SHAH v. LEON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION
RAJIV SHASHIKANT SHAH,
Plaintiff,
vs. 	Case No. 4:25cv500-MW-MAF
LEON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
Defendant.
_______________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
On December 5, 2025, a notice of removal was filed, ECF No. 1, and
the filing fee paid, ECF No. 2. Later that same day, an amended notice of
removal was filed, ECF No. 3, correcting the omission of Defendant’s
signature from the original notice.
The removal statute requires the “district court in which such notice is
filed [to] examine the notice promptly” and, “[i]f it clearly appears on the
face of the notice and any exhibits annexed thereto that removal should not
be permitted, the court shall make an order for summary remand.” 28
U.S.C. § 1455(b)(4). This case has been reviewed to determine whether
grounds for removal exists, or whether this case should be remanded to
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state court. It is before the undersigned magistrate judge pursuant to Local
Rule 72.2(E).
First, the notice of removal shows that Rajiv Shashikant Shah is
seeking to remove a state criminal prosecution to federal court pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1455 and 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1). The case is listed as case
number 2024 CF 3341 and is pending in Leon County Circuit Court. ECF
No. 3 at 1. Plaintiff here is the Defendant in state court, and because the
action is pending in Leon County, Florida, the case is potentially removable
to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1443 which provides that a criminal
prosecution “commenced in a State court may be removed by the
defendant to the district court of the United States for the district and
division embracing the place wherein it is pending . . . .” Thus, contrary to
the improper case style as shown on page one of the notice, Mr. Shah is
not the plaintiff but is a state court defendant in a criminal proceeding.
Nonetheless, if removal is appropriate, the notice was properly filed in this
Court.
What is also improper about the initiation of this case is that Mr. Shah
did not comply with 28 U.S.C. § 1455(a). That statute requires a defendant
desiring to remove a case from state court to federal court to file “a copy of
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all process, pleadings, and orders served upon such defendant . . . in such
action.” Plaintiff did not file any documents from state court case number
2024 CF 3341.1
Notably, § 1455(b) requires a “notice of removal of a criminal
prosecution [to] be filed not later than 30 days after the arraignment in the
State court, or at any time before trial, whichever is earlier, except that for
good cause shown the United States district court may enter an order
granting the defendant . . . leave to file the notice at a later time.” 28
U.S.C. § 1455(b)(1). Acknowledging that requirement, Mr. Shah admits
that the removal notice was not filed within 30-days of his arraignment.
ECF No. 3 at 4, 11. 	While the exact date of his arraignment is unknown,
Mr. Shah advises that it was not until he received “post-arraignment
discovery in late 2025" that he understood “the nature and scope of the
allegations against him and the extent to which the prosecution was built
on considerations that federal law does not permit.” 	Id. at 4. He says that
at the time of his arraignment, he did not have “access to the complete
1 Mr. Shah did attach a lengthy investigative report to the notice of removal. ECF
No. 1-1. As explained by Plaintiff in his notice of removal, the investigative report was
issued by the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation [DBPR] and
formed the basis for the probable cause affidavit which initiated case number 2024-CF-
3341 in state court. ECF No. 3 at 4.
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DBPR investigative file, the full probable-cause affidavit, or” other
communications “that reveal the State’s reliance on national origin as the
core evidentiary predicate.” 	Id. at 11. Thus, Mr. Shah contends he has
shown good cause to file the belated notice of removal “because the State
withheld or delayed disclosure of the very materials necessary to
understand the discriminatory basis of the charges.” 	Id. at 11. He also
says that the discovery was produced “in November 2025" and he “acted
diligently and in good faith once he obtained the information necessary to
articulate a federal civil-rights basis for removal.” 	Id. at 12.
Thus, it appears that the underlying state criminal prosecution grew
out of the investigation undertaken by the Florida Department of Business
and Professional Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and
Tobacco. 2 ECF No. 3 at 4. Mr. Shah operated a business which assisted
“foreign nationals, primarily citizens of the republic of India, participate in
Florida’s annual quota alcoholic beverage license drawing administered by
the Department of Business and Professional Regulation (DBPR) . . . .” 	Id.
2 Mr. Shah indicates a complaint was filed against his company, Keshra
Financial, LLC, with the Florida Attorney General, accusing him of “fraudulent
manipulation” of the quota drawing. ECF No. 3 at 3. Presumably, that led to the DBPR
investigation.
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at 2. Mr. Shah was charged with organized fraud, criminal use of personal
identification information, money laundering, and securities fraud. 	Id. 	He
contends that the case is unlawfully based on his national origin and
ethnicity and violates federal law prohibiting such discrimination. 	Id. at 1-2,
5.
The removal statute permits the removal of “civil actions or criminal
prosecutions, commenced in a State court . . . (1) Against any person who
is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of such State a right under any
law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United States, or of
all persons within the jurisdiction thereof.” 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1). The
United States Supreme Court has interpreted the statute as permitting the
removal of a state prosecution to federal court only if two requirements are
met. Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 788, 86 S. Ct. 1783, 1788, 16 L.
Ed. 2d 925 (1966). “First, the petitioner must show that the right upon
which the petitioner relies arises under a federal law ‘providing for specific
civil rights stated in terms of racial equality.’” Alabama v. Conley, 245 F.3d
1292, 1295 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing to Rachel, 384 U.S. at 792, 86 S. Ct. at
1790). “Second, the petitioner must show that he has been denied or
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cannot enforce that right in the state courts.” Conley, 245 F.3d at 1295
(citing to Rachel, 384 U.S. at 794, 86 S. Ct. 1783).
Mr. Shah asserts that removal is warranted because his right “to
participate in lawful economic activity without racial or ethnic discrimination”
has been violated under the Equal Protection Clause and 42 U.S.C. §
1981. ECF No. 3 at 5. First, the removal statute permits the removal of a
criminal proceeding when a person “cannot enforce in the courts of such
State a right under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of
the United States . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1). Mr. Shah cannot remove this
case based on an alleged violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
The phrase “any law providing for ... equal civil rights” refers to
laws “providing for specific civil rights stated in terms of racial
equality,” and does not include rights of “general application
available to all persons or citizens.” Rachel, 384 U.S. at 792,
86 S.Ct. 1783. . . . Therefore, to the extent Conley relies upon
broad assertions under the Equal Protection Clause or § 1983,
those rights are insufficient to support a valid claim for removal
under § 1443(1).
Conley, 245 F.3d at 1295-96.
However, “the United States Supreme Court recognized that § 1981
qualifies under § 1443(1) as a law providing specific civil rights stated in
terms of racial equality.” 245 F.3d at 1296 (citing to City of Greenwood v.
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Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 825, 86 S. Ct. 1800, 16 L. Ed. 2d 944 (1966)). In
addition, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibits discrimination “based on race or
national origin in employment contracts.” Jimenez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 146
F.4th 972, 988 (11th Cir. 2025). Thus, it is concluded that Mr. Shah has
met the first prong of Rachel.
Mr. Shah argues that he has also met the second prong for removal -
that he “cannot enforce” his federal rights in state court. ECF No. 3 at 5.
He contends that “ethnicity and national origin is not peripheral,” but is “the
backbone of the States’s theory.” 	Id. 	He argues that “[n]o motion,
instruction, or evidentiary ruling can cure a prosecution whose existence is
predicated on federally prohibited classifications.” 	Id. 	These arguments
miss the mark.
“Generally, the denial of the petitioner's equal civil rights must be
‘manifest in a formal expression of state law.’” Rachel, 384 U.S. at 803, 86
S.Ct. 1783 (quoted in Conley, 245 F.3d at 1296). “This requirement
ensures that removal is available only in cases where the denial of the right
can be clearly predicted and avoids involving federal judges in ‘the
unseemly process of prejudging their brethren of the state courts.’” 	Id. at
803-04, 86 S. Ct. 1783 (quoted in 245 F.3d at 1296). The Court explained
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that “removal is not warranted by an assertion that a denial of rights of
equality may take place and go uncorrected at trial.” Rachel, 384 U.S. at
800, 86 S. Ct. at 1794. Instead, it is “warranted only if it can be predicted
by reference to a law of general application that the defendant will be
denied or cannot enforce the specified federal rights in the state courts. A
state statute authorizing the denial affords an ample basis for such a
prediction.” 384 U.S. at 800, 86 S. Ct. at 1794. The reason is simple -
without a constitutional, statutory or legislative impediment, a person
seeking removal of a criminal prosecution “cannot swear before his case
comes to trial that his enjoyment of all his civil rights [will be] denied to
him.” 	Id. at 799, 86 S. Ct. at 1794.
Here, Mr. Shah has not identified a state law which will deny him “the
equal civil rights” enjoyed by all citizens. 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1). He has not
alleged that the state court is unable to address a wrong. Instead, his
allegations pertain to the actions of the State in prosecuting the case. ECF
No. 3 at 6-11. That does not meet the requirement of Rachel or the
statutes permitting removal.
The motives of the officers bringing the charges may be
corrupt, but that does not show that the state trial court will find
the defendant guilty if he is innocent, or that in any other
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manner the defendant will be “denied or cannot enforce in the
courts” of the State any right under a federal law providing for
equal civil rights. The civil rights removal statute does not
require and does not permit the judges of the federal courts to
put their brethren of the state judiciary on trial. Under §
1443(1), the vindication of the defendant's federal rights is left
to the state courts except in the rare situations where it can be
clearly predicted by reason of the operation of a pervasive and
explicit state or federal law that those rights will inevitably be
denied by the very act of bringing the defendant to trial in the
state court.
Conley, 245 F.3d at 1297 (quoting Sunflower Cnty. Colored Baptist Ass’n v.
Trs. of Indianola Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 369 F.2d 795, 797 (5th Cir.
1966)). Here, Mr. Shah’s request for removal is based on speculation and
fear, not facts or affirmations that his rights will be denied. He has not met
the requirement of Rachel - that he show with “relative clarity” that the
denial of his civil rights will “take place in the courts of the State” and is
“manifest in a formal expression of state law.” 384 U.S. at 803, 86 S. Ct. at
1796. Accordingly, it is concluded that the notice of removal was not
appropriately filed and this case should be remanded to state court.
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RECOMMENDATION
In light of the foregoing, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that this
case be REMANDED to the Second Judicial Circuit Court in and for Leon
County, Florida and the Clerk of Court be directed to close the file.
IN CHAMBERS at Tallahassee, Florida, on December 11, 2025.
S/ 	Martin A. Fitzpatrick
MARTIN A. FITZPATRICK
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this
Report and Recommendation, a party may serve and file specific written
objections to these proposed findings and recommendations. 	Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b)(2). A copy of the objections shall be served upon all other
parties. 	A party may respond to another party’s objections within
fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b)(2). 	Any different deadline that may appear on the electronic
docket is for the Court’s internal use only and does not control. 	If a
party 	fails 	to 	object 	to 	the 	Magistrate 	Judge’s 	findings 	or
recommendations as to any particular claim or issue contained in this
Report and Recommendation, that party waives the right to challenge on
appeal the District Court’s order based on the unobjected-to factual and
legal conclusions. 	See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636.
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