Zea v. National Association of Realtors (NAR) et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 25-cv-81016-DIMITROULEAS/MATTHEWMAN
JORGE A. ZEA,
Plaintiff,
v.
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
REALTORS®, et al.,
Defendants.
______________________________________/
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION [DE 8]
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Plaintiff Jorge A. Zea’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for
Preliminary Injunction and Supporting Memorandum of Law to Compel Defendants’ Compliance
with Their Own Binding Rules (“Motion”) [DE 8]. This matter was referred to the Undersigned
United States Magistrate Judge by the Honorable William P. Dimitrouleas, United States District
Judge. See DE 14.
Defendants National Association of REALTORS® (“NAR”); Broward, Palm Beaches and
St. Lucie REALTORS®, Inc.; Beaches MLS, Inc.; Miami Association of REALTORS®, Inc.;
Orlando Regional REALTOR® Association, Inc.; Space Coast Multiple Listing Service, Inc.;
Space Coast Association of REALTORS®, Inc.; Royal Palm Coast REALTOR® Association,
Inc.; Florida Gulf Coast Multiple Listing Service, Inc.; Naples Area Board of REALTORS®, Inc.;
My Florida Regional MLS, Inc. (d/b/a Stellar MLS); Northeast Florida Multiple Listing Service,
Inc. (d/b/a realMLS); Northeast Florida Association of REALTORS®, Inc.; Central Panhandle
Association of REALTORS®, Inc.; Connecticut Association of REALTORS®; Smart MLS, Inc.;
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and West and Southeast REALTORS® of the Valley, Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”) have filed
a Response [DE 62], and Plaintiff has filed a Reply [DE 63]. Plaintiff and Defendants have also
filed declarations in support of their briefs. See DEs 9, 62-1, 62-18, 62-20. The Motion is fully
briefed and ripe for review.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Jorge A. Zea, a realtor and licensed real estate broker proceeding pro se in this
case, filed a 122-page Complaint [“Compl.”, DE 1] against Defendants on August 15, 2025.
Defendants include NAR and 16 local REALTOR® associations and MLS providers. Compl.
¶¶ 27–46. Plaintiff is a licensed real estate agent and broker with Blue Lighthouse Realty, Inc. [DE
9-1 at 133]. Blue Lighthouse, Plaintiff’s “innovative, non-traditional, low-cost real estate
brokerage service,” offers a fixed-fee listing service whereby property owners pay a one-time fee
to list their property for sale. Compl. ¶ 19. Under Blue Lighthouse’s business model, all leads
received by Plaintiff are forwarded to the seller, and the seller coordinates showings, negotiates
directly with buyers, and coordinates the sale of the property. Compl. ¶ 22.
NAR is a nationwide trade association in the real estate industry. Decl. of Rodney Gansho
(“Gansho 	Decl.”) 	¶ 	2, 	DE 	62-18. 	NAR’s 	membership 	consists 	of 	licensed 	real 	estate
professionals—including brokers, sales agents, property managers, appraisers, and counselors—
who belong to state and local REALTOR® associations across the country. Id. ¶ 3. NAR develops
standards for efficient, effective, and ethical real estate business practices, including its Code of
Ethics and Handbook on Multiple Listing Policy. Id. ¶ 5. This Handbook is a guide for local
associations of REALTORS® regarding the operation of MLSs. Id. ¶ 8. The Handbook contains
various tiers of model rules: mandatory, recommended, optional, and informational. Id. ¶ 11.
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State and local associations of REALTORS® are independently incorporated entities (with
separate governing rules and bylaws). Id. ¶ 4. State REALTOR® associations act as intermediaries
between NAR and the local REALTOR® associations. Id. ¶ 13. Local associations (together as a
group or through wholly owned subsidiaries) can own and operate MLSs but must abide by certain
standards to use NAR’s REALTOR® trademark and access professional liability insurance
procured by NAR. Id. ¶¶ 9, 12. Those standards include enforcing the Code of Ethics and following
all mandatory NAR policies and MLS rules in the Handbook. Id. ¶¶ 5, 6(c), 12. The local
associations enforce the MLS rules on their members and are responsible for monitoring their
members’ compliance and for taking enforcement steps when violations occur. Id. ¶ 14. Because
each association administers its own procedures, compliance questions are resolved individually,
with violations determined on a case-by-case basis. Id. ¶¶ 12–14.
The Complaint alleges six counts, all based on antitrust violations brought under the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. More specifically, the Complaint alleges that Defendants have
violated federal antitrust law by collectively refusing to enforce certain NAR rules that Plaintiff
acknowledges protect competition. Compl. ¶¶ 8, 376–447. As it relates to Plaintiff’s Motion, the
Complaint alleges that Defendants have failed to enforce three of NAR’s mandatory rules,
including the: (1) “Non-Filtering Rule,” prohibiting filtering of customer-facing listings by
brokerage/agent or compensation offered (Policy Statement 8.5); (2) “IDX Display Rule,”
requiring that contact information for listing brokerages be displayed in online listings (Policy
Statement 7.58); and (3) “Buyer-Broker Agreement Rule,” mandating written agreements between
MLS participants working with a buyer setting forth the terms of compensation (Policy Statement
8.13). Gansho Decl. ¶ 16. Plaintiff contends that Defendants’ alleged refusal to enforce these pro-
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competitive rules has competitively disadvantaged his discount-brokerage business. Compl. ¶¶ 21–
26.
II. 	MOTION, RESPONSE, AND REPLY
A. 	Plaintiff’s Motion [DE 8]
Plaintiff is seeking a preliminary injunction requiring Defendants to follow their own rules.
[DE 8 at 1]. He claims that he exhausted private remedies before seeking judicial relief. Id. at 2.
Plaintiff further argues that he has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, he and the
public will suffer irreparable harm absent an injunction, the balance of hardships favors an
injunction, and the injunction is in the public interest. Id. at 5–17.
B. 	Defendants’ Response [DE 62]
Defendants respond by arguing that Defendants already enforce the rules at issue, and,
moreover, a court order requiring enforcement of said rules is improperly vague and lacking in
specificity. [DE 62 at 5–8]. Next, Defendants contend that Plaintiff has not clearly established the
elements required to obtain a preliminary injunction. Id. at 8–19. Finally, Defendants assert that
Plaintiff fails to address the bond required for obtaining injunctive relief. Id. at 19–20.
C. 	Plaintiff’s Reply [DE 63]
In reply, Plaintiff first alleges that Defendants’ “own sworn declarations and exhibits
eliminate any genuine issue of fact.” [DE 63 at 2]. Next, Plaintiff claims that Defendants’ argument
that an order requiring enforcement of the rules is improperly vague actually constitutes a
“confession of intentional non-enforcement.” Id. at 5. He also maintains that he has clearly
demonstrated each of the requisite elements for obtaining a preliminary injunction. Id. at 6–10.
Additionally, Plaintiff requests that the “bond requirement be waived or, in the alternative, set at
a nominal amount of one dollar ($1.00)” in light of the facts of this case. Id. at 11.
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III. 	APPLICABLE LAW
A court is required to consider the following factors when determining whether preliminary
injunctive relief is to be granted: “whether the movant has established: (1) a substantial likelihood
of success on the merits; (2) that irreparable injury will be suffered if the relief is not granted; (3)
that the threatened injury outweighs the harm the relief would inflict on the non-movant; and (4)
that entry of the relief would serve the public interest.” Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403
F.3d 1223, 1225–26 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Ingram v. Ault, 50 F.3d 898, 900 (11th Cir. 1995)).
“Because a preliminary injunction ‘is an extraordinary and drastic remedy’ relief may not
be granted ‘unless the movant clearly established the burden of persuasion as to the four
requisites.’” Callahan v. United States Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. through Alex Azar II, 939
F.3d 1251, 1257 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing McDonald’s Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1306
(11th Cir. 1998)). A showing of irreparable injury is “‘the sine qua non of injunctive relief.’” Siegel
v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Ass’n of
Gen. Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 896 F.2d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir.1990)). Even if a plaintiff
can “establish a likelihood of success on the merits, the absence of a substantial likelihood of
irreparable injury would, standing alone, make preliminary injunctive relief improper.” Siegel, 234
F.3d at 1176.
IV. 	ANALYSIS
As an initial matter, the Court finds that an evidentiary hearing on the Motion is not
necessary. “An evidentiary hearing is required for entry of a preliminary injunction only ‘where
facts are bitterly contested and credibility determinations must be made to decide whether
injunctive relief should issue.’” Bonilla v. Librati, No. 1:21-CV-21588-KMM, 2022 WL 2805254,
at *3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 15, 2022) (citing Cumulus Media, Inc. v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc., 304
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F.3d 1167, 1178 (11th Cir. 2002)). Here, the facts are not bitterly contested, and no credibility
determinations must be made.
Next, because the Motion must be denied if Plaintiff has not clearly established that
irreparable injury will be suffered if the relief is not granted, the Court will consider that element
first.
According to the Motion, Plaintiff became aware of Defendants’ alleged non-enforcement
of the NAR rules in 2021 and initially believed that “the Burnett litigation”1 would resolve the
issue. [DE 8 at 2]. When the issue was not resolved in 2024, at the conclusion of the Burnett
litigation, Plaintiff claims he “spent the following year pursuing private remedies—filing ethics
complaints, submitting compliance requests, and engaging Defendants directly via email and
conversations.” Id. Plaintiff cautions that the Court “should not mistake Plaintiff’s years of
restraint and multiple direct resolution attempts for a lack of urgency. To the contrary, this history
demonstrates the exact good-faith exhaustion of alternatives that precedes a necessary request for
judicial intervention.” Id. at 3. He further claims that for “months prior to filing this action, [he]
engaged in a voluminous, good-faith effort to persuade Defendants to simply comply with and
enforce their own binding, pro-competitive rules.” Id. Plaintiff has filed with the Court certain
emails addressed to some of the Defendants to establish his attempts to resolve the enforcement of
the rules. [DE 9-1, Exs. 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4]. The first emails are dated
September 2024, and they span into 2025.
1 Plaintiff does not further explain what the Burnett litigation is in the Motion; however, in their Response, Defendants
argue that “Plaintiff is also unable to challenge the buyer-broker agreement rule, which, as Plaintiff admits, was
implemented as part of a class action settlement of litigation against NAR in the Western District of Missouri. See
Burnett, et al. v. Nat’l Ass’n of REALTORS®, et al., No. 19-cv-332 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 19, 2024), ECF No. 1458-1.” [DE
62 at 16]. According to Defendants, “[t]hat settlement received final approval on November 27, 2024, and the practice
changes went into effect in August 2024. Id. at ECF No. 1622. Because the Western District of Missouri approved the
practice changes and retained jurisdiction over the settlement, any alleged enforcement issues related to the buyer-
broker agreement rule are subject to final approval by that court.” Id.
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Plaintiff filed his Motion on August 27, 2025. Thus, he waited almost a full year between
drafting his first emails to certain Defendants and filing the Motion. This delay significantly
undermines his assertion of irreparable harm. Injunctive remedies “will generally not be granted
in favor of one who, with full knowledge of what is being done or with the means of acquiring
such knowledge, acquiesces or delays in asserting rights until the defendant is in a position that he
or she can alter only with great damage.” 42 Am. Jur. 2d Injunctions § 44(II)(e) (2025). “A delay
in seeking a preliminary injunction of even only a few months—though not necessarily fatal—
militates against a finding of irreparable harm.” Wreal, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 840 F.3d 1244,
1248 (11th Cir. 2016). Preliminary injunctions are “premised on the need for speedy and urgent
action to protect a plaintiff’s rights before a case can be resolved on its merits.” Id. (affirming
district court’s denial of preliminary injunction where plaintiff failed to prove an imminent
irreparable harm after waiting five months to move for injunctive relief). “When there has been
delay in seeking injunctive relief, courts look to whether the moving party has reasonably justified
the delay.” Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Calabrese, No. 18-60788-CIV, 2018 WL 6653079, at *5
(S.D. Fla. July 5, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 18-60788-CIV, 2018 WL
6653070 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 7, 2018) (denying preliminary injunction because a year-long delay
between learning of infringement to suing, during which the parties exchanged letters and phone
calls attempting to resolve the dispute, disproved an irreparable harm).
Here, the Motion should be denied first on the basis that Plaintiff waited almost a year to
file it after he started communicating with Defendants regarding their perceived rule violations.
The limited emails attached to Plaintiff’s declaration do not provide sufficient justification for the
delay. Further, Plaintiff has cited no cases in which courts have permitted such a delay. This delay
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is fatal to the Plaintiff’s Motion. Nonetheless, for the purposes of a complete record, the Court will
also consider the specific irreparable harm claimed by Plaintiff in his Motion and Reply.
First, to the extent Plaintiff argues that “irreparable harm to the public itself – through
suppression of competition – can independently justify injunctive relief,” Plaintiff has not cited
any law that supports this argument. The case relied on by Plaintiff—Florida Businessmen for
Free Enterprise v. City of Hollywood, 648 F.2d 956, 958 (5th Cir. 1981)—is inapposite. In that
case, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals granted the appellants’ motion for stay and enjoined the
enforcement of a local ordinance pending appeal regarding whether it violated appellants’ First
Amendment rights. Here, Plaintiff is broadly claiming that Defendants’ actions are causing
irreparable harm to the public through the suppression of competition. The Court finds that
Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged irreparable harm to the public, which requires the issuance of
a preliminary injunction.
Second, Plaintiff alleges that an “injunction is essential to halt ongoing, irreparable harm
that poisons the competitive process, deceives customers, and directly injures Plaintiff’s business.”
[DE 8 at 14]. He explains that “[e]very instance in which Plaintiff loses a business opportunity
enabled by the restraints, results in irreparable harm. In the real estate industry, a lost customer is
not merely a temporary setback—it is a permanent loss.” Id. at 15. Plaintiff claims that the harm
is exponential because losing one client causes a loss in “potential referrals, word-of-mouth
growth, and the reputational goodwill that brokers rely on to sustain and grow their businesses.”
Id. According to Plaintiff, “Defendants’ conspiracy directly harms Plaintiff’s ability to compete
on the merits of his low-cost model, causing the loss of customers, reputation and market
opportunities that cannot be remedied by money damages alone.” Id. Plaintiff further claims that
there is “irreparable harm to the public and the competitive process.” Id. at 16. Thus, the ongoing
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systemic harm to consumers and to the competitive process alone compels the issuance of a
preliminary injunction.” Id.
In sum, Plaintiff argues that he will suffer future harm in the form of loss of customers and
goodwill if Defendants are permitted to continue to flout the NAR rules. He relies on BellSouth
Telecommunications, Inc. v. MCIMetro Access Transmission Servs., LLC, 425 F.3d 964, 970 (11th
Cir. 2005), in claiming this type of harm. The Eleventh Circuit in Bellsouth Telecommunications
explained, “[a]lthough economic losses alone do not justify a preliminary injunction, ‘the loss of
customers and goodwill is an irreparable injury.’” 425 F.3d at 970 (citing Ferrero v. Associated
Materials Inc., 923 F.2d 1441, 1449 (11th Cir.1991)). In BellSouth Telecommunications, the
Eleventh Circuit also explicitly found that the “record supports the finding of the district court that
BellSouth was losing about 3200 customers per week under the previous regime.” Id. at 970. Thus,
in alleging irreparable damages in the form of future loss of customers and good will, the plaintiff
in that case had specifically shown the number of customers it was losing. As other courts have
noted, the finding of irreparable harm in BellSouth Telecommunications was, therefore, contingent
on specific evidence showing how many customers would be lost. See, e.g., Klein v. Oved, No.
9:22-CV-80160-KAM, 2023 WL 7129942, at *2 (S.D. Fla. June 22, 2023) (distinguishing
Bellsouth Communications since the plaintiffs before the district court in Klein had not sufficiently
established a loss of customers or good will to justify the issuance of a preliminary injunction.).
Here, Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence whatsoever to support his contention that
he will suffer future loss of customers and good will. Thus, even if he had timely filed his Motion,
he has not established irreparable harm. See Cap., L.P. v. Heyden Enters., LLC, No. 23-cv-14248,
2024 WL 3738925, at *13 (S.D. Fla. July 19, 2024) (finding no irreparable harm where plaintiff
failed to present “specific evidence to establish extensive loss of goodwill or loss of customers”).
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Plaintiff has not established irreparable harm for the reasons stated above. Because this
required element has not been met, it is unnecessary to address the other requisite elements for a
preliminary injunction.
V. 	CONCLUSION
In 	light 	of 	the 	foregoing, 	the 	undersigned 	United 	States 	Magistrate 	Judge
RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff Jorge A. Zea’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Supporting
Memorandum of Law to Compel Defendants’ Compliance with Their Own Binding Rules [DE 8]
be DENIED for the reasons stated in this Report and Recommendation.
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT
The parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of being served with a copy of this
Report and Recommendation within which to file written objections, if any, with United States
District Judge William P. Dimitrouleas. Failure to file objections timely shall bar the parties from
a de novo determination by the District Judge of an issue covered in the Report and
Recommendation and shall bar the parties from attacking on appeal unobjected-to factual and legal
conclusions contained in this Report and Recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v.
Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989); 11th Cir.
R. 3-1.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED in Chambers at West Palm Beach, Florida, this 14th
day of 2026.
WILLIAM MATTHEWMAN
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
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