Corbin L Young, LLC

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
IN THE MATTER OF: 	: 	CASE NUMBER
:
CORBIN L YOUNG, LLC, 	: 	26-50042-LRC
:
:
Debtor. 	:
:
CITIZENS BANK NA 	: 	CONTESTED MATTER
f/k/a RBS Citizens NA, 	:
:
Movant, 	:
:
v. 	:
:
CORBIN L YOUNG, LLC, 	: 	IN PROCEEDINGS UNDER
: 	CHAPTER 11 OF THE
Respondent. 	: 	BANKRUPTCY CODE
ORDER
Before the Court is the Motion for Relief from Automatic Stay Nunc Pro Tunc to
January 2, 2026, or in the Alternative Motion to Confirm Property is not Part of the
_______________________________________________________________
IT IS ORDERED as set forth below:
_____________________________________
Lisa Ritchey Craig
U.S. Bankruptcy Court Judge
Date: February 9, 2026
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Bankruptcy Estate (Doc. 16, the “Motion”), filed by Citizens Bank NA f/k/a RBS Citizens
NA (“Movant”) and called for hearing on January 29, 2026 (the “Hearing”). 	Present at the
Hearing were Anjali Khosla, counsel for Movant; Alan Hinderleider, counsel for the
United States Trustee; and creditor Corbin L. Young (“Young”). 	Corbin L Young, LLC
(“Debtor”) failed to appear in opposition to the Motion.
On March 25, 2025, Debtor filed a pro se voluntary petition under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code. 	See Case Number 25-53242-LRC (the “First Case”). 	On March 26,
2026, the Court entered an Order Regarding Pro Se Entity Filing, notifying Debtor that it
could not proceed in the bankruptcy case without counsel and giving Debtor until April 9,
2025, to file an application to employ counsel. 	First Case, Doc. 5. 	According to the
documents filed by Debtor in the First Case, Debtor owned only one asset and owed no
unsecured debts and only one secured debt. 	First Case, Docs. 2, 12. The docket of the First
Case reflects that Debtor failed to appear for the first meeting of creditors scheduled for
April 25, 2025. 	After forbearing for several weeks past the April 9 th deadline, the Court
eventually dismissed the First Case on April 28, 2025, due to Debtor’s continued failure to
obtain counsel. First Case, Doc. 17.
On January 2, 2026 (the “Petition Date”), Debtor filed a second pro se Chapter 11
petition. 	On January 5, 2026, the Court again entered its Order Regarding Pro Se Entity
Filing, notifying Debtor that it could not proceed in a bankruptcy case without counsel and
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giving Debtor until January 20, 2026, to hire counsel. 	Doc. 4. 	Debtor’s filed schedules,
again, indicate that, other than $3,000 in bank savings, Debtor owns only one asset and has
no unsecured creditors and only one secured creditor.1
On January 5, 2026, Movant filed an Emergency Motion to Cry Foreclosure Sale
(Doc. 5, the “Emergency Motion”). 	In the Emergency Motion, Movant asserted that
Young was obligated on a note (the “Loan”) secured by a deed to secure debt on 5530
Campbellton Road SW, Atlanta, GA 30331 (the “Property”) and that Movant is an entity
entitled to enforce the note and security deed. 	Movant further alleged that Debtor filed
this bankruptcy case on the eve of a scheduled foreclosure sale for the purpose of hindering
and delaying Movant from exercising its state law remedies and foreclosing on the
Property. 	Movant noted that this case is Debtor’s second Chapter 11 case and that Debtor
filed this case without counsel, notwithstanding its knowledge that doing so caused the
dismissal of the First Case. 	Movant also contended that Young, rather than Debtor, owned
the Property. 	According to Movant, Young, acting as the principal of Debtor, claimed in a
letter to Movant that, although Debtor filed this case to protect Young’s interest in the
Property, Debtor’s bankruptcy filing somehow stayed Movant’s scheduled foreclosure
sale. See Emergency Motion, Exhibit C. 	Accordingly, out of an abundance of caution,
Movant filed the Emergency Motion, asking the Court to allow Movant to cry the
1 On Schedule D, Debtor lists both Young and Movant as holding a security interest in Debtor’s real estate. 	There
appears to be only one debt, however.
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foreclosure sale. 	Given the shortened notice, Movant agreed not to record any foreclosure
deed until the Court could hold a further hearing with additional notice.
The Court held an expedited hearing on the Emergency Motion on January 6, 2026,
at which counsel for Movant and counsel for the United States Trustee appeared. 	No party
appeared in opposition to the Emergency Motion, and the Court entered an order permitting
Movant to cry the foreclosure sale without recording the foreclosure sale deed. 	Doc. 9.
On January 12, 2026, Movant filed the Motion, which discloses that Movant held a
foreclosure sale on January 6, 2026, and purchased the Property. 	Movant further asserted
that the payoff on the Loan as of the date of the foreclosure sale was $352,116.52, that the
fair market value of the Property was $308,000,2 that the Loan originated in February
2024, and that Movant had received a total of only five payments on the Loan since that
time. 	Movant asserted that the lack of payments on the Loan while the arrearage
continued to increase evidenced Debtor’s bad faith in filing the case and demonstrated “an
intention to thwart the lender in its attempt to enforce its rights to foreclose this property
and ultimately amount to a scheme to delay and hinder Movant.” 	Accordingly, Movant
requested the Court lift the stay retroactively to the date of the foreclosure sale, permit
Movant to record the foreclosure sale deed, and grant whatever relief is necessary to permit
Movant to exercise its state law rights to recover the Property. 	Alternatively, if the Court
2 This figure is consistent with the value placed on the Property by Debtor on Schedule A/B of $305,500. 	See Doc.
19.
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found that the Property was not property of Debtor’s bankruptcy estate and, therefore, the
automatic stay did not apply, Movant requested an order confirming that fact.
On January 16, 2026, Young filed a letter in apparent response to the Emergency
Motion and the Court’s order allowing Movant to cry the foreclosure sale of the Property
(Doc. 17, the “Letter”). 	In the Letter, Young did not dispute Movant’s statements that
Young, rather than Debtor, owned the Property. 	Indeed, Young stated “Yes, Corbin L
Young is the owner of the [Property]” but argued that Young’s ownership of the Property
did not preclude a finding that Debtor may have a “vested interest” in the Property “without
the necessity of a transfer of assets.” 	Letter, at 2. 	In the Letter, Young also referenced a
lawsuit he filed in the District Court (Case No. 25-7410, the “District Court Action”) on
December 29, 2025. 	In the complaint filed in the District Court Action, Young alleged
that the named defendants were “claiming ownership and the right to foreclose on Young’s
residential home and property of 5530 Campbellton Road SW, Atlanta, GA 30331.”
District Court Action, Doc. 1 (the “Complaint”), p. 2. 	There is no allegation in the
Complaint that Debtor owned an interest in the Property. 	Young also repeatedly argued
that the defendants’ attempts to foreclose the loan constituted a violation of Young’s due
process rights, presumably because he was the owner of the Property. 	Id., pp. 6, 9 (noting
that the Fifth Amendment prevents any person from being deprived of property without due
process).
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At the Hearing, Movant again asserted that the Property was not property of
Debtor’s bankruptcy estate. 	Alternatively, Movant argued that, if the Court found that the
Property was property of Debtor’s bankruptcy estate, given the facts surrounding the filing
of the case and Debtor’s failure to prosecute the case by obtaining counsel, it would be
inequitable to require Movant to rescind the foreclosure sale and start over. 	Young,
appearing in his capacity as a creditor of Debtor, argued, without support, that the Court
should not have allowed Movant to conduct a nonjudicial foreclose sale because the
contract between the parties required Movant to foreclose through a judicial foreclosure
proceeding. 	Young also asserted that Movant had not demonstrated it was the owner of
the note and deed to secure debt.3 	The United States Trustee took no position on the
Motion.
After hearing the arguments of Movant and Young, the Court concluded that the
Property was not property of Debtor’s bankruptcy estate on the Petition Date and that
Debtor filed this case in bad faith. 	After the Court announced its ruling and concluded the
Hearing, Young stated that he had a “quit claim” deed. 	Immediately after the Hearing,
Young filed the quit claim deed with the Clerk of Court (Doc. 25, the “Quit Claim Deed”).
Notwithstanding Young’s multiple assertions to the District Court and this Court that he
3 Based on the documents filed by Movant, the Court finds that Movant has established a “colorable claim” that it is
entitled to enforce the note and security deed. 	See In re Dees, No. 19-66217-PWB, 2021 WL 3671110, at *4 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. Aug. 12, 2021), aff'd sub nom. Dees v. New Rez LLC, No. 1:21-CV-3475-JPB, 2022 WL 3030548 (N.D. Ga.
July 29, 2022) (noting that a showing of a colorable claim provides sufficient standing to a movant seeking relief from
the automatic stay).
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owned the Property, the Quit Claim Deed, executed on March 25, 2025, purports to transfer
the Property from Young to Debtor. 	It is witnessed and notarized but does not bear any
recording stamp. 	The Quit Claim Deed contains certain language that appears to make the
transfer of the Property to Debtor conditional or perhaps subject to divestment upon the
occurrence of a certain event.
The Court has no admissible evidence before it that Debtor owned the Property on
the Petition Date. 	Out of an abundance of caution, however, the Court will modify the
ruling it made at the Hearing to solely grant Movant the relief it requested in the Motion
rather than the alternative relief. 	The filing of a bankruptcy petition in bad faith
constitutes “cause” to lift the stay pursuant to § 362(d)(1). In re Phoenix Piccadilly, Ltd.,
849 F.2d 1393, 1394 (11th Cir. 1988) (considering the existence of certain bad faith factors
to determine whether a Chapter 11 petition was filed in bad faith; these factors are any
which 	evidence 	‘an 	intent 	to 	abuse 	the 	judicial 	process 	and 	the 	purposes 	of 	the
reorganization provisions’ or, in particular, factors which evidence that the petition was
filed ‘to delay or frustrate the legitimate efforts of secured creditors to enforce their
rights’”).
Here, the Phoenix Piccadilly factors favor a finding that Debtor filed this case in
bad faith: (1) assuming Debtor owns the Property, Debtor has only one asset in which it
does not have legal title as the Property is subject to Movant’s interest; (2) Debtor does not
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appear to be operating a substantial business in the Property; (3) Debtor filed this case on
the eve of a foreclosure sale of the Property and for no other apparent reason; (4) Debtor
does not appear to have any employees; (5) Debtor has no unsecured creditors; (6) Debtor
filed but did not prosecute the First Case; (7) this case is clearly a two-party dispute
between Debtor and Movant; and (8) as Debtor has not fulfilled its obligations as a Chapter
11 debtor, this case is due to be dismissed as a result of Debtor’s failure to file an
application to employ counsel. The Phoenix Picadilly factors overwhelmingly establish
that this case was filed in bad faith for the sole purpose of hindering and delaying Movant
from exercising its state law rights with regard to the Property, and that constitutes “cause”
to modify the stay under § 362(d)(1). 	Further, given the fact that this case will be
dismissed, no bankruptcy purpose would be served by not modifying the automatic stay to
permit Movant to record the foreclosure sale deed.
For all these reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion is GRANTED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the automatic stay provided by 11 U.S.C. §
362(a), which the Court previously modified to permit Movant to cry the foreclosure sale,
is hereby further modified to permit Movant to record the foreclosure sale deed and to
recover possession of the Property.
END OF DOCUMENT
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Distribution List
Corbin L Young, LLC
5530 Campbellton Rd SW
South Fulton, GA 30331
Corbin L Young
5530 Campbellton Rd SW
South Fulton, GA 30331
Alan Hinderleider
Office of the United States Trustee
362 Richard B Russell Federal Building
75 Ted Turner Drive, S.W.
Atlanta, GA 30303
Anjali Khosla
Rubin Lublin, LLC
3145 Avalon Ridge Place, Suite 100
Peachtree Corners, GA 30071
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