Barberi v. Pio Pio Cuba, Corp. et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 25-cv-22378-BLOOM/Elfenbein
RENZO BARBERI,
Plaintiff,
v.
PIO PIO CUBA, CORP. a Florida Profit
Corporation and HIALEAH
INDUSTRIAL PORTFOLIO, LLC,
a Florida Limited Liability Company
Defendants.
________________________________/
ORDER
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Costs,
Expert Witness Fees and Litigation Expenses (“Motion”), ECF No. [12], filed on July 21, 2025.
Defendant filed a Response, ECF No. [14], to which Plaintiff filed a Reply. ECF No. [17]. The
Court has reviewed the Motion, the record, the applicable law, and is otherwise fully advised.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On May 27, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant
to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. ECF No. [1]. On June 6, 2025, Defendants filed a
Motion to Approve Consent Judgment. ECF No. [7]. The case was thereafter administratively
closed on June 9, 2025, ECF No. [9], and the Court granted Final Judgment in favor of Plaintiff
and against Defendants on June 23, 2025. ECF No. [11].
Plaintiff filed the instant Motion seeking (1) $13,237.00 in attorneys’ fees; (2) $612.50 in
paralegal fees; and (3) $3,511.10 in expert fees, costs, and litigation expenses, for a total award of
$17,360.60. ECF No. [12] at 15. Defendants respond that (1) the hourly rates requested are
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unreasonable; (2) an unreasonable amount of time was expended on the litigation; (3) Plaintiff’s
counsel is seeking fees incurred for seeking fees; (4) Plaintiff’s counsel is seeking fees he waived;
and (5) Plaintiff’s expenses are unreasonable. ECF No. [14]. Plaintiff replies that (1) the hourly
rate is reasonable; (2) the hours expended were reasonable; and (3) Plaintiff’s expenses are
reasonable. ECF No. [17].
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to the ADA, prevailing parties may be entitled to attorney’s fees, litigation
expenses, and costs. Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 12205 states in pertinent part:
In any action or administrative proceeding commenced pursuant to this chapter, the
court or agency, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses, and costs,
and the United States shall be liable for the foregoing the same as a private
individual.
42 U.S.C. § 12205; Ass’n of Disabled Ams. v. Neptune Designs, Inc., 469 F.3d 1357, 1359
(11th Cir. 2006) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12205). For purposes of the ADA, a “prevailing party” is
one that “[r]eceive[s] at least some relief on the merits of his claim . . . . ” Buckhannon Bd. & Care
Home v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603-04 (2001) (quoting Hewitt v.
Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760, (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Section 1920 of Title 28 provides that the court may tax as costs:
(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;
(2) Fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for
use in the case;
(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;
(4) Fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials where
the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case;
(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title;
(6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, and
salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation services under section
1828 of this title.
28 U.S.C. § 1920.
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Additionally, “expert witness fees are ordinarily not taxable costs; however, pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 12205 such fees may be taxed as litigation expenses in ADA cases.” Herrera v. APQ
Coconut Grove FL, LLC, No. 25-cv-21278, 2025 WL 2178401, at *13 (S.D. Fla. July 29, 2025)
(citing Fox v. The Marquis Corp., No. 08-cv-81264, 2010 WL 1010871, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 15,
2010)).
While the award of attorney’s fees and costs are within the sound discretion of the trial
court, the standards established for determining when a court should exercise that discretion to
award fees to a prevailing party are those set forth by the United States Supreme Court
in Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978). Bruce v. City of Gainesville, 177
F.3d 949, 951-52 (11th Cir. 1999) (applying Christiansburg standard in ADA suit); Daniel-River
v. Everglades College, No. 16-cv-60044, 2017 WL 5197509 at *2 (S.D. Fla. June 16, 2017). Per
Christiansburg, a prevailing plaintiff “should ordinarily be awarded attorney’s fees in all but
special circumstances.” 434 U.S. at 416-17.
III. 	DISCUSSION
Defendants agree that Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs but argue that an
award of only $2,965.00 in attorneys’ fees and $1,500.00 in taxable costs is proper. ECF No. [14]
at 10-11. In Norman v. Housing Auth. of City of Montgomery, the Eleventh Circuit provided the
framework 	within 	which 	courts 	may 	analyze 	the 	reasonableness 	of 	an 	award
of attorneys’ fees. 836 F.2d 1292 (11th Cir. 1988). “[T]he starting point in any determination for
an objective estimate of the value of a lawyer’s services is to multiply hours reasonably expended
by a reasonable hourly rate.” Id. at 1299. The party who applies for attorneys’ fees bears the
burden of submitting satisfactory evidence to establish both that the requested rate is in accord
with the prevailing market rate and that the hours are reasonable. Id. at 1303. “A reasonable hourly
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rate is the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for similar services, by lawyers
of 	reasonable 	comparable 	skills, 	experience, 	and 	reputation” and 	“satisfactory 	evidence
necessarily must speak to rates actually billed and paid in similar lawsuits.” Id. at 1299.
After calculating the lodestar fee, the court then analyzes whether to adjust the amount
upward or downward. In making this determination, the court may depend upon a number of
factors, including the quality of the results, the quality of the representation, whether the fee
arrangement was contingent, and whether there was a delay in the receipt of payment by counsel
for the prevailing party. Id. at 1302. “If the result was excellent, then the court should compensate
for all hours reasonably expended.” Id. (quoting Popham v. City of Kennesaw, 820 F.2d 1570,
1580 (11th Cir. 1987)). But “[i]f the result was partial or limited success, then the lodestar must
be reduced to an amount that is not excessive.” Id. (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,
436-37 (1983)). “Even if the results obtained are exceptional, no enhancement is permissible
unless there is specific evidence in the record to show that the quality of representation was
superior to that which one would reasonably expect in light of the rates claimed.” Id. Finally,
“where there is a delay the court should take into account the time value of money and the effects
of inflation and generally award compensation at current rates rather than at historic rates.” Id.
A. Hourly Rate
First, Defendants argue that counsel Ronald Stern’s hourly rate of $610 and paralegal
Muminat Kerimova’s hourly rate of $175 are unreasonable. ECF No. [14] at 5-6.
In his Motion, Plaintiff cites to a series of recent cases in which courts found Stern’s hourly
rate of between $550.00 and $570.00 reasonable. ECF No. [12] at 9 (citing Order Granting Motion
for Default Judgment, Caplan v Leung Healthcare N. Miami Beach, Inc., No. 24-cv-22930 (Dec.
5, 2024), ECF No. [15] at 8-9 (hourly rate of $550 for Stern and $175 for Kerimova was
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reasonable); Order Granting in Part Plaintiff’s Verified Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Caplan v.
Sunrise Animal Hospital, LLC, No. 24-cv-60365 (Feb. 12, 2025), ECF No. [27] at 3-4, (finding
hourly rate of $550 for Stern and $175 for Kerimova was reasonable, but reducing total award);
cf. Paperless Omnibus Order, Barberi v. Raluna Solar Energy Sols., No. 24-cv-24099 (July 17,
2025), ECF No. [61] (granting unopposed motion for attorneys’ fees, where parties agreed on
hourly rate of $570 for Stern and $175 for Kerimova). In support of their argument that the
requested hourly rates are unreasonable, Defendants state that, although Stern is “an experienced
ADA litigator,1 this area of practice is highly repetitive and presents no novel legal questions to
justify such a rate.” ECF No. [14] at 5. Defendants also note that although Judge Middlebrooks
found that the hourly rates were reasonable in Sunrise Animal Hospital, he also found that “a lower
fee award is appropriate” because “Defendant never appeared in the case, and there was no
substantive motion practice involved, aside from moving for final default judgment.” Order
Granting in Part Plaintiff’s Verified Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, No. 24-cv-60365, ECF No. [27]
at 3.
Defendants point out that Leung and Sunrise both “ended with a Final Default Judgment,
with no appearance by Defendants to dispute Mr. Stern’s claimed rate, and that, even when
unopposed, his fee request in Sunrise . . . was significantly reduced as excessive.” ECF No. [14]
at 5. Defendants also cite a series of ADA cases in which the court found that an hourly rate
between $400.00 and $420.00 was reasonable. ECF No. [14] at 5-6 (citing, e.g., Pinero v. Jorge
Alberto Alvarez Revocable Living Tr., No. 23-cv-20056, 2024 WL 264150, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 8,
2024) (awarding $415.00 hourly rate for attorney with fifteen years of experience), report and
1 In the Motion, Plaintiff states Stern has twenty years of experience as an attorney, he “concentrates his practice in
representing disabled plaintiffs in ADA cases and has handled literally hundreds of actions seeking to address ADA
violations.” ECF No. [12] at 5. The Motion states Kerimova “has an MA degree from Florida International
University and has been with The Advocacy Law Firm P.A. since January 2018.” Id. at 5-6.
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recommendation adopted sub nom., Pinero v. Alvarez, 2024 WL 262752 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 24, 2024);
Kennedy v. Fountains of Boynton Assocs., Ltd., No. 16-cv-81902, 2017 WL 5957662, at *3 (S.D.
Fla. Nov. 6, 2017) (awarding $400.00 hourly rate for two attorneys with twenty and thirty years
of experience, respectively, and $115.00 hourly rate for paralegal), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 2017 WL 5956871 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 29, 2017); Caplan v. Mallory, No. 19-cv-62103,
2021 WL 883493, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2021) (awarding Stern a $420.00 hourly rate, but
denying Kerimova’s requested $125.00 rate because the performed tasks were “clerical rather than
‘work traditionally done by an attorney’”), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 879198
(S.D. Fla. Mar. 9, 2021)).
The fact that Leung and Sunrise were default judgments in which Stern’s $550.00 hourly
rate was not opposed does not change the fact that the district court found that, in December 2024
and February 2025, Stern’s $550 hourly rate was reasonable. Additionally, the most recent case
Defendants cite in which Stern was awarded a $420.00 hourly rate—or lower—is from February
2021, over four years ago. See Mallory, 2021 WL 883493, at *4. Therefore, the $420.00 rate does
not account for Stern’s increased “experience, [the] rise in litigation expenses, and . . . continuous
inflation in general[.]” ECF No. [17] at 5.
Although Plaintiff notes that an hourly rate of $570.00 “was undisputed by defense
counsel” in Barberi v. Raluna Solar Energy Solutions Inc., that court did not address whether the
rate was reasonable because defense counsel had agreed to the total award. Paperless Omnibus
Order, Barberi v. Raluna Solar Energy Sols. Inc., No. 24-cv-24099, (July 17, 2025), ECF No. [61].
Plaintiff argues that, in determining the reasonableness of the fees and hourly rate, courts consider
“the current prevailing market rate” which is “the rate at the time of the fee petition, not the rate at
the time the services were performed.” ECF No. [12] at 9. Therefore, it is unclear why a $40
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increase in the hourly rate Stern received just four months ago would be appropriate here.
Accordingly, based on the rate that defense counsel agreed to pay Stern in Raluna, Stern’s twenty
years of experience as an attorney, and the Court’s knowledge of the prevailing market rate in the
Southern District of Florida, the Court finds that a $570.00 hourly rate is reasonable here.
Similarly, in Leung, Sunrise and Raluna, Kerimova was awarded an hourly rate of $175.00, which
is the rate Plaintiff requests in the Motion. The Court finds $175.00 reasonable as well.
B. Hours Expended
Defendants argue that the “21.7 hours of attorney time and 3.5 hours of paralegal time is
beyond excessive.” ECF No. [14] at 6. Specifically, Defendants object to the amount of time billed
for (1) drafting the complaint; (2) communicating with the client; and (3) post-judgment work done
for the purpose of obtaining attorneys’ fees. Id. at 6-9.
In support of their argument that the amount of time billed was unreasonable, Defendants
cite to the Court’s Order on Judicial Notice, in which the Court took notice of the fact that
“Plaintiff’s counsel has filed over 50 ADA cases in the Southern District of Florida in 2025” and
that Stern filed six complaints between May and June 2025 which “are virtually identical to that
filed in this action, excepting paragraphs 3 and 5, describing the defendants, and paragraph 15,
describing the alleged violations.” ECF No. [19] at 2. Because the Complaint in this case “is a
template of the ‘boilerplate’ provisions in which only the Defendants and the alleged violations
are revised for each of the hundreds of cases . . . Stern files annually[,]” Defendant argues the 2.5
hours Stern states he spent drafting the Complaint is unreasonable. ECF No. [14] at 7. Plaintiff
argues that the fact that “certain activities have become routine” for Stern as a result of his many
years of representing ADA plaintiffs “is in Defendants’ favor and is reflected by the reasonable
time entries.” ECF No. [17] at 7. Plaintiff disputes that filing an ADA action “involves nothing
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more than filing a form complaint” and that “[e]ven a ‘form’ complaint must be tailored to the
particular plaintiff, as well as tailored to include and describe the proper parties, addresses,
violations, types of public accommodation, registered agents, etc.” Id. The Court agrees that 2.5
hours spent drafting the Complaint is reasonable.
Second, Defendants object to the 2.1 hours Stern billed for discussing the case with
Plaintiff. ECF No. [14] at 7. Defendants cite Petinsky v. Hussain for the proposition that “there
was no justification to award fees for communications with a client beyond the initial consultation.
ECF Id. (citing Petinsky v. Hussain, No. 13-cv-60519, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188910, at * 13
(S.D. Fla. July 9, 2013), report and recommendation adopted, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188897
(S.D. Fla. July 30, 2013).). However, in Petinsky, the Court did not make any broad generalizations
about the reasonableness of communicating with a client after the initial consultation. The Court
found it reasonable that plaintiff’s counsel billed “.4 hours to communicate with the client
requesting authorization to proceed with the suit[,]” but struck the additional “.1 hours to ‘review’
authorization[.]” Petinsky v. Hussain, No. 13-cv-60519, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188910, at * 13
(S.D. Fla. July 9, 2013), report and recommendation adopted, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188897
(S.D. Fla. July 30, 2013). On April 30, 2025, Stern billed .5 hours for “Communication w Client
re Problems at Property[.]” ECF No. [14-3] at 1. He then billed .6 hours on May 26, 2025 for
“Discussion w client re initial inspection[,]” .5 hours on June 6, 2025 to “Discuss case with
client[,]” and .5 hours to “Discuss case with client” on June 24, 2025. Id. at 1-2. As Plaintiff notes,
he is “a civil rights activist who takes an active interest and participation in the ADA actions he
brings.” ECF No. [17] at 9. Moreover, Florida’s Rules Regulating Professional Conduct mandate
that a lawyer “keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter” and “promptly
comply with reasonable requests for information[.]” R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.4. Accordingly,
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Stern’s 2.1 hours spent discussing Plaintiff’s visit to the property and then keeping Plaintiff
apprised of the case as the litigation progressed is reasonable.
Third, Defendants argue that upon the Court’s entry of Final Judgment on June 23, 2025,
“Plaintiff achieved his goal in filing suit, and Plaintiff’s counsel’s entitlement to attorneys’ fees
was established.” ECF No. [14] at 7 (emphasis omitted). They argue that Plaintiff is not entitled to
attorneys’ fees for Stern’s “efforts to set the amount of attorneys’ fees to be awarded.” Id.
(emphasis omitted). Because the time Stern expended post-judgment was “exclusively for . . .
Stern’s benefit[,]” Defendants argue those hours are “not compensable.” Id. However, it is not
clear that, as Defendants argue, federal law precludes ADA attorneys from recovering attorneys’
fees for the time spent litigating the amount of fees to which they are entitled. Although “[l]awyers
should not be compensated for turning the litigation about attorneys’ fees into a ‘second major
litigation[,]” the Eleventh Circuit has stated that the district court “may not entirely deny civil
rights litigants the recovery of statutory fees (which we have said includes fees for litigating fees).”
Thompson v. Pharmacy Corp. of Am., 334 F.3d 1242, 1245 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983)); see also McMahan v. Toto, 311 F.3d 1077, 1085-86 (11th
Cir. 2002) (comparing “federal court practice of allowing recovery of attorney’s fees for litigating
both entitlement and amount issues” with Florida statute which does not permit awarding
attorneys’ fees for litigating the amount of them due) (citing State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Palma, 629 So. 2d 830, 833 (Fla. 1993)).
Defendants cite Caplan v. All American Auto Collision, Inc., in which the Court stated that
“the 4.7 hours Stern bills for preparing his motions for costs and fees are not compensable.” No.
18-cv-61120, 2019 WL 13084767, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 16, 2019). However, that conclusion was
based on the Eleventh Circuit’s statement in Norman that “[t]he law seeks to compensate attorneys
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for work reasonably done actually to secure for clients the benefits to which they are entitled.” 836
F.2d at 1305. And the Eleventh Circuit has recognized that “[a]dequate fee awards are essential to
the full enforcement of the civil rights statutes and are an integral part of the remedies necessary
to secure compliance with the laws.” Yates v. Mobile Cnty. Pers. Bd., 719 F.2d 1530, 1532 (11th
Cir. 1983) (quoting Johnson v. Univ. Coll. of Univ. of Ala. in Birmingham, 706 F.2d 1205, 1211
(11th Cir. 1983)). The fact that Stern benefits from the preparation of the instant Motion does not
undermine the fact that Plaintiff also benefits from “fee awards sufficient to attract competent
counsel without producing a windfall to the attorneys.” Id. (quoting Johnson, 706 F.2d at 1211).
Therefore, counsel is not categorically barred from recovering attorneys’ fees for post-judgment
work litigating attorneys’ fees.
Defendants also argue that “the four time entries claimed by . . . Stern on and after July
16, 2025, totaling 1.6 hours, should be deemed waived and not compensable” because, in an email
exchange with defense counsel, Stern wrote he was “not charging anything from 7/16 on Thanks.”
ECF No. [14] at 9 (quoting ECF No. [14-2] at 3). Plaintiff replies that Defendants “misrepresent
the settlement talks in their Response” and that Stern “was willing to not bill and add the time
entries after July 1, if they agreed to compensate the fees and costs the Plaintiff incurred before
the date.” ECF No. [17] at 10. Indeed, based on the emails attached to the Response and the Reply,
counsel appeared to be in the midst of settlement negotiations. ECF Nos. [14-2], [17-2].
Defendants have not provided any caselaw to support the proposition that a plaintiff waives his
entitlement to attorneys’ fees for specific time entries solely based on inconclusive statements
made counsel during mandatory conferrals. Because Plaintiff is entitled to post-judgment
attorneys’ fees and Defendants have not raised any other objections to the time entries from July
16, 2025 and beyond, the Court finds these entries are reasonable.
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C. Expenses
Defendants also object to the following expenses: (1) the $45.00 service of process; (2) the
$2,500.00 expert fee;2 (3) the $500.00 re-inspection fee; and (4) the PACER charges and printing
fees. ECF No. [14] at 9-11.
Regarding the service of process fee, Plaintiff’s list of expenses includes two $45.00
charges for “service.” ECF No. [12-1] at 3-4. Plaintiff states “Defendants do not dispute Plaintiff’s
entitlement for recovery of this service fee.” ECF No. [12] at 12-13. However, Defendants state
the “alleged charge for Service of Process upon Defendant PIO PIO is improper as no Affidavit of
Service was filed of record and Plaintiff’s counsel’s fee Invoice indicates that Service of Process
was cancelled.” ECF No. [14] at 9. Plaintiff replies that “[t]he process server’s fee of $45 includes
8 attempts at 1 service address. Any additional address or any additional attempt incur another $45
invoice.” ECF No. [17] at 11. Plaintiff notes that he “receives the process server’s invoices
regardless whether the attempts were successful and regardless [of] whether the Undersigned
canceled a request to serve a defendant after even one attempt has been made.” Id. Plaintiff
attached the invoice of $45.00 for the attempted service of Pio Pio from the process server. ECF
No. [17-1] at 3. Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to recover this fee.
Regarding Jon Kronillis’s expert fee, Plaintiff seeks to recover $2,500.00 for “Expert Fee
(Flat Fee).” ECF No. [14-3] at 3. “Plaintiff retained Mr. Jon Kronillis as an expert to perform an
evaluation of the Subject Facility.” ECF No. [12] at 13. Plaintiff states that, included within the
$2,500.00, is “a $500.00 re-inspection fee for the expert’s re-inspection of the Subject Facility that
will be conducted after the deadline the Court set for the Defendants to complete remediation of
2 Plaintiff states that Defendants “have agreed to pay $1,500.00 of the amount,” ECF No. [12] at 14, but Defendants
state they do not object to “$1,000 of expert fees.” ECF No. [14] at 9. The Court will accept Defendants’ representation
that they have only agreed to pay $1,000.00 Therefore, Defendants object to $1,500.00 of the $2,500.00 fee.
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the existing barriers to access.” Id. at 13-14.3 Plaintiff argues that the re-inspection fees “have been
awarded in civil rights cases in order to monitor compliance with the court order.” Id. at 14 (citing
e.g., Order Granting Motion for Final Default Judgment, Barberi v. Pego International Corp., No.
15-cv-23873, (S.D. Fla. May 17, 2016), ECF No. [24] (awarding full amount of requested attorney
fees, costs, and litigation expenses, including re-inspection fee of $500.00); Default Final
Judgment, Barberi v. La Pinarena Gallo Pinto Corp., No. 16-cv-23959, (S.D. Fla. Nov. 17, 2016),
ECF No. [22] (same).
Defendants argue that the expert’s flat fee and re-inspection fee are improper because the
expert’s affidavit “fails to establish what amount Plaintiff actually paid to date or will pay, only
what ‘flat fee’ [the] Expert purportedly charges; and Plaintiff failed to provide any evidence of
payment[.]” ECF No. [14] at 9-10. In Kronillis’s affidavit, attached to the Motion, Kronillis states
that he charged “a flat fee of $2,500.00 for my services, which a portion has already been remitted.
I agree to accept the balance at the conclusion of the case.” ECF No. [12-2] ¶ 4. Defendant argues
that Plaintiff’s “failure to submit an hourly account of Plaintiff’s expert work renders impossible
any alternative determination of fees and warrants denial of the fee in its entirety for failure to
comply with Local Rule 7.3.” ECF No. [14] at 10 (citing Mannarino v. U.S, 218 F.R.D. 372, 375
(E.D.N.Y. 2003). Although Plaintiff cites to several cases in this District for the proposition that
“the expert fee amount is . . . reasonable and allowable[,]” Plaintiff does not address Defendants’
argument that, without an hourly account of Plaintiff’s expert work, it is impossible to determine
whether the requested fee is reasonable. ECF No. [17] at 13 (citing, e.g., Macort v. McDonald’s
Corp., No. 03-cv-1333, 2005 WL 1925740, at *10 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 11, 2005) (awarding expert fee
of $3,850.00); Karakis v. Argentinian Grill, LLC, No. 09-cv-61204, 2010 WL 298599, at *3 (S.D.
3 Although Plaintiff states the $500.00 re-inspection fee is included in the $2,500.00 flat fee, the invoice reflects two
separate charges: one for “Re-Inspection Fee (Flat Fee)” and one for “Expert Fee (Flat Fee).” ECF No. [14-3] at 3.
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Fla. Jan. 20, 2010) (awarding $2,500.00 in costs for pre-suit inspection of the premises)). Although
Kronillis states that he spent “approximately 13-14 hours in total on this matter[,]” he does not
provide a detailed breakdown of those hours. ECF No. [12-2] ¶ 5. Although Kronillis states that
he “conducted a preliminary inspection of the restaurant[,]” “personally discussed and reviewed
all reports and documentation with Plaintiff’s counsel,” and “personally visited the Property and
spent a substantial amount of time inspecting and preparing a report as well as researching records
and reviewing and advising Mr. Stern as needed[,]” he does not state how much time he spent on
each of these tasks. Id. ¶¶ 1, 3, 5. Given the Court’s inability to determine the reasonableness of
the number of hours expended on Kronillis’s report, the Court will adopt the approach taken by
other courts dealing with the same expert. See Barberi v. TCB Sport Ent. LLC, No. 21-cv-60726,
2022 WL 625239, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 16, 2022) (“[R]ather than rejecting outright Plaintiff's
request for reimbursement of expert fees, the undersigned recommends that the Court award
$1,500 towards this cost. This is consistent with what the undersigned and other Courts have found
to be a reasonable flat rate for an expert in a similar case.”), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 21-cv-60726, 2022 WL 624998 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 3, 2022); Caplan v. Mallory, No. 19-
cv-62103, 2021 WL 883493, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2021) (same), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 19-cv-62103, 2021 WL 879198 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 9, 2021); but see Caplan v. 101
Vapor & Smoke, LLC, No. 18-cv-23049, 2019 WL 13260857, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2019)
(denying expert fees where Kronillis’[s] report and corresponding time sheets lack any detail
regarding the time spent on the inspection of the property or details of the inspection”), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 18-cv-23049, 2019 WL 13260858 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 16, 2019).
Therefore, based on what other courts have found to be a reasonable flat rate for Kronillis’s report
in similar cases, the Court awards $1,500.00 in expert fees.
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Case No. 25-cv-22378-BLOOM/Elfenbein
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Regarding the “Re-Inspection Fee (Flat Fee)” included in the attached invoice and the
$3,511.10 in total costs, Plaintiff has not put forth any evidence that Kronillis charges an additional
$500.00 for a re-inspection of the property. See ECF No. [14-3] at 3. Indeed, Plaintiff states in the
Motion that the $500.00 “Re-Inspection Fee” is included in Kronillis’s $2,500.00 flat fee. ECF
No. [12] at 13. However, the invoice includes two separate line items: one for a $2,500.00 “Expert
Fee (Flat Fee)” and one for a $500.00 “Re-Inspection Fee (Flat Fee).” ECF No. [14-3] at 3. In his
affidavit, Kronillis states that “[u]pon notice that the Property has been modified to correct the
ADA violations, I shall reinspect the Property to determine whether or not the Property was
brought into compliance with the requirements of the ADA[,]” but never references an additional
fee for this re-inspection. ECF No. [12-2] ¶ 6. Indeed, Kronillis only states that “The Advocacy
Law Firm, P.A. was charged a flat fee of $2,500.00 for my services[.]” Id. ¶ 4. Therefore, Plaintiff
cannot recover for the purported “Re-Inspection Fee.”
Regarding the PACER and printing fees, Plaintiff seeks a total of $16.10. ECF No. [14-3]
at 3-4. Printing fees are taxable under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4). Defendants argue that “Plaintiff
receives email link[s] to filings that can be printed without charge to PACER.” ECF No. [14] at
10. In Reply, Plaintiff states that “every page of documents retrieved from [PACER] public search
costs $0.10” and “the requested [PACER] fees of $4.10 are not for accessing the case-related
documents through . . . CM/ECF-generated emails.” ECF No. [17] at 14. Because the PACER
charges are “reasonable costs in the ‘advancement of litigation’” Plaintiff is entitled to the full
$16.10. Mallory, 2021 WL 883493, at *5 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12205) (awarding PACER fees in
ADA case).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows:
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1. 	Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, Expert Witness Fees and Litigation
Expenses, ECF No. [12], is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
2. 	Plaintiff shall recover:
a. 	$12,369.00 in attorneys’ fees;
b. 	$612.50 in paralegal fees;
c. 	$2,011.10 in costs, which is comprised of $1,500.00 in expert fees, $90.00
in service fees, $405.00 in filing fees, and $16.10 in printing and PACER
fees.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on November 10, 2025.
_________________________________
BETH BLOOM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies to:
Counsel of Record
Case 1:25-cv-22378-BB Document 20 Entered on FLSD Docket 11/12/2025 Page 15 of 15