Donaldson v. US Bank Trust National Association, not in its ind

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT LAUDERDALE DIVISION
In re:
KIAWNA NICHOLE DONALDSON, 	Case No. 17-24103-SMG
Debtor. 	Chapter 13
________________________________________/
KIAWNA NICHOLE DONALDSON,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Adv. No. 25-1021-SMG
U.S. BANK TRUST NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION, not in its individual
capacity but solely as owner trustee for
RCF2 ACQUISITION TRUST; NRZ
PASS-THROUGH TRUST X, U.S. BANK
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION AS TRUSTEE;
FAY SERVICING, LLC; and SELENE
FINANCE LP,
Defendants.
________________________________________/
ORDER DISMISSING ADVERSARY PROCEEDING
FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
Scott M. Grossman, Chief Judge
United States Bankruptcy Court	_____________________________________________________________________________
ORDERED in the Southern District of Florida on October 28, 2025.
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Plaintiff Kiawna Nichole Donaldson filed a voluntary petition1 for relief under
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code on November 25, 2017. She then confirmed2 a
chapter 13 plan on October 30, 2018, completed all plan payments, and received her
chapter 13 discharge3 on September 23, 2024. After receiving her discharge, she
brought this adversary proceeding4 against defendants U.S. Bank Trust National
Association, not in its individual capacity but solely as Owner Trustee for RCF2
Acquisition Trust (U.S. Bank-RCF2); U.S. Bank National Association as Trustee for
NRZ Pass-Through Trust X (U.S. Bank-NRZ); Fay Servicing, LLC; and Selene
Finance LP, seeking damages for alleged violations of the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act (RESPA).5 After she amended her original complaint,6 the defendants
moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)7 for failure to state
a claim.8 All parties then consented to an order denying those motions as moot and
allowing the plaintiff to file a second amended complaint.9
The plaintiff then filed a second amended complaint,10 which the defendants
again moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).11 After
considering the motions to dismiss, the plaintiff’s responses,12 and the defendants’
1 Case No. 17-24103-SMG (“Main Case”) (Dkt. No. 1).
2 Main Case (Dkt. No. 81).
3 Main Case (Dkt. No. 290).
4 Dkt. No. 1.
5 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq.
6 Dkt. No. 16.
7 Made applicable here by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7012.
8 Dkt. Nos. 18, 19.
9 Dkt. No. 28.
10 Dkt. No. 29 (Second Amended Complaint).
11 Dkt. Nos. 32 (filed by Fay Servicing and U.S. Bank-NRZ) and 36 (filed by Selene and U.S. Bank-
RCF2).
12 Dkt. Nos. 40 and 41.
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replies,13 the Court concludes that – although not raised by any defendant – it lacks
subject matter jurisdiction and therefore must dismiss this adversary proceeding for
the reasons discussed below.
The second amended complaint asserts fourteen counts, all arising under
RESPA:
• 	Count I (Fay Servicing and U.S. Bank-RCF2) alleges a violation of
12 U.S.C. § 2605(b)(1)-(2) for failure of the transferor servicer and
owner to provide timely written notice of transfer of servicing.14
• 	Count II (Selene Finance and U.S. Bank-NRZ) alleges a violation of
12 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(1)-(2) for failure of the transferee servicer to
provide notice of transfer within fifteen days of the effective date.15
• 	Count 	III 	(Selene 	Finance) 	alleges 	a 	violation 	of 	12 	U.S.C.
§ 2605(e)(2) 	for 	failure 	to 	make 	appropriate 	corrections 	to 	the
borrower’s account within thirty days of an inquiry.16
• 	Count IV (Selene Finance) alleges a violation of § 2605(e)(2) for
taking adverse action before addressing the borrower’s inquiry—
specifically, 	imposing 	forced-place 	insurance 	while 	an 	address
dispute remained unresolved.17
• 	Count 	V 	(Selene 	Finance) 	asserts 	a 	violation 	of 	12 	U.S.C.
§ 2605(k)(1)(A), 	prohibiting 	the 	procurement 	of 	forced-place
insurance without a reasonable basis to believe the borrower failed
to maintain coverage.18
• 	Count VI (Selene Finance) alleges a violation of § 2605(k)(1)(C) for
failure to take timely action to correct errors in the allocation of
payments and to recognize the confirmed Chapter 13 plan.19
13 Dkt. Nos. 42 (filed by Fay Servicing and U.S. Bank-NRZ) and 43 (filed by Selene and U.S. Bank-
RCF2).
14 Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 37 – 42.
15 Id. at ¶¶ 43 – 47.
16 Id. at ¶¶ 48 – 52.
17 Id. at ¶¶ 53 – 57.
18 Id. at ¶¶ 58 – 62.
19 Id. at ¶¶ 63 – 66.
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• 	Count VII (Selene Finance) asserts a violation of § 2605(l)(1)(A) for
failing to send, by first-class mail, a written notice reminding the
borrower of the obligation to maintain hazard insurance before
imposing forced-place insurance.20
• 	Count VIII (Selene Finance) alleges a violation of § 2605(l)(1)(B) for
failing to send the second required notice regarding forced-place
insurance coverage at least thirty days after the first.21
• 	Count IX (Selene Finance) asserts a violation of § 2605(l)(1)(C) for
imposing forced-place insurance without waiting fifteen days after
the last required notice.22
• 	Count X (Selene Finance) alleges a violation of § 2605(m) for charging
amounts for forced-place insurance that were not bona fide or
reasonable.23
• 	Count 	XI 	(Selene 	Finance) 	asserts 	a 	violation 	of 	12 	U.S.C.
§ 2609(c)(1)(A) for failing to provide an initial escrow statement
clearly itemizing estimated insurance premiums for the first twelve
months after establishment of the escrow account.24
• 	Count XII (Selene Finance) alleges a violation of § 2609(c)(2)(A) for
failure to provide an annual escrow statement clearly itemizing the
current 	monthly 	payment 	and 	disbursements 	for 	taxes 	and
insurance.25
• 	Count XIII (Fay Servicing) (mislabeled as a second “Count XII” in the
pleading) asserts a violation of 12 U.S.C. § 2609(k)(1)(E) for failing
to 	timely, 	accurately, 	and 	completely 	transfer 	all 	borrower
information and documents to the transferee servicer.26
• 	Count XIV (Fay Servicing) alleges a violation of § 2609(k)(1)(E) for
failure to transfer accurate property information, including the
borrower’s address, from Fay to Selene.27
20 Id. at ¶¶ 67 – 70.
21 Id. at ¶¶ 71 – 74.
22 Id. at ¶¶ 75 – 77
23 Id. at ¶¶ 78 – 83.
24 Id. at ¶¶ 84 – 89.
25 Id. at ¶¶ 90 – 94,
26 Id. at ¶¶ 95 – 97.
27 Id. at ¶¶ 98 – 100.
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As a result of the defendants’ conduct, the plaintiff alleges she suffered significant
financial and personal harm. This alleged harm included the defendants refusing to
recognize a loan modification and accordingly “nullifying” and refusing to credit
$37,443.02 in payments under her chapter 13 plan. As a result, her mortgage arrears
increased from $13,009.55 to $34,579.00, and she lost the ability to complete her
chapter 13 plan as originally confirmed.28 The mortgage – which was in foreclosure
before she filed for bankruptcy – is once again in foreclosure.29 In addition, the
plaintiff alleges she suffered significant credit damage, reputational harm, and
emotional distress because of the defendants’ actions.30
Before reaching the merits of any dispute, federal courts have an “independent
obligation to ensure that subject-matter jurisdiction exists.”31 “If at any point a
federal court discovers a lack of jurisdiction, it must dismiss the action.”32 Under 28
U.S.C. § 1334(a), district courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases
under the Bankruptcy Code.33 And under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b), district courts have
original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under the
Bankruptcy Code or arising in or related to cases under the Bankruptcy Code.34
28 U.S.C. § 157(a) then provides that each district court may refer any or all of its
cases under the Bankruptcy Code and any or all proceedings arising under the
28 She later modified her confirmed plan to remove this mortgage loan and deal with it outside of her
plan. Main Case (Dkt. Nos. 272, 280, 284).
29 Id. at ¶¶ 107 – 110.
30 Id. at ¶¶ 105, 115 – 116.
31 Jacobson v. Fla. Sec’y of State, 974 F.3d 1236, 1245 (11th Cir. 2020).
32 Id. (citing MSP Recovery, LLC v. Allstate Ins. Co., 835 F.3d 1351, 1357 (11th Cir. 2016)); In re Greer,
621 B.R. 514, 517 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2020).
33 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a).
34 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b).
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Bankruptcy Code or arising in or related to a case under the Bankruptcy Code to the
bankruptcy judges for the district.35 The District Court has done so here through its
standing Order of Reference.36
As this Court explained in In re Jimenez,37
Although the terms “arising under,” “arising in,” and “related to” may
sound colloquial, they actually have very precise meanings that have
developed 	under 	the 	case 	law. 	A 	proceeding 	“arising 	under” 	the
Bankruptcy Code is “one based in a provision of the Bankruptcy Code
itself.” Examples of “arising under” proceedings include claims to avoid
preferences and fraudulent transfers under 11 U.S.C. §§ 547 and 548,
respectively. A proceeding “arising in” a bankruptcy case is one that is
not based on any right expressly created by the Bankruptcy Code, but
which would have no practical existence outside of the bankruptcy case.
Examples of “arising in” proceedings include determinations of the
validity, extent, or priority of liens; allowance or disallowance of claims
against the estate; and other matters affecting administration of the
bankruptcy estate.38
This RESPA action does not “arise under” the Bankruptcy Code, nor does it
“arise in” a case under the Bankruptcy Code. That leaves only “related to” jurisdiction
as a basis for subject matter jurisdiction.
[A] proceeding “related to” a case under the Bankruptcy Code is a civil
proceeding that could be pursued outside a bankruptcy case, “but which
nonetheless bears a connection with the title 11 case sufficient to bring
it within federal bankruptcy jurisdiction.” The Eleventh Circuit has held
that “[a]n action is related to bankruptcy if the outcome could alter the
debtor’s rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action (either positively
or negatively) and which in any way impacts upon the handling and
administration of the bankrupt estate.” As noted by the Eleventh Circuit
in adopting the Third Circuit’s 	test in Pacor, 	Inc. 	v. 	Higgins for
determining “related to” jurisdiction, “[t]he usual articulation of the test
for determining whether a civil proceeding is related to bankruptcy is
35 28 U.S.C. § 157(a).
36 Dist. Ct. Admin. Order 2024-84 (Nov. 1, 2024); see also Dist. Ct. Loc. R. 87.2.
37 627 B.R. 536 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2021).
38 Id. at 540–41 (internal citations omitted).
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whether the outcome of the proceeding could conceivably have an effect
on the estate being administered in bankruptcy.”39
The plaintiff here received her chapter 13 discharge40 four months before she
filed this adversary proceeding. Chapter 13 trustee Robin Weiner has since filed her
final report and account,41 certifying that “the estate has been fully administered.”
But even before receiving her discharge, the plaintiff had modified her chapter 13
plan to remove the mortgage loan at issue here.42 As a result, the defendants obtained
stay relief to resume foreclosure proceedings in state court.43
Because the plaintiff received her discharge and her chapter 13 bankruptcy
case has been fully administered, determination of her RESPA claims could not have
any conceivable effect on her bankruptcy estate.44 This Court therefore lacks subject
matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the second amended complaint
is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
# # #
Copies furnished to all counsel of record by CM/ECF.
39 Id., at 541 (internal citations omitted); see Miller v. Kemira, Inc. (In re Lemco Gypsum, Inc.), 910
F.2d 784, 787–89 (11th Cir. 1990); Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984).
40 Main Case (Dkt. No. 290).
41 Main Case (Dkt. No. 306).
42 Main Case (Dkt. Nos. 272, 280, 284).
43 Id. Even if the plaintiff had not yet received her discharge, the Court would still lack jurisdiction
over these RESPA claims because the mortgage loan was being treated outside of her chapter 13 plan.
See, e.g. In re Tomasevic, 279 B.R. 358, 362 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002) (concluding that the bankruptcy
court had no jurisdiction over post-petition RESPA claims relating to a mortgage loan being paid
outside the plan, because those claims had no connection to the debtor’s performance or payment under
the plan and implicated no issue with respect to property of the estate).
44 Indeed, under her confirmed plan, all property of the estate vested in her upon confirmation. Main
Case (Dkt. Nos. 76, 81); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1327(b) (“Except as otherwise provided in the plan or the
order confirming the plan, the confirmation of a plan vests all of the property of the estate in the
debtor.”).
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