PARKER v. FEDEX CORPORATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
TIMOTHY PARKER,
Plaintiff,
v.
FEDEX CORPORATION,
Defendant.
CIVIL ACTION NO.
5:26-cv-00152-TES
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff, Timothy Parker, filed suit against Defendant, the FedEx Corporation
(“FedEx”), on April 22, 2026. [Doc. 1]. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant unlawfully
terminated his employment under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, et seq. [Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 1, 56].
On August 17, 2026, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See generally [Doc. 9].1 Plaintiff responded to that
motion [Doc. 10], and Defendant replied to his response. [Doc. 11]. This Court stayed
any discovery and discovery-related deadlines until it rules on Defendant’s motion to
dismiss. [Doc. 13]. It now rules on Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
1 The parties jointly stipulated to extend Defendant’s deadline to file a responsive pleading to August 17,
2026. [Doc. 6].
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BACKGROUND
Taking the facts as alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint as true, as this Court must, the
story here is straightforward. Plaintiff was a longtime FedEx employee. He started
working for the company around early October of 2001, at their Atlanta Ramp
Hartsfield-Jackson Airport location. [Doc. 1 at ¶ 16]. By 2005, he was promoted twice.
[Id. at ¶¶ 18–19]. In 2009, FedEx transferred him to their Norcross Ground location,
where he “reduced the loss rate from triple digits per thousand shipments to single
digits.” [Id. at ¶¶ 20–23]. However, after FedEx tripled his Norcross workload in 2024,
Plaintiff took a new position at its Macon facility, where he was employed as a Senior
Security Specialist from October of that year until his termination. [Id. at ¶¶ 24–26].
Plaintiff alleges that he inherited a three-hundred-fifty (350) case backload. [Id. at
¶ 27]. Further, instead of giving Plaintiff an opportunity to minimize his inherited
caseload, Defendant “sent a management team of investigators to determine why
Plaintiff was behind in his cases” within a month of Plaintiff taking the job. [Id. at ¶ 28].
On January 12, 2025, Plaintiff received a phone call from a man named Trey
Lance. [Id. at ¶ 30].2 Lance arrived at the Macon location to retrieve something called a
“pelican crate” from Plaintiff. [Id. at ¶ 31]. When Plaintiff entered the warehouse to help
2 This Court accepts as true the well-pled factual allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint for purposes of
considering Defendant’s motion to dismiss. However, for clarity, the Court does note that Defendant—
upon information and belief—states in its reply that the individual’s name is Trey Landry, not Trey
Lance. [Doc. 9-1, p. 3, n. 1].
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Lance retrieve the pelican crate, he slipped on a piece of label backing, fell onto the
floor, and tore his meniscus. [Id. at ¶¶ 32–34].
Plaintiff informed FedEx of his workplace injury on January 14, 2025; his boss
filled out a workers’ compensation form and told him to go to the doctor for an
evaluation, where he first learned he had a torn meniscus. [Id. at ¶¶ 35–38]. However, in
response to his injury claim, “Mr. McManus,” a FedEx Senior Manager, met with
Plaintiff and told him there was no evidence of his injury. [Id. at ¶¶ 39–40]. While
Plaintiff’s claim was under investigation, McManus placed him on suspension and sent
him a separation letter, offering him $20,000 in exchange for his retirement. [Id. at ¶¶
41–42]. Plaintiff did not accept the offer. [Id. at ¶ 43]. After he refused the offer,
Defendant terminated his employment on April 7, 2025. [Id. at ¶ 44]. Plaintiff does not
allege which employee or employees in particular were responsible for the decision to
terminate his employment.
Plaintiff claims that, since July of 2003, he has been a member of a protected class
based on his age. [Id. at ¶ 17]. At the time of his injury, he was over the age of forty
years old and qualified to perform the tasks required by his position. [Id. at ¶¶ 46–47].
Although Defendant maintains that Plaintiff was terminated because of false statements
regarding an alleged injury at work [Id. at ¶ 48]; [Doc. 9-1, p. 4], he was one of “several”
employees terminated and replaced with a younger individual. [Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 45, 49–50].
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Plaintiff alleges that he was “subject to adverse employment action when
Defendant terminated him on April 7, 2025,” and that “Defendant discriminated against
Plaintiff based on his age and ultimately terminated his employment due to his status
as an employee over 40, a protected class of individuals.” [Id. at ¶¶ 51–52]. He brings a
claim for age discrimination under the ADEA. [Id. at ¶¶ 53–61]; 29 U.S.C. § 623.
LEGAL STANDARD
Defendants seek to dismiss Plaintiff’s action against them for failure to state a
claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, district
courts must accept the facts set forth in the complaint as true. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 572 (2007). A complaint survives a motion to dismiss only if it alleges
sufficient factual matter (accepted as true) that states a claim for relief that is plausible
on its face. McCullough v. Finley, 907 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009)). In fact, a well-pled complaint “may proceed even if it
strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that a recovery
is very remote and unlikely.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (citations omitted).
Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 does not require detailed factual
allegations, it does require “more than [] unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-
harmed-me accusation[s].” McCullough, 907 F.3d at 1333 (citation omitted). To decide
whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, district courts are instructed to use a
two-step framework. Id. The first step is to identify the allegations that are “no more
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than mere conclusions.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). “Conclusory allegations are
not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. (citation omitted). After disregarding the
conclusory allegations, the second step is to “assume any remaining factual allegations
are true and determine whether those factual allegations ‘plausibly give rise to an
entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
Furthermore, a complaint attacked by a 12(b)(6) motion is subject to dismissal
when it fails to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “A plaintiff must plead more than labels
and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”
McCullough, 907 F.3d at 1333 (internal quotations omitted); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555. “To be sure, a plaintiff may use legal conclusions to structure his complaint, but
legal conclusions ‘must be supported by factual allegations.’” McCullough, 907 F.3d at
1333 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). While courts, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, must
take all the factual allegations in the complaint as true, they are not bound to accept a
legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Courts must
“identify conclusory allegations and then discard them—not ‘on the ground that they
are unrealistic or nonsensical’ but because their conclusory nature ‘disentitles them to
the presumption of truth.’” McCullough, 907 F.3d at 1333 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681).
The issue to be decided when considering a motion to dismiss is not whether the
claimant will ultimately prevail, but “whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence
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to support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other
grounds by Davis v. Scheuer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984). The factual allegations in a complaint
“must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and cannot
“merely create[] a suspicion of a legally cognizable right of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
545, 555. Finally, complaints that tender “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement’” will not survive against a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (alteration in original). Stated differently, the
complaint must allege enough facts “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery
will reveal evidence” supporting a claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
In the context of employment discrimination claims, including ADEA claims, a
plaintiff may properly state a claim without showing it can meet the McDonnell Douglas
evidentiary burden for claims based on circumstantial evidence of discrimination. See
Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 789 F.3d 1239, 1245–46 (11th Cir. 2015); see also Castillo v.
Allegro Resort Mktg., 603 F. App’x 913, 917–919 (11th Cir. 2015).3 However, he must
provide enough factual matter, taken as true, to suggest intentional discrimination.
3 Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, a plaintiff must first make a prima facie case to
support an inference of discrimination, including an adverse employment action taken against him,
which the employer may then rebut by offering a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse
action. Sims v. MVM, Inc., 704 F.3d 1327, 1332–33 (11th Cir. 2013). The plaintiff must then show that the
employer’s provided reason is either false or merely a pretext for actual unlawful discrimination. Id.
Under this evidentiary burden, the plaintiff holds the burden of persuasion. Id. at 1332. However, this
framework “is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement.” Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1246 (citing
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002)). So, at pleading, plausibility remains the standard.
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Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1246 (quoting Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 974
(11th Cir. 2008)).
To do so, a plaintiff may opt to allege a prima facie case for ADEA discrimination,
demonstrating that: (1) he was a member of a protected age group; (2) he was subjected
to adverse employment action; (3) he was qualified to do the job in question; and (4) he
was replaced by or otherwise lost a position to a younger individual. Chapman v. Al
Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1024 (11th Cir. 2000). But such an exhaustive complaint is not
required. An employment discrimination complaint need not include “specific facts
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination” at the pleadings stage to survive a Rule
12(b)(6) motion. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508, 510 (2002); see also Buchanan
v. Delta Air Lines Inc., 727 F. App’x 639, 642 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding clearly that dismissal
of an ADEA age discrimination claim for failure to state a claim was “in error” where the
dismissal rested on “the fact that the allegations [the plaintiff] raised failed to establish a
prima facie case of age discrimination”—even though the Eleventh Circuit agreed that the
complaint did not establish a prima facie case). Instead, the complaint must “provide
enough factual matter to plausibly suggest intentional discrimination.” Buchanan, 727 F.
App’x at 641 (citing Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1246).
With the foregoing standards in mind—and taking the facts asserted in Plaintiff’s
complaint as true—the Court rules on Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
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DISCUSSION
Plaintiff does not fail to state a claim. Under the ADEA, a plaintiff must prove that
his age was the “but-for” cause of the adverse employment action taken against him.
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009); 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). So, at the pleadings
stage, a plaintiff’s complaint must plausibly present a case that his age was the “but-for”
cause of his employment termination, based on either direct or circumstantial evidence
of discrimination. See id.; see also Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1024.
Here, Plaintiff does allege that he was over forty [Doc. 1 at ¶ 46], that he was
terminated [Id. at ¶ 44], that he was qualified [Id. at ¶ 47], and that his position was later
filled by a younger individual. [Id. at ¶ 45]. And, beyond these threadbare recitals of an
ADEA claim’s elements, Plaintiff also offers enough factual assertions to raise his claim
beyond mere speculation.
Specifically, although Plaintiff does not allege that any particular FedEx employee
engaged in ageist behavior, he does allege that FedEx fired him and replaced him with a
younger employee, that FedEx has similarly fired “several” other employees and
replaced them with younger workers, and enough facts to raise the possibility that
FedEx’s stated reason for terminating him—alleged false statements regarding his
workplace injury—was pretextual. [Id. at ¶ 48].
This Court has previously found bare, conclusory allegations insufficient to meet
the plausibility pleading requirement in the ADEA discrimination context. See, e.g., Grant
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v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., No. 4:18-CV-129 (CDL), 2018 WL 5793860, at *2 (M.D.
Ga. Nov. 2, 2018). In Grant, the Court reasoned that a plaintiff failed to plausibly plead
age-based discrimination claims under ADEA because she failed to allege that any actor
for the Defendant with influence over her termination acted with ageist animus, engaged
in ageist behavior, or uttered any ageist remark. Id. So, the Grant plaintiff failed to state a
claim because she failed to present any plausible case that she was terminated because of
her age, even though she did allege a simple recitation of the elements (that she was over
forty years old, was terminated, and was replaced by a younger hire). Id.
This complaint is different. Here, like the plaintiff in Grant, Plaintiff does not make
any allegations of direct ageist animus, ageist behavior, or ageist remarks. However,
unlike the plaintiff in Grant, Plaintiff goes beyond bare recitation of the elements. Plaintiff
instead alleges several nonconclusory facts that—taken as true—support a plausible
inference that the stated reasons for terminating him were pretextual.
Plaintiff alleges that he was injured at work; he reported a workplace injury, was
directed to obtain a medical evaluation, and received confirmation from a medical
provider that he tore his meniscus. [Doc. 1 ¶¶ 35–38]. Then, he alleges that a FedEx
employee placed him on suspension (and his claim under investigation), claiming there
was “no evidence” supporting his meniscus injury. [Id. at ¶¶ 39–41]. Following this
investigation, FedEx first sent him a letter offering money in exchange for his retirement,
and then—when he refused the offer—fired him. [Id. at ¶¶ 42–44]. Plaintiff rounds out
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his factual allegations by claiming that his termination came on the heels of a company
investigation into his results at work [Id. at ¶¶ 27–29] and was part of a pattern of
terminations where older workers were replaced with younger alternatives. [Id. at ¶¶ 44–
45, 49–50].
Taking these allegations as true, these facts potentially suggest intentional
discrimination: the company told Plaintiff to seek medical evaluation of his injury, he
obtained medical evaluation, and then he was fired allegedly due to false statements
regarding that evaluated injury. So, Plaintiff was possibly terminated for a policy violation
he did not commit, supporting a plausible inference that the stated injury-related reason
for his termination was pretextual.
And, when combined with the allegation that Plaintiff is not the only employee to
be fired and replaced by a younger worker, Plaintiff’s allegations further support a
plausible inference that his age—rather than some other reason—was the actual but for
cause of his termination, even without an outright admission of discriminatory intent
from any FedEx employee. See Buchanan, 727 F. App’x at 642 (holding that a plaintiff
stated a claim for age discrimination where she alleged facts that, together, established
she was terminated for a violation she did not commit and, therefore, that her employer’s
cited reasons for terminating her were pretextual).
Simply put, Plaintiff’s complaint goes beyond conclusory restatement of an ADEA
claim’s 	elements 	and 	provides 	nonconclusory 	facts 	suggesting 	a 	claim 	of 	age
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discrimination beyond the speculative level. The possibility of alternative, lawful
explanations for Defendant’s decision to terminate Plaintiff is not enough to dismiss for
failure to state a claim.
CONCLUSION
Accepting the facts in the complaint as true, Plaintiff states a claim upon which
relief can be granted. Accordingly, this Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim.
SO ORDERED, this 14th day of October, 2026.
S/ Tilman E. Self, III
TILMAN E. SELF, III
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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