Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
WEST PALM BEACH DIVISION
CASE NO. 1:25-cv-23593-EA
Elvis Muli Mbutha,
Petitioner,
v.
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Respondent.
__________________________________/
ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
This cause comes before the Court in response to its sua sponte order that the parties brief the
Court’s subject matter jurisdiction [ECF No. 9]. 	Having considered the arguments before the
Court, the Court agrees with the respondent—U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”)—and dismisses the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Background
As alleged in the petition, on February 24, 2025, Elvis Muli Mbutha (“the petitioner”), who is
an alien, was arrested for trespassing. The next day, he had his first appearance and was sentenced
to time served. 	The petitioner was not released from custody because ICE placed a 48-hour
immigration detainer on him. ICE then took him into custody on February 28, 2025.
The petitioner then filed this petition for habeas corpus in August 2025. 	In it, he seeks (1)
immediate release because the immigration detainer was allegedly a violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights, (2) unspecified injunctive relief, and (3) a judgment declaring him to be a
lawful permanent resident entitled to the protection of the Due Process Clause and the Fourth
Amendment. This Court issued a sua sponte order [ECF No. 9] for the parties to brief whether the
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Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the petition and whether the case is moot since the
petitioner is no longer being held on an immigration detainer.
Analysis
The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the petition because 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)
deprives the Court of such jurisdiction. Moreover, even if there were subject matter jurisdiction
over the petition, the Court would still dismiss or deny the petition because (1) the relief the
petitioner seeks exceeds the scope of the relief historically granted by a writ of habeas corpus and
(2) this case is moot since the petitioner is no longer being held on an immigration detainer.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Subject matter jurisdiction refers to a court’s “power to hear cases.” 	Lightfoot v. Cendant
Mortg. Corp., 580 U.S. 82, 92 (2017). Because of the nature of subject matter jurisdiction, it “can
never be waived or forfeited.” Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 141 (2012).
Congress has granted federal courts subject matter jurisdiction over most petitions for writs of
habeas corpus. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (“Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by . . . the
district courts[.]”). But Congress has expressly withheld grants of subject matter jurisdiction to all
petitions for writs of habeas corpus “arising from” any challenged “decision or action by the
Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against
any alien[.]” See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).
As the Supreme Court has explained, § 1252(g) deprives federal courts of subject matter
jurisdiction over petitions for the writ of habeas corpus when the Attorney General exercises her
discretion “to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any
alien[.]” Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999).
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In applying § 1252(g), the Eleventh Circuit has stated that the statute “does not proscribe
substantive review of the underlying legal bases for those discretionary decisions and actions.”
Madu v. United States AG, 470 F.3d 1362, 1368 (11th Cir. 2006). But see Demore v. Hyung Joon
Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 537 (2003) (O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (“Nowhere in [Reno] did the Court suggest, however, that the statute’s
jurisdictional limits might not apply depending on the particular grounds raised by an alien for
challenging the Attorney General’s decision in these three areas.” (emphasis added)).
However, 	the Eleventh 	Circuit 	later 	clarified 	that 	Madu 	“spoke to 	a narrow 	set 	of
circumstances” where the petitioner’s “claim was that the government could not detain or remove
him because it did not even have a removal order to execute.” 	Camarena v. Dir., Immigr. &
Customs Enf’t, 988 F.3d 1268, 1273 (11th Cir. 2021) (citing Madu, 470 F.3d at 1367-68).
The Eleventh Circuit explained that regardless of the theory raised, federal courts lack subject
matter jurisdiction over 	any challenge to the Attorney General’s decision to commence
proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders because “a party may not dress up a claim
with legal or constitutional clothing to invoke [a court’s] jurisdiction” since “that sleight of hand
would gut the jurisdictional limits [plainly] set by Congress” in § 1252(g)’s text. See id. at 1274
(quoting Patel v. United States AG, 971 F.3d 1258, 1272 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc)); see also
Foster v. Townsley, 243 F.3d 210, 214 (5th Cir. 2001) (concluding that “claims of excessive force,
denial of due process, denial of equal protection[,] and retaliation are all directly connected to the
execution of the deportation order” and thus “fall within the ambit of section 1252(g) and are
precluded from judicial review”).
This is because § 1252(g)’s plain text states:
Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of law
(statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of title 28, United States Code,
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or any other habeas corpus provision, . . . no court shall have jurisdiction to hear
any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action
by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute
removal orders against any alien under this Act.
(Emphasis added).
Indeed, “[s]ection 1252(g) is unambiguous: it bars federal courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction
over any claim for which the ‘decision or action’ of the Attorney General (usually acting through
subordinates) to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders is the basis
of the claim.” Gupta v. McGahey, 709 F.3d 1062, 1065 (11th Cir. 2013).
And detaining an alien undoubtedly “arises” from the Attorney General’s “decision or action”
to commence proceedings against the alien, as those terms plainly indicate. See Gupta, 709 F.3d
at 1065 (“Securing an alien while awaiting a removal determination constitutes an action taken to
commence proceedings.”); see also Arise, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (defining to
“arise” from as “[t]o originate” or “to stem (from)”).
Because the petitioner here challenges his detention pursuant to an immigration detainer, this
cause or claim necessarily “arises” from the Attorney General’s “decision or action” to commence
proceedings against him. Therefore, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the petition.
The Historical Understanding of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
While 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) authorizes federal district courts to issue the writ of habeas corpus,
§ 2241(a) codifies the common law writ of habeas corpus and allows federal district courts to issue
the writ only to the extent that the writ could be issued under English law. See Dep’t of Homeland
Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 107 (2020) (explaining that the scope of the writ of habeas
corpus is the same as “its scope ‘when the Constitution was drafted and ratified’” (quoting
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 746 (2008))); see also id. at 141-42 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(explaining that the writ of habeas corpus originated in the King’s Bench in the 16th century to
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fulfill “the guarantee in Magna Carta” prohibiting unlawful imprisonment); Trump v. CASA, Inc.,
606 U.S. 831, 841 (2025) (explaining that when statutes authorize courts to grant remedies
historically available under English law, the statute codifies the historical understanding of the
remedy); Max Crema & Lawrence B. Solum, The Original Meaning of “Due Process of Law” in
the Fifth Amendment, 108 Va. L. Rev. 447, 461 (2022) (“The American colonists considered
themselves inheritors of the English common law” and “claimed [it] as their birthright.”).
Under 	English 	law, 	the 	writ 	of 	habeas 	corpus 	was 	“the 	appropriate 	remedy 	to
ascertain . . . whether [a] person [was] rightfully in confinement[.]” Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at
117 (majority opinion) (first alteration in original) (quoting Joseph Story, 3 Commentaries on the
Constitution of the United States § 1333, p. 206 (1833)). Thus, the writ of habeas corpus could
only be used “to ‘remov[e] the injury of unjust and illegal confinement.’” Id. (quoting 3 William
Blackstone, Commentaries *137).
This is why the Supreme Court has explained that “[h]abeas is at its core a remedy for unlawful
executive detention[,]” which in turn means that “[c]laims so far outside the ‘core’ of habeas may
not be pursued through habeas.” Id. at 119 (first alteration in original) (quoting Munaf v. Green,
553 U.S. 674, 693, 697 (2008)).
Accordingly, even if there were jurisdiction over this petition, the Court would not be able to
grant the injunctive and declaratory relief the petitioner seeks because this relief is outside the
“core” of the historical relief afforded by the writ of habeas corpus. See Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S.
at 119-20 (explaining that a petitioner cannot seek “the opportunity to remain lawfully in the
United States” via a habeas petition because such relief “falls outside the scope of the writ as it
was understood when the Constitution was adopted”).
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Mootness
Moreover, federal courts lack jurisdiction over cases that are moot. 	Spencer v. Kemna, 523
U.S. 1, 18 (1998). A case is moot if “there is nothing for [the court] to remedy,” regardless of how
“it may have come about[.]” Id.
Here, there is nothing for the Court to remedy, thereby rendering the case moot, because the
petitioner challenges the legality of being held on an immigration detainer when he is no longer
being so held.
Conclusion
Therefore, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1. 	The petition [ECF No. 1] is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. 	See Stalley v. Orlando Reg’l Healthcare Sys., 524 F.3d 1229, 1232
(11th Cir. 2008) (“A dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not a judgment on
the merits and is entered without prejudice.”).
2. 	This CASE IS CLOSED.
ORDERED in Chambers in West Palm Beach, Florida, this 11th day of December 2025.
ED ARTAU
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
CC:
Elvis Muli Mbutha, pro se
A-060-755-480
Krome Service Processing Center
Inmate Mail/Parcels
18201 SW 12th Street
Miami, FL 33194
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Noticing 2241/Bivens US Attorney
Email: usafls-2255@usdoj.gov
Noticing INS Attorney
Email: usafls-immigration@usdoj.gov
Michele S. Vigilance
DOJ-USAO
United States Attorney's Office
99 NE 4th Street
Miami, FL 33132
305-961-9387
Email: michele.vigilance@usdoj.gov
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