PITTS v. MACON WATER AUTHORITY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
SHATORIA KIERRA PITTS, 	:
:
Plaintiff, 	:
: 	CIVIL ACTION
v. 	: 	No. 5:25-CV-347 (CAR)
:
MACON WATER AUTHORITY, 	:
:
Defendant. 	:
___________________________________ :
ORDER ON MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Shatoria Kierra Pitts’s Motion to Proceed In
Forma Pauperis (“IFP”). Having reviewed Plaintiffs’ Affidavit, it appears she is unable to
pay the cost of commencing this action or the United States Marshal service fees.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP [Doc. 3] is GRANTED. But, because
Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to establish this Court has jurisdiction over this case
or to state any viable claim for relief, there will be no service of process until further
order of this Court.
If Plaintiff wishes to maintain this action, then pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)
she must file a recast Complaint within 21 days of the date of this Order, which will
supersede her original Complaint, as hereinafter directed. Plaintiff’s “Motion for Default
Judgment as to Royal Covenant & Heavenly Decree of Redemption, Abundance,
Restitution & Sovereignty” [Doc. 5] is DENIED as patently frivolous.
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A. Motion to Proceed IFP
Motions to proceed IFP are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), which provides:
[A]ny court of the United States may authorize the commencement,
prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal,
or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees or security therefor, by a
person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such
prisoner possesses1 that the person is unable to pay such fees or give
security therefor.
When considering a motion to proceed IFP filed under § 1915(a), “[t]he only
determination to be made by the court . . . is whether the statements in the affidavit satisfy
the requirement of poverty.” 2 The Court should accept statements contained in an IFP
affidavit, “absent a serious misrepresentation.”3 Although a litigant need not show [s]he
is “absolutely destitute” to qualify under § 1915(a), [s]he must show that “because of h[er]
poverty, [s]he is unable to pay for the court fees and costs, and to support and provide
necessities for h[er]self and h[er] dependents.”4
The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s application to proceed IFP and is satisfied that
she cannot pay the court fees because of poverty. Plaintiff states she receives no income,
1 “Despite the statute’s use of the phrase ‘prisoner possesses,’ the affidavit requirement applies to
all persons requesting leave to proceed IFP.” Martinez v. Kristi Kleaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1306
n.1 (11th Cir. 2004).
2 Martinez v. Kristi Keaners, Inc., 364 F.3d 1305, 1307 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
3 Id.
4 Id. (citation omitted).
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has no assets, is unemployed, and receives $290 from public assistance.5 Thus, Plaintiff
qualifies as a pauper under § 1915, and her Motion [Doc. 3] is GRANTED.
B. Preliminary Screening
Because Plaintiff is proceeding IFP, the Court is required to screen her Complaint
and must sua sponte dismiss the complaint or portion thereof which (1) is found to be
frivolous or malicious, (2) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or (3) seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.6 Title 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e) “accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an
indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the
complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are
clearly baseless.”7
Dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate when the facts as pleaded do
not state a claim for relief that is “plausible on its face”8 and is governed by the same
standard as a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).9 A claim is
plausible where the plaintiff alleges factual content that “allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”10 The
5 Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP [Doc. 3 at 1–2].
6 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b).
7 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
8 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009).
9 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997).
10 Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 663.
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plausibility standard requires that a plaintiff allege sufficient facts “to raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” that supports a plaintiff’s claims.11 But
“[d]espite the leniency afforded pro se plaintiffs, the district court does not have license
to rewrite a deficient pleading.” 12 Pro se “pleadings are held to a less stringent standard
than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.”13
1. 	Factual Background
Plaintiff, 	who 	identifies 	herself 	as 	“General 	Executrix—Daughter 	of 	Zion,
Crowned with Glory,” “Executrix Princess,” and “Trustee and Trust Protector of the
TORYKATT ROYAL LIVING TRUST,” claims Defendant Macon Water Authority
unlawfully disconnected her water service despite Plaintiff’s full payment via a United
States Postal Service money order.14 Plaintiff seeks over four million dollars in damages
for violations of unspecified constitutional rights and laws, including “the use and
dishonor of a U.S. Postal Service Money Order,”15 “tampering with trust property,”
“trespass on private land,” “dishonor of a lawful incident,” “interference with trust
operations,” “tampering with trust property,” “trespass on private land,” “dishonor of a
lawful instrument,” “interference with trust operations,” “failure to honor money order,”
11 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
12 Osahar v. United States Postal Serv., 297 F. App’x 863, 864 (11th Cir. 2008).
13 Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
14 Complaint [Doc. 1]; Schedule of Fees/Claim [Doc. 1-5].
15 Complaint, p. 1.
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“interference with commerce,” “tampering with water meter,” and “unauthorized water
shutoff.”
Plaintiff has also filed a “Notice of Wrongful Shutoff & Demand for Restoration”
to serve as “formal notice that [she] reserve[s] all rights under the Uniform Commercial
Code, Georgia law, and federal law to seek reimbursement, damages, and other remedies
for losses caused by this wrongful act”;16 an “Affidavit of Non-Response, Certificate of
Default, Appointment of Fiduciary Duty, Default Judgment, and Full Pardon” wherein
she “appoints” the undersigned “as fiduciary and trustee bound by oath” to “protect[ ]
and preserv[e] the Estate, enforc[e] th[e] judgment; and discharge[e] all unlawful
claims”;17 and a “Motion for Default Judgment as to Royal Covenant & Heavenly Decree
of Redemption, Abundance, Restitution & Sovereignty.”18
2. 	Analysis
First, Plaintiff fails to allege facts from which this Court can determine whether it
has jurisdiction over her claims. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. A district
court must have “at least one of three types of subject matter jurisdiction: (1) jurisdiction
under a specific statutory grant; (2) federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1331; or (3) diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).”19 Federal courts have
16 [Doc. 2].
17 [Doc. 4].
18 [Doc. 5].
19 Baltin v. Alaron Trading Corp., 128 F.3d 1466, 1469 (11th Cir. 1997).
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diversity jurisdiction over civil actions between citizens of different states or between
citizens of a state and citizens or subjects of a foreign state where the amount in
controversy exceeds $75,000.20 Diversity jurisdiction “applies only to cases in which the
citizenship of each plaintiff is diverse from the citizenship of each defendant.” 21 For
purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a corporation is a citizen of the state, or states, in which
it is incorporated and the state where it has its principal place of business.22 A district
court may sua sponte “address the issue of subject matter jurisdiction at any time.”23
Plaintiff states this “matter involves federal questions, including the use and
dishonor of a U.S. Postal Service Money Order, trust property interference, and
constitutional rights,” 24 but she fails to identify any federal statute or constitutional right
Defendant has allegedly violated. Plaintiff also seems to invoke this Court’s diversity
jurisdiction, as she states the “amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 exclusive of interest
and costs,”25 but it appears Plaintiff and Defendant do not have diversity of citizenship.
Thus, Plaintiff must recast her Complaint with allegations sufficient to establish this
Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case.
20 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
21 Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996); Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d 1284,
1287 (11th Cir 1998) ("[D]iversity jurisdiction requires complete diversity, meaning that every
plaintiff must be diverse from every defendant."); Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S.
381, 389 	(1998) 	("The presence of 	[a] 	nondiverse 	party 	automatically 	destroys 	original
jurisdiction.").
22 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c).
23 Herskowitz v. Reid, 187 F. App’x 911, 912–913 (11th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
24 Complaint, p. 1.
25 Id.
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Second, Plaintiff has failed to state any viable claim for relief. The Court cannot
discern any cause of action under federal or state law. Plaintiff states she “reserve[s] all
rights under the Uniform Commercial Code, Georgia law, and federal law to seek
reimbursement, damages, and other remedies for losses caused by this wrongful act,”
and also references “conversion of funds,” “breach of agreement,” and “public health and
safety hazard,” 26 but she alleges no facts to support any such claims.
Given Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court will afford her an opportunity to amend
her complaint to state viable claims.27 The Court will not look back to the facts alleged in
the original complaint once any amended complaint is filed; the Court will only consider
the facts in the amended complaint when it conducts the frivolity review required by §
1915(e)(2)(B).28
In the “statement of claims” section of her amended complaint, Plaintiff must link
any claims she makes to the named defendant. If Plaintiff fails to link the named
defendant to a claim, the claim will be dismissed; if Plaintiff makes no allegations in the
body of her complaint against the named defendant, that defendant will be removed from
the action and dismissed. Plaintiff must provide enough facts to plausibly demonstrate
26 “Notice of Wrongful Shutoff & Demand for Restoration,” p. 1 [Doc. 2].
27 See Duff v. Steub, 378 F. App’x 868, 872 (11th Cir. 2010) (“When it appears a pro se plaintiff’s
complaint, if more carefully drafted, might state a claim, the district court should give the pro se
plaintiff an opportunity to amend h[er] complaint instead of dismissing it.”).
28 Hoefling v. City of Miami, 811 F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that the filing of an
amended pleading renders the previous pleading a “legal nullity”).
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the defendant’s actions or omissions resulted in the violation of her rights under a specific
law. It is recommended that, when drafting her “statement of claims,” Plaintiff list
numbered responses to the following questions (to the extent possible) along with the
name of the defendant:
(1) What did the defendant do (or not do) to violate her rights?
(2) When did each action occur?
(3) How was Plaintiff injured as a result of the defendant’s action?
(4) What law did the defendant violate?
In drafting her recast Complaint, Plaintiff should take care to comply with Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and 10(b).29 Complaints that violate these Rules “are often
disparagingly referred to as ‘shotgun pleadings.’” 30 Shotgun pleadings may contain
“conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause
of action” 31 or fail to separate each cause of action or claim for relief into a separate count.32
“The unifying characteristic of all types of shotgun pleadings is that they fail to one
29 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) states “A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: . . . a short
and plain statement of the claim.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b) states “A party must state its claims or
defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of
circumstances[.]”
30 Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015).
31 Id. at 1322 (footnote omitted).
32 Id. at 1323 (footnote omitted).
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degree or another, and in one way or another, to give the defendants adequate notice of
the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.”33
Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to give Defendant adequate notice of the claims against
it and the grounds for each claim. To comply with Rule 10(b), Plaintiffs must adequately
allege factual allegations into numbered paragraphs to sufficiently state a claim and allow
Defendant to respond to each claim individually. Plaintiff must separate her causes of
action into separate counts and clarify the factual allegations supporting each claim.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP [Doc. 3] is GRANTED. If Plaintiff wishes to
maintain this action, then pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) she must file a recast
Complaint within 21 days of the date of this Order, which will supersede her original
Complaint. This recast Complaint MUST be filed in accordance with the directives
contained in this Order. 	If Plaintiffs fail to respond within twenty-one (21) days, the
Court will dismiss this action with prejudice. Upon receipt of any amended complaint,
the Court will reevaluate the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). There will be
no service of process until further notice from the Court.
Plaintiff’s “Motion for Default Judgment as to Royal Covenant & Heavenly Decree
of Redemption, Abundance, Restitution & Sovereignty” [Doc. 5] is DENIED as patently
frivolous.
33 Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323 (footnote omitted).
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SO ORDERED, this 5th day of December, 2025.
S/ C. Ashley Royal__________________
C. ASHLEY ROYAL, SENIOR JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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