DINKINS v. PINERO

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
TREY LORENZ DINKINS, 	:
:
Petitioner, 	:
:
v. 	: 	Case No. 5:25-cv-272-TES-CHW
:
AARON PINEIRO, Warden 	: 	Proceedings Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254
: 	Before the U.S. Magistrate Judge
Respondent. 	:
:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is Respondent Warden Aaron Pineiro’s motion to dismiss as
untimely (Doc. 13) this Section 2254 federal habeas action commenced by Petitioner Trey
Lorenz Dinkins (Doc. 1). For the following reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that
Respondent’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 13) be GRANTED and that this action be
DISMISSED 	with 	prejudice 	as 	untimely. 	It 	is 	further 	RECOMMENDED 	that
Petitioner’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 7) be DENIED as moot.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner challenges his March 15, 2012, conviction in the Superior Court of
Houston County for malice murder, two counts felony murder, aggravated assault,
aggravated battery, and three counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a
crime. (Doc. 14-11, p. 3). The trial court sentenced Petitioner to life for the malice murder
count and consecutive five-year sentences on each possession of a firearm count. (Id.).
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Petitioner’s conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of Georgia on March 6, 2017.
(Doc. 14-11); Dinkins v. State, 300 Ga. 713, 797 S.E.2d 858 (2017).
Petitioner filed a state habeas action on July 7, 2017, in the Superior Court of
Hancock County. (Doc. 14-1). The Hancock County Superior Court transferred the case to
the Superior Court of Telfair County on January 29, 2020. (Doc. 14-9, p. 1). Following
numerous amendments raising a total of forty-two grounds for relief, the state habeas court
denied the petition on June 16, 2022. (Doc. 14-9). Petitioner did not file an application for
a certificate of probable cause to appeal.
Petitioner, pro se, commenced this federal habeas action on May 22, 2025. (Doc.
1). On July 1, 2025, Petitioner filed a “motion for summary judgment.” (Doc. 7). On July
22, 2025, the Court ordered Petitioner to amend his petition within thirty days. (Doc. 6).
He failed to do so. Respondent answered (Doc. 12) and moved to dismiss the petition as
untimely. (Doc. 13). The Court ordered Petitioner to respond (Doc. 5), but Petitioner failed
to do so. Rather, on October 10, 2025, Petitioner filed an “amended petition” that merely
realleges Grounds One and Two in his initial federal habeas petition. (Doc. 17). For the
reasons explained below, Petitioner’s action is untimely and is not subject to equitable
tolling.
Untimeliness Under the AEDPA
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act or “AEDPA,” a one-year
limitation period applies to Section 2254 federal habeas petitions. Normally, as here, that
limitation period begins to run as of the “date on which the judgment became final by the
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conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28
U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). To determine this date, the Court must “look to the actions taken
by the state court and the relevant state law” when determining whether the state direct
appellate review process has been completed. Chamblee v. Florida, 905 F.3d 1192, 1196
(11th Cir. 2018). The AEDPA further provides for statutory tolling of the limitation period
while a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with
respect to the pertinent judgment . . . is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
Petitioner’s conviction became final on June 5, 2017, the expiration of the 90-day
time limit to seek certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States following the
Georgia Supreme Court’s decision on May 30, 2017.1 See Phillips v. Warden, 908 F.3d
667, 671 (11th Cir. 2018) (“If the petitioner timely pursues all available state relief on
direct review, but does not file a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, his conviction
becomes final at the expiration of the period for filing such a petition.”) (citing Gonzalez
v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 149–50 (2012)); S UP . CT . R. 13. From that date, the AEDPA’s
clock ran for 32 days until July 7, 2017, when Petitioner filed his state habeas petition
tolling the AEDPA’s one-year period. (Doc. 14-1). The state habeas court denied
Petitioner’s state habeas petition on June 16, 2022. (Doc. 14-9). Because Petitioner did not
file a certificate of probable cause to appeal the denial of the state habeas petition to the
1 Because the 90th day, June 4, was a Sunday, Petitioner had until that Monday, June 5, to seek
certiorari review.
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Georgia Supreme Court,2 his state habeas action concluded on July 18, 2022—the
expiration of the 30-day period in which Petitioner could have properly sought appellate
habeas review pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-14-52(b).3
The AEDPA’s clock then ran for the remaining 333 days allotted for Petitioner to
file a federal habeas petition. Therefore, Petitioner’s time to file this federal habeas petition
expired on June 16, 2023. Petitioner’s Section 2254 federal habeas petition, not filed until
May 22, 2025, is more than twenty-two months out of time.
Equitable Tolling or Other Savings Provisions
The AEDPA imitations period can be subject to equitable tolling. “A petitioner is
entitled to equitable tolling only if he shows (1) that he has been pursuing his rights
diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented
timely filing.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (internal quotations omitted).
“Equitable tolling is an extraordinary remedy [that] is applied sparingly.” Outler v. United
States, 485 F.3d 1273, 1280 (11th Cir. 2007). Further, Petitioner has the burden of proving
that equitable tolling is warranted. San Martin v. McNeil, 633 F.3d 1257, 1268 (11th Cir.
2011).
2 Petitioner asserts in his original federal habeas petition that he appealed the state habeas court’s
decision “within 30 days but never received a response.” (Doc. 1, p. 7). The Court was unable to
locate a notice of appeal filed in Petitioner’s state habeas case, and the Georgia Supreme Court’s
online record does not show that a certificate of probable cause application was docketed.
3 The 30th day was July 16, a Saturday, so Petitioner had until that Monday, July 18, to seek
appellate habeas review.
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Petitioner does not specifically ask for equitable tolling of the AEDPA’s limitation
period, and equitable tolling is not warranted. Petitioner’s only justification for his
untimeliness is “a matter of jurisdiction can be raised at any time in any court and due to
me getting stabbed in left arm and [neck] I couldn’t write [legibly] due to nerve damage in
left arm medical records will show [therapy] taken.” (Doc. 1, p. 13). While a medical
condition could, in some situations, satisfy the equitable tolling standard, Petitioner’s
allegation of illegible writing certainly does not arise to an extraordinary circumstance
warranting equitable tolling. See Robinson v. U.S., 327 F. App’x 816 (11th Cir. 2007)
(discussing medical condition as basis for equitable tolling, but concluding that plaintiff's
allegations of heart condition, high blood pressure, dental needs, scabies, and denial of
medication were insufficient to justify equitable tolling). Accordingly, equitable tolling is
not applicable, and Petitioner’s Section 2254 petition should therefore be dismissed as
untimely.
CONCLUSION
For the reason discussed herein, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent’s motion
to dismiss (Doc. 13) be GRANTED and this action be DISMISSED with prejudice.
Furthermore, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s motion for summary judgment
(Doc. 7) be DENIED as moot. Additionally, pursuant to the requirements of Rule 11 of
the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, it does not appear that Petitioner has made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); see Slack
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v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483–84 (2000). Therefore, it is further RECOMMENDED
that a certificate of appealability be DENIED.
OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections
to this Recommendation, or seek an extension of time to file objections, WITHIN
FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. Any objection is limited
in length to TWENTY (20) PAGES. See M.D. Ga. L.R. 7.4. The District Judge shall make
a de novo determination of those portions of the Recommendation to which objection is
made. All other portions of the Recommendation may be reviewed for clear error.
The parties are further notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party
failing to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations contained in a report
and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives
the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual
and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and the
consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection, however,
the court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.”
SO RECOMMENDED, this 26th day of November, 2025.
s/ Charles H. Weigle_________
Charles H. Weigle
United States Magistrate Judge
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