CHEESE v. WATSON

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
RODNEY TERRANCE CHEESE, :
:
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : Case No. 5:25-cv-426-MTT-ALS
:
DENISE FACHINI, et al., :
:
Defendants. :
:
_________________________________
ORDER
Proceeding pro se, Plaintiff Rodney Terrance Cheese, a prisoner at Johnson State Prison in
Wrightsville, Georgia, initially filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia. (Doc. 1). On October 1, 2025, that court transferred the Complaint
to this Court. (Docs. 3-4).
INITIAL REVIEW OF COMPLAINT
In accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act, federal courts are obligated to
conduct a preliminary screening of every complaint filed by a prisoner who seeks redress from a
government entity, official, or employee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
Liberally construed, Plaintiff’s complaint appears to request his immediate release from
confinement following a conviction for violating the terms of his probation in Wilcox County,
Georgia. (Doc. 1, at 5). It is unclear whether Plaintiff intends for his pleading to be a federal habeas
corpus action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 or whether he is alleging a civil rights violation under 42
U.S.C § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the defendants deprived him
of a right under the U.S. Constitution or federal law and that the deprivation was committed by a
person acting under color of state law. Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir.
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1995); Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010). On the other hand, “any
challenge to the fact or duration of a prisoner’s confinement is properly treated as a habeas corpus
matter, whereas challenges to conditions of confinement may proceed under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983[.]”
McKinnis v. Mosely, 693 F.2d 1054, 1057 (11th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). “Federal habeas
corpus relief is appropriate when a petitioner alleges that his custody itself is illegal.” Jones v.
Augusta State Med. Prison, No. CV 313-012, 2013 WL 1736782, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 21, 2013)
(citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973)). Conversely, the Supreme Court of the
United States has clarified that “[t]o state a claim for relief in an action brought under § 1983,
[plaintiffs] must establish that they were deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of
the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.” Focus
on the Family v. Pinellas Suncoast Transit Auth., 344 F.3d 1263, 1276-77 (11th Cir. 2003)
(alterations in original) (citing Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999)).
Release from prison or any criminal conviction is not available as a remedy in a § 1983 action.
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994). Monetary damages are available in a § 1983 action
but not in a habeas action. See Preiser, 411 U.S. at 493, 500. Plaintiff’s Complaint does not appear
to seek redress via monetary damages.
Accordingly, if Plaintiff is challenging the fact or validity of his confinement and he seeks
his release from state prison, then the proper cause of action is a § 2254 habeas petition. Plaintiff
is advised, however, that any petition for habeas corpus relief is subject to the exhaustion doctrine.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). Thus, a prisoner is required to exhaust all available state remedies before
he may go forward with a habeas action in federal court. See Dill v. Holt, 371 F.3d 1301, 1302
(11th Cir. 2004); Skinner v. Wiley, 355 F.3d 1293, 1295 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that
administrative exhaustion is required in all habeas cases), overruled in part on other grounds as
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recognized by Santiago-Lugo v. Warden, 785 F.3d 467, 472 (11th Cir. 2015). To exhaust, a
prisoner must “fairly present[ ]” every issue raised in the petitioner’s federal habeas petition to the
state’s highest court, either on direct appeal or through other collateral means for review. Castille
v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989); O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999) (finding
that exhaustion requires “that state prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to
resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s established
appellate review process.”). Thus, if Plaintiff has failed to first pursue a review of his conviction
and sentence in a state superior court, the Court of Appeals of Georgia, and/or the Supreme Court
of Georgia, he is barred from seeking habeas relief from a federal district court.
However, if Plaintiff instead seeks to complain about the events surrounding his arrest,
conviction, and/or the conditions of his confinement, he should recast his complaint on the Court’s
standard § 1983 form. In so doing, he cannot request to be released from incarceration, and it is
usually futile to name the judge who presided over his criminal proceedings or the prosecutors
who prosecuted him as Defendants in a § 1983 civil action. See generally, Heck, 512 U.S. at 481;
Allen v. Fla., 458 F. App’x 841, 843 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12
(1991) (“Judges are entitled to absolute immunity from suits for acts performed while they are
acting in their judicial capacity unless they acted in ‘complete absence of all jurisdiction.’”); Holt
v. Crist, 233 F. App’x 900, 903 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431
(1976)) (“‘[I]n initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case, the prosecutor is immune
from a civil suit for damages under § 1983.’”).
Plaintiff is further advised that this Court may be barred from considering a § 1983 claim
that alleges that the criminal proceedings underlying his present imprisonment were somehow
wrongful. The Supreme Court has held that:
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in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would
render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the
conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive
order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination,
or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus[.]
Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-487. Thus, if Plaintiff intends to assert a § 1983 action that alleges false
imprisonment or malicious prosecution, he cannot do so until the underlying conviction that
initially placed him on probation or his present probation revocation sentence has been overturned
or deemed invalid. See id.
After considering this Court’s guidance above, if Plaintiff still wishes to pursue a federal
claim,1 he must recast his complaint on the proper form for the legally actionable federal claim he
wishes to bring. If Plaintiff is challenging his state court conviction and seeks his release, he must
recast his allegations on the Court’s standard § 2254 form petition and specifically include all
previous challenges he has made to his conviction in the state superior and/or appellate courts of
Georgia. If instead, Plaintiff wants to complain about the conditions of his confinement and seek
monetary compensation, he should recast his allegations on the Court’s standard § 1983 form.
Conversely, if Plaintiff wants to pursue both a habeas corpus claim pursuant to § 2254 and a § 1983
claim then he must file separate actions for the different type of claims and pay the filing fees for
each. Plaintiff cannot pursue both a habeas action pursuant to § 2254 and a §1983 action
under one civil action number. Thus, if Plaintiff pursues both types of actions then he should
include this civil action number on only one of the complaint forms and the other complaint form
will be assigned a new civil action number. Plaintiff shall have FOURTEEN (14) DAYS from the
1 At this early stage in the litigation, Plaintiff is advised that he does have the additional option to request that this
Court dismiss this civil action without prejudice so that he may exhaust his state court remedies, if he has not done so,
or to pursue remedies through administrative offices or other entities that may grant him the relief he seeks, or for any
other reason he deems necessary. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A).
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date of this Order to choose the federal civil action he intends to pursue and to recast his complaint
on the appropriate form as instructed. The recast complaint shall supersede (take the place of) the
initial pleadings and this Court will not look back at his prior pleadings to determine whether
Plaintiff has an actionable claim.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has failed to submit a proper complaint before the Court. Plaintiff shall have
FOURTEEN (14) DAYS from the date of this Order to recast his Complaint on the appropriate
form for the type of federal civil action he intends to pursue as instructed. While this action is
pending, Plaintiff must also immediately inform the Court in writing of any change in his mailing
address. There will be no service of process in this case until further order of the Court. Failure
to fully and timely comply with this Order may result in the dismissal of this civil action.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to forward to Plaintiff a copy of the § 2254 and § 1983
standard forms for Plaintiff’s use in complying with this Court Order.
SO ORDERED, this 30th day of October, 2025.
s/ ALFREDA L. SHEPPARD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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