USA v. Sullivan

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
LEIHINAHINA SULLIVAN,
Defendant.
CR. NO. 17-00104 JMS
CR. NO. 21-00096 JMS
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR COMPASSIONATE
RELEASE
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR COMPASSIONATE
RELEASE
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the court is pro se Defendant Leihinahina Sullivan’s
(“Defendant”) January 16, 2025 Motion for Compassionate Release (“Motion”).
See ECF No. 1750 in Cr. No. 17-00104 JMS and ECF No. 342 in Cr. No. 21-
00096 JMS.1 Because Defendant fails to demonstrate an extraordinary and
compelling reason to reduce her sentence and, in any event, the court would deny
1 Defendant was charged and pled guilty in two separate cases, Cr. No. 17-00104 JMS
and Cr. No. 21-00096 JMS. The Motion was filed in both cases, and unless otherwise stated, all
references in this Order are to Cr. No. 17-00104 JMS.
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the Motion based on a consideration of the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors,
the Motion is DENIED.2
II. BACKGROUND
On July 20, 2021, Sullivan entered a plea of guilty, pursuant to a plea
agreement, to counts 1, 29, and 35 of a Fourth Superseding Indictment in Cr. No.
17-00104 JMS and to a single-count Information in Cr. No. 21-00096 JMS.3 See
ECF No. 1202 in Cr. No. 17-00104 JMS and ECF No. 6 in Cr. No. 21-00096 JMS.
Those matters were consolidated for sentencing, and on March 28, 2023,
Defendant was sentenced to a term of incarceration of 180 months in Cr. No. 17-
00104 JMS and 24 months in Cr. No. 21-00096 JMS, with both terms to run
consecutive, resulting in a total sentence of 204 months. See ECF No. 1530 in Cr.
No. 17-00104 JMS and ECF No. 197 in Cr. No. 21-00096 JMS.
2 This is not Defendant’s first motion for compassionate release. Defendant filed a July
22, 2025 Motion for Compassionate Release, which was denied on October 7, 2025. ECF Nos.
1699, 1725. She then filed a motion for reconsideration, which was also denied. ECF Nos.
1730, 1731. Defendant filed a second Motion for Compassionate Release on November 17,
2025, which was denied on December 30, 2025 based on a failure to exhaust. ECF Nos. 1737,
1745. Next, Defendant filed a Motion on December 8, 2025, seeking, in part, for the court to
grant her compassionate release. That Motion was denied on December 9, 2025. ECF Nos.
1746, 1747.
3 Counts 1–7, 29–34, and 35–47 in the Fourth Superseding Indictment charged
Defendant with wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. ECF No. 495. Each of these groups
of counts related to a different scheme—Counts 1–7 involved a “tax fraud scheme,” Counts 29–
34 involved an “education fraud scheme,” and Counts 35–47 involved a “credit card fraud
scheme.” Id.; see also Presentence Report, ECF No. 1514 at PageID.17817–17833. The single
count information charged Defendant with aggravated identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1028A (in relation to the wire fraud offense charged in Count 35 of the Fourth Superseding
Indictment). 	ECF No. 1 in Cr. No. 21-00096 JMS.
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Defendant is 54 years old and presently incarcerated at Victorville
Medium I FCI with a projected release date of February 25, 2034. See Find an
Inmate, (“Find By Name” entering “Leihinahina Sullivan”), https://www.bop.gov/
inmateloc/ (last visited January 30, 2026).
The court decides the Motion without requiring a response from the
United States and without a hearing pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(d).
III. DISCUSSION
A. 	Legal Standard
Ordinarily, “a federal court ‘may not modify a term of imprisonment
once it has been imposed.’” United States v. Wright, 46 F.4th 938, 944 (9th Cir.
2022) (quoting United States v. Keller, 2 F.4th 1278, 1281 (9th Cir. 2021), and 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)). Congress created a limited exception for modifying the
sentence of a federal inmate who files a motion for “compassionate release”
satisfying the substantive and procedural requirements of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A). Section 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by the First Step Act of 2018
(“FSA”), provides in relevant part:
[T]he court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of
Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant after the
defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to
appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a
motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days
from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the
defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the
term of imprisonment . . . after considering the factors set
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forth in [18 U.S.C.] section 3553(a) to the extent that
they are applicable, if it finds that—
(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant
such a reduction;
. . . .
and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable
policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). “As compassionate release derogates from the
principle of finality, it is a ‘narrow’ remedy . . . and the court’s disposition of a
compassionate release motion ‘is discretionary, not mandatory[.]’” Wright, 46
F.4th at 944–45 (internal citations omitted). “[C]ompassionate release is not
sentencing or resentencing. The focus of compassionate release proceedings is not
on what sentence is most appropriate given the defendant’s background and crime;
it is on whether new circumstances warrant discretionary relief.” United States v.
Bryant, 144 F.4th 1119, 1128 (9th Cir. 2025).
But the FSA itself does not define “extraordinary and compelling
reasons.” “Instead, Congress stated that the Sentencing Commission, ‘in
promulgating general policy statements regarding the sentencing modification
provisions in section 3582(c)(1)(A) of title 18, shall describe what should be
considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction, including
the criteria to be applied and a list of specific examples.’” United States v. Aruda,
993 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 994(t)).
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United States Sentencing Commission Policy Statement § 1B1.13(a)
states, in relevant part, that a court may grant a motion for compassionate release
if, “after considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), to the extent that
they are applicable,” the court determines that: extraordinary and compelling
reasons warrant the reduction; the defendant “is not a danger to the safety of any
other person or to the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)”; and “the
reduction is consistent with [§ 1B1.13’s] policy statement.”
Section 1B1.13 then sets forth several specific extraordinary and
compelling reasons which may form—individually or in combination—the basis to
reduce a sentence: (1) certain medical circumstances; (2) age coupled with health
issues; (3) certain family circumstances; (4) being a victim of sexual or physical
abuse while in custody; (5) other circumstances (or a combination of
circumstances) “similar in gravity” to (1)–(4)4; and (6) an unusually long sentence.
Further, “rehabilitation of the defendant is not, by itself, an extraordinary and
compelling reason . . . . However, rehabilitation of the defendant while serving the
sentence may be considered in combination with other circumstances” in
determining whether and to what extent to reduce a term of incarceration.
4 The Sentencing Commission “considered but specifically rejected a requirement that
‘other reasons’ be similar in nature and consequence to the specified reasons. Rather, they need
be similar only in gravity . . . .” Supplement to USSG App. C, amend. 814, p. 207 (Nov. 1,
2023). Regardless, the Ninth Circuit has described this exception as “narrow.” United States v.
Bryant, 144 F.4th 1119, 1126 (9th Cir. 2025).
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Guidelines § 1B1.13(d). “[C]ourts are bound by § 1B1.13 in deciding all
compassionate release motions under § 3582(c)(1)(A)” and thus a defendant is
ineligible for compassionate release if he does not meet the showing required
under § 1B1.13. Bryant, 144 F.4th at 1124 (internal quotation marks omitted).
And although the court must consider “extraordinary and compelling”
reasons and the § 3553(a) factors, it may deny compassionate release on any of
these bases:
First, the district court must determine whether
“extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant” a
sentence reduction. Second, the court must evaluate
whether a reduction would be “consistent with applicable
policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.”
Third, the court must consider and weigh the factors set
forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to decide whether the
requested sentence reduction is warranted “under the
particular circumstances of the case.” Although a district
court must conclude that a defendant satisfies all three
predicates before granting a motion for compassionate
release, it may deny compassionate release if a defendant
fails to satisfy any of these grounds.
Wright, 46 F.4th at 945 (emphasis, footnote, and internal citations omitted). Thus,
a district court may deny a compassionate release motion based solely on a
defendant’s failure to show an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for release
under § 1B1.13. “[A] district court that properly denies compassionate release
need not evaluate each step” in the “sequential step-by-step analysis” required by
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Keller, 2 F.4th at 1284. “Such a reading is compelled
by the structure of the compassionate release statute, which treats its requirements
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as conjunctive.” Wright, 46 F.4th at 947 (citing id.). “This structure necessarily
dictates that a court may deny compassionate release at any stage of the
§ 3582(c)(1)(A) pipeline.” Id.
B. 	Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
To satisfy § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s exhaustion requirement—a mandatory
claim processing rule—a defendant must submit a request to the BOP that explains
the basis for the relief sought and provides a proposed release plan. See 28 C.F.R.
§ 571.61(a)(1)–(2); Keller, 2 F.4th at 1282. Here, it appears that Defendant has
exhausted her administrative remedies. See ECF No. 1750 at PageID.23699; ECF
No. 1750-1 at PageID.23708–23711.
C. 	Defendant Does Not Present an Extraordinary and Compelling Reason,
or a Combination of Such Reasons, Warranting Early Release
Defendant asserts that the court should grant her motion for
compassionate release based on a totality of circumstances, including: (1) her
medical condition, which centers around a right total hip replacement and the
presence of a tumor behind her right knee; (2) that the sentencing range has been
reduced by the Sentencing Commission; (3) dissatisfaction with many of the
court’s prior rulings; (4) the length of her sentence, coupled with conditions of
confinement that are more severe than normal due to COVID-19; and (5) her
extraordinary rehabilitation coupled with a low PATTERN (short for Prisoner
Assessment Tool Targeting Estimated Risk and Needs) score. ECF No. 1750. The
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court considers each argument and determines that Defendant fails to demonstrate
the applicability of any of the bases constituting extraordinary and compelling
reasons as set forth in § 1B1.13. See Bryant, 144 F.4th at 1124 (finding that a
defendant is ineligible for compassionate release if she does not meet the showing
required under § 1B1.13).5
First, Defendant claims that she is suffering from a medical condition
relating to her hip replacement that requires long-term or specialized medical care
that is not being provided and without which she is at risk of serious deterioration
in health or death. The same appears to be true for the tumor behind her knee. See
ECF No. 1750 at PageID.23691, 23702.
This claim fails—Defendant has not shown that she suffers from any
medical condition that “requires long-term or specialized medical care that is not
being provided” and that, without that medical care, she is “at risk of serious
deterioration in health or death.” Guideline § 1B1.13(b)(1)(C). Instead, Defendant
simply states, with no support, that as a result of her hip replacement and tumor she
5 Defendant’s Motion is premised on a faulty view of the law—that under Concepcion v.
United States, 597 U.S. 481 (2022), there is virtually no limitation on the information that the
court may consider in determining whether a defendant has shown extraordinary and compelling
reasons. See, e.g., ECF No. 1750 at PageID.23701–23702. But Concepcion involved the
imposition of a reduced sentence under § 404(b) of the FSA, not § 3582(c)(1)(A). In fact,
Concepcion recognized that for certain sentencing modifications, including ones brought under
§ 3582(c)(1)(A), “Congress expressly cabined district courts’ discretion by requiring courts to
abide by the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements.” Concepcioin 597 U.S. at 495. In
short, “[i]f a defendant cannot show ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ as defined in
§ 1B1.13, then [she] is ineligible for compassionate release.” Bryant, 114 F.4th at 1124.
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is “suffering from a medical condition that requires long-term or specialized
medical care that is not being provided and without which I am at risk of serious
deterioration in health or death.” ECF No. 1750 at PageID.23691. These
conclusory and unsupported statements are insufficient. See, e.g., United States v.
Sapp, 2025 WL 860100, at *3 (D. Idaho Mar. 18, 2025) (finding that a defendant
cannot rely on mere assertions of a medical condition to support a motion for
compassionate release); United States v. Masuisui, 2024 WL 4818706, at *4 (D.
Haw. Nov. 18, 2024) (“Here, however, despite his sweeping claims, Masuisui has
failed to provide any evidence of his medical conditions, prognosis, treatment
needs, or why the BOP medical facility at which he is currently incarcerated is
unable or unwilling to meet those needs.”); United States v. Dade, 2024 WL
404508, at *4 (D. Idaho Feb. 3, 2024) (“In the absence of any evidence that
[defendant’s] medical conditions are not controlled, the Court is not persuaded that
he has made the requisite showing for relief.”). In short, Defendant has failed to
meet her burden to show that her medical conditions satisfy the § 1B1.13(b)(1)(B)
criteria, which requires a showing that a serious medical condition “substantially
diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within the environment
of a correctional facility and from which he or she is not expected to recover.”
Finally, under § 1B1.13(b)(5), Defendant has not shown that her medical
conditions, whether by themselves or in combination with other reasons set forth in
§ 1B1.13(b)(1)–(4), are “similar in gravity” to the reasons set forth in
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§ 1B1.13(b)(1)–(4).6
Second, Defendant argues that she is entitled to compassionate release
because of a change in the guidelines since her sentencing. 	ECF No. 1750 at
PageID.23699. But Defendant previously filed an 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion
on this very basis, and the court denied that motion on December 13, 2024. See
ECF Nos. 1650, 1658. 	Even if this issue could be raised again under § 1B1.13,
the court will not reconsider that ruling here.
Third, throughout her Motion Defendant argues at great length that
the court has consistently ruled against her and has been biased against her. But
disagreement with the court’s rulings is not a basis for compassionate release under
§ 1B1.13. See Bryant, 144 F.4th at 1126–1127 (stating that § 3582(c)(1)(A)
provides a means for relief based on post-sentencing events).
Fourth, Defendant claims that there is a “[h]uge disparity between my
sentence of 17 years for wire fraud and identity theft with a restitution of $3.2
million and the average sentence for the same offense.” ECF No. 1750 at
6 	Although Defendant references COVID-19 and its hardship in a prison setting, she
fails to provide any explanation as to how conditions of confinement due to COVID-19 impact
her differently than other inmates. See United States v. Vela, 2025 WL 2210928, at *2 (D. Idaho
Aug. 2, 2025) (stating that harsh conditions of confinement that the defendant “endured during
the COVID-19 pandemic do not amount to an extraordinary and compelling reason at this time,
when vaccines are available for COVID-19, and it is no longer a pandemic” and that “[f]inding
these conditions to support an extraordinary or compelling circumstance would entitle every
prisoner who was incarcerated during the pandemic to a sentence reduction”).
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PageID.23699. 	But Defendant’s personal belief that her sentence is longer than
justified is not a basis to grant a motion for compassionate release under
§ 1B1.13(b)(6). Instead, under § 1B1.13(b)(6), an unusually long sentence can be
considered in determining whether a defendant shows an extraordinary and
compelling reason if a defendant has served at least 10 years of that sentence and
there is a change in the law (other than a Guideline amendment not made
retroactive), and that change would produce a gross disparity between the sentence
imposed and the sentence likely to be imposed at the time the motion was filed.
Defendant meets none of these criteria.
Fifth, Defendant alleges that her guidelines were incorrectly
calculated. ECF No. 1750 at PageID.23701. In addition to being incorrect, this is
not a basis to grant a motion for compassionate release. See Bryant, 144 F.4th at
1128 (9th Cir. 2025) (“Using the compassionate release statute to second-guess a
sentencing determination years later endorses an endless repetition of inquiry into
sentences that have already been through the wringer of judicial review.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Sixth, Defendant claims “extraordinary rehabilitation,” which is
demonstrated in her significant BOP programming. See ECF No. 1750 at
PageID.23703–23704. Rehabilitation standing alone is not a basis to grant a
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motion for compassionate release.7 And although the court may consider
rehabilitation in combination with other circumstances in determining whether and
to what extent to reduce a term of incarceration, the court finds that the totality of
the circumstances, including Defendant’s rehabilitation efforts, do not support
granting the Motion.
Whether viewed individually or in combination, Defendant has failed
to show extraordinary and compelling reasons in support of her Motion.
D. 	The Relevant § 3553(a) Factors Do Not Support Granting the Motion
Relevant § 3553(a) factors include: (1) “the nature and circumstances
of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant;” and (2) “the
need for the sentence imposed . . . (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to
promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to
afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from
further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in
the most effective manner.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)–(2). And, under the
parsimony clause, “[t]he court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater
than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth” in § 3553(a)(2). 18 U.S.C.
7 	Similarly, Defendant’s low PATTERN score is not a basis under § 1B1.13 to find
extraordinary and compelling reasons. See United States v. Rosales-Zuniga, 2024 WL 448383,
at *5 (D. Or. Feb. 5, 2024); United States v. Demming, 2025 WL 1115610, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Apr.
15, 2025). Instead, the court addresses it when considering the relevant § 3553(a) factors.
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§ 3553(a). Here, the relevant § 3553(a) factors do not support granting
Defendant’s Motion.8
The court starts with the offense conduct. Defendant engaged in three
separate fraud schemes: (1) a tax fraud scheme involving the filing of over 300
false federal tax returns and 300 false state tax returns, with 50 separate taxpayer
victims and an actual tax loss of over $2,700,000, ECF No. 1514 at PageID.17817–
17824; (2) a credit card fraud scheme involving 34 credit cards, with over
$1,000,000 fraudulently charged and over $140,000 charged-off by the banks, id.
at PageID.17825–17827; and (3) an education fraud scheme involving fraudulent
financial aid applications resulting in the disbursement of over $537,000, id. at
PageID.17828–17832.
Defendant went to great lengths to conceal her illegal activity,
directing fraud proceeds into at least 15 different bank accounts that she controlled
or had access to. Id. at PageID.17834. She used a nonprofit organization, Mobile
Native Hawaiian Health (“MNHH”), to obtain individuals’ personal identifying
information, to funnel fraud proceeds, and to provide apparent legitimacy to her
fraud. See, e.g., id. at PageID.7816–17817. She even used her minor son’s bank
account to deposit fraud proceeds. See id. at PageID.17806, 17816–17817.
8 This section largely tracks the court’s discussion of the relevant § 3553(a) analysis in a
previous order of the court denying a sentence reduction. See United States v. Sullivan, 2024
WL 5108275, at *2–5 (D. Haw. Dec. 13, 2024), aff’d, 2025 WL 2092841 (9th Cir. July 25,
2025). Nothing relevant has changed since that Order.
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As the court stated at sentencing:
[T]he criminal conduct across the board was staggering
in its scope, length and complexity. It was staggering in
the boldness in which Ms. Sullivan would engage in this
conduct. . . . [W]hen I say bold, I mean it’s just the sheer
number of tax returns and credit cards and just the natural
ability to lie and lie and lie. And it seems as if, when you
look at this offense conduct, that lies come easier to
Ms. Sullivan than the truth. And behind all of this is
unrelenting greed. . . . And that’s evidenced by both the
offense conduct itself and by the fact that [Defendant]
continued to engage in this conduct after indictment.
ECF No. 1579 at PageID.19547–19548 (sentencing hearing transcript).
Further, in weighing the nature and circumstances of the offense,
Defendant engaged in obstructive (if not criminal) conduct after she was first
indicted. On November 8, 2017, a First Superseding Indictment charged
Defendant with the filing of false tax returns of T.K. and R.C. while the case
against Defendant was pending. See ECF No. 1; ECF No. 27 at PageID.86; and
ECF No. 1514 at PageID.17835. The United States filed a motion to revoke bail,
and in response Defendant filed declarations of T.K. and R.C. stating that
Defendant did not prepare the disputed tax returns. ECF No. 43-1 at PageIDs.305–
307; ECF No. 43-2 at PageID.308–309. These declarations, however, were false.
See ECF No. 1514 at PageID.17835; ECF No. 41-3; ECF No. 41-5; and ECF No.
41-6.
Defendant also attempted to tamper with witnesses who testified
before the grand jury. Several tax fraud victims reported that Defendant told them
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to assert a Fifth Amendment privilege in the grand jury, and Defendant texted
grand jury witness S.D.: “Remember you answer ‘don’t know.’ Even if you think
you know.” ECF No. 1514 at PageID.17836. D.M., a friend of S.D., testified that
Defendant told him to lie to the grand jury regarding S.D. Id.
Defendant’s obstructive conduct continued into an evidentiary
sentencing hearing in which she testified. As stated by the court at sentencing,
Defendant testified “that she never misrepresented that she was acting on behalf of
a charitable institution, MNHH, in committing any offense. This clearly is
material and false.” ECF No. 1579 at PageID.19494. She also committed perjury
when she testified that “Henry Tanner’s mother gave her permission to use the
information in the aid application, including stating that [he] was homeless.” Id. at
PageID.19498.
Defendant’s criminal history is also a concern. Having completed law
school, Defendant applied for a low-interest loan for Native Hawaiians with the
Office of Hawaiian Affairs (“OHA”). ECF No. 1514 at PageID.17848. She was
approved for the loan, under the condition that she pass the Hawaii State bar exam.
On October 15, 2004, defendant provided OHA with a “Notice of Passing” the bar.
But when OHA called the Hawaii Supreme Court to confirm the results, it was
determined that Defendant in fact failed the bar exam—instead, Defendant
fraudulently altered the Notice of Passing to include her name. Id. at
PageID.17849. When asked by law enforcement about the bar results, Defendant
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blamed her sister, and denied altering the Notice of Passing. Id. This conduct
resulted in a 2005 conviction in Hawaii State Court for tampering with a
government record. Id. at PageID.17848. And several years later, in 2012,
Defendant was convicted of seven counts of unauthorized computer access under
Hawaii law. Id. at PageID.17850.
Despite the overwhelming evidence of Defendant’s fraudulent
conduct, she never accepted responsibility for her actions. As one example, she
blamed others during her sentencing hearing. As the court stated,
you’ve proven today in your allocution that you still
haven’t understood what you’ve done or accepted
responsibility in any way. . . . And you got up here today
and did what you always do, point a finger somewhere
else. Point a finger somewhere else. You deflect blame
and have no insight into your own wrongdoing.
ECF No. 1579 at PageID.19550–19551.
At sentencing, the court also commented on the paucity of mitigating
evidence relating to the offense or in Defendant’s history:
Now, I looked and tried to determine what are the
mitigating factors. And I tell you there’s not much on
that side of the ledger. I know that you have mental
health issues. We’ve been through that. You have two
children. I don’t doubt that you love your children. I
have no reason to doubt that. You’re going to be a
grandma soon apparently. But other than that, it’s very
hard for me to find mitigating evidence in this case. It’s
just very difficult to find in the record or even through
the course of this litigation.
Id. at PageID.19552.
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Given the totality of the circumstances, and taking into account the
§ 3553(a) factors and the parsimony clause, the court does not believe that
reducing Defendant’s sentence is appropriate. As the court stated at sentencing:
And I’m going to say something I’ve said only a few
times in my coming up, I guess, on 18 years as a judge,
which is, I am firmly convinced that if you don’t change,
and I see no indication you have the insight to change,
you will continue criminal conduct when you’re released.
I just see that as inevitable almost in your case. Because
you refuse to look inward. You refuse to do so. Your
own husband said that you’re incapable of following the
rules and think only of yourself. And that’s what I’ve
seen. Incapable of following the rules.
Id. at PageID.19551–19552.
The court has set forth some—but not all—of the scope and troubling
nature of Defendant’s conduct. The court has also taken into consideration the
evidence Defendant has presented in favor of her Motion, including her extensive
programming while incarcerated and her low PATTERN score. But, given the
totality of the evidence, a very significant sentence was (and remains) appropriate.
A reduction in sentence would, in the court’s view, result in a sentence that would
not be sufficient to comply with the goals of sentencing set forth in § 3553(a)(2), to
include the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to
promote respect for the law, to afford adequate deterrence, and to protect the public
from further crimes by the Defendant.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Defendant’s Motion for Compassionate Release—ECF No. 1750 in
Cr. No. 17-00104 JMS and ECF No. 342 in Cr. No. 21-00096 JMS—is DENIED.
Defendant is cautioned that, should she file any further motions for compassionate
release, she must clearly state what new facts or law support such a motion under
§ 1B1.13. A free-flowing discourse about past events involving her underlying
criminal prosecution is not a basis for compassionate release.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, January 30, 2026.
/s/ J. Michael Seabright
J. Michael Seabright
United States District Judge
Case 1:21-cr-00096-JMS Document 343 Filed 01/30/26 Page 18 of 18
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