Hudson v. Espinosa

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 26-cv-21561-BLOOM
CHAD HUDSON,
Appellant,
v.
RICHARD ANTONIO ESPINOSA,
Appellee.
_____________________________________/
ORDER ON BANKRUPTCY COURT APPEAL
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon an appeal from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court of the
Southern District of Florida (“Bankruptcy Court”), ECF No. [11], filed on April 6, 2026. Appellee
filed a Response to the Brief, ECF No. [15], to which Appellant filed a Reply, ECF No. [16]. The
Court has reviewed the briefs, the record, and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons set forth
below, the Bankruptcy Court’s Order is affirmed. See Summary Judgment Order, Hudson v.
Espinosa, No. 25−01227−CLC, ECF No. [65].
I. 	BACKGROUND
Prior to any bankruptcy proceedings, Appellant sued Appellee and others in Colorado state
court after discovering that Appellee had been using Appellant’s residential rental property for
marijuana cultivation, resulting in damage to the premises. ECF No. [7-3] at 5. After a bench trial,
the Colorado court entered judgment in Appellant’s favor for damages totaling $35,333.43 based
on a finding of civil conspiracy and breach of contract (the “Colorado Judgment”). Id. at 33.
However, the Colorado court found that Appellant had not proven his other claims, including
fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, negligence, trespass and exemplary
damages. See generally id.
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Specifically, as to the civil conspiracy claim, the Colorado court found that Appellee had
signed the residential lease and illegally participated in an expansive scheme of marijuana
cultivation at the subject property, knowing that such use was contrary to the lease and not
approved by Appellant. Id. at 17. As to the breach of contract claim, the Colorado court found that
Appellee breached his lease agreement with Appellant by permitting smoking of marijuana at the
property, failing to pay monthly rent, making structural alterations to the property, failing to
maintain the property in its pre-lease condition, engaging in and permitting the growing of illegal
quantities of marijuana at the property, and permitting the property to become contaminated by
mold. Id. at 21.
However, the Colorado court found that Appellant’s fraudulent misrepresentation claim
failed as Appellant did not prove that any false representation was made regarding Appellee’s
residence at the property. Id. at 18. His negligent misrepresentation claims failed based on
Appellant’s failure to show justifiable reliance. Id. at 19–20. His negligence claim against Appellee
was barred by the economic loss rule. Id. at 20. His trespass claim failed as Appellant did not show
that any defendant was at the property without proper invitation and consent. Id. at 22. And
importantly, the Colorado court found that Appellant’s claim for exemplary damages failed as
Appellee’s conduct “was not so malicious as to support an award of exemplary damages.” Id. at
32. The Colorado court did not find that Appellee’s “conduct was willful and wanton.” Id. at 33.
In April 2025, Appellee filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. In Re: Richard Antonio Espinosa,
Case No. 25-14405-CLC (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Apr. 22, 2025). In June 2025, Appellant filed the
underlying adversarial proceeding in the Southern District of Florida Bankruptcy Court (the
“Underlying Proceeding”), seeking a determination of nondischargeability of the Colorado
Judgment pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)—that is, he sought a determination that the Colorado
Judgment was non-dischargeable due to “willful and malicious injury from [Appellee]’s unlawful
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marijuana grow[ing] operation.” ECF No. [7-3] at 49. Appellee responded to the Complaint in the
Underlying Proceeding, raising, among other affirmative defenses, the defense of collateral
estoppel based on the findings in the Colorado Judgment. Id. at 63–64.
Discovery became contentious, and “the parties ultimately agreed that the Court could
decide the merits of [Appellant]’s claim from the findings of fact contained in the judgment.” ECF
No. [1] at 7. Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order abating all discovery and
directing the filing of substantive pleadings. ECF No. [7-1] at 5.
Appellant and Appellee then filed summary judgment motions and their respective
oppositions. ECF No. [7-4]. The Bankruptcy Court then issued its Summary Judgment Order,
denying Appellant’s motion for summary judgment and granting Appellee’s motion for summary
judgment. ECF No. [1] at 3. In reaching its conclusion, the Court relied only on evidence found in
the Colorado Judgment, as both parties agreed that the findings of fact contained in the Colorado
Judgment were “entitled to collateral estoppel effect and need not be retried in this case.” Id. at 4.
Applying Colorado law principles, the Bankruptcy Court found that collateral estoppel
applied. Id. at 9. The Bankruptcy Court explained that while Appellee’s conduct was willful, it
was not malicious, both based on “insufficient evidence” of malice and based on the Colorado
Judgment’s determination of insufficient malice to warrant exemplary damages. Id. at 9–11. The
Court highlighted that other defendants paid for the property, handled all communications with
Appellant, and were directly and substantially involved with the marijuana cultivation. Id. at 10–
11. Appellee, by contrast, was found only to have known about and participated in the cultivation.
Id. at 11.
In March 2026, Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal, seeking to appeal the Summary
Judgment Order. ECF No. [1]. The appeal is now fully briefed.
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II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
District courts have jurisdiction to hear timely appeals of final judgments of bankruptcy
courts. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b), 158(a)(1). A bankruptcy court’s legal conclusions and application
of the law to the facts of a given case are reviewed de novo, and its factual findings for clear error.
Carrier Corp. v. Buckley (In re Globe Mfg. Corp.), 567 F.3d 1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 2009); Club
Assocs. v. Consol. CapitalRealty Inv’rs (In re Club Assocs.), 951 F.2d 1223, 1228 (11th Cir. 1992).
“Under de novo review, [a] Court independently examines the law and draws its own conclusions
after applying the law to the facts of the case, without regard to decisions made by the Bankruptcy
Court.” In re Mut. Ben. Offshore Fund, Ltd., 508 B.R. 762, 769 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (quoting Kaiser
Aerospace & Elecs. Corp. v. Teledyne Indus., Inc. (In re Piper Aircraft Corp.), 244 F.3d 1289,
1295 (11th Cir. 2001) (alterations in original)). Reviewing for clear error, “findings of fact are not
clearly erroneous unless, in light of all the evidence, [the reviewing court is] left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Westgate Vacation Villas, Ltd. v. Tabas (Int’l
Pharmacy & Discount II, Inc.), 443 F.3d 767, 770 (11th Cir. 2005). “Where there are two
permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly
erroneous.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Appellant requests oral argument. ECF No. [11] at 58. Appellee does not request oral
argument. ECF No. [15] at 4. According to Local Rule 87.4(g) governing Bankruptcy Appeals,
“[t]he setting of oral argument is within the discretion of the District Court.” S.D. Fla. R. 87.4(g).
The Court does not find that oral argument will enhance its consideration of the issues in this
appeal and denies Appellant’s request as unnecessary.
Appellant raises eight issues on appeal. ECF No. [11] at 6–8. The Court addresses each
issue in turn.
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A. Whether Conversion of the Hearing Constituted a Due Process Violation
Appellant first argues that the Bankruptcy Court violated his due process rights by finding
at a hearing on unrelated motions that discovery should be abated and the case directed to
dispositive motions. ECF No. [11] at 6. The Bankruptcy Court, he claims, cannot make a “decision
of dispositive consequence” without notice. Id. at 15–16. Specifically, Appellant argues that a
court cannot grant summary judgment sua sponte without giving the affected party reasonable
notice and an opportunity to respond. Id. at 19–20.
Appellee responds that the Bankruptcy Court’s ruling did not end the case without warning
but directed the parties to file substantive motions by a certain deadline, which Appellant did. ECF
No. [15] at 29. The Summary Judgment Order followed a written procedure and full briefing. Id.
Following review of the record, the Court finds that the Bankruptcy Court was well within
its authority to modify the scheduling of the case and to direct the case to dispositive motions
briefing. As an initial matter, the Court did not make a dispositive ruling during the hearing, as
Appellant suggests. The Court merely indicated that the parties should prepare dispositive motions
following the hearing. As such, the due process rights that Appellant references were not violated.
Moreover, a bankruptcy court may, in the interest of justice, make such orders as are
appropriate with respect to the timing and sequence of discovery. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7037; Fed. R.
Civ. P. 37. Indeed, Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7026 incorporates Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26, which permits a court, on its own, to limit the frequency or extent of discovery
where appropriate. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C). The Bankruptcy Court was well within its authority
to abate all discovery where it found that doing so was appropriate.
Furthermore, the Bankruptcy Court plainly had the authority to dictate the timing of
dispositive motions. Indeed, Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9006 states that even where a
“rule, notice given under a rule, or court order requires or allows an act to be done within a
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specified time, the court may—for cause and with or without a motion or notice—reduce the time.”
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(c)(1). It is expressly contemplated that the timing of summary judgment
motions can be changed whenever “the court orders otherwise.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7056.
Thus, the Bankruptcy Court did not err when it ordered that discovery be abated and
dispositive motions be filed.
B. Whether the Summary Judgment Order Misstates the Record
Appellant next argues that the Summary Judgment Order contains reversible error insofar
as it characterizes the abatement as something “the parties ultimately agreed to,” where, in reality,
the Bankruptcy Court “determine[ed]” on its own to abate discovery and order summary judgment
briefing. ECF No. [11] at 20–21. Appellant contends that his compliance with the summary
judgment briefing schedule does not fix this procedural error. Id. at 21.
Appellee responds that there is no record contradicting the Bankruptcy Court’s account of
the parties’ agreement, and even if the phrasing was erroneous, there was no prejudice, as the
Bankruptcy Court “decided the issue solely from the Colorado Judgment, and [Appellant] fully
litigated that issue through his own summary judgment filings.” ECF No. [15] at 30.
The Court finds there was no error. A bankruptcy court’s factual findings are upheld unless
clearly erroneous. In re Downtown Properties, Ltd., 794 F.2d 647, 651 (11th Cir. 1986). A finding
is not “clearly erroneous” unless the reviewing court is “left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed.” Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985). Here,
Appellant offers no evidence undermining the Bankruptcy Court’s account of the parties’
agreement. The Bankruptcy Court’s order stated that it decided to abate discovery and order
summary judgment briefing after “querying of the parties at the hearing” and “determining that it
is appropriate to direct the following relief.” That statement is not incompatible or inconsistent
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with a finding that the parties agreed that the matter could be decided on the basis of the Colorado
Judgment. As such, the Court finds no error in the Bankruptcy Court’s statement of the record.1
C. Whether the Abatement Order Foreclosed Appellant’s Ability to Invoke Rule
56(d) Protection
Appellant next argues that the Court eliminated his opportunity to fully develop his case
when it abated discovery and ordered summary judgment briefing. ECF No. [11] at 23–25. He
contends the Bankruptcy Court “ensured” that he “could never file a timely Rule 56(d)
declaration.” Id. at 24. Appellant points to areas of discovery that he would have developed absent
the abatement of discovery. Id. at 25–27.
Appellee responds that because the Summary Judgment Order relied on the Colorado
Judgment and not on “unresolved discovery matters,” the additional discovery sought by Appellant
would not have impacted the case. ECF No. [15] at 30–31. Moreover, nothing precluded Appellant
from seeking relief pursuant to Rule 56(d). Id. at 31.
The Court disagrees with Appellant. The law surrounding Rule 56(d) is clear. “If a
summary judgment motion is filed before discovery, the party opposing summary judgment may
move the court under Rule 56(d) to permit the discovery necessary to oppose the motion.”
Edgewater House Condo. Ass’n v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 825 F. App’x 658, 664 (11th Cir. 2020)
(internal quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted). The movant must “specifically
demonstrate how postponing the court’s ruling would have enabled him, by discovery or other
means, to rebut [the opposing party’s] showing of the absence of a genuine issue of fact.” Id.
1 Appellant briefly raises an argument that the Bankruptcy Court’s failure to rule on the pending motion to
quash is reversible error. ECF No. [11] at 22. However, as the Court just discussed, there is no evidence
that the parties did not agree the matter could be decided based on the findings of fact contained in the
Colorado Judgment. As such, the subpoena at issue had become moot, and there is no error in the
Bankruptcy Court not providing an additional ruling.
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(citation omitted). Nothing precluded Appellant from moving for Rule 56(d) relief if he felt doing
so was appropriate. The Court finds that Appellant’s failure to move for relief and his decision to
fully participate in summary judgment briefing weigh against finding error by the Bankruptcy
Court.
D. Whether the Bankruptcy Court Misapplied Collateral Estoppel
Appellant next argues that the Bankruptcy Court erred in treating the Colorado Judgment’s
denial of exemplary damages as preclusive of the federal § 523(a)(6) malice inquiry. ECF No. [11]
at 27. Specifically, Appellant argues that the issues were not strictly identical, and the Bankruptcy
Court abdicated its exclusive federal jurisdiction to decide the issue of dischargeability. Id. at 27–
29.
Appellee responds that the Bankruptcy Court correctly stated the law—preclusion
principles apply in bankruptcy dischargeability actions, and Colorado law dictates the preclusive
effect of the Colorado Judgment. ECF No. [15] at 14–15. Moreover, this case reflects a valid use
of defensive collateral estoppel, and the Colorado Judgment’s factual findings make clear that
malice did not exist. Id. at 15–16. Fundamentally, once the preclusive factual findings were
established, Appellant could not establish malice under § 523(a)(6). Id. at 17–18.
Appellant replies that the Colorado Judgment’s findings on malice were based on
“[Appellant]’s passivity—not [Appellee]’s innocence.” ECF No. [16] at 2. Moreover, the Colorado
Judgment is internally inconsistent, finding intent but not malice. Id. at 3. Furthermore, collateral
estoppel does not apply because the issues are not identical. Id. at 5. Appellant points to three
errors: (1) the Bankruptcy Court misstated the Colorado Judgment’s exemplary damages ruling,
(2) the Bankruptcy Court found willfulness but not malice without explaining how one is satisfied
but not the other, and (3) collateral estoppel was unavailable, as the issues are not identical. Id. at
12–13.
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In general, a Chapter 7 debtor is “entitled to a discharge of all debts that arose prior to the
filing of the bankruptcy petition. But ‘this “fresh start” policy is only available to the “honest but
unfortunate debtor.”’” In re Kane, 755 F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). Thus,
Congress created several exceptions to the general rule of discharge. Id. One such exception is
found in § 523(a)(6), and it excepts from discharge any debt “for willful and malicious injury by
the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity.” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).2
The Eleventh Circuit has explained that a debtor commits a “willful” injury when he
“commits an intentional act the purpose of which is to cause injury or which is substantially certain
to cause injury.” Kane, 755 F.3d at 1293 (quoting In re Jennings, 670 F.3d 1329, 1334 (11th Cir.
2012)). The actor must intend the injury, not merely cause the injury. Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523
U.S. 57, 61–62 (1998). The term “malicious” means “wrongful and without just cause or excessive
even in the absence of personal hatred, spite or ill-will.” Jennings, 670 F.3d at 1334 (quotation
marks and citation omitted). In the context of a § 523(a)(6) analysis, “[c]onstructive or implied
malice can be found if the nature of the act itself implies a sufficient degree of malice.” In re Ikner,
883 F.2d 986, 991 (11th Cir. 1989).
Separately, under Colorado law, four elements must be established for collateral estoppel
to apply. People ex rel. Gallagher, In & For Eighteenth Jud. Dist. v. Dist. Ct. In & For Arapahoe
Cnty., 666 P.2d 550, 554 (Colo. 1983) (citing People v. Hearty, 644 P.2d 302 (Colo. 1982);
Pomeroy v. Waitkus, 183 Colo. 344, 517 P.2d 396 (1973)).
First, the issue must be identical to an issue that was actually and necessarily
decided at a prior proceeding. Second, there must have been a final judgment on
the merits at the first proceeding. Third, there must be identity of parties, or privity
between parties, against whom the doctrine is asserted. Fourth, the party against
2 Since a bankruptcy court’s determination that an injury was “willful and malicious” is a factual finding,
“on appeal, we review de novo any legal interpretation of the terms ‘willful’ and ‘malicious,’ but we review
only for clear error the bankruptcy court’s finding that a creditor showed a willful and malicious injury by
a preponderance of the evidence.” Kane, 755 F.3d at 1293.
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whom the doctrine is asserted must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the issue in the prior proceeding.
Id. Importantly, collateral estoppel “applies to both legal and factual issues.” Grynberg v. Arkansas
Oklahoma Gas Corp., 116 P.3d 1260, 1264 (Colo. App. 2005) (citing Carpenter v. Young, 773
P.2d 561 (Colo. 1989)). As a result, “[i]f two cases present different legal issues, but nevertheless
involve the same underlying factual issue, collateral estoppel may apply.” Id. (citations omitted).
Importantly, “[w]hile collateral estoppel may bar a bankruptcy court from relitigating factual
issues previously decided in state court, [] the ultimate issue of dischargeability is a legal question
to be addressed by the bankruptcy court in the exercise of its exclusive jurisdiction to determine
dischargeability.” In re St. Laurent, 991 F.2d 672, 676 (11th Cir. 1993), as corrected on reh’g
(June 22, 1993) (citation omitted).
The Bankruptcy Court correctly determined that issue preclusion applies and correctly
stated the relevant Colorado law for determining the preclusive effect of an earlier judgment. ECF
No. [1] at 8–9.
Moreover, the Bankruptcy Court correctly applied principles of collateral estoppel to the
Colorado Judgment. The Bankruptcy Court focused on the Colorado Judgment’s factual findings,
determining that those facts were identical to the issues raised in the instant case, were litigated to
a final judgment on the merits between the same parties, and were based on a full and fair
opportunity to litigate in the Colorado proceedings. Those findings included the following—that
defendants other than Appellee paid for the expenses associated with the property, handled all
communications with Appellant regarding the lease, and were “directly and substantially involved
with the cultivation of marijuana” at the subject property. ECF No. [1] at 10–11. Appellee, by
contrast, was not found to have had that level of involvement and was only found to have “known
about and participated in the marijuana cultivation” at the subject property. Id. at 11. The
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Bankruptcy Court then analyzed Colorado law’s definition of “malice” to determine the
significance of the Colorado Judgment’s factual conclusion that Appellee’s conduct was not
sufficiently malicious to justify exemplary damages. Id. Taking all of this under consideration, the
Bankruptcy Court concluded that it could not find malice for purposes of § 523(a)(6). Id. That
analysis is without error and the Bankruptcy Court properly applied collateral estoppel to the
factual matters from the Colorado Judgment.
Finally, Appellant contends that the Bankruptcy Court erred in finding the Colorado
Judgment’s “malice” finding relevant. Appellant suggests that the Bankruptcy Court wrongly
treated the Colorado and federal definitions of malice as identical, abdicating its responsibility to
independently assess malice for purposes of § 523(a)(6). ECF No. [11] at 27–29. The Court finds
SAFS, Inc. v. Davis instructive. No. 21-81750-CIV, 2022 WL 3684917 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 4, 2022),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 21-81750-CV, 2022 WL 3656974 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 25,
2022). There, a creditor filed a state court lawsuit against a debtor seeking to enforce certain
contracts. Id. at *1. The jury found for the creditor but denied punitive damages, finding that the
debtor’s conduct was not “outrageous, either because he acted with reckless indifference toward
[the creditor’s] rights or engaged in conduct that constitutes an intentional and wanton violation of
those rights[.]” Id. at *2. The debtor then filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and the creditor
challenged the debtor’s right to discharge the judgment the creditor obtained in the state court
lawsuit. Id. The bankruptcy court reasoned that the state court finding of no punitive damages
“precluded re-litigation of ‘willful and malicious’ conduct.” Id. The district court affirmed the
bankruptcy court’s § 523(a)(6) determination that collateral estoppel barred the § 523(a)(6) claim,
finding that the creditor’s failure to prove the debtor acted in reckless disregard meant that the
creditor could never prove the “willful” prong of a § 523(a)(6) claim. Id. at *5. Applying SAFS,
the Bankruptcy Court was well within its rights to compare a state definition of a term to a federal
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definition for purposes of assessing the relevance of a state court factual finding. Of course,
Appellant is correct that the Bankruptcy Court could not have found “malice” defined identically
between Colorado and federal law and therefore treated the federal “malice” question as disposed
of by the Colorado Judgment. But the Bankruptcy Court did not do that. It compared the two
definitions to assess the relevance of the Colorado Judgment’s findings on malice and determined
that the Colorado Judgment’s finding on malice was relevant. That is a proper legal analysis.
E. Whether the Rooker-Feldman Affirmative Defense “Infected” the Bankruptcy
Court’s Analysis
Appellant next argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine had no application to this
proceeding, but the Bankruptcy Court nonetheless applied the doctrine to bar Appellant’s claims.
ECF No. [11] at 29–31. Appellee responds that Rooker-Feldman was irrelevant to the Summary
Judgment Order. ECF No. [15] at 31. Instead, the Bankruptcy Court rested its decision “on
collateral-estoppel principles and the insufficiency of the precluded facts to prove malice.” Id.
A review of the record does not support that Appellee “planted a seed” regarding Rooker-
Feldman which later “infected” the Summary Judgment Order. ECF No. [11] at 29–31. The
Bankruptcy Court plainly relied on collateral estoppel principles, and those principles were the
basis of its decision. There is no indication in the Summary Judgment Order that the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine played any role in the Bankruptcy Court’s reasoning, and the Court finds this
argument from Appellant without merit.
F. 	Whether “Unproven, Slanderous Factual Allegations” Were Permitted to Remain
in the Record
Appellant argues that factual allegations found in Appellee’s affirmative defenses were
improperly allowed to remain in the record, ECF No. [11] at 31, and because the Bankruptcy Court
abated discovery, such allegations went unrebutted. Id. at 32. The presence of such allegations
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“infected these proceedings with a defamatory falsehood.” Id. at 34. Appellee responds that defects
in affirmative defenses or disputed pleading allegations do not matter where the Bankruptcy Court
relied on the Colorado Judgment. ECF No. [15] at 32.
The Court finds no error in the Summary Judgment Order. The Summary Judgment Order
was expressly predicated on, and limited to, the factual findings in the Colorado Judgment. Indeed,
that was “the only evidence” upon which the Bankruptcy Court relied. ECF No. [1] at 4. Appellant
provides no reason to believe that any external allegations “infected” the Summary Judgment
Order. Indeed, Appellant contends that a reversible error exists “[i]f the Bankruptcy Court’s
analysis was in any way influenced by” these allegations yet provides no actual reason to believe
the Bankruptcy Court was so influenced. The Summary Judgment Order is limited to the Colorado
Judgment’s factual findings and not factual allegations contained in any affirmative defense. The
Court finds no reversible error.
G. Whether the Bankruptcy Court Erred in Not Addressing Appellee’s Sworn
Admissions
Appellant next argues that the Bankruptcy Court erred in not addressing Appellee’s sworn
admissions—found across interrogatories, requests for admission, trial testimony, and other
sources—which he contends conclusively establish malice. ECF No. [11] at 34–51. Appellant
points to two categories of admissions—those from the Colorado proceedings and those from the
discovery undertaken in the bankruptcy proceeding. Id. As to the former category, the Bankruptcy
Court relied on the Colorado Judgment’s factual findings, which in turn incorporated any such
admissions. The significance of any such admissions was fairly and fully litigated, and the
Colorado Judgment made certain factual findings after considering them. This implicates the
precise nature and purpose of collateral estoppel—that a court should not reconsider evidence that
has already been fully weighed and litigated in a final judgment before another court. Thus, the
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Bankruptcy Court did not err in failing to address depositions from the Colorado proceeding where
preclusive findings based on them were already made.
As to discovery materials from the bankruptcy proceeding, the Bankruptcy Court again did
not err in failing to discuss them. The Bankruptcy Court expressly found that no additional factual
material was necessary beyond the Colorado Judgment, and the parties agreed to this. ECF No. [1]
at 4. As such, the Bankruptcy Court did not rely on any evidence beyond the factual findings in
the Colorado Judgment and was performing precisely the analysis that it indicated to the parties it
would do.
H. Whether “Fraudulent Procurement of the Lease” Establishes Malice
Appellant’s final argument is that the Summary Judgment Order improperly focuses on
Appellee’s actions after the lease was signed and does not consider Appellee’s fraudulent
procurement of the lease, which satisfies § 523(a)(6) as a matter of law. ECF No. [11] at 51–53.
Appellee responds that this theory was expressly considered and rejected in the Colorado
Judgment. ECF No. [15] at 32.
In the Colorado Judgment, the state court expressly considered Appellant’s claim of
fraudulent misrepresentation, finding that the claim failed as Appellant did not prove that any false
representation was made. ECF No. [7-3] at 18. In other words, the issue of fraud was actually,
fully, and fairly litigated in the Colorado proceeding, and the Colorado Judgment’s findings
regarding it are entitled to preclusive effect. As such, the Bankruptcy Court did not err in failing
to consider Appellant’s contentions regarding fraudulent procurement of the lease, as such
contentions were properly subject to collateral estoppel.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1. 	The decision of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District of Florida, as
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evidenced in the Bankruptcy Court’s Summary Judgment Order dated February 27,
2026, 	see 	Hudson 	v. 	Espinosa, 	No. 	25−01227−CLC, 	ECF 	No. 	[65], 	is
AFFIRMED.
2. 	This appeal is DISMISSED.
3. 	The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on October 13, 2026.
_________________________________
BETH BLOOM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies to:
Counsel of Record
Chad Hudson
10940 S. Parker Road
Parker, CO 80134
720-400-0444
Email: chadhudson927@gmail.com
PRO SE
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