DAVIS v. HAIRE et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PANAMA CITY DIVISION
MICHAEL J. DAVIS,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 5:25-cv-281-MW-MJF
T. RATLIFF, et al.,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, filed an amended civil rights
complaint in which he asserts that three employees of the Florida
Department 	of 	Corrections 	violated 	the 	Eighth 	and 	Fourteenth
Amendments. Doc. 12. Because Plaintiff fails to state a claim on which
relief can be granted, the District Court should dismiss this civil action.
BACKGROUND
A. 	Plaintiff’s Initial Complaint
On 	September 	24, 	2025, 	Plaintiff 	commenced 	this civil 	action
against 	three 	employees 	of 	the 	Florida 	Department 	of 	Corrections:
Captain T. Ratliff, Officer T. Haire, and Officer W. Brown. Doc. 1. The
undesigned conducted the requisite screening of Plaintiff’s complaint.
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Because 	Plaintiff 	failed 	to 	state 	a 	claim, 	the 	undersigned 	afforded
Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint. Doc. 11.
B. 	Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
On March 9, 2026, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. Doc. 12.
Plaintiff’s amended complaint consists of two factual allegations:
• 	“[o]n May 30, 2025, at 8:30 am Michael Davis was
put on property restriction (“property”), no blue
uniforms, no socks. Only boxer in a 60 degrees AC
unit, and without food (air tray).”
• 	“my law work, pictures, motion was all thrown
away and Sergeant T. Haire is responsible.”
Id. at 5.
In the “Statement of Claims” section, Plaintiff states that he asserts
an Eighth-Amendment claim and a Fourteenth-Amendment claim. Id. at
7. Although Plaintiff states his due process claim is against T. Haire,
Plaintiff does not specify the particular Defendant(s) against whom he
asserts the Eighth Amendment claim. Id. at 6–7.
STANDARD
The 	District 	Court 	is required to 	review Plaintiff’s 	complaint,
identify cognizable claims and dismiss the complaint, or any portion
thereof, if the complaint “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a
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claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from
a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)–(b);
see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (applying the same standard to in forma
pauperis proceedings). Determining whether a complaint states a claim
upon which relief can be granted is governed by the standard set forth in
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6); Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1485 (11th Cir. 1997). To
survive dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
D ISCUSSION
A. 	Plaintiff Fails to State a Due-Process Claim Against T. Haire
Plaintiff asserts that T. Haire violated the Fourteenth Amendment
when Haire discarded Plaintiff’s property. Doc. 12 at 6.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
deprivations of property “without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend.
XIV, § 1. To state a claim for a denial of due process, a plaintiff must
allege:
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(1) a deprivation of a constitutionally-protected property interest;
(2) state action; and
(3) constitutionally-inadequate process.
Cryder v. Oxendine, 24 F.3d 175, 177 (11th Cir. 1994); see Catron v. City
of St. Petersburg, 658 F.3d 1260, 1266 (11th Cir. 2011); Grayden v.
Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003).
As to the third element, when a state official was not acting
pursuant to any established state procedure, but rather was engaging in
a “random, unauthorized” act, the State is not required to provide pre-
deprivation process. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). The
Due Process Clause is satisfied if the state provides sufficient post-
deprivation process. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543–44 (1984).
Florida law provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy for theft
of inmate property by prison guards. 	Inmates may file a tort action in
state court to recover damages for destruction of property. See Fla. Stat.
§ 768.28(1); Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1331 (11th Cir. 2009).
The existence of 	a 	private 	cause 	of 	action 	under 	Florida 	law
provides 	Plaintiff 	with 	a 	meaningful 	post-deprivation 	remedy 	to
challenge the loss of property caused by prison guards. Case, 555 F.3d at
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1331; see Loor v. Bailey, 708 F. App’x 992, 994–95 (11th Cir. 2017); Smith
v. Israel, 619 F. App’x 839, 842 (11th Cir. 2015). Plaintiff, therefore, has
failed to state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.
B. 	Plaintiff Fails to State a Condition-of-Confinement Claim
An 	Eighth-Amendment 	conditions-of-confinement 	claim 	entails
three elements:
(1) the plaintiff endured conditions that were sufficiently serious to
violate the Eighth Amendment;
(2) the defendant acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind
with regard to the conditions at issue; and
(3) there is a causal connection between the defendant’s conduct
and the alleged constitutional injury.
Saunders v. Sheriff of Brevard Cnty., 735 F. App’x 559, 564 (11th Cir.
2018); Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004).
1. 	Plaintiff Fails to Allege Serious Conditions
In determining whether conditions were “sufficiently serious,” “only
those 	deprivations 	denying 	the 	minimal 	civilized 	measure 	of 	life’s
necessities” violate the Eighth Amendment. Hudson v. McMillian, 503
U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] prisoner’s mere
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discomfort, without more, does not offend the Eighth Amendment.”
Chandler, 	379 	F.3d 	at 	1295. 	“[T]he 	challenged 	condition 	must 	be
‘extreme,’” and at the very least must pose “‘an unreasonable risk of
serious damage to [the prisoner’s] future health’ or safety.” Id. at 1289
(quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993)). “Restrictive” and
“even harsh” prison conditions simply “are part of the penalty that
criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.” 	Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).
(a). 	The Clothing Restriction
Here, Plaintiff alleges that on May 30, 2025, he was placed on
property restriction, which entailed being confined in a cell while wearing
only 	underwear. 	But 	Plaintiff 	does 	not 	allege 	the 	duration 	of 	the
restriction.
Plaintiff’s 	paltry 	allegations 	are 	insufficient 	to 	state 	a 	claim.
Federal courts routinely hold that mere confinement “without clothing
(other than boxers), bedding, or hygienic materials for 72 hours . . . is not
the type of extreme prison conditions that create a substantial risk of
serious harm.” Woodson v. Whitehead, 673 F. App’x 931, 932 (11th Cir.
2016); 	O’Connor 	v. 	Kelley, 	644 	F. 	App’x 	928, 	932 	(11th 	Cir. 	2016)
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(prisoner’s placement on strip-cell status for longer than 72 hours during
January in Florida, without a blanket, mattress or bed and with only a
“suicide shroud,” did not violate the Eighth Amendment).
(b). 	The Food Restriction
Plaintiff also alleges that he was denied food by an unknown
person. Doc. 12 at 5. But Plaintiff does not allege:
• 	the duration of the denial of food;
• 	the extent of the denial of food; and
• 	any adverse consequences that Plaintiff suffered from the
denial of food.
Although a prisoner is entitled to reasonably adequate food, “a
prison does not violate the Eighth Amendment by feeding a prisoner
minimal amount of food for a limited number of days.” Hernandez v. Fla.
Dep’t of Corr., 281 F. App’x 862, 865 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Novak v.
Beto, 53 F.2d 661, 665, 668 (5th Cir. 1971)). For example, the Eleventh
Circuit noted that a prisoner’s confinement in a strip cell for 10 days in
October where he was not given any food for 24 hours “d[id] not rise to
the level of cruel and unusual deprivations.” Turner v. Warden, GDCP,
650 F. App’x 695, 701–02 (11th Cir. 2016). Plaintiff’s allegation that he
was “denied food” by some unidentified individual over some unknown
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period 	of 	time 	“stops 	short 	of 	the 	line 	between 	possibility 	and
plausibility.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558.
The undersigned afforded Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his
complaint to include facts that would allow the District Court to plausibly
infer Plaintiff endured sufficiently deleterious conditions. But Plaintiff
failed to make such allegations.
2. 	Failure to Allege Deliberate Indifference
Plaintiff’s 	condition-of-confinement 	claim 	fails 	for 	a 	second
independent reason: Plaintiff’s allegations fail to satisfy the subjective
element.
As for the subjective element, a plaintiff must allege that the
defendants acted “‘with a sufficiently culpable state of mind’ with respect
to the condition at issue”—that is, deliberate indifference. Chandler, 379
F.3d at 1289 (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8). To satisfy the deliberate-
indifference element, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant “was
actually, subjectively aware that his own conduct caused a substantial
risk of serious harm to the plaintiff.” Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251,
1262 (11th Cir. 2024) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 839
(1970)). That is, a plaintiff must allege “that the defendant acted with
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‘subjective recklessness’” and “the defendant actually knew that his
conduct—his own acts or omissions—put the plaintiff at substantial risk
of serious harm.” Id. at 1253.
Here, Plaintiff simply alleges “[o]n May 30, 2025, at 8:30 am
Michael Davis was put on property restriction (“property”), no blue
uniforms, no socks. Only boxer in a 60 degrees AC unit, and without food
(air tray).”
Despite 	detailed 	instructions 	from 	the 	undersigned—not 	to
mention the instructions found on the complaint form—Plaintiff failed to
allege that any of the named Defendants were responsible for denying
Plaintiff clothing and food.
But even if the District Court were to assume that every Defendant
denied Plaintiff food and clothing, Plaintiff failed to allege that this posed
a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff.
For this reason, too, Plaintiff fails to state an Eighth-Amendment
conditions-of-confinement claim.
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CONCLUSION
For 	the 	reasons 	set 	forth 	above, 	the 	undersigned 	respectfully
RECOMMENDS that the District Court:
1. 	DISMISS this civil action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A
and 1915; and
2. 	DIRECT the clerk of the court to close the case file.
At Pensacola, Florida on this 17th day of March 2026.
/s/ Michael J. Frank
Michael J. Frank
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
The District Court referred this case to a magistrate
judge 	to 	address 	preliminary 	matters 	and to 	make
recommendations regarding dispositive matters. See
N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed R.
Civ. P. 72(b). Objections to these proposed findings and
recommendations must be filed within fourteen days of
the 	date 	of 	the 	report 	and 	recommendation. 	Any
different deadline that may appear on the electronic
docket is for the court’s internal use only and does not
control. An objecting party must serve a copy of its
objections upon all other parties. A party who fails to
object 	to 	the 	magistrate 	judge’s 	findings 	or
recommendations 	contained 	in 	a 	report 	and
recommendation 	waives 	the 	right 	to 	challenge 	on
appeal the District Court’s order based on unobjected-
to factual and legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1;
28 U.S.C. § 636.
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