SAXTON v. OFFICER THOMAS et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
JERRY RONALD SAXTON, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:25-CV-239 (MTT)
)
Officer THOMAS, et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
)
ORDER
Plaintiff Jerry Donald Saxton filed this pro se lawsuit and contemporaneously
moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). ECF 1; 2. On March 14, 2025, the
Court granted Saxton’s motion to proceed IFP and found his complaint deficient
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). ECF 3. Saxton was thus ordered to recast and has
since filed an amended complaint, styled as a “letter regarding medical condition.”1 ECF
4. Because Saxton is proceeding IFP, the Court must screen and dismiss his amended
complaint: (1) if it is frivolous or malicious; (2) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted; or (3) if it seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). “A dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for
failure to state a claim is governed by the same standard as a dismissal pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Thomas v. Harris, 399 F. App'x 508, 509
(11th Cir. 2010) (citing Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997)).
1 Saxton states that, pursuant to a medical condition, he cannot write. ECF 4 at 1. Thus, according to
Saxton, he had to email his amended complaint to another individual so that they could print it for filing.
Id. Because pro se litigants’ pleadings “are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by
attorneys,” the Court accepts the email attached as an exhibit to his letter as his amended complaint, and
will screen it accordingly. Tannenbaum v. U.S., 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
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I. DISCUSSION
A. Factual Allegations
Saxton brings this action against Officer Thomas of the Bibb County Sheriff
Department’s Code Enforcement, “4 other unknown officers,” and “unknown county
employees.”2 ECF 4-1 at 1. Saxton alleges that he received a citation from Bibb County
Code Enforcement regarding the condition of his front yard. Id. He alleges that Officer
Thomas gave him a list of tasks to complete at his property. Id. at 2. According to
Saxton, that list did not include any required improvements in his backyard. Id.
Saxton alleges that when the officers returned to his home for a compliance
check, they entered his backyard without permission, removed a fence, and confiscated
various items, including $40,000 worth of equipment. Id. At some point during the
incident, Saxton alleges he was handcuffed, and his phone was confiscated to prevent
him from filming the Code Enforcement Officers’ actions. Id. Saxton also alleges that he
was fined and that friends and/or family members of Officer Thomas have thrown beer
bottles through the windshield of his car since the incident. Id. Finally, Saxton alleges
that Officer Thomas’ son lives with and is best friends with Saxton’s ex-wife, creating a
conflict of interest. Id. Saxton does not allege the exact date of the incident; he states
only that the incident occurred “almost 1 year ago from the exact time of the second
complaint,” which was approximately July 2024. Id. at 3.
2 In his initial complaint, Saxton named Sheriff David Davis and Code Enforcement Officer Mann as
defendants to this action. ECF 1 at 2. His amended complaint asserts no allegations against those
defendants. ECF 4-1. As the Court stated in its order to recast, the Court will not look back to the facts
alleged in the original complaint once the amended complaint is filed; the Court will only consider the
facts in the amended complaint when it conducts the frivolity review required by § 1915(e)(2)(B). Hoefling
v. City of Miami, 811 F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that the filing of an amended pleading
renders the previous pleading a “legal nullity”). Accordingly, any claims against Sheriff Davis and Officer
Mann are DISMISSED without prejudice.
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Saxton claims the defendants’ conduct violated the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition against illegal search and seizure, the Eighth Amendment, and the First
Amendment. Id. at 3. Saxton also asserts a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress under Georgia law and for the defendants’ alleged ethical violations. Id.
B. Frivolity Review
1. Unidentified Defendants
As an initial matter, Saxton names “4 other unknown officers” and an unspecified
number of “unknown county employees” as defendants along with Officer Thomas. ECF
4-1 at 1. Generally, “fictitious-party pleading is not permitted in federal court.”
Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 738 (2010). An exception to the prohibition on
fictitious-party pleading exists when the plaintiff’s description of the defendant is “‘at the
very worst, surplusage’ because the plaintiff’s description of the defendant ‘sufficiently
clear to allow service of process.’” Velma v. Gruler, 808 F. App’x 872, 880 (11th Cir.
2020); see Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1215-16 (11th Cir. 1992). Here, Saxton
provides no description of the “4 other unknown officers and the unknown county
employees,” apart from their presence at his home with Officer Thomas on an
unidentified date. ECF 4-1 at 2. That is not a sufficiently clear description to allow
service of the unknown officers and county employees. See Richardson v. Johnson,
598 F.3d 734, 738 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding the description “John Doe, Guard, Charlotte
Correctional Institute” was “insufficient to identify the fictitious defendant among the
many guards employed at CCI”).
Because Saxton does not allege the specific date of the incident, it is unclear
whether dismissal of the unknown defendants would effectively be with prejudice due to
the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the Court will afford Saxton 60 days from the
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entry of this order to identify the unknown defendants. There will be no extensions. If
Saxton properly identifies the unknown defendants, he may amend his complaint to add
claims against those defendants. Saxton’s amended complaint should specifically allege
each defendant’s actions or omissions that resulted in the violation of his rights under a
specific law. Failure to properly identify the unknown defendants may result in the
dismissal of Saxton’s claims against them.
The Court now reviews Saxton’s claims against Officer Thomas.
2. Fourth Amendment Claim
Saxton alleges that Officer Thomas violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition
of unreasonable search and seizure when he entered Saxton’s backyard and removed
his property without a warrant. ECF 74-1 at 2.
The Fourth Amendment “protects two types of expectations, one involving
‘searches,’ the other ‘seizures.’” U.S. v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (2984). “A ‘search’
occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is
infringed.” Id. “A ‘seizure’ of property occurs when there is some meaningful
interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.” Id. “[S]earches
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate,
are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court has recognized that
administrative searches of homes for municipal fire, health, and safety inspections,
without the homeowners’ consent, are subject to Fourth Amendment protection.
Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 534
(1967).
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Here, Saxton alleges Officer Thomas had an order that authorized only entry into
Saxton’s front yard. ECF 4-1 at 2. Saxton alleges that, without a warrant, Officer
Thomas cut a lock on Saxton’s back fence, entered Saxton’s back yard, tore down
Saxton's fences, and took equipment from Saxton’s home. Id. Construed liberally,
Saxton has plausibly alleged that Officer Thomas’s actions constituted an unreasonable
search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
Accordingly, Saxton’s Fourth Amendment claim against Officer Thomas will
proceed for further fact-finding.
3. Eighth Amendment Claim
Saxton also alleges that the defendants violated the Eighth Amendment. ECF 4-1
at 3. Saxton does not specify under which clause of the Eighth Amendment he asserts a
claim. However, based on Saxton’s allegations, his complaint could be construed as
asserting a claim under the Eighth Amendment’s excessive fines clause or under the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
The Eighth Amendment’s excessive fines clause provides, “[e]xcessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.” U.S. Const., amend. VIII. Saxton must plausibly allege that assessments
against him are “(1) a fine and (2) excessive.” United States v. 817 N.E. 29th Drive, 175
F.3d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir. 1999). A fine is excessive “if it is grossly disproportional to
the gravity of a defendant’s offense.” Yates v. Pinellas Hematology & Oncology, P.A.,
21 F.4th 1288, 1314 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321,
335 (1998)). When assessing whether a fine is excessive, courts consider several non-
exhaustive factors including “(i) whether the defendant is in the class of persons at
whom the statute was principally directed; (ii) how the imposed penalties compare to
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other penalties compare to other penalties authorized by the legislature; and (iii) the
harm caused by the defendant.” Id. at 1314. Penalties “falling below the maximum
statutory fines for a given offense … receive a strong presumption of constitutionality.”
Id.
Here, Saxton alleges only that he was fined $2,000. ECF 4-1 at 2. His amended
complaint contains no details regarding whether this fine is disproportionate to the
typical fine for code enforcement violations, or whether the fine is above the maximum
amount permitted in the applicable statutory provisions. Id. Thus, to the extent Saxton
intended to assert an excessive fine claim under the Eighth Amendment, he fails to
state such a claim.
As for the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, that
clause applies only to individuals convicted of crimes. Whitney v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,
318 (1986). Here, Saxton does not allege that he is incarcerated or that he has been
convicted of a crime, and, thus, the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual
punishments clause does not apply.3 ECF 4-1.
Saxton’s Eighth Amendment claims are DISMISSED without prejudice.
3 The Fourth Amendment protects from government officials’ use of excessive force on arrestees and
other “seized” individuals. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). Here, even if the Court
construes Saxton’s complaint as alleging excessive force under the Fourth Amendment, that claim still
fails. Saxton’s only allegation relating to the use of force during the alleged search and seizure is that he
“was handcuffed and made to stay away.” ECF 4-1 at 2. Saxton does not explain what force, if any, was
used when the officers handcuffed him. And Saxton fails to allege which defendant placed handcuffs on
him, rendering it impossible to tell which defendant could be liable. See Sebastian v. Ortiz, 918 F.3d
1301, 1312 (11th Cir. 2019) (“[O]nly the most exceptional circumstances will permit an excessive force
claim on the basis of handcuffing alone.”); Huebner v. Bradshaw, 935 F.3d 1183, 1191 (11th Cir. 2019)
(“[W]e have repeatedly held that painful handcuffing alone doesn’t constitute excessive force.”). Saxton,
thus, fails to state an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment.
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4. First Amendment Claim
Saxton also alleges the defendants violated the First Amendment by confiscating
his phone and prohibiting him from filming the officers’ conduct. ECF 4-1 at 2-3.
The Eleventh Circuit has recognized “a First Amendment right, subject to
reasonable time, manner, and place restrictions, to photograph or videotape police
conduct.” Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000). “Additionally,
… law enforcement officers may not arrest an individual as a way ‘to thwart or intrude
upon First Amendment rights otherwise being validly asserted.’” Toole v. City of Atl.,
798 Fed. App’x 381, 387 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Kelly v. Page, 335 F.2d 381, 387 (5th
Cir. 1964)). However, while Saxton arguably had a First Amendment right to film the
code enforcement officer’s actions, he fails to allege which officer confiscated his
phone. Because Saxton does not link a particular defendant to the alleged First
Amendment violation, he has failed to state a claim under the First Amendment.
Saxton’s First Amendment claim is DISMISSED without prejudice.
5. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim
Saxton also alleges that “the stress [the defendants] put on [him] due to his
[s]trokes was intentional infliction of emotional distress.” ECF 4-1 at 3. Saxton does not
allege that the defendants’ actions caused him to experience strokes or further medical
complications. Rather, he appears to allege that his stress from his interactions with the
defendants was heightened because of his medical condition. Id. at 3.
Under Georgia law, intentional infliction of emotional distress contains four
elements: “(1) The conduct must be intentional or reckless; (2) The conduct must be
extreme and outrageous; (3) There must be a causal connection between the wrongful
conduct and the emotional distress; and (4) The emotional distress must be severe.”
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Parcel Service v. Moore, 238 Ga. App. 376, 377, 519 S.E.2d 15 (1999) (quoting Odem
v. Pace Academy, 235 Ga. App. 684, 654(2), 510 S.E.2d 326 (1998)). Saxton’s
one-sentence allegation does not state a claim. First, Saxton does not allege that the
defendants intended to inflict emotional pain or that they acted recklessly with regard to
that possibility. See Johnson v. American Nat. Red Cross, 253 Ga. App. 587, 593, 569
S.E.2d 242 (2002). Moreover, Saxton alleges only that the defendants caused “stress.”
ECF 4-1 at 3. He does not allege any other physical and/or mental manifestations that
constitute “severe” emotional distress under Georgia law.4 Howerton v. Harbin Clinic,
LLC, 333 Ga. App. 191, 208, 776 S.E.2d 288 (2015) (“To demonstrate that the
emotional distress [he] suffered was severe, a plaintiff must show, at the very least, that
physical and/or mental manifestations of that distress required [him] to seek medical or
psychological treatment.”) (collecting cases).
Saxton’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is DISMISSED
without prejudice.
6. Claims Related to Ethical Violations
Saxton also alleges that Officer Thomas and the other code enforcement officers
committed ethical violations. ECF 4-1 at 2. Specifically, Saxton alleges that Officer
Thomas had a conflict of interest because his son lives with Saxton’s ex-wife. Id. Saxton
also alleges that someone who knew Officer Thomas5 threw a bottle through Saxton’s
4 Saxton alleges that he had strokes and heart problems, and that the defendants should have granted
his request an extension of time to complete his required yard work because of those health issues. ECF
4-1 at 2. It is unclear if those allegations are intended to support his claim for Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress. To the extent that they are, Saxton again fails to plausibly allege that the denial of an
extension caused him severe emotional distress.
5 It is unclear exactly who Saxton alleges threw a bottle through his windshield. Saxton alleges the bottle
was thrown by “Mr. Thomas’s son best friend to [Saxton’s] ex-wife.” ECF 4-1 at 2. It appears that the
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windshield and was not charged for his or her actions. Id. Finally, Saxton alleges that
the defendants failed to take into account Saxton’s medical conditions during the
incident in question, which constituted an ethical violation. Id. However, Saxton fails to
connect the alleged ethical violations to a legal cause of action. Thus, Saxton fails to
state a claim based on the defendants’ ethical duties.
Accordingly, any claim arising from the officers’ alleged ethical violations is
DISMISSED without prejudice.
II. CONCLUSION
Saxton has 60 days from the entry of this order to properly identify the “4
unknown code enforcement officers” and the “unknown county employees,” and to file
an amended complaint asserting claims against those defendants. The following claims
are DISMISSED without prejudice as to Officer Thomas: (1) Saxton’s Eighth
Amendment claim; (2) Saxton’s First Amendment claim; (3) Saxton’s state law claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (4) any claim arising from the officers’
alleged ethical violations. Saxton’s Fourth Amendment claim for unreasonable search
and seizure against Officer Thomas SHALL proceed for further factual development.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that service be made on Bibb County Code Enforcement
Officer Thomas by the United States Marshal Service.
Saxton is advised that he must serve upon opposing counsel (or the defendants
if they are not represented by counsel) copies of all motions, pleadings, discovery, and
correspondence (including letters to the Clerk or to a judge) filed with the Clerk of Court.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a). Saxton shall include with any paper which is filed with the Clerk of
individual referred to is Officer Thomas’ son. Regardless, it is clear that the individual who threw the bottle
through Saxton’s windshield is not a named defendant.
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Court a certificate stating the date on which a true and correct copy of that paper was
mailed to the defendants. The Clerk of Court will not serve or forward to the defendants
or their counsel copies of any materials filed with the Court.
In addition, the following limitations are imposed on discovery: except with written
permission of the Court first obtained, (1) interrogatories may not exceed twenty-five to
each party (Local Rule 33.1), (2) requests for production of documents and things under
Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may not exceed ten requests to each
party (Local Rule 34), and (3) requests for admissions under Rule 36 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure may not exceed fifteen requests to each party (Local Rule 36).
Saxton is responsible for diligently prosecuting his complaint, and failure to do so
may result in dismissal under Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Saxton
is required to keep the Clerk of Court advised of her current address during the
pendency of this action. Failure to promptly advise the Clerk of any change of address
may result in the dismissal of this action.
SO ORDERED, this 31st day of December, 2025.
S/ Marc T. Treadwell
MARC T. TREADWELL, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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