Pena et al v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 0:25-CV-62431-DAMIAN/AUGUSTIN-BIRCH
JUANDEL PENA and MARTINA RUIZ,
Plaintiffs,
v.
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,
Defendant.
________________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON
PLAINTIFFS’ RENEWED MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
This cause comes before the Court on Juandel Pena and Martina Ruiz’s Renewed Motion
for Preliminary Injunction. DE 14. The Honorable Melissa Damian, United States District Judge,
referred the Motion to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for a report and
recommendation. See DE 24. Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. filed a response, DE 16, and
Plaintiffs filed a reply. DE 17. Having carefully considered the record and the briefing and being
otherwise fully advised, the Court RECOMMENDS DENYING Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion for
Preliminary Injunction [DE 14].
I. Background
Plaintiffs have sued Defendant for, among other purported violations, violating section
1681s-2(b) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”). DE 1. Although Plaintiffs’ allegations are
at times unclear and disjointed, the Court understands their allegations to be as follows. On
December 15, 2022, Plaintiffs financed a 2015 BMW X5M through Defendant. Id. ¶ 9. Two years
later, Plaintiff Pena was involved in an accident and has been “financially disabled” since then. Id.
¶ 6. In 2025, due to Plaintiff Pena’s financial hardship, Plaintiffs requested a deferment of their
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payments but were denied. Id. ¶ 10. On June 16, 2025, Defendant sent Plaintiffs a delinquency
letter, demanding $1,498.20, and, on July 18, 2025, “vaguely threatened ‘possible’ repossession.”
Id. ¶¶ 11, 12. On August 1, 2025, Defendant allegedly made good on its threat of repossession and
repossessed Plaintiffs’ BMW. Id. ¶ 13. Defendant mailed a post-repossession notice to Plaintiffs
that same day. Id. ¶ 14. According to Plaintiffs, Defendant’s agent improperly secured the BMW
during repossession, which caused $34,183.26 in damage. Id. ¶¶ 13, 15.
On August 5, 2025, a “Manager Angelo granted a 21-day redemption extension to August
28.” Id. ¶ 16. A week later, “Defendant posted fabricated $12,894 ‘deficiency balance adjustment’
before reinstatement despite no sale of the” BMW. Id. ¶ 17. Plaintiffs called Defendant on August
13, 2025, and a representative confirmed that the redemption extension was still in place until
August 28, 2025, and that there was still time to reinstate. Id. ¶ 18. Plaintiffs made two
reinstatement payments, but the $12,894 deficiency remained visible despite Plaintiffs making the
final reinstatement payment. Id. ¶¶ 20–22. However, on August 21, 2025, “Defendant deducted
$12,894 as ‘charge-off adjustment.’” Id. ¶ 23.
A week later, Plaintiffs picked up their BMW, noticed damage, and called Defendant to
demand that Defendant repair the BMW. Id. ¶ 24. Plaintiffs “disputed Equifax,” and “Defendant
verified false July repo” on September 6, 2025. Id. ¶ 25. Plaintiffs later sent an email to Defendant
detailing the damage to the BMW, and Defendant requested additional time to respond. Id. ¶¶ 26,
27. Not receiving a response on time, Plaintiff Pena sent Defendant a “Final Escalation” email,
demanding repairs and estimating the damage to be $34,183.26. Id. ¶ 28. Defendant did not
respond to Plaintiff Pena’s email, so Plaintiffs filed a complaint with the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau. Id. ¶ 29. Plaintiffs allege that “Defendant reports July 2025 repo inconsistently,
despite August 1 event + August 14 reinstatement; inconsistent bureau status.” Id. ¶ 34.
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Plaintiffs allege that Defendant has violated section 1681s-2(b) of the FCRA in three
ways.1 First, Plaintiffs contend that Defendant “[f]alsely reported July 2025 repossession despite
August 1, 2025 event, August 14 reinstatement, and August 28 return.” Id. ¶ 37. Second, Plaintiffs
maintain that Defendant “[f]abricated $12,894 deficiency posted August 12 and visible until
August 21––6 days post-reinstatement.” Id. ¶ 38. Lastly, Plaintiffs assert that Defendant “[f]ailed
to reasonably reinvestigate after August 28 . . . and September 6 disputes, verifying false tradeline.”
Id. ¶ 39.
After filing their Complaint, Plaintiffs filed the present Renewed Motion for Preliminary
Injunction.2 DE 14. Therein, Plaintiffs argue that they have suffered “concrete harm from
[Defendant’s] inaccurate reporting” and that “Defendant’s post-service admissions and continued
false reporting constitute willful violation of the FCRA and irreparable harm requiring immediate
injunctive relief.” Id. at 2.
II. Analysis
Before evaluating whether Plaintiffs have satisfied the four requirements for a preliminary
injunction, the Court must first determine whether Plaintiffs can even obtain injunctive relief under
the FCRA. See Stolfat v. Equifax, Inc., No. 24-80856-CV, 2024 WL 4881239, at *1 (S.D. Fla.
Sept. 19, 2024) (“Before a court reaches the merits of whether to grant a preliminary injunction, it
must first be assured it has the authority to grant the requested equitable relief.”). Plaintiffs cannot.
See id. (“[T]he FCRA does not, itself, confer upon this court the power to issue a preliminary
injunction in consumer cases.”); Gonzalez v. Macy’s/DSNB, No. 06-61571-CIV, 2006 WL
5849317, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 12, 2006) (“Upon a review of the FCRA’s civil remedy provisions,
1 Plaintiffs raise other causes of action in addition to the FCRA. See DE 1 at 11–17. The Court does not discuss those
causes of action because they are not pertinent to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
2 This Court denied Plaintiffs’ first Motion for Preliminary Injunction give that Plaintiffs filed it before perfecting
service upon Defendant. See DE 11.
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the plain language of the statute reveals that a private plaintiff can only obtain compensatory
damages, punitive damages and attorney’s fees. Declaratory or injunctive relief is not available to
a private plaintiff . . . .” (citations omitted)); Mangio v. Equifax, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 283, 285 (S.D.
Fla. 1995) (“[I]njunctive relief is not available to Mangio under the FCRA.”); see also Washington
v. CSC Credit Servs. Inc., 199 F.3d 263, 268 (5th Cir. 2000) (“We hold that the affirmative grant
of power to the [Federal Trade Commission] to pursue injunctive relief, coupled with the absence
of a similar grant to private litigants when they are expressly granted the right to obtain damages
and other relief, persuasively demonstrates that Congress vested the power to obtain injunctive
relief [under the FCRA] solely with the FTC.”).
Defendant maintains that Plaintiffs cannot obtain injunctive relief under the FCRA in its
response, citing much of the same caselaw as above. DE 16 at 3–5. But Plaintiffs contend in their
reply that this body of caselaw is outdated given the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Holden v.
Holiday Inn Club Vacations, Inc., 98 F.4th 1359 (11th Cir. 2024), which Plaintiffs incorrectly
contend permits a private litigant to obtain injunctive relief under the FCRA. DE 17 at 3–4
(“Defendant’s primary argument––that private plaintiffs lack standing for injunctive relief under
the FCRA––is based on outdated authority. The Eleventh Circuit permits such relief where
irreparable harm is shown. Holden v. Holiday Inn Club Vacations, Inc. 98 F.4th 1359, 1371 (11th
Cir. 2024).”).
At best, Plaintiffs have wholly misread Holden. As the Eleventh Circuit explained in
Holden, the question before the Court was “what amounts to an actionable inaccuracy under the
FCRA,” Holden, 98 F.4th at 1363, not whether private litigants can obtain injunctive relief under
the FCRA. Indeed, Holden never discusses or mentions injunctive relief. At worst, Plaintiffs have
obtained their Holden analysis and citation from an unreliable source, such as artificial intelligence
(“AI”). The best indication of this possibility is Plaintiffs’ citation to page 1371 of Holden. Holden,
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however, ends on page 1369. No level of misreading would cause Plaintiffs to cite to a non-existent
page.
This Court previously admonished Plaintiffs for potentially using AI hallucinated legal
citations. DE 11 at 2. The Court should not have to warn Plaintiffs again. If Plaintiffs include any
other false or inaccurate legal citations in briefing that the Court suspects were generated by AI,
the Court will order Plaintiffs to appear in person to explain those citations and why they should
not be sanctioned for their conduct.
III. Recommendation
Because 	Plaintiffs 	cannot 	obtain 	injunctive 	relief 	under 	the 	FCRA, 	the 	Court
RECOMMENDS DENYING Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion for Preliminary Injunction [DE 14].
Within fourteen days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation,
any party may serve and file written objections to any of the above findings and recommendations.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); S.D. Fla. Mag. R. 4(a). The parties are hereby notified that a failure to
timely object waives the right to challenge on appeal the District Court’s order based on
unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions contained in this Report and Recommendation.
11th Cir. R. 3-1 (2014).
DONE AND SUBMITTED in Chambers at Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 19th day of
February, 2026.
___________________________________
PANAYOTTA AUGUSTIN-BIRCH
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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