GUESS v. WHEELER et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
SHAWN GUESS, 	:
:
Plaintiff, 	: 	Case No. 5:25-CV-00427-CAR-CHW
:
v. 	:
:
STEVEN WHEELER, et al., 	: 	Proceedings Under 42 U.S.C. §1983
: 	Before the U. S. Magistrate Judge
Defendants. 	:
ORDER
Pro se Plaintiff Shawn Guess, aka James Shawn Guess, a prisoner at Central State
Prison in Macon, Georgia has filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. 	ECF No. 1. 	Plaintiff
has also filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) and a motion for the
appointment of an attorney (ECF No. 3).
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
As it appears Plaintiff is unable to pay the cost of commencing this action, his
application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is hereby GRANTED. 	However,
even if a prisoner is allowed to proceed in forma pauperis, he must pay the full amount
of the $350.00 filing fee in installments based on funds in the prisoner’s account. 	When
a prisoner has funds in his account, he must pay an initial partial filing fee of twenty
percent of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits to the prisoner’s account, or
(2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account for the six month period
immediately preceding the filing of the complaint. 	28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
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A review of Plaintiff’s account certification shows deposits totaling $1850 for the
preceding six months with an average monthly deposit of $308.33. 	ECF No. 2-1 at 1.
Twenty percent of $308.33 is $61.67. 	Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that
Plaintiff pay an initial partial filing fee of $61.67.
Following payment of the initial partial filing fee, money will be deducted from
Plaintiff’s account until the filing fee ($350.00) is paid in full as set forth in § 1915(b)
and explained below. 	It is accordingly DIRECTED that the CLERK forward a copy
of this ORDER to the business manager of the facility in which Plaintiff is incarcerated
so that withdrawals from his account may commence as payment towards the filing fee.
The district court’s filing fee is not refundable, regardless of the outcome of the case,
and must therefore be paid in full even if the Plaintiff’s complaint (or any part thereof)
is dismissed prior to service.
I. 	Directions to Plaintiff’s Custodian
It is ORDERED that the warden of the institution wherein Plaintiff is incarcerated,
or the sheriff of any county wherein he is held in custody, and any successor custodians,
each month cause to be remitted to the Clerk of this Court twenty percent (20%) of the
preceding month’s income credited to Plaintiff’s account at said institution until the
$350.00 filing fee has been paid in full. 	In accordance with the provisions of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Plaintiff’s custodian is hereby authorized to forward
payments from the prisoner’s account to the Clerk of Court each month until the filing fee
is paid in full, provided the amount in the account exceeds $10.00. 	It is further
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ORDERED that collection of monthly payments from Plaintiff’s trust fund account shall
continue until the entire $350.00 has been collected, notwithstanding the dismissal of
Plaintiff’s lawsuit or the granting of judgment against him prior to the collection of the full
filing fee.
II. 	Plaintiff’s Obligations Upon Release
Plaintiff should keep in mind that his release from incarceration/detention does not
release him from his obligation to pay the installments incurred while he was in custody.
Plaintiff remains obligated to pay those installments justified by the income in his prisoner
trust account while he was detained. 	If Plaintiff fails to remit such payments, the Court
authorizes collection from Plaintiff of any balance due on these payments by any means
permitted by law. 	Plaintiff’s Complaint may be dismissed if he is able to make payments
but fails to do so or if he otherwise fails to comply with the provisions of the PLRA.
In conclusion, Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is
GRANTED, and Plaintiff is ORDERED to pay an initial partial filing fee of $61.67.
While Plaintiff’s custodian is ordered to make subsequent payments on Plaintiff’s behalf,
Plaintiff should note that it is HIS RESPONSIBLITY to pay the initial partial filing fee.
Thus, Plaintiff must make arrangements with the appropriate official to ensure that the
initial partial filing fee is paid in accordance with this Order. 	Plaintiff shall have
FOURTEEN (14) DAYS from the date shown on this Order to pay the required initial
partial filing fee to the Clerk of Court. 	Thereafter, Plaintiff’s custodian shall remit
monthly payments as set forth above.
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MOTION FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF AN ATTORNEY
Plaintiff has moved this Court to appoint him an attorney. 	ECF No. 3. 	A district
court “may request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel.”1 	28
U.S.C. 	§ 	1915(e)(1). 	There 	is, 	however, 	“no 	absolute 	constitutional 	right 	to 	the
appointment of counsel” in a § 1983 lawsuit. 	Poole v. Lambert, 819 F.2d 1025, 1028 (11th
Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (citations omitted). 	Appointment of counsel is “instead a privilege
that is justified only by exceptional circumstances, such as where the facts and legal issues
are so novel or complex as to require the assistance of a trained practitioner.” 	Id. (citations
omitted). 	In determining whether a case presents extraordinary circumstances, the Court
considers
(1) the type and complexity of the case; (2) whether the plaintiff is capable
of adequately presenting his case; (3) whether the plaintiff is in a position to
adequately investigate the case; (4) whether the evidence “will consist in
large part of conflicting testimony so as to require skill in the presentation of
evidence and in cross examination”; and (5) whether the appointment of
counsel would be of service to the parties and the court “by sharpening the
issues in the case, shaping the examination of witnesses, and thus shortening
the trial and assisting in a just determination.” 	The District Court may also
inquire into whether the plaintiff has made any effort to secure private
counsel.
DeJesus v. Lewis, 14 F.4th 1182, 1204-05 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Ulmer v. Chancellor,
1 The 	statute, 	however, 	does 	not 	provide 	any 	funding 	to 	pay 	attorneys 	for 	their
representation or authorize courts to compel attorneys to represent an indigent party in a
civil case. 	See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989);
Taylor v. Pekerol, 760 F. App’x 647, 651 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (citations omitted)
(stating that the district court has no “inherent power” to compel counsel to represent a
civil litigant and § 1915(e)(1) provides no such authority).
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691 F.2d 209, 213 (5th Cir. 1982)).
The Court has considered Plaintiff’s motion and—after applying the factors set forth
above—concludes that appointed counsel is not justified. 	Plaintiff has demonstrated the
ability to litigate his case, including filing pleadings and motions sufficiently setting out
his 	contentions 	to 	allow 	review 	by 	this 	Court. 	Plaintiff’s 	case 	is 	not 	complex.
Additionally, at this early stage in the litigation, it is unclear if the case will proceed to trial.
Thus, there is no basis to conclude that counsel will be needed for the presentation of
evidence 	or 	cross 	examination 	of 	witnesses. 	Plaintiff, 	“like 	any 	other 	litigant[],
undoubtedly would [be] helped by the assistance of a lawyer, but [his] case is not so
unusual” that appointed counsel is necessary. 	Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th
Cir. 1999).
Accordingly, 	Plaintiff’s 	motion 	seeking 	appointed 	counsel 	(ECF 	No. 	3) 	is
DENIED. 	Should it later become apparent that legal assistance is required in order to
avoid prejudice to Plaintiff’s rights, the Court, on its own motion, will consider assisting
him in securing legal counsel at that time. 	Consequently, there is no need for Plaintiff to
file additional requests for counsel.
INITIAL REVIEW OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
In accordance with the PLRA, the district courts are obligated to conduct a
preliminary screening of every complaint filed by a prisoner who seeks redress from a
government entity, official, or employee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 	In this case,
Plaintiff states that he has been experiencing vision loss due to cataracts since 2016.
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ECF No. 1 at 6-7. 	Plaintiff states that after an office visit with an ophthalmologist from
Upson Eye Clinic in December 2023, he was informed that he would have cataract
surgery in January or March 2024. 	Id. at 7. 	Plaintiff complains that he has never
received that surgery and that he now suffers from “near total blindness”. 	Id. at 7-8.
Plaintiff raises a claim under the Eighth Amendment for deliberate indifference to a
serious medical need. 	Id. at 4, 	Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and court costs. 	Id. at
9.
Plaintiff names Centurian Managed Care, CEO Steven Wheeler, COO John Frese,
Chief Medical Officer Dr. Arnold, Department of Corrections Commissioner Tyrone
Oliver, and Warden David Stokes as Defendants. 	Id. at 1-4. 	However, there are no
allegations whatsoever within his complaint which specifically link Defendants Wheeler,
Frese, Arnold, Oliver, or Stokes to any unconstitutional act. 	See id. at 5-8. 	A district
court properly dismisses a claim when the plaintiff, other than naming the defendant in the
caption of the complaint, fails to state any allegations that connect the defendant with an
alleged constitutional violation. 	Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008)
(citing Pamel Corp. v. P.R. Highway Auth., 621 F.2d 33, 36 (1st Cir. 1980)) (“While we
do not require technical niceties in pleading, we must demand that the complaint state with
some minimal particularity how overt acts of the defendant caused a legal wrong.”);
LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1538 (11th Cir. 1993) (“[S]ection 1983 requires proof
of an affirmative causal connection between the actions taken by a particular person under
color of state law and the constitutional deprivation.”) (quotation marks and citations
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omitted). 	Because Plaintiff does not link his claims to any of these Defendants, his
complaint is subject to dismissal.
If Plaintiff is pursuing his claims based exclusively on the supervisory roles of
Defendants Wheeler, Frese, Arnold, Oliver, and Stokes, Plaintiff’s claims would still be
subject to dismissal. 	It is well-settled in the Eleventh Circuit that supervisory officials
such as Prison Commissioners, Chief Executives, and Wardens cannot be held liable under
§ 1983 solely on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. See, e.g., Keating
v. City of Miami, 598 F.3d 753, 762 (11th Cir.2010); Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263,
1269 (11th Cir. 1999); Hendrix v. Tucker, 535 F. App’x 803, 805 (11th Cir. 2013) (per
curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“The standard by which a supervisor is held
liable in her individual capacity for the actions of a subordinate is extremely rigorous.”).
Instead, to establish liability against a supervisor, a prisoner must allege facts showing a
causal 	connection 	between 	the 	supervisory 	defendants’ 	actions 	and 	an 	alleged
constitutional violation such as the supervisor personally participated in the alleged
constitutional violation, directed their subordinates to act unlawfully, or knew their
subordinates would act unlawfully but the supervisor failed to stop them. 	Keating, 598
F.3d at 762.
Plaintiff has made no showing of a causal connection between any action of any
Defendant in a supervisory role and the injuries Plaintiff suffered from being denied
cataract surgery. 	See Hernandez v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 281 F. App’x 862, 866-67 (11th
Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (rejecting claim where the plaintiff failed to allege decision making
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officials took specific actions amounting to a constitutional violation); Asad v. Crosby, 158
F. App’x 166, 170-72 (11th Cir. 2005) (affirming district court’s dismissal of supervisory
liability claims against two defendants because the record failed to show that they
“personally participated in the alleged constitutional violations, or that there was a causal
connection between the supervisory defendants’ actions and an alleged constitutional
violation”).
As to Defendant Centurian Managed Care, private contractors who provide prison
services such as this Defendant cannot be held liable under § 1983 unless the alleged
constitutional deprivation occurred as a direct result of the contractor’s official policies or
customs. 	See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91
(1978); Buckner v. Toro, 116 F.3d 450, 452 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (holding that
when a private corporation contracts with the county to provide medical services to
inmates, the entity should be treated as a municipality); Snow ex rel. Snow v. City of
Citronelle, 420 F.3d 1262, 1270 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.
378, 385 (1989) (“A municipality may not be held liable under section 1983 on a theory of
respondeat superior.”); Weiland v. Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313,
1328 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (holding
that for a municipality to be liable under § 1983, the plaintiff must “establish that the
government unit has a ‘policy or custom’ that caused the injury.”).
Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant Centurian Managed Care does have a custom of
providing cataract surgery for prisoners at Central State Prison but just has not done so for
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him. 	ECF No. 1 at 6-8. 	Because Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Centurian
Managed Care has a custom or policy of denying cataract surgery, his claims as to
Centurian Managed Care are also subject to dismissal.
It thus appears upon preliminary review that Plaintiff’s complaint is subject to be
dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A for failure to state a claim for which relief may
be granted. 	Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court will afford Plaintiff one
opportunity to remedy the defects with his complaint as explained above. 	See Duff v.
Steub, 378 F. App’x 868, 872 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). 	Therefore, Plaintiff is now
required to submit a recast complaint if he wishes to proceed. 	Plaintiff is advised that to
support a claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, a plaintiff must allege
“(1) a serious medical need; (2) the defendants’ deliberate indifference to that need; and
(3) causation between that indifference and the plaintiff’s injury.” 	Mann v. Taser Int’l,
Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). To establish the second
element—deliberate indifference—a plaintiff must plausibly allege that the defendant: (1)
“was subjectively aware that his own conduct put the inmate at substantial risk of serious
harm”; (2) disregarded that risk; and (3) “acted with ‘subjective recklessness as used in the
criminal law[.]’” 	Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1262 (11th Cir. 2024) (en banc)
(quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 839 (1994)).
The recast complaint must contain a caption that clearly identifies, by name, each
individual that Plaintiff has a claim against and wishes to include as a Defendant in the
present lawsuit. Plaintiff is to name only the individuals associated with the claim that he
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is pursuing in this action. 	It is recommended that, when drafting his statement of claims,
Plaintiff provide responses to the following questions (to the extent possible) along with
the name of each defendant to which the claim is attributed:
(1) 	How and when did the Defendant become aware of your serious medical
need?
(2) 	What did this Defendant do (or not do) in response to this knowledge?
(3) 	Is the Defendant a supervisory official and if so, was he/she personally
involved in the constitutional violation? 	If not, how did his/her actions
otherwise cause the unconstitutional action? 	How do you know?
Plaintiff must recast his complaint on the Court’s standard § 1983 complaint form.
Plaintiff must honestly and completely answer every question presented on the standard
form. 	Plaintiff is notified that one sole operating complaint is permissible. The general
rule is that an amended complaint supersedes an original complaint. See Schreane v.
Middlebrooks¸ 522 F. App’x 845, 847 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam); Barber v. Krepp, 680
F. App’x 819, 821 n.2 (11th Cir. 2017) (declining to consider allegations in pro se
petitioner’s initial pleading since it would have been superseded by the subsequent
amended pleading). 	Thus, Plaintiff’s amended complaint will take the place of his
original complaint. 	In other words, the Court will not refer to the original complaint to
see if Plaintiff has stated a viable claim. 	Accordingly, any fact Plaintiff deems necessary
to his lawsuit should be clearly stated in his recast complaint, even if Plaintiff has
previously alleged it in another filing. 	Plaintiff is advised that if he fails to link a named
Defendant to a claim, the claim will be dismissed; if Plaintiff makes no allegations in the
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body of his complaint against a named Defendant, that Defendant will be dismissed. 	If
Plaintiff raises unrelated claims under the same civil action number, the unrelated claims
may be dismissed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20; Toenniges v. Warden, 672 F. App’x 889, 890
(11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (citing 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)) (holding that district court did
not abuse its discretion in dismissing as improperly joined claims against two defendants
which did not “arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences”.).
Plaintiff should state his claims as simply as possible. 	He need not use legal
terminology or cite any specific statute or case law to state a claim, although the Court will
presume that Plaintiff’s claims are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless otherwise
specified. 	See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. 	Plaintiff is not to include any exhibits or attachments
with his complaint. 	The recast complaint cannot be longer than ten pages in its entirety.
CONCLUSION
As set forth above, Plaintiff’s motion for the appointment of counsel (ECF No. 3) is
DENIED. 	Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED,
and Plaintiff is ORDERED to pay an initial partial filing fee of $61.67. 	Plaintiff is further
ORDERED to recast his complaint on the Court’s standard form. 	Plaintiff shall have
FOURTEEN (14) DAYS from the date of this Order to recast his complaint and to pay
the partial initial filing fee as instructed. 	While this action is pending, Plaintiff must also
immediately inform the Court in writing of any change in his mailing address. 	Failure to
fully and timely comply with this Order may result in the dismissal of this Complaint.
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There will be no service of process in this case until further order of the Court.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to forward Plaintiff a standard § 1983 form along
with his service copy of this order (with the civil action number showing on all) for
Plaintiff’s use in complying with the Order of the Court.
SO ORDERED and DIRECTED, this 24th day of November, 2025.
s/ Charles H. Weigle
Charles H. Weigle
United States Magistrate Judge
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