UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. BALL

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
TRAVIS BALL, 	:
:
Movant, 	:
:
v. 	: 	Case No. 5:21-cr-065-CAR-CHW-1
: 	Case No. 5:25-cv-269-CAR-CHW
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	: 	28 U.S.C. § 2255
:
Respondent. 	:
:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is the Government’s motion to dismiss Movant Travis Ball’s motion to
vacate 	his 	sentence 	pursuant 	to 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 2255. 	For 	the 	following 	reasons, 	it 	is
RECOMMENDED that the Government’s motion (Doc. 112) be GRANTED and Movant’s
Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. 111) be
DISMISSED. It is further RECOMMENDED that a certificate of appealability be DENIED.
Finally, it is RECOMMENDED that “Movant’s motion for the courts report and recommendation
to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside or quash sentence” (Doc. 117) be DISMISSED as
moot.1
BACKGROUND
On November 17, 2021, Movant was indicted for one count of Threats Against the
President. (Doc. 1). With the assistance of counsel, Movant pleaded guilty to one count of Threats
1 Docketed at 115 is Movant’s “Motion to Oppose United States Motion to Dismiss Movant’s
§ 2255 Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence.” (Doc. 115). This document appears to
be a reply to the Government’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 112) rather than a true motion. As such,
the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to TERMINATE the motion at ECF No. 115.
Case 5:21-cr-00065-CAR-CHW Document 118 Filed 02/02/26 Page 1 of 7

2
Against the President under 18 U.S.C. § 871. (Docs. 65, 66). The Plea Agreement explained that
this count carried a maximum term of five (5) years imprisonment, a maximum fine of
$250,000.00, and up to three years of supervised supervision (Doc. 65, pp. 2–3).
Although he faced a maximum prison sentence of 5 years, or 60 months, the presentence
investigation report (PSR) indicated that Movant’s sentencing guideline range was 27 to 33 months
based upon a total offense level of 14 and a criminal history category of IV. (Doc. 67, ¶¶ 70–71).
Movant filed an objection to the PSR which, if granted, would have lowered the sentencing
guideline range to 21 to 27 months. (Docs. 68; 70-1). The Court sentenced Movant to 33 months
imprisonment and entered Judgment on December 1, 2022. (Doc. 73). Movant did not directly
appeal his sentence.
On February 21, 2023, Movant filed a motion for acquittal which the Court denied. (Docs.
79, 85). 	Movant filed a second motion for acquittal on June 22, 2023, which the Court again
denied. (Docs. 88, 93). On February 14, 2025, Movant filed a motion to dismiss all charges, and
he filed a motion to dismiss the case four days later.2 (Docs. 99, 100). On March 6, 2025, Movant
filed a motion for an unconditional discharge. (Doc. 102). The Court denied these three motions
on April 8, 2025. (Doc. 103).
Movant filed a second motion for unconditional discharge on May 14, 2025. (Doc. 106).
The Court, out of an abundance of caution that Movant’s motion could be construed as a motion
for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, ordered Movant to recast his Section 2255 motion within thirty
on the proper form. (Doc. 107). On June 10, 2025, Movant filed a new Section 2255 motion on
2 Movant dated (Doc. 99) as February 20, 2025, which would normally be the date of filing pursuant to the
Prison Mailbox Rule. However, because February 20, 2025, is after the date of docketing, Movant’s motion
necessarily cannot have been sent on February 20, 2025. The same is true for (Doc. 100) which Movant
dated as February 26, 2025, but was docketed on February 18, 2025.
Case 5:21-cr-00065-CAR-CHW Document 118 Filed 02/02/26 Page 2 of 7

3
the proper form. (Doc. 111). The Government moved to dismiss Movant’s Section 2255 motion as
untimely. (Doc. 112).
In his Section 2255 motion, Movant raises four grounds for relief. (Doc. 111). As explained
below, because Movant’s Section 2255 motion is untimely, and no tolling provisions apply to his
case, the Court need not consider the merits of Movant’s argument. The Government’s motion to
dismissed should be granted, and Movant’s Section 2255 motion should be dismissed.
DISCUSSION
I. 	Movant’s Section 2255 Motion is Untimely.
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), enacted on April 24, 1996,
was created primarily to put an end to the unacceptable delay in the review of prisoners’ habeas
petitions by adding a one-year limitation period for the filing of habeas corpus petitions. “The
purpose of AEDPA is not obscure. It was to eliminate the interminable delays in the execution of
state and federal criminal sentences, and the . . . overloading of our federal criminal justice system,
produced by various aspects of [the Supreme Court of the United States’s] habeas corpus
jurisprudence.” Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 264–65 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In
pertinent part, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) provides that:
A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section. The
limitation period shall run from the latest of--
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental
action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if
the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action;
Case 5:21-cr-00065-CAR-CHW Document 118 Filed 02/02/26 Page 3 of 7

4
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme
Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have
been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
The triggering date applicable to this case is “the date on which the judgment of conviction
becomes final.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1).
Since Movant did not directly appeal his conviction or sentence, his judgment of conviction
became final when the time for filing a direct appeal expired. Murphy v. United States, 634 F.3d
1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2011). According to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in effect at the
time of Movant’s sentencing, Movant had fourteen days after the entry of judgment to file a notice
of appeal. See, e.g., F ED. R. APP . P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i). Therefore, for purposes of AEDPA’s limitations
period, Movant’s judgment of conviction became final on December 15, 2022, fourteen days after
his judgment of conviction was entered on December 1, 2022. Absent tolling, the time for collateral
review of that conviction expired a year later, on December 15, 2023. Because Movant filed this
Section 2255 motion in May 2025—more than seventeen months after the limitation period
expired—his motion is untimely, and thus subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1).3
Further, Movant’s Section 2255 motion is not rendered timely due to equitable tolling. “[A]
petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he shows (1) that he has been pursuing his rights
3 Any argument that certain of Movant’s post-convictions filings should be considered as “properly filed
application[s]” that toll the one-year statute of limitations period would be immaterial, because the
combined tolling period of those motions does not render Movant’s Section 2255 application timely. In
viewing the Court’s docket, Movant filed five post-conviction motions which could be argued as tolling the
AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations: the first “Motion for Acquittal” (Doc. 79) filed on February 21,
2023; the second “Motion for Acquittal” (Doc. 88) filed on June 22, 2023; a “Motion to Dismiss All
Charges” (Doc. 99) filed on February 14, 2025; a “Motion to Dismiss Case” (Doc. 100) filed on February
18, 2025; and a “Motion for Unconditional Discharge” (Doc. 102) filed on March 7, 2025. The Court ruled
on (Doc. 79) on April 7, 2023, (Doc. 88) on January 3, 2024, and (Docs. 99, 100, 102) on April 8, 2025.
The total amount of time these documents remained pending was 293 days. If this time is subtracted from
the period in this case, Movant’s Section 2255 motion would still be 223 days out of time.
Case 5:21-cr-00065-CAR-CHW Document 118 Filed 02/02/26 Page 4 of 7

5
diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely
filing.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Movant appears to argue that equitable tolling applies because he instructed his attorney to file a
Section 2255 motion, but the attorney failed to do so. (Doc. 111, p. 14).
Movant’s argument fails for two reasons. First, he does not have any constitutional right to
counsel during collateral proceedings such that his pre-conviction attorney was required to file a
Section 2255 motion even if requested. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (“We
have never held that prisoners have a constitutional right to counsel when mounting collateral
attacks upon their convictions and we decline to so hold today. Our cases establish that the right
to appointed counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no further.”) (internal citation omitted).
Second, even if Movant did have a constitutional right to an attorney during this collateral
proceeding and that attorney failed to timely file this Section 2255 motion, the Supreme Court has
made clear “that a garden variety claim of excusable neglect, such as a simple miscalculation that
leads a lawyer to miss a filing deadline, does not warrant equitable tolling.” Holland, 560 U.S. at
651–52 (cleaned up); see Steed v. Head, 219 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 2000) (collecting cases).
Movant is not represented by an attorney in this collateral proceeding, and he has not shown that
any action or nonaction of a prior attorney would qualify as an extraordinary circumstance that
prevented Movant from filing a timely petition. Indeed, Movant would be hard-pressed to make
such a showing considering the numerous pro se motions he filed with the Court between judgment
and this proceeding. See generally (Docket).
Movant has not shown that he was prevented in any way from filing this untimely Section
2255 motion. The record gives no indication that “extraordinary circumstances” warranting
equitable tolling are present. E.g., Lawrence v. Florida, 421 F.3d 1221, 1226 (11th Cir. 2005)
Case 5:21-cr-00065-CAR-CHW Document 118 Filed 02/02/26 Page 5 of 7

6
(“Equitable tolling . . . is available when a movant untimely files because of extraordinary
circumstances that are both beyond his control and unavoidable even with diligence.” (internal
quotations and citations omitted)). Therefore, Movant’s Section 2255 motion is not rendered
timely due to equitable tolling.
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District
Courts provides that “[t]he district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it
enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” A certificate of appealability may issue only if the
applicant makes “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2).
When a court denies a collateral motion on procedural grounds, this standard requires a
movant to demonstrate that “jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a
valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable
whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,
484 (2000). Movant cannot meet this standard and, therefore, a certificate of appealability in this
case should be denied.
CONCLUSION
For the reason discussed herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Government’s motion to
dismiss (Doc. 112) be GRANTED and Movant’s Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. 111) be DISMISSED. It is further RECOMMENDED that a
certificate of appealability be DENIED. Finally, it is RECOMMENDED that “Movant’s motion
for the courts report and recommendation to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside or quash
sentence” (Doc. 117) be DISMISSED as moot
Case 5:21-cr-00065-CAR-CHW Document 118 Filed 02/02/26 Page 6 of 7

7
OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections to this
Recommendation, or seek an extension of time to file objections, WITHIN FOURTEEN (14)
DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. Any objection is limited in length to TWENTY (20)
PAGES. See M.D. Ga. L.R. 7.4. The District Judge shall make a de novo determination of those
portions of the Recommendation to which objection is made. All other portions of the
Recommendation may be reviewed for clear error.
The parties are further notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party failing
to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations contained in a report and
recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to
challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions
if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for
failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal
for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.”
SO RECOMMENDED, this 2nd day of February, 2026.
s/ Charles H. Weigle_________
Charles H. Weigle
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 5:21-cr-00065-CAR-CHW Document 118 Filed 02/02/26 Page 7 of 7