,” but the Amended
Complaint does not specifically name Dr. Garrett as one of the
staff to whom Spriestersbach continually gave his real name. See
Amended Complaint at ¶ 151. However, reading the Amended
Complaint as a whole, Spriestersbach alleges he advised
Dr. Garrett of his real name and personal identifying
information on at least one occasion. See id. at ¶ 153 (alleging
he “provided the . . . H.S.H. staff and doctors . . . with his
name, date of birth, social security number”); id. at ¶ 152
(alleging Dr. Garrett used Spriestersbach’ “protests regarding
his identity as evidence of his incompetency”).
According to Spriestersbach, on February 26, 2018,
unknown HSH staff took him to obtain copies of his social
security card and State identification card. Those documents
should have demonstrated to HSH staff that he was Joshua
Spriestersbach and not Thomas Castleberry. Dr. Garrett and
others, however, continued to hold Spriestersbach at HSH for two
more years. [Id. at ¶¶ 154-56.]
In January 2020, Dr. Garrett confirmed
Spriestersbach’s identity and that he was not Thomas
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Castleberry, and Spriestersbach was released on January 17,
2020. [Id. at ¶¶ 158-59.]
Spriestersbach makes a general allegation that:
At all times relevant to this case the
Defendants acted recklessly, willfully and with
deliberate indifference to the rights and health
of [Spriestersbach]. Defendants, individually and
collectively, owed a duty to [Spriestersbach] and
breached their duty to [Spriestersbach] by
failing to investigate and confirm his identity
so that he would not be unlawfully held in
custody for someone else’s crimes.
[Amended Complaint at ¶ 164.]
In the instant Motion, Dr. Garrett asks this Court to
dismiss all of Spriestersbach’s claims against her because he
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. [Motion
at 2 (citing Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure).] Dr. Garrett emphasizes that Spriestersbach’s claims
against her arise from the medical care and services that she
provided in the course and scope of her employment at HSH.
[Motion, Mem. in Supp. at 1-2 (citing Amended Complaint at
¶ 18).] Dr. Garrett asserts she is entitled to qualified
immunity as to Counts I and II because she was acting in the
course and scope of her employment at HSH, and her actions were
reasonable because they were in accordance with Hawai`i law and
the state court orders. [Id. at 12.] As to the state law claims
against her, Dr. Garrett argues that she is entitled to
qualified/conditional privilege. See id. at 16-17. Further,
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Dr. Garrett argues all of Spriestersbach’s state law claims are
insufficiently pled, and he has pled insufficient factual
allegations to support an award of punitive damages under either
federal or state law. [Id. at 18-24.] Finally, Dr. Garret argues
any portion of Spriestersbach’s claims against her based on the
medical care, treatment, or advice she provided to him before
November 21, 2019 is time-barred pursuant to Hawai`i Revised
Statutes Section 657-7.23. [Id. at 24-25.] Dr. Garrett argues
Spriestersbach’s claims against her should be dismissed with
prejudice. [Id. at 25.]
DISCUSSION
I. 	Materials Beyond the Pleadings
Generally, district courts may not consider
material outside the pleadings when assessing the
sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Lee v. City
of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir.
2001).[ 6 ] When “matters outside the pleading are
presented to and not excluded by the court,” the
12(b)(6) motion converts into a motion for
summary judgment under Rule 56. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(d). Then, both parties must have the
opportunity “to present all the material that is
pertinent to the motion.” Id.
6 Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1125–26
(9th Cir. 2002), overruled Lee on grounds not relevant to the
issues presented in the instant Motion. See, e.g., Cortez v.
Klique Car Club, Inc., Case No. 2:23-cv-07210-MEMF-MAA, 2024 WL
988374, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2024). Galbraith was abrogated
on other grounds by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007). See, e.g., Higa v. Kobayashi, CIV. NO. 19-00664 LEK-WRP,
2020 WL 2027290, at *4 (D. Hawai`i Apr. 27, 2020).
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There are two exceptions to this rule: the
incorporation-by-reference doctrine, and judicial
notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 201. Both
of these procedures permit district courts to
consider materials outside a complaint, but each
does so for different reasons and in different
ways. . . .
Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 998 (9th
Cir. 2018).
A. 	Judicial Notice
Dr. Garrett asks this Court to take judicial notice of
the filings and pleadings in the Castleberry Criminal Case.
[Motion, Mem. in Supp. at 4 n.1.]
Judicial notice under Rule 201 permits a
court to notice an adjudicative fact if it is
“not subject to reasonable dispute.” Fed. R.
Evid. 201(b). A fact is “not subject to
reasonable dispute” if it is “generally known,”
or “can be accurately and readily determined from
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(1)–(2).
Accordingly, “[a] court may take judicial
notice of matters of public record without
converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for
summary judgment.” Lee, 250 F.3d at 689
(quotation marks and citation omitted). But a
court cannot take judicial notice of disputed
facts contained in such public records. Id.
Khoja, 899 F.3d at 999 (alteration in Khoja). Public records
that a district court can take judicial notice of include
“documents filed with courts, ‘both within and without the
federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct
relation to the matters at issue.’” Bartolotti v. Maui Mem’l
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Med. Ctr., Civil No. 14-00549 SOM/KSC, 2015 WL 4545818, at *3
(D. Hawai`i July 28, 2015) (quoting United States v. Borneo,
Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992)). This Court therefore
grants Dr. Garrett’s request and takes judicial notice of the
docket and filings in the Castleberry Criminal Case, but this
Court does not take judicial notice of the disputed facts within
those filings.
B. 	Incorporation by Reference
Dr. Garrett notes that the Amended Complaint cites and
relies upon a July 26, 2022 article in the New York Times
Magazine, and she includes a copy of the article with the
Motion. [Motion, Mem. in Supp. at 4 (citing Amended Complaint at
¶ 3); Motion, Declaration of Lois H. Yamaguchi, Exh. 2.] The
Motion recounts various factual assertions from the article
about Spriestersbach and the events that gave rise to this case.
[Motion, Mem. in Supp. at 4-8.] Dr. Garrett appears to argue
that the article is incorporated by reference in the Amended
Complaint. See id. at 8-10 (discussing case law regarding
incorporation by reference).
Unlike rule-established judicial notice,
incorporation-by-reference is a judicially
created doctrine that treats certain documents as
though they are part of the complaint itself. The
doctrine prevents plaintiffs from selecting only
portions of documents that support their claims,
while omitting portions of those very documents
that weaken—or doom—their claims. Parrino v. FHP,
Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 706 (9th Cir. 1998),
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superseded by statute on other grounds as
recognized in Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443
F.3d 676, 681–82 (9th Cir. 2006) (observing “the
policy concern underlying the rule: Preventing
plaintiffs from surviving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
by deliberately omitting references to documents
upon which their claims are based”).
Although the doctrine is straightforward in
its purpose, it is not always easy to apply. In
Ritchie, we said that a defendant may seek to
incorporate a document into the complaint “if the
plaintiff refers extensively to the document or
the document forms the basis of the plaintiff’s
claim.” [United States v.] Ritchie, 342 F.3d
[903,] 907 [(9th Cir. 2003)]. How “extensively”
must the complaint refer to the document? This
court has held that “the mere mention of the
existence of a document is insufficient to
incorporate the contents of a document” under
Ritchie. Coto Settlement v. Eisenberg, 593 F.3d
1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Ritchie, 342
F.3d at 908–09). . . .
Khoja, 899 F.3d at 1002.
The New York Times Magazine article is cited only once
in the Amended Complaint, and it is only cited as an
illustration of Spriestersbach’s assertion that the “traumatic
events [giving rise to this case] have already shocked America.”
See Amended Complaint at ¶ 3. Because the Amended Complaint does
not refer to the article extensively, and because the article
does not form the basis of any claim asserted in the Amended
Complaint, this Court concludes that the article is not
incorporated by reference in the Amended Complaint. Considering
the article attached to the Motion would require converting the
Motion into a motion for summary judgment, see Khoja, 899 F.3d
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at 998, and this Court declines to do so. Therefore, this Court
will not consider the factual statements in Dr. Garrett’s Motion
that were taken from the article.
II. 	Qualified Immunity
Dr. Garrett argues Spriestersbach’s Section 1983
claims against her must be dismissed because she is entitled to
qualified immunity.
Qualified immunity “shields government officials
performing discretionary functions from liability
for civil damages ‘insofar as their conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.’” Scott v. Henrich, 39
F.3d 912, 914 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727,
73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982)). When an officer claims
qualified immunity, we ask “(1) whether there has
been a violation of a constitutional right; and
(2) whether that right was clearly established at
the time of the officer’s alleged misconduct.”
Jessop v. City of Fresno, 936 F.3d 937, 940 (9th
Cir. 2019) (quoting Lal v. California, 746 F.3d
1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 2014)). Courts have
discretion to decide which of the two prongs
“should be addressed first in light of the
circumstances in the particular case at hand.”
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129 S.
Ct. 808, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2009). “Addressing
the second prong before the first is especially
appropriate where ‘a court will rather quickly
and easily decide that there was no violation of
clearly established law.’” Jessop, 936 F.3d at
940 (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 239, 129 S. Ct.
808).
Saved Mag. v. Spokane Police Dep’t, 19 F.4th 1193, 1198 (9th
Cir. 2021).
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A. 	Constitutional Violation
Spriestersbach’s Section 1983 claims against
Dr. Garrett allege violations of his rights under the Fourth
Amendment and the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 177-78, 182-84.
“The Fourth Amendment protects ‘[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable
. . . seizures.” Manuel v. City of Joliet, 580 U.S. 357, 364
(2017) (alterations in Manuel). “The general rule is that Fourth
Amendment seizures are ‘reasonable’ only if based on probable
cause to believe that the individual has committed a crime.” Id.
(brackets, citation, and some internal quotation marks omitted).
Further, a wrongful pretrial detention is a Fourth Amendment
violation, even where the deprivation of liberty occurs after
the legal process as a result of the arrest has commenced. Id.
at 364-66. A plaintiff’s arrest on a bench warrant is not an
unreasonable seizure if there was probable cause to believe that
there was a bench warrant issued for the plaintiff’s arrest. See
Wang v. Monterey Park Police Dep’t, No. CV 07-6188-VBF (MLG),
2008 WL 2676846, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 7, 2008) (citing Beck v.
State of Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S. Ct. 223, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142
(1964) (“[T]he facts and circumstances within their knowledge
and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were
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sufficient to warrant a prudent man believing that the
petitioner had committed or was committing an offense.”)).
In the instant case, Spriestersbach alleges he was
wrongfully arrested and detained on May 11, 2017 on a bench
warrant issued for Thomas Castleberry because the arresting
officers did not have probable cause to believe that he was
Thomas Castleberry. See Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 2, 78-79. He was
detained at OCCC and HSH until his release on January 17, 2020,
and during this time he continued to assert he was not Thomas
Castleberry. See id. at ¶¶ 1-2. This Court concludes that these
allegations are sufficient pled a plausible Fourth Amendment
violation. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)).
The Ninth Circuit has stated:
“Liberty is protected from unlawful state
deprivation by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.” Haygood v. Younger, 769
F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
Moreover, “[t]he Supreme Court has recognized
that an individual has a liberty interest in
being free from incarceration absent a criminal
conviction.” Oviatt [ex rel. Waugh v. Pearce],
954 F.2d [1470,] 1474 [(9th Cir. 1992)] (citing
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, 99 S. Ct.
2689, 61 L. Ed. 2d 433 (1979)). As the Court
explained:
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[D]epending on what procedures the State
affords defendants following arrest and
prior to actual trial, mere detention
pursuant to a valid warrant but in the face
of repeated protests of innocence will after
the lapse of a certain amount of time
deprive the accused of “liberty . . .
without due process of law.”
Baker, 443 U.S. at 145, 99 S. Ct. 2689. Thus, the
loss of liberty caused by an individual’s
mistaken incarceration “after the lapse of a
certain amount of time” gives rise to a claim
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. . . .
Lee, 250 F.3d at 683 (some alterations in Lee). The allegations
summarized above are also sufficient to plead a Fourteenth
Amendment due process violation. The Court next turns to the
issue of whether Spriestersbach sufficiently alleged that Dr.
Garrett’s actions and omissions were a cause of the
constitutional violations.
In Rivera v. Corrections Corp. of America, the
plaintiff, Rudy Rivera (“Rivera”), was indicted in the District
of Nevada for marijuana-related offenses and arrested in
California. 999 F.3d 647, 650 (9th Cir. 2021). Rivera was to be
transferred to the District of Nevada for arraignment and a
detention hearing. The United States Marshals Service (“the
Marshals”) transferred Rivera to the Nevada Southern Detention
Center (“NSDC”) on November 4, 2015. However, Rivera did not
have his first hearing in the District of Nevada until
October 24, 2016. NSDC was private detention facility operated
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by CoreCivic, formerly known as Corrections Corporation of
America. Id. While he was detained at NSDC, “Rivera repeatedly
informed CoreCivic employees that he had not been to court and
did not have counsel,” but his “interactions with CoreCivic
employees led him to believe that his case was proceeding
normally and there was no further action he could take to prompt
a hearing.” Id. at 650-51. He also testified that the CoreCivic
employees never explained to him that he was in the custody of
the Marshals and that he could raise his concerns to a Marshals
deputy at NSDC. Id. at 650.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of CoreCivic, holding
that “[a] rational jury could find that, in failing to notify
the Marshals of Rivera’s detention and in dissuading and
preventing Rivera from seeking other help, CoreCivic was a cause
of Rivera’s pre-hearing detention . . . .” Id. at 654. In so
holding, the Ninth Circuit rejected CoreCivic’s argument that it
did not cause Rivera’s prolonged detention because it could
neither release Rivera nor bring him before judge. Id. at 653.
Even though CoreCivic could not schedule a
hearing for Rivera, it could have almost
certainly prompted a hearing by notifying the
Marshals of Rivera’s plight. . . . [W]hen the
Public Defender’s Office informed the Marshals of
Rivera’s detention, the Marshals brought Rivera
to court the next business day. We have no reason
to believe the Marshals would have responded
differently had CoreCivic, and not the Public
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Defender’s Office, informed them of Rivera’s
prolonged detention.
Id. at 653–54. Similarly, in the instant case, when Dr. Garrett
confirmed Spriestersbach’s identity in January 2020, he was
released within that month. [Id. at ¶¶ 158-59.] Spriestersbach
alleges he was an occasional patient at HSH, under the name
Spriestersbach, since 2002. Thus, Dr. Garrett had access to
medical records under the name that the purported Thomas
Castleberry was asserting was his real name. See id. at ¶ 151.
It can be reasonably inferred that, had Dr. Garrett checked
Spriestersbach’s records sooner, Spriestersbach could have been
released earlier. Spriestersbach has pled sufficient factual
allegations to allow this Court to draw the reasonable inference
that Dr. Garrett was a cause of Spriestersbach’s prolonged
detention. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” (citation
omitted)). This Court therefore turns to the next step of the
qualified immunity analysis.
B. 	Clearly Established Right
The Ninth Circuit has stated:
As the Supreme Court explained, . . . “clearly
established law must be ‘particularized’ to the
facts of the case.” White v. Pauly, –– U.S. ––,
137 S. Ct. 548, 552, 196 L. Ed. 2d 463 (2017)
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(quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,
640, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 97 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1987)).[ 7 ]
If this is not done, “[p]laintiffs would be able
to convert the rule of qualified immunity that
our cases plainly establish into a rule of
virtually unqualified liability simply by
alleging violation of extremely abstract rights.”
Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639, 107 S. Ct. 3034.
Saved Mag., 19 F.4th at 1199 (brackets in Saved Mag.). In
evaluating Dr. Garrett’s assertion of qualified immunity, this
Court must determine whether “the right asserted by
[Spriestersbach was] so clearly established that a reasonable
[state official in Dr. Garrett’s position] would have known that
his conduct violated that right?” See id. (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
As previously noted, Spriestersbach does not allege
that Dr. Garrett was one of the HSH staff to whom he continually
gave his real name. See Amended Complaint at ¶ 151. However, he
apparently advised Dr. Garrett of his name and personal
identifying information on at least one occasion. See id. at
¶¶ 152-53. For purposes of the instant Motion, this Court
assumes that the factual allegations in the Amended Complaint
are true. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“for the purposes of a
motion to dismiss we must take all of the factual allegations in
7 Anderson was overruled on other grounds by Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). See, e.g., Donaghe v. Lashaway,
Case No. 16-cv-5973-RJB-JRC, 2017 WL 8942557, at *11 (W.D. Wash.
May 2, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 2458875
(June 7, 2017).
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the complaint as true” (citation omitted)). Dr. Garrett heard
Spriestersbach’s assertion of misidentification after he had
been arrested by HPD officers as Thomas Castleberry, [Amended
Complaint at ¶¶ 79, 141,] held at OCCC as Thomas Castleberry,
[id. at ¶¶ 142, 145,] brought before the state court, with
counsel, as Thomas Castleberry, [id. at ¶¶ 147-48,] and
transferred to HSH under the name Thomas Castleberry pursuant to
the state court’s order for an evaluation by a three-doctor
panel, [id. at ¶ 149]. Further, Spriestersbach acknowledges that
his “disability and the perception of him by those in authority
makes it difficult for his statements of fact about his identity
to be trusted; makes his statements regarding his understanding
of legal proceedings to be discounted; and causes him to be
confused . . . .” 8 [Id. at ¶ 189.]
Based on Lee and the cases cited therein, at the time
of the events at issue in this case, it was clearly established
that, without adequate arrest and pretrial procedures, the
mistaken arrest of a person on a facially valid warrant and
detention constitutes a due process violation “‘after the lapse
of a certain amount of time.’” Lee, 250 F.3d at 684 (discussing
Baker, 443 U.S. at 144–45, 99 S. Ct. 2689; Erdman v. Cochise
8 Spriestersbach states that, at all times relevant to this
case, he “was schizophrenic, bipolar and dysfunctional.” See,
e.g., Amended Complaint at ¶ 48.
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County, Arizona, 926 F.2d 877, 882 (9th Cir. 1991)). It was also
clearly established that “[a]n arrest without probable cause
violates the Fourth Amendment and gives rise to a claim for
damages under § 1983.” Id. at 685 (quotation marks and citation
omitted). However, although this Court has concluded, based on
Rivera, that Spriestersbach has sufficiently alleged that
Dr. Garrett was a cause of the constitutional violations, Rivera
was decided after the events at issue in this case. Thus, at the
time of the events at issue in this case, the clearly
established law did not include Rivera.
Further, Lee does not constitute clearly established
law as to Dr. Garrett. In Lee, Kerry Sanders - who had a history
of mental illness - was arrested in Los Angeles, California and
mistakenly identified as Robert Sanders - who had absconded from
a temporary release program at a correctional facility in New
York. 250 F.3d at 677. The Los Angeles Police Department
(“LAPD”) informed officials with the New York State Department
of Correctional Services (“NYSDCS”) that LAPD had Robert Sanders
in custody. NYSDCS provided LAPD with an identification packet
for Robert Sanders, but LAPD failed to verify that the person in
its custody was Robert Sanders. Based on LAPD representations,
Philip Coombe, Jr. (“Coombe”), NYSDCS’s acting director, or
other NYSDCS officials, instructed NYSDCS employees to arrange
for Kerry Sanders to be extradited to New York. After an
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extradition hearing, NYSDCS employees took custody of Kerry
Sanders in California and brought him back to New York. They did
not verify that the person they transported was in fact Robert
Sanders. Kerry Sanders remained incarcerated in New York until
NYSDCS officials realized the mistake after Robert Sanders was
arrested in another jurisdiction. Id. at 677-78.
Marry Sanders Lee (“Lee”), individually and as
conservator for Kerry Sanders and his estate, brought
Section 1983 claims and other claims. The defendants were the
City of Los Angeles, four LAPD officers, Coombe, and other
unnamed City of Los Angeles and NYSDCS employees. Id. at 677. In
relevant part, the district court dismissed the claims against
the NYSDCS defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction and
dismissed the Section 1983 claims against the City of Los
Angeles and the LAPD defendants. Id. at 679. On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district
court’s personal jurisdiction ruling, as well as the district
court’s dismissal of the Section 1983 claims against the City of
Lost Angeles and the LAPD Defendants. The Ninth Circuit held
that the plaintiffs stated valid Section 1983 claims based on,
inter alia, violations of the Fourth Amendment and the
Fourteenth Amendment due process clause. Id. at 695. Because the
Fourteenth Amendment analysis and the Fourth Amendment analysis
only addressed the City of Los Angeles and the LAPD, id. at 683-
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85, Lee does not constitute clearly established law as
Dr. Garrett. Although there was at least one instance when
Dr. Garrett heard Spriestersbach assert his real identity, she
was not in the same position as the LAPD defendants in Lee. LAPD
was involved in the initial mistaken identification of Kerry
Sanders as Robert Sanders, and LAPD failed to utilize the
identification packet that it received from NYSDCS to verify
that the person in their custody was Robert Sanders. See id. at
677-78. In contrast, Dr. Garrett was not involved in the
mistaken identification of Spriestersbach as Thomas Castleberry,
and she was not provided with information from a government
agency that could have been used to determine whether her
patient was in fact Thomas Castleberry. Therefore, Lee is not
sufficiently “particularized to the facts of the case” to
constitute clearly established law as to Dr. Garrett. See White
v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted).
Similarly, the other cases discussed in the relevant
portion of Lee - Baker, 443 U.S. at 144–45, and Erdman, 926 F.2d
at 882 - are not sufficiently particularized to constitute
clearly established law as to Dr. Garrett. The defendants in
Baker were 1) the sheriff of the county in which the plaintiff
was held for three days after being arrested on a warrant issued
for offenses committed by his brother, and 2) the sheriff’s
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surety. 443 U.S. at 140-41. The defendants in Erdman were two
counties that were involved in the plaintiff’s arrest for
conduct to which he had already pleaded and for which he had
already served time in custody. 926 F.2d at 878.
This Court therefore concludes that, at the time of
the events at issue in this case, Spriestersbach’s Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights were not so clearly established that
a reasonable state official in Dr. Garrett’s position would have
known that failing to immediately investigate Spriestersbach’s
report of mistaken identification would constitute a violation
of Spriestersbach’s rights. See Saved Mag., 19 F.4th at 1199.
Because Spriestersbach’s rights were not clearly established,
Dr. Garrett is entitled to qualified immunity from his
Section 1983 claims. The portions of Counts I and II alleging
Section 1983 claims against Dr. Garrett are therefore dismissed
because Spriestersbach has failed to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
“Dismissal with prejudice and without leave to amend
is not appropriate unless it is clear . . . that the complaint
could not be saved by amendment.” Hoang v. Bank of Am., N.A.,
910 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation and quotation
marks omitted)). Although it is unlikely that Spriestersbach
will be able to do so, it may be possible for him to amend his
factual allegations to bring his Section 1983 claims against
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Dr. Garrett within the realm of clearly established law. The
dismissal of his Section 1983 claims against Dr. Garrett is
therefore without prejudice.
III. Qualified/Conditional Privilege
Dr. Garrett argues Spriestersbach’s state law claims
against her must be dismissed because she has a qualified or
conditional privilege.
Hawaii law provides that a nonjudicial
government official has a qualified or
conditional privilege with respect to his or her
tortious actions taken in the performance of his
or her public duty. Towse v. State of Hawaii, 647
P.2d 696, 702 (Haw. 1982); Runnels v. Okamoto,
525 P.2d 1125, 1128 (Haw. 1974). This privilege
shields all but the most guilty nonjudicial
officials from liability, but not from the
imposition of a suit itself. Towse, 647 P.2d at
702. The privilege is the result of the Hawaii
Supreme Court’s balancing of competing interests.
It protects the innocent public servant’s
pocketbook, yet it allows an injured party to be
heard. See Medeiros v. Kondo, 522 P.2d 1269, 1272
(Haw. 1974).
For a tort action to lie against a
nonjudicial government official, the injured
party must allege and demonstrate by clear
and convincing proof that the official was
motivated by malice and not by an otherwise
proper purpose. Towse, 647 P.2d at 702–03;
Medeiros, 522 P.2d at 1272. When a public
official is motivated by malice, and not by
an otherwise proper purpose, Hawaii law
provides that the cloak of immunity is lost
and the official must defend the suit the
same as any other defendant. Marshall v.
Univ. of Haw., 821 P.2d 937, 946 (Haw. Ct.
App. 1991), abrogated on other grounds by
Hac v. Univ. of Haw., 73 P.3d 46 (Haw.
2003).
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The existence or absence of malice is
generally a question for the jury. Runnels,
525 P.2d at 1129. However, when the
existence or absence of malice is
demonstrated to the court via uncontroverted
affidavits or depositions, the court may
rule on the existence or absence of malice
as a matter of law. See id.
Edenfield v. Estate of Willets, Civ. No. 05–00418 SOM–
BMK, 2006 WL 1041724, at *11–12 (D. Haw. Apr. 14,
2006) (parallel citations omitted).
Begley v. Cnty. of Kauai, CIVIL 16-00350 LEK-KJM, 2018 WL
3638083, at *6 (D. Hawai`i July 31, 2018) (some citations
omitted). “Except in claims for defamation, an actual malice
standard applies as to all tort claims.” Id. (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). The qualified or conditional
privilege under Hawai`i law will be referred to in this Order as
the “conditional privilege.” 9
First, Spriestersbach argues conditional privilege is
not available to Dr. Garrett. See Mem. in Opp. at 22 (arguing
conditional privilege “only applies to a person who acts so as
to ‘set and carry out governmental policies, while acting within
the scope of his or her powers as a governmental official’”
(quoting Slingluff v. State Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 131 Haw. 239,
9 The qualified or conditional privilege is sometimes
referred to as “qualified immunity.” See, e.g., Slingluff v.
Hawai`i, 131 Hawai`i 239, 244, 317 P.3d 683, 688 (Ct. App.
2013). Because this order also discusses qualified immunity
under federal law, the term “conditional privilege” is used in
this Order to distinguish between the two.
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245 (Ct. App. 2013)). Spriestersbach misstates Slingluff. In the
passage he quotes, the Hawai`i Intermediate Court of Appeals
(“ICA”) merely notes that the issue in Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S.
564 (1959), “was whether the protections given to high
officials, i.e., ‘executive officers of cabinet rank,’ should be
extended to other government officials who set and carry out
governmental policies, while acting within the scope of his or
her powers as a government official[,]” and that the United
States Supreme Court answered that question in the affirmative.
See Slingluff, 131 Hawai`i at 245, 317 P.3d at 689 (quoting
Barr, 360 U.S. at 572, 79 S. Ct. 1335). The ICA ultimately
stated that
the primary purpose of [conditional privilege] is
to ensure that public officers and employees are
not unduly hampered, deterred and intimidated in
the discharge of their duties by the threat of
lawsuits. It seeks to avoid making public
officials unduly fearful in their exercise of
authority and to avoid discouraging them from
taking prompt and decisive action.
Id. at 246, 317 P.3d at 690 (emphases added) (brackets,
citations, and internal quotation marks omitted). Although
determining and carrying out government policy clearly falls
within the scope of the conditional privilege, they are not the
only circumstances when the conditional privilege applies. The
privilege also applies when the defendant makes decisions
exercising governmental discretion. See id. at 250, 317 P.3d at
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694 (holding that the circuit court did not err when it denied
two physician defendants’ motion for summary judgment because
their decisions “did not involve policy making or any other type
of governmental discretion”). This Court therefore rejects
Spriestersbach’s argument that the conditional privilege only
applies when the defendant is setting and carrying out
government policy.
Spriestersbach also points out that “[p]hysicians
employed by the state and indeed even treating in a state prison
do not necessarily enjoy the privilege.” [Mem. in Opp. at 22
(citing Slingluff v. State Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 131 Haw. 239,
246 (Ct. App. 2013)).] Spriestersbach argues that, similarly,
Dr. Garrett is not entitled to the conditional privilege merely
because she treated him at HSH. See id. In Slingluff, the ICA
held that “the exercise of purely medical judgment is not
entitled to the shield of [the conditional privilege].” 131
Hawai`i at 247, 317 P.3d at 691. The circuit court had concluded
that:
the defendant physicians were negligent in:
(1) failing to promptly treat Slingluff in order
to apply [an incision and drainage] treatment to
the abscess, and that the delay in treatment fell
below the standard of care; (2) prescribing the
wrong dosage of antibiotic; and (3) failing to
prescribe a different antibiotic when it became
apparent that the original antibiotic was not
working.
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Id. at 249–50, 317 P.3d at 693–94. On appeal, the ICA held that
the physician defendants were not entitled to the conditional
privilege as to these matters because they “all pertain to the
exercise of purely medical discretion because they involved
strictly medical diagnosis and treatment. The decisions made did
not involve policy making or any other type of governmental
discretion.” Id. at 250, 317 P.3d at 694.
In the instant case, the decision at issue is
Dr. Garrett’s decision not to undertake independent
investigation when she initially heard her patient’s statement,
or statements, that he was Spriestersbach and not Thomas
Castleberry. That was not a medical diagnosis of her patient’s
condition nor was it a decision regarding the appropriate
medical treatment for her patient. Her decision not to undertake
an investigation into his identity was an exercise of government
discretion because the investigation would have required her to
question, inter alia, HPD’s, OCCC’s, and the state court’s
records identifying her patient as Thomas Castleberry. This
Court therefore concludes that Dr. Garrett’s decision is
protected by the conditional privilege.
Spriestersbach next argues that, even if the
conditional privilege would otherwise apply, Dr. Garrett is not
entitled to the protection of the privilege because she acted in
reckless disregard of the law or his legal rights. [Mem. in Opp.
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at 22 (some citations omitted) (citing Awakuni v. Awana, 115
Haw. 126, 141, 165 P.3d 1027, 1042 (2007)).] The Amended
Complaint does not contain a specific allegation that
Dr. Garrett acted with malice or in reckless disregard for the
law or his legal rights when she initially decided not to
investigate his report(s) of mistaken identification.
Spriestersbach makes only general allegations applicable to
several defendants. See, e.g., Amended Complaint at ¶ 22
(alleging “wrongful acts and/or omissions by any individual
defendant was done intentionally, maliciously, or with reckless
disregard for the rights of Joshua”). Such conclusory assertions
of malice and reckless disregard, which are not supported by
other factual allegations, are insufficient for Spriestersbach’s
state law claims to survive dismissal. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
(citation omitted)).
As previously noted, ultimately, to defeat
Dr. Garrett’s assertion of conditional privilege, Spriestersbach
will have to “demonstrate by clear and convincing proof that
[Dr. Garrett] was motivated by malice and not by an otherwise
proper purpose.” See Edenfield, 2006 WL 1041724 at *12 (citing
Towse, 647 P.2d at 702–03; Medeiros, 522 P.2d at 1272).
Spriestersbach has not pled factual allegations that, if proven
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to be true, would establish by clear and convincing evidence
that Dr. Garrett “was motivated by malice and not by an
otherwise proper purpose.” This Court therefore concludes that
Dr. Garrett is entitled to the protection of the conditional
privilege. All of Spriestersbach’s state law claims against her
must therefore be dismissed because he has failed to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.
Although it is unlikely that Spriestersbach will be
able to do so, it may be possible for Spriestersbach to amend
his allegations to render the conditional privilege
inapplicable, at least for purposes of a motion to dismiss. The
dismissal of his state law claims against Dr. Garrett is
therefore without prejudice.
IV. 	Other Arguments
This Court has dismissed all of Spriestersbach’s
claims against Dr. Garrett without prejudice. If Spriestersbach
chooses to file a second amended complaint, the new factual
allegations that he includes in an attempt to address the
defects discussed in this Order are likely to affect the other
defects that Dr. Garrett alleges exist in the Amended Complaint.
This Court therefore declines to address the other arguments
that Dr. Garrett raises in the Motion.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Dismiss First
Amended Complaint Filed October 18, 2023 (ECF 250), which
Dr. Garrett filed on November 1, 2023, is HEREBY GRANTED IN PART
AND DENIED IN PART. The Motion is GRANTED insofar as all of
Spriestersbach’s claims against Dr. Garrett are DISMISSED. The
Motion is DENIED insofar as the dismissal is WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Spriestersbach is GRANTED leave to file a second amended
complaint to cure the defects identified in this Order.
Spriestersbach shall file his second amended complaint by
March 29, 2024. If Spriestersbach chooses not to file a second
amended complaint, this case shall proceed as to the remaining
claims in his First Amended Complaint, filed October 18, 2023.
Spriestersbach is CAUTIONED that he may not add any
additional parties in the second amended complaint, nor may he
add any additional claims or theories of liability against
Dr. Garrett. Spriestersbach is also CAUTIONED that the deadline
to file his second amended complaint will not be affected by the
filing of any motion for reconsideration of this Order. If a
motion for reconsideration is filed and granted after the filing
of his second amended complaint, Spriestersbach will be granted
leave to file a third amended complaint.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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DATED AT HONOLULU, HAWAII, March 15, 2024.
JOSHUA SPRIESTERBACH VS. STATE OF HAWAII, ET AL; CV 21-00456
LEK-RT; ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT
ALLISON GARRETT, M.D.’S MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED
COMPLAINT FILED OCTOBER 18, 2023 (ECF 250)
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