Hadley v. Perez et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 25-cv-22162-BLOOM/Louis
DEMOREE HADLEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
DESIREE PEREZ, ROC NATION, ICONIC CREATIVE, LLC,
DANIEL BOBER, NATALIE ANDERSON, SIG 9, LLC, JAMES FONDO,
STEVEN CADY, JESSICA CADY, SOUTH BROWARD HOSPITAL DISTRICT,
ODYSSEY BEHAVIORAL HEALTHCARE, LIFE SKILLS SOUTH FLORIDA
OUTPATIENT, LLC, BROWARD COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, JOHN DOE, #1,
JOHN DOE, #2, and RACHEL BERNSTEIN,
Defendants.
___________________________________________________________________/
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LIMITED RECONSIDERATION OF THE
COURT’S OMNIBUS ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Plaintiff Demoree Hadley’s Motion for Limited
Reconsideration of the Court’s Omnibus Order on Motions to Dismiss (“Motion”), ECF No. [257].
Defendant Desiree Perez (“Perez”) filed a Response in Opposition, ECF No. [264], Defendant
Iconic Creative, LLC (“Iconic”) filed a Response in Opposition, ECF No. [265], Defendant South
Broward Hospital District (“the District”) filed a Response in Opposition, ECF No. [276], and
Defendant Life Skills South Florida Outpatient, LLC (“LifeSkills”) filed a Response in
Opposition. ECF No. [277]. The Court has carefully considered the Motion, all opposing
submissions, the record in the case, the applicable law, and is otherwise fully advised. For the
reasons set forth below, the Motion is granted in part and denied in part.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed her initial Complaint on May 9, 2025, and her Amended Complaint on June 3,
2025. See ECF Nos. [1], [49]. Defendants thereafter filed their respective Motions to Dismiss, see
ECF Nos. [86], [87], [88], [89], [91], [93], [128], [149], [160], and [187]; Plaintiff filed Responses
to the Motions to Dismiss, see ECF Nos. [152], [153], [154], [155], [156], [157], [175], [176],
[201], [222]; and Defendants filed their respective Replies, see ECF Nos. [165], [166], [167],
[168], [169], [171], [199], [203], [213], and [231].
On October 8, 2025, the Court issued its Omnibus Order on Motions to Dismiss, ECF No.
[242], granting in part and denying in part the various Motions to Dismiss. Plaintiff now seeks
reconsideration of the Court’s Order. ECF No. [257]. In the Motion, Plaintiff asks the Court to:
(1) consider certain facts it overlooked when dismissing Demoree’s malicious
prosecution claim with prejudice – a claim first brought in the Amended Complaint;
(2) consider that Florida law requires dismissal without prejudice for failure to
abide by the FMMA; and (3) reconsider its reliance on Comparelli when compared
to the procedural circumstances of this case.
Id. at 6.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A motion for reconsideration is “an extraordinary remedy to be employed sparingly.” Burger
King Corp. v. Ashland Equities, Inc., 181 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1370 (S.D. Fla. 2002). “The burden is
upon the movant to establish the extraordinary circumstances supporting reconsideration.” Saint
Croix Club of Naples, Inc. v. QBE Ins. Corp., No. 2:07-cv-00468-JLQ, 2009 WL 10670066, at *1
(M.D. Fla. June 15, 2009) (citing Taylor Woodrow Constr. Corp. v. Sarasota/Manatee Airport
Auth., 814 F. Supp. 1072, 1073 (M.D. Fla. 1993)).
A motion for reconsideration must do two things. First, it must demonstrate some
reason why the court should reconsider its prior decision. Second, it must set forth
facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce the court to reverse its prior
decision. Courts have distilled three major grounds justifying reconsideration: (1)
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an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; and
(3) the need to correct clear error or manifest injustice.
Cover v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 148 F.R.D. 294, 295 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (citations omitted).
“Such problems rarely arise and the motion to reconsider should be equally rare.” Burger King
Corp., 181 F. Supp. 2d at 1369. Because court opinions “are not intended as mere first drafts,
subject to revision and reconsideration at a litigant’s pleasure,” a motion for reconsideration must
clearly “set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to demonstrate to the Court the reason
to reverse its prior decision.” Am. Ass’n of People With Disabilities v. Hood, 278 F. Supp. 2d 1337,
1339 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (citations omitted). As such, a court will not reconsider its prior ruling
without a showing of “clear and obvious error where the ‘interests of justice’ demand correction.”
Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condo. Ass’n, Inc., No. 6:11-cv-1637-Orl-31, 2013 WL 425827,
at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 4, 2013) (quoting Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Glenn Estess & Assoc., 763
F.2d 1237, 1239 (11th Cir. 1985)). “When issues have been carefully considered and decisions
rendered, the only reason which should commend reconsideration of that decision is a change in
the factual or legal underpinning upon which the decision was based.” Taylor Woodrow Constr.
Corp., 814 F. Supp. at 1072-73; see also Longcrier v. HL-A Co., 595 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1247 n.2
(S.D. Ala. 2008) (noting that reconsideration motions are to be used sparingly, and stating,
“imagine how a district court’s workload would multiply if it was obliged to rule twice on the same
arguments by the same party upon request”).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiff’s Malicious Prosecution Claim – Count XXV
Plaintiff argues that “the Court erred by dismissing Demoree’s malicious prosecution claim
against Desiree with prejudice and without affording Demoree an opportunity to amend.” ECF No.
[257] at 6. In support of her argument, Plaintiff cites to Rosen v. TRW, Inc, for the general rule:
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If our precedent leaves any doubt regarding [the] rule to be applied in this circuit,
we now dispel that doubt by restating the rule. Where a more carefully drafted
complaint might state a claim, a plaintiff must be given at least one chance to amend
the complaint before the district court dismisses the action with prejudice.
979 F.2d 191, 194 (11 th Cir. 1992).
However, as Defendant Perez correctly points out, the Eleventh Circuit relied upon a rule
established in Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 1112 (11 th Cir. 1991), which was subsequently
overturned in Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am Corp. 314 F.3d 541, 542 (11th Cir. 2002). In
Wagner, the Court held, “A district court is not required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend his
complaint sua sponte when the plaintiff, who is represented by counsel, never filed a motion to
amend nor requested leave to amend before the district court.” Id. Here, the Plaintiff never sought
to further amend its Complaint, and the Court was not required to grant Plaintiff leave to file a
second amended complaint sua sponte. As such, Plaintiff’s reliance on Rosen is misplaced.
Alternatively, Plaintiff relies upon Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) to support her argument that leave
to amend should be granted unless a substantial reason exists for its denial. ECF No. [257] at 7. In
support, Plaintiff cites to Nolan v. Douglas County, which defined a substantial reason as “undue
delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies
by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance
of the amendment, and futility of the amendment.” 903 F.2d 1546, 1550 (11 th Cir. 1990). However,
Plaintiff’s reliance upon Rule 15(a) is also misplaced. While ordinarily a “court should freely give
leave” to amend a complaint “when justice so requires”, Fed R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), the Eleventh
Circuit has found that dismissal with prejudice is “not an abuse of discretion” where “there was no
cognizable request for the court to grant.” Cluff v. Miami-Dade Cnty., No. 22-10704, 2022 WL
16757095, at *3 (11th Cir. Nov. 8, 2022). Here, Plaintiff never sought to further amend her
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Complaint, and dismissal with prejudice was proper given that no such request was pending before
the Court. As such, Plaintiff’s Motion is denied as to Count XXV – Malicious Prosecution.
B. Plaintiff’s Fraudulent Inducement Claim – Count XX
Plaintiff argues that “the Court erred by entering dismissals with prejudice and relying on
Comparelli.” ECF No. [257] at 4. Plaintiff contends that “the procedural facts and circumstances
of Comparelli are entirely different from [Plaintiff’s] case” and “the Comparelli Court dismissed
the case with prejudice only after issuing a prior order addressing the merits of the pleading
deficiencies and entering a dismissal without prejudice.” Id. Specifically, Plaintiff requests the
Court reconsider its ruling as to its fraudulent inducement claim, Count XX, against Defendant
Iconic Creative. Id. at 15.
Iconic responds that “the motion’s attempt to distinguish Comparelli v. Boliviarian Republic
of Venezuela, 655 F. Supp. 3d 1169, 1194 (S.D. Fla. 2023) is misplaced.” ECF No. [265] at 8. The
Court agrees with Iconic. Comparelli noted that “a district court may dismiss a case without
prejudice after a plaintiff has been afforded an opportunity to amend their initial complaint.” 655
F. Supp. 3d 1169, 1194 (S.D. Fla. 2023) (citing Eiber Radiology, Inc. v. Toshiba Am. Med. Sys.,
Inc., 673 F. App'x 925, 930 (11th Cir. 2016)). In Eiber, the Eleventh Circuit stated:
We have never required district courts to grant counseled plaintiffs more than one
opportunity to amend a deficient complaint, nor have we concluded that dismissal
with prejudice is inappropriate where a counseled plaintiff has failed to cure a
deficient pleading after having been offered ample opportunity to do so.
673 F. App'x 925, 930 (11th Cir. 2016). Here, Plaintiff filed her Complaint on May 9, 2025, and
brought a claim against Iconic for fraudulent inducement. Id. at 61. Shortly thereafter, on May 27,
2025, Iconic filed its Motion to Dismiss and argued that Plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead
fraudulent inducement and failed to plead a cognizable injury. ECF No. [38] at 6-11. Plaintiff
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thereafter filed her Amended Complaint, ECF No. [49], and the Court issued its Scheduling Order
requiring all motions to amend pleadings be filed by August 5, 2025. ECF No. [72].
Plaintiff now asserts she “can correct the pleading deficiency listed in the Court’s Omnibus
Order as it relates to Iconic”, ECF No. [257] at 15, but offers no support for her assertion. Plaintiff
had a sufficient opportunity to correct any pleading deficiencies and was certainly aware of the
issues raised in Iconic’s Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff did not seek any further amendment, despite
having until August 5, 2025, to do so. As such, Plaintiff’s Motion is denied as to Count XX –
Fraudulent Inducement.
C. Plaintiff’s Florida Medical Malpractice Act Claims – Counts XII, XIII, XIV, and
XV
In the Court’s Omnibus Order on Motions to Dismiss, it determined that “the allegations
pertaining to District and LifeSkills [arose] out of the rendition of medical care.” ECF No. [242]
at 17. As such, Plaintiff was “required to comply with pre-suit notice requirements.” Id. at 18.
Plaintiff failed to do so, and the Court dismissed Counts XXII, XXIII, XIV, and XV with prejudice.
Id.
Plaintiff argues that “Florida law prohibits dismissal with prejudice for failing to comply with
the [Florida Medical Malpractice Act], so long as a party is within the two-year timeframe.” ECF
No. [257] at 11. In its Response, the District contends that Plaintiff was on notice that her claims
related to medical care of services but made no to attempt to further amend the Complaint. ECF
No. [276] at 4. Similarly, in its Response, LifeSkills argues that because Plaintiff never sought
leave to amend, the Court is under no obligation to allow Plaintiff an opportunity to amend her
claims. ECF No. [277] at 2.
Upon review, the Court is persuaded by Plaintiff’s argument. While Florida law does not
explicitly prohibit dismissal with prejudice for failing to comply with the pre-suit notice
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requirements of the Florida Medical Malpractice Act (“FMMA”), Florida courts have held that
non-compliance with pre-suit notice is not fatal to a claim and that plaintiff should be allowed to
cure procedural deficiencies if the statute of limitations has not expired. See Kukral v. Mekras, 679
So. 2d 278, 283 (Fla. 1996); Malunney v. Pearlstein, 539 So.2d 493 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (dismissal
of lawsuit in medical malpractice action for failure to give required notice was not bar to filing a
second action based on the same cause); Dimick-Russell v. Frankel, 734 So. 2d 486, 487 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1999); (if the court’s ruling is not on the merits and there is still time to comply with the pre-
suit notice requirements, plaintiff should not be barred from bringing a claim).
The pre-suit notice requirement was raised by the Defendants in their respective Motions to
Dismiss, ECF Nos. [149], [160], and Plaintiff responded that the pre-suit notice requirements did
not apply. ECF No. [176]. Ultimately, the Court determined the claims required pre-suit notice
and dismissed with prejudice Counts XXII, XXIII, XIV, and XV against Defendants for Plaintiff’s
failure to comply. ECF No. [242] at 18. Because the two-year statute of limitations has yet to
expire in Plaintiff’s FMMA case, the Court grants Plaintiff’s Motion as to Counts XII, XIII, XIV,
and XV. The Court amends its prior Order, ECF No. [242], to reflect dismissal of these counts
without prejudice.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1. 	that Plaintiff’s Motion, ECF No. [257], is GRANTED as to Counts XII, XIII, XIV,
and XV as to Defendants South Broward Hospital District and Life Skills South Florida
Outpatient, LLC, and the Court’s prior order, ECF No. [242], is AMENDED to reflect
dismissal without prejudice as to Counts XII, XIII, XIV, and XV as to Defendants
South Broward Hospital District and Life Skills South Florida Outpatient, LLC;
2. 	Plaintiff’s Motion, ECF No [257], is DENIED as to Counts XX and XXV.
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DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on December 8, 2025.
_________________________________
BETH BLOOM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
cc:
counsel of record
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