USA v. Olson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
WEST PALM BEACH DIVISION
CASE NO. 9:25-cr-80031-EA-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
JEFFREY DANIEL OLSON,
Defendant.
__________________________________/
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS
This cause comes before the Court upon the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
[ECF No. 40]. After having considered the Motion, the United States of America’s
Response in Opposition [ECF No. 41], the Defendant’s Reply [ECF No. 42], and the
full record, and having conducted a hearing on November 18, 2025, this Court
hereby denies the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 40].
Relevant Background
In February 2025, the Defendant, Jeffrey Daniel Olson (“Defendant”), was
charged by the United States of America (“Government”) with violating 18
U.S.C. § 1752(a)(1) by knowingly entering a United States Secret Service (“USSS”)
restricted area established for the protection of President Donald Trump at Mar-a-
Lago Club in Palm Beach, Florida without lawful authority to do so. [ECF No. 1 at
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2, 4-5; ECF No. 21]. Specifically, the Defendant allegedly approached the Mar-a-
Lago Club’s northern gate, jumped over the wall, and entered the restricted property.
[ECF No. 1 at 3]. The Defendant then allegedly moved across the restricted property
to the eastern lawn before being detained by USSS personnel. [ECF No. 1 at 3].
The Defendant thereafter moved for a competency and sanity evaluation,
which 	Magistrate 	Judge 	William 	Matthewman 	granted. 	[ECF 	No. 	19]. 	The
Government and Defendant’s counsel stipulated to the contents of the evaluation,
and Magistrate Judge Ryon McCabe found that the Defendant was “suffering from
a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent.” [ECF No. 28 at 1-
2].
Thus, pursuant to § 4241(d) of the United States Code, Magistrate Judge
McCabe committed the Defendant to the custody of the Attorney General in June
2025 for the Defendant to be hospitalized in a suitable treatment facility “for a
reasonable time, not to exceed four months, for the purpose of restoring the
Defendant’s competency and as such hospitalization is necessary to determine
whether there is a substantial probability that Defendant will attain the capacity to
permit the proceedings to go forward in the foreseeable future.” [ECF No. 28 at 1-
2]. The Defendant has remained in the Attorney General’s custody since June 2025
awaiting a suitable treatment facility. At a status conference on October 15, 2025,
the Government asserted that it believed the Defendant would be hospitalized in a
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suitable treatment facility in November 2025. [ECF No. 39]. Indeed, the Defendant
has since been hospitalized in a suitable treatment center in Springfield, Missouri.
The question before this Court, as argued in the Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss [ECF No. 40], is whether the Court should dismiss the information because
the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) had delayed the Defendant’s hospitalization due to
the lack of available bed at a suitable treatment center until shortly after the
November 18, 2025, hearing on the Defendant’s motion. The Defendant claims the
pre-hospitalization delay violated § 4241(d)(1) of the United States Code and his
due process rights. [ECF No. 40 at 6-7]. The Defendant argues that his pre-
hospitalization waiting period was unreasonable because it exceeded the four-month
statutory time limit, and he is only charged with a misdemeanor. [ECF No. 40 at 1-
2].
The Government opposes the motion. [ECF No. 41]. The Government asserts
that United States v. Alhindi, 97 F.4th 814 (11th Cir. 2024) controls, and the four-
month statutory limitation the Defendant cites relates only to the period of
hospitalization, not the pre-hospitalization period. [ECF No. 41 at 6-7]. The
Government contends that the pre-hospitalization period of five months and two
weeks was reasonable and did not violate the Defendant’s due process rights. [ECF
No. 41 at 7]. The Government attributes the delay to the limitations of available bed
spaces in the BOP facilities. [ECF No. 41 at 9].
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While the Defendant claims that he is charged only with a misdemeanor, the
Government contends that such distinction is irrelevant because a defendant cannot
be charged unless he is competent. [ECF No. 41 at 10-11]. Citing Jackson v. Indiana,
406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972), the Government argues that pretrial detention is not a
violation of due process where a defendant is being held for a “reasonable period of
time [deemed] necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that
a defendant will attain competency in the foreseeable future.” [ECF No. 41 at 11].
According to the Government, the delay is due to the BOP’s interest in getting the
Defendant to the best suited facility, which is reasonably related to the Defendant’s
competency under Jackson. [ECF No. 41 at 11].
Analysis
The plain text of § 4241(d)(1) provides that, after the defendant is committed
to the Attorney General’s custody:
The Attorney General shall hospitalize the defendant for treatment in a
suitable facility –
(1) for such a reasonable period of time, not to exceed four months, as
is necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability
that in the foreseeable future he will attain the capacity to permit the
proceedings to go forward[.]
18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1).
As Judge Aileen Cannon explained in a well-reasoned opinion: “Based on the
plain text of § 4241(d)(1)—which clearly refers to hospitalization not exceeding four
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months—pre-hospitalization delay following a Court’s commitment order does not
cut into the four-month evaluative hospitalization period provided by § 4241(d)(1).”
United States v. Alhindi, No. 22-80085-CR-CANNON, 2023 U.S. Dis. LEXIS
236769, 2023 WL 10645450, at *7 (S.D. Fla. April 21, 2023), aff’d, 97 F.4th 814;
see also Alhindi, 97 F.4th at 824 (explaining that Judge Cannon’s reading of
§ 4241(d)(1) “is the grammatically correct reading of the provision”).
On 	appeal, 	the 	Eleventh 	Circuit 	held 	that 	the 	four-month 	period
in § 4241(d)(1) refers to “the period during which the defendant receives ‘treatment’
while he is ‘hospitalize[d].’ And by the statutory terms, that period can begin only
once the Attorney General ‘hospitalize[s] the defendant for treatment.’” Alhindi, 97
F.4th at 824 (alterations in original). When the text of the statute is clear and the
“statutory scheme is coherent and consistent,” the analysis must end there. Id.
(quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997)).
While the Defendant urges this Court to not follow Alhindi on the basis that
he is charged with a misdemeanor rather than a felony, neither Alhindi, nor § 4241,
makes any such distinction. Courts are not permitted to rewrite statutes. Friends of
Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d 1210, 1224 (11th Cir. 2009).
Section 	4241 	applies 	equally 	to 	competency 	determinations 	involving 	either
misdemeanors or felonies.
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Pursuant to Jackson, “due process requires that the nature and duration of
commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual
is committed.” Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738. Here, it is clear the Defendant has been
held for five months in pre-hospitalization detention because there was no space for
him at FMC-Springfield. This bears reasonable relation to the purpose of his
commitment, namely, to get treatment at the appropriate facility to determine if there
“is a substantial probability that in the foreseeable future he will attain the capacity
to permit the proceedings to go forward.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1).
Therefore, this Court finds that the Defendant’s due process rights have not
been violated, there has been no violation of § 4241, and dismissal of the information
would be inappropriate. Cf. United States v. Curtin, 78 F.4th 1299, 1308 (11th Cir.
2023) (finding that even where the government violated § 4241, by hospitalizing the
defendant for more than four months, “there’s no particular reason to think . . . that
dismissal would be the (or even an) appropriate response to a § 4241(d) violation,
there being no clear logical relationship between the wrong (over-detention) and the
remedy (expungement of the entire case).”). Moreover, it would be inappropriate to
dismiss the information before the Government has an opportunity to attempt to
restore the Defendant to competency given the Government’s compelling interest in
enforcing laws that exist for the safety and protection of the President of the United
States of America.
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Conclusion
Therefore, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED the Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss [40] is hereby DENIED.
ORDERED 	in Chambers in West Palm Beach, Florida, this 12th day of
December 2025.
ED ARTAU
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
CC:
Kristy Militello
Federal Public Defender's Office
250 S. Australian Avenue Suite 400
West Palm Beach, FL 33401
561-833-6288
Fax: 561-833-0368
Email: Kristy_Militello@fd.org
John C. McMillan
United States Attorney's Office
500 South Australian Avenue Suite 400
West Palm Beach, FL 33401
561-820-8711
Fax: 820-8777
Email: john.mcmillan@usdoj.gov
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