Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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THE DISTRICT COURT OF GUAM
NOU XIONG, next friend for V.L.; V.L., on
their own behalf and on behalf of others
similarly situated,
Petitioners-Plaintiffs,
vs.
COLONEL ALAN P. BORJA, in his official
capacity as Warden of the Guam Department
of Corrections, Hagåtña Detention Facility;
SERGIO ALBARRAN, in his official capacity
as Field Office Director of U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement;1 and DOES 1-10,
Respondents-Defendants.
CIVIL CASE NO. 25-00026
DECISION & ORDER
DENYING RESPONDENTS-
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
SANCTIONS ON COUNSEL FOR
PETITIONERS-PLAINTIFFS
Before the court is Respondents-Defendants’ (collectively, “the Government”) Motion
for Sanctions on Counsel for Petitioners-Plaintiffs, Joshua J. Schroeder. ECF No. 34. Petitioners-
Plaintiffs filed an Opposition to the Government’s motion, and the Government filed its Reply.
ECF Nos. 42 & 43. Upon review of the filings and the relevant law, the court finds this matter
suitable for submission without oral argument. For the reasons stated below, the court hereby
1 At the June 7, 2025 hearing, counsel for Stephen Green and Ken Sherman informed the court that Sergio Albarran
is the new U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Field Office Director overseeing Guam. As such, Mr.
Albarran is substituted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d).
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DENIES the Government’s motion.
I. 	BACKGROUND
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
V.L. is a Hmong man who legally immigrated to the United States from a Thai refugee
camp as a child in December 1987. Am. Pet. at 3, ECF No. 5; Mot. for Sanctions at 7, ECF No.
34; Opp. to Mot. for Sanctions at 6, ECF No. 42. He entered the country as a lawful permanent
resident with a green card.2 ECF No. 42, at 6.
On September 25, 1998, V.L. was convicted of attempted murder in the state of
California. Gov’t Ex. A at 9, ECF No. 16-1. As a result, he was sentenced to twenty-two years of
imprisonment. ECF No. 34, at 2.
On February 27, 2018, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security served V.L. with a
notice to appear for his removal proceedings brought pursuant to the Immigration and
Nationality Act (“INA”). ECF No. 16-1, at 6-7. On March 20, 2018, the immigration judge
ordered V.L.’s removal to Laos. ECF No. 34-2, at 1. V.L. waived his right to appeal the
immigration judge’s order, and he remained in the country under an Order of Supervision. ECF
No. 34-2, at 2; ECF No. 34-1; Decl. of Att’y Joshua J. Schroeder at 7, ECF No. 42-3.
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement detained V.L. in April 2025. ECF No. 34, at
3. On April 19, 2025, V.L. received a Warning for Failure to Depart and on May 6, 2025, he
received a Notice to Alien of File Custody Review. ECF No. 16-2, at 10-14. V.L. called Nou
Xiong, on May 24, 2025, telling her that he would be removed to Laos the next morning, May
25, 2025. ECF No. 5, at 3.
B. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 25, 2025, the Petitioners-Plaintiffs filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
2 Petitioner, however, is a citizen of Laos, not the United States. ECF No. 16-1, at 9.
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the Northern District of Texas where V.L. was then being detained in the Prairieland Detention
Center. ECF No. 34, at 3; ECF No. 5, at 2. Petitioners-Plaintiffs presented twenty claims for
relief in the petition; all predicated upon Executive Orders and Proclamations invoking the
President’s authority under the Aliens Enemies Act (“AEA”).3 Pet. N.D. Tex. at 50-68, ECF No.
17-2. Petitioners-Plaintiffs then filed motions for a temporary restraining order and for class
certification. ECF No. 42-3, at 16. The Northern District of Texas ordered the government to not
remove V.L. from the United States, and it scheduled a hearing for the matter. Id.
On May 26, 2025, the government filed an Emergency Request for Phone Conference
and Clarification of Temporary Restraining Order asking for a “conference to clarify whether
removal under authorities other than the Alien Enemies Act (AEA) [was] permissible.”4 ECF
No. 16-1, at 1. The government informed the District Court for the Northern District of Texas
that they were not removing V.L. pursuant to the AEA but were instead removing him under the
INA. Id. The government attached V.L.’s removal order, notice to appear, and his criminal
records to the request. Id. at 4-11. After proffering this evidence, the government contended that
it should be allowed to remove V.L. to Laos pursuant to the INA removal order.5 Id. at 1-2.
The Northern District of Texas reviewed the government’s emergency request and denied
V.L.’s motion for a temporary restraining order. ECF No. 16-3. The court there held that V.L.
failed to establish a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits because the government
proffered evidence that V.L. was being removed pursuant to the respondents’ INA authority. Id.
3 Petitioner’s main contentions are tied to Proclamation 10903, “Invocation of the Alien Enemies Act Regarding the
Invasion of the United States by Tren de Aragua,” which draws its authority from the AEA to remove Venezuelan
citizens who are fourteen years or older and members of Tren de Aragua from the United States. ECF No. 5, at 20.
4 Counsel for Petitioners-Plaintiffs, Joshua J. Schroeder, stated that he missed the government’s phone call before it
filed this emergency request, and that it filed the request ex parte without his consent. ECF No. 42-3, at 18.
5 That same day, the government flew V.L. from Texas to Guam. ECF No. 42-3, at 16. V.L. disembarked from the
plane in Guam and the plane continued to Laos without him because of the order from the Northern District of
Texas blocking his removal from the country. ECF No. 34, at 9. The government held V.L. in the Hagåtña Detention
Center while he was on Guam. Id.
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at 3-4. Having decided the issue, the court cancelled its previously scheduled hearing on the
matter. ECF No. 42-3, at 4.
Later that same day, May 26, 2025, Petitioners-Plaintiffs filed a Renewed Emergency
Application for a Temporary Restraining Order. Gov’t Ex. E at 1, ECF No. 16-5. In the renewed
motion, they argued that the “assumptions based on the civil nature of the INA processes no
longer exist” and that “every person subject to INA processes are due notice and an opportunity
to challenge the actions of the executive under military powers.” Id. at 2-3. They further stated
that notice of V.L.’s removal “was not served on [his] counsel and no notice was given to
explain how the removal … complies with U.S. treaty obligations that preclude torture and
removal to a place where torture and death are likely to occur.” Id. at 3. On June 4, 2025, the
court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed Petitioners-Plaintiffs’ habeas petition finding
that the Petitioners-Plaintiffs lacked subject matter jurisdiction to challenge the removal pursuant
to 8 U.S.C. § 1252 of the INA.6 Gov’t Ex. G, at 2-4, ECF No. 16-7.
While the renewed application was pending, Petitioners-Plaintiffs initiated proceedings in
this court by filing a habeas petition on June 1, 2025. Pet., ECF No. 1. The next day, on June 2,
2025, they filed the First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, and realleged the twenty
claims for relief predicated upon the AEA – which were almost identical to the twenty claims
they brought in the Texas case. Compare ECF No. 5 at 52-72, with ECF No. 17-2 at 50-68. They
also filed an Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and an Emergency Motion to
Certify Class where they alleged that V.L. and his proposed class were “military detainees”
subject to “immediate, summary removal, disappearance, or extraordinary rendition from the
United States pursuant to the AEA.”7 ECF No. 6, at 3; ECF No. 7. Accordingly, this court
6 V.L. had been given the opportunity to reply to the government’s INA jurisdiction argument. ECF No. 22-6.
7 Mr. Schroeder averred that V.L.’s “criminal history and immigration status [were] unclear” to him at the time of
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ordered the Government to not remove V.L. from the “District of Guam without advance notice
of the intended move.” ECF No. 8.
On June 5, 2025, the Government filed its Opposition in the present case to Petitioners-
Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order arguing that V.L. was “seeking a
second, or rather third, bite at the proverbial apple.” ECF No. 16, at 2. The Government further
asserted that the “request for a TRO is baseless as [V.L. was] well-aware that [his] removal [was]
pursuant to Title 8 of the U.S. Code, and more specifically the Immigration Nationality Act - not
the Alien Enemies Act.” Id. On June 6, 2025, Petitioners-Plaintiffs filed their Reply, contending
that the Government was not following its own laws, including both the AEA and the INA. ECF
No. 18, at 8. Moreover, they asserted that “[i]nitiating a Title 8 removal order does not absolve
the Government from finding an appropriate location to remove individuals to, as well as its
legal duty under the Administrative Procedures Act.”8 Id. at 9. They also noted that this court
had jurisdiction over this Amended Petition through the Suspension Clause. Id. at 4-6.
On June 7, 2025, this court held its hearing on the Emergency Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order and Emergency Motion to Certify Class. ECF No. 20. At the Saturday hearing,
Mr. Schroeder appeared for V.L. and waived his client’s presence at the hearing. Transcript of
Proceedings at 8, ECF No. 32. The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Districts of Guam and the
Northern Mariana Islands and the Office of the Attorney General of Guam appeared for
Defendants-Respondents. Id. at 5-6.
Mr. Schroeder argued that the INA removal order was pretextual,9 and the Government
the filing of the emergency motions. Decl. of Joshua J. Schroeder, at 2, ECF No. 6-2.
8 Petitioners-Plaintiffs commented that it “appears that the Government cites to Title 8 as an apparent legal basis to
accomplish process-less death sentences, indefinite detentions, torture, and other horrors without due process or the
opportunity to be heard.” ECF No. 18, at 16.
9 Mr. Schroeder confirmed after the court questioned him multiple times directly that he received “notice through
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relied on the AEA to remove V.L. Id. at 12, 32. He reached this conclusion for two reasons.
First, the Government did not have the authority to “remove someone to a place where they’re
likely to be killed, tortured, you know, indefinitely detained or whatnot.” Id. at 23. Second, the
Government could not remove individuals “to Laos or anywhere else without the sovereign
consent of those nations.” Id. at 23-24. He argued that his client was being treated like “some
sort of enemy combatant” under the AEA, and the fact that President Trump imposed a travel
ban on the country of Laos,10 V.L.’s country of origin, demonstrated that the Government had no
intention of following the traditional INA removal process.11 Id. at 8-9. Because he believed that
his client could not be removed to Laos, Mr. Schroeder asserted that that his client was due
additional notice and an additional opportunity to be heard after his notice of removal “to make
sure that if” V.L. was being removed, he would not “be removed somewhere dangerous or to a
war zone.”12 Id. at 14-15. When repeatedly pressed by the court on the issue of jurisdiction, Mr.
Schroeder asserted that his client had jurisdiction to bring his claims under the AEA based on
Boumediene v. Bush and the Suspension Clause of the Constitution. Id. at 13, 29, 48-49.
this court proceeding and through the proceeding that happened in the Northern District of Texas about why” the
Government was removing his client under the INA, but he maintained that this client was a “part of a group of
people who [were] not removable or were determined not to be removable.” ECF No. 32, at 14. Mr. Schroeder also
stated that he “had a little history [with the case] because … the crime comes from California” and yet he still had
“reason to believe that [the basis for his client’s removal] was the AEA and war powers, proclamations and the idea
that my client was an enemy of the state or an enemy alien or something like that.” Id. at 16-17, 20.
10 Traditionally, under the INA, the United States would not remove an individual to a country that does not accept
removals or to a country that would torture the individual. ECF No. 42, at 6. DHS would instead place that
individual under an Order of Supervision until such time that removal became feasible. Id.
11 Petitioner relied on other additional circumstantial evidence to contend that his INA removal was pretextual. ECF
No. 32, at 32. For example, he argued that the President Trump ordered non-Venezuelans, thus not semantically
subject to the President Trump’s Proclamation 10903, to be sent to Centro de Confinamiento del Terrorismo
(“CECOT”) in El Salvador. Id. This meant that Petitioner, a non-Venezuelan could also be sent to CECOT,
according to Mr. Schroeder’s analysis. Mr. Schroeder also cited to the high-profile case of Kilmar Abrego Garcia as
another example of the Government ignoring the typical process for removals as justification for his argument that
the Government here was not following the traditional INA removal process. See ECF No. 42-3, at 7.
12 Mr. Schroeder argued that this was “not a normal immigration way of handling a removal” and that notice of his
client’s removal coming through the habeas judicial process is “not sufficient notice.” ECF No. 32, at 20-21.
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The Government countered that “[t]his is an appeal of a Title 8 removal disguised as a
habeas petition under Title 50.” Id. at 36. The evidence demonstrated that V.L.’s “removal [was]
under the INA [through] both his notice to appeal and the order of removal, which the petitioner
was well aware of before filing his petition in this court.” Id. at 37. This conclusion was further
supported by the fact that V.L. was neither Venezuelan nor a member of Tren de Aragua,
meaning Proclamation 10903 did not apply to him. Id. The Government asserted that any
argument to the contrary was “pure conjecture and speculation” which was directly refuted by its
evidence. Id. at 38. The Government confirmed that V.L. was being removed to Laos13 and
stated that the court had no jurisdiction to review his removal order under the INA.14 Id. at 38-39
(the Government answered affirmatively when asked if V.L. was going to Laos).
After the hearing, Petitioners-Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Stay Pending Appeal. ECF No.
21. On June 9, 2025, the court denied the Emergency Application for Temporary Restraining
Order, Emergency Motion to Certify Class, and Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, and dismissed
the habeas petition with prejudice. ECF No. 25. The court reasoned Petitioners-Plaintiffs failed
to show a likelihood of success on the merits as the Government produced evidence
demonstrating that V.L.’s removal was occurring under the INA. Id. at 6. It also stated that
Petitioners-Plaintiffs could not represent a class because he “failed to show commonality,
typicality, and adequacy” as he was being removed under the INA, not the AEA. Id. at 7. Lastly,
the court concluded that Petitioners-Plaintiffs failed to establish jurisdiction for his claims
because of the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the INA. Id.
Petitioners-Plaintiffs appealed the court’s decision to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
13 The Government later stated “he was intended to be moved to Laos and that was the plan. I don’t know what will
happen from here on out.” ECF No. 32, at 53.
14 The Government alleged that the Petitioner wanted to “use this run-of-the-mill Title 8 removal to jump into the
national fray and challenge the president’s proclamations under the AEA.” ECF No. 32, at 40.
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Circuit which affirmed this court’s decision on jurisdictional grounds. ECF Nos. 28, 44. The
court must now consider the Government’s Motion for Sanctions on Counsel for Petitioners-
Plaintiffs. ECF No. 34.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
The court can sanction attorneys under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and its inherent authority.
Macedo v. Dolgen Cal., LLC, No. 1:23-cv-00840, 2025 WL 2203021, *7-8 (E.D. Cal. 2025).
Sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the court’s inherent authority are reserved for
“extraordinary” circumstances. In re Keegan Mgmt. Co., Sec. Litig., 78 F.3d 431, 437 (9th Cir.
1996) (simplified); see also Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991) (“Because of their
very potency, inherent powers must be exercised with restraint and discretion.”). “The Ninth
Circuit has not addressed the burden of proof required for compensatory sanctions, but a finding
of bad faith by clear and convincing evidence is sufficient.” In re Facebook, Inc. Consumer
Privacy User Profile Litig., 655 F.Supp.3d 899, 925 (N.D. Cal. 2023) (citing Lahiri v. Universal
Music & Video Distrib. Corp., 606 F.3d 1216, 1219 (9th Cir. 2010)).
III. 	DISCUSSION
The Government requests that this court impose sanctions on V.L.’s attorney, Mr. Joshua
J. Shroeder, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the court’s inherent authority. ECF No. 34, at 23-
24. The Government alleges that Mr. Schroeder knowingly or recklessly made frivolous
arguments. Id. at 17. The Government focuses on three different examples. First, Mr. Schroeder
had notice about V.L.’s INA removal at least six days before filing the initial petition here
because of the government’s filings in the Texas case, and the Government argues that Mr.
Schroeder should have performed an inquiry into V.L.’s removal.15 Id. at 17-18; see also ECF
No. 43, at 2-3. Second, the Government argues that Mr. Schroeder’s AEA arguments were
15 Mr. Schroeder was aware of V.L.’s order of removal prior to filing this habeas petition. ECF No. 42-3, at ¶ 25.
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meritless because the AEA could not have possibly applied to Mr. Schroeder’s client who was
neither a Venezuelan nor a member of Tren de Aragua. Id. at 17. Third, the Government asserts
that Mr. Schroeder’s jurisdictional arguments were baseless, yet he continued to argue them
regardless. Id. at 19.
The Government also alleges that Mr. Schroeder made these frivolous arguments for an
improper purpose. Id. at 20-21. It contends that Mr. Schroeder engaged in this litigation “to delay
the government’s lawful execution of [the Petitioner’s] removal to Laos” and he did so with
persistent stubbornness demonstrating bad faith. Id. The Government cites to Mr. Schroeder’s
repeated filings, even after the Northern District of Texas found that it did not have subject
matter jurisdiction, as evidence of frivolousness with an improper purpose. Id. at 19, 21.
Imposition of sanctions here would “deter attorneys from bringing groundless actions to delay or
defeat the enforcement of the law.” Id. at 23.
In its reply brief, the Government further argued that Mr. Schroeder had not previously
mentioned the Order of Supervision and that he “did not cite Laos’s historical refusal to accept
deportees from the United States as a reason to distrust that the government was removing V.L.
to Laos until after this Court dismissed the petition.” ECF No. 43, at 3-5.
Mr. Schroeder counters that he zealously advocated for his client “to secure notice and
ordinary process amid acknowledged uncertainty about authority and destination.”16 ECF No.
42, at 13. He described his filings as “narrow” and appropriate under the circumstances as there
“was no discovery, no duplicative motion practice, and no effort to keep collateral disputes alive
once issues [were] mooted.” Id. He further states that the Government has failed to provide
“evidence of subjective bad faith” as required, and that the Government has also failed to provide
16 In addition to his Opposition brief, Mr. Schroeder provided a lengthy declaration on his own behalf and
declarations from several legal professionals who contend that he did not act with subjective bad faith and that his
belief that the United States would not remove individuals to Laos was reasonable. ECF No. 42-3, 42-4, 42-5, 42-6.
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a dollar amount or other accounting method for its incurred costs. Id. at 11, 14. Accordingly, he
asks the court to deny the Government’s motion with prejudice. Id. at 16-17.
A. SECTION 1927
Section 1927 of Title 28 of the United States Code grants courts the authority “to hold
attorneys personally liable for fees and costs incurred as a result of their misconduct.” Caputo v.
Tungsten Heavy Powder, Inc., 96 F.4th 1111, 1153 (9th Cir. 2024). Specifically, the court can
sanction any attorney “who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and
vexatiously.”17 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Under this statute, the court can require the attorney “to satisfy
personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such
conduct.” Id.
The Ninth Circuit has “held that ‘[s]anctions pursuant to section 1927 must be supported
by a finding of subjective bad faith.’” Lake v. Gates, 130 F.4th 1064, 1070 (9th Cir. 2025)
(quoting Blixseth v. Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC, 796 F.3d 1004, 1007 (9th Cir. 2015)). Bad
faiths means “an attorney knowingly or recklessly raises a frivolous argument or argues a
meritorious claim for the purpose of harassing an opponent.” Id. Frivolous arguments “for the
purposes of § 1927 sanctions … are ‘baseless and made without reasonable and competent
inquiry’ or made up of ‘legal or factual contentions so weak as to constitute objective evidence
of improper purpose.’” Caputo, 96 F.4th at 1155 (quoting In re Girardi, 611 F.3d 1027, 1062
(9th Cir. 2010)). As the Ninth Circuit has noted, however, “carelessly, negligently, or
unreasonably multiplying the proceedings is not enough.” In re Girardi, 611 F.3d at 1061.
The court finds that Mr. Schroeder did not knowingly or recklessly raise frivolous
arguments, and, therefore, he did not have subjective bad faith as necessary for a sanction under
17 Section 1927 sanctions “cannot be applied to an initial pleading.” In re Keegan Mgmt. Co., Sec. Litig., 78 F.3d at
435.
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28 U.S.C. § 1927. The court further finds that Mr. Schroeder did not have an improper purpose
in filing the petition or any of the related motions. Mr. Schroeder worked in an expedited manner
in an attempt to best preserve his client’s rights. While his filings could have been more
diligently prepared, better articulated, and more clearly organized, the court does not find that
this is one of those exceptional circumstances that warrant sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.
Mr. Schroeder’s arguments are more extensive than the Government’s simplified, factual
assertions as noted above. Mr. Schroeder argued that the lack of process exhibited in V.L.’s
removal demonstrated that his removal was occurring outside of the traditional INA process and
was instead occurring under the AEA. He contends that, under the circumstances, he reasonably
argued that his client could not be removed under the INA “due to Laos’s refusal to accept
deportees.” ECF No. 42-3, at ¶ 25. At the hearing, Mr. Schroeder argued that “Laos has generally
rejected removals because the Hmong people who are in this country are here because they took
sides in the war against [Laos].” ECF No. 32, at 23.
Mr. Schroeder further asserts that his arguments regarding notice and process were also
reasonable because his client was subject to an Order of Supervision and because his client
would be subject to torture if he was returned to Laos as a Hmong man. ECF No. 32, at 14. He
supported these conclusions with his own personal experience as an immigration attorney and
based on his consultation with another immigration attorney.18 ECF No. 42-3, at ¶ 14. He also
supported these conclusions based on media stories suggesting the Government violated court
orders to illegally remove people to South Sudan and El Salvador. ECF No. 5, at 21, 34, 50.
Mr. Schroeder provided a lengthy dissertation on the history of habeas corpus in the
Amended Petition, and he concluded that the Government’s removal of V.L. without the
18 Mr. Schroeder supported his AEA claims with other circumstantial evidence to demonstrate that the Government
was no longer conducting typical INA deportations. See supra note 12.
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opportunity to be heard before a federal court would result in the suspension of habeas corpus in
violation of the Suspension Clause of the Constitution. ECF No. 5, at 57. He developed the
history of the doctrine and cited Supreme Court precedent. See generally ECF No. 5. His legal
argument failed, but he made a good faith argument of what he contends the law should be, and
this is not a sanctionable offense. See Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 830-31 (9th
Cir. 1986) (“[T]he pleader need not be correct in his view of the law … [he] must have a ‘good
faith argument’ for his or her view of what the law is, or should be.”).
Although this court and the court in the Northern District of Texas ultimately disagreed
with counsel and concluded that this was a typical INA removal based on the evidence presented
by the Government, the court does not find Mr. Schroeder’s arguments to be completely baseless
or that he did not conduct a competent inquiry. Counsel relied on circumstantial evidence and his
own professional experience to argue zealously on behalf of his client because he hoped to
preserve his client’s right to due process of the law. See Lake, 130 F.4th at 1071 (Bumatay, J.,
dissenting) (“But asserting an unpersuasive claim is different from asserting a sanctionable
one.”) (emphasis in the original). Considering the expedited nature of this case and the good faith
arguments presented by counsel, Mr. Schroeder’s conduct was reasonable.
B. INHERENT AUTHORITY
Courts have the “inherent power to ‘fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which
abuses the judicial process.’” Caputo v. Tungsten Heavy Powder, Inc., 96 F.4th 1111, 1148 (9th
Cir. 2024) (quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44-45 (1991)). A monetary sanction
based on the court’s inherent authority must be based on “either ‘(1) a willful violation of a court
order; or (2) bad faith.’” Id. (quoting Am. Unites for Kids v. Rousseau, 985 F.3d 1075, 1090 (9th
Cir. 2021)). A finding of bad faith, or “conduct tantamount to bad faith,” can be based on a
“broad range of willful improper conduct” like frivolousness, “vindictiveness, obduracy, or mala
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fides.” Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 992, 994 (9th Cir. 2001). A court awarding a compensatory
sanction “must ‘apply a “but-for” causation standard,’ tracing the compensation back to the
sanctionable conduct of the party or attorney.”19 Id. (quoting Am. Unites for Kids, 985 F.3d at
1089-90).
As stated above, the court does not find that Mr. Schroeder acted in bad faith in pursuing
this habeas petition on behalf of his client. First, Mr. Schroeder’s arguments regarding the AEA,
while unpersuasive, were colorable based on the circumstantial evidence he offered to support
his allegations. Second, Mr. Schroeder’s jurisdictional arguments, while also unpersuasive, were
made in good faith as he supported his conclusions with discussions on common law, natural
law, and precedential opinions related to the Suspension Clause.
Mr. Schroeder identified several reasons for why his client was actually being removed
under the AEA. For example, the country of Laos had “refused to accept deportees for decades”
and Petitioner’s Hmong background made it even more unlikely for him to be sent to Laos
because he would possibly be considered an enemy of the country of Laos. ECF No. 42-3, at ¶
27. Thus, DHS could not remove the Petitioner to Laos pursuant to V.L.’s INA removal order
because Laos had historically not accepted removals from the United States and because the INA
does not allow for removals to a country for an individual who would be at risk of torture unless
there is additional process. ECF No. 32, at 23; see also id. at 14-15 (describing how the proper
INA protocols were not being followed for an individual designated to be “removed somewhere
dangerous”). Mr. Schroeder also highlighted at the hearing that the Government was ignoring the
INA in other high-profile examples, like for Kilmar Abrego Garcia, who Mr. Schroeder contends
was removed in contravention of the law. See id. at 33-35. While the court ultimately found the
19 Courts can rely on the but-for standard in “exceptional cases” to “shift all of a party’s fees, from either the start or
some midpoint of a suit, in one fell swoop.” Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 581 U.S. 101, 110 (2017).
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Government’s evidence to be persuasive, Mr. Schroeder’s arguments were not completely
without merit, and the court finds that they were not made in bad faith.
Mr. Schroeder’s jurisdictional arguments pushed against the current precedent on subject
matter jurisdiction in habeas cases. This is permissible when a party has a good faith argument
for what the law is or what the law should be. See Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 830-31. Mr. Schroeder
developed the common law history of the right to habeas corpus relief and outlined many of its
natural law principles. See generally ECF No. 5. He then cited Supreme Court precedent on
federal court jurisdiction related to the Suspension Clause of the Constitution to argue that his
client’s claims should be heard. See also ECF No. 32, at 29-30 (arguing at the hearing that his
client’s claims were properly before the court based on the Suspension Clause and the Supreme
Court’s holding in Boumediene v. Bush). The court chose to follow the precedent that it found to
be more applicable to the facts of the present case, but Mr. Schroeder’s arguments were not
meritless and are not deserving of sanction where, as here, the court finds that Mr. Schroeder
made the arguments in good faith. Accordingly, the court does not find it appropriate to sanction
Mr. Schroeder using its inherent authority.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that Mr. Schroeder did not have the requisite
bad faith for sanctions. As such, the court DENIES the Government’s motion with prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Frances M. Tydingco-Gatewood
Chief Judge
Dated:Apr 20, 2026
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