BEAGLES v. DIXON et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION
JOHNNY DALTON BEAGLES,
Petitioner,
v. 	Case No. 4:24cv093-AW/MAF
RICKY DIXON, Secretary,
Florida Department of Corrections,
Respondent.
____________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
On January 26, 2024, Petitioner Johnny Dalton Beagles, a state inmate
proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254. 	ECF No. 1. 	On May 3, 2024, Respondent filed an answer,
with exhibits. 	ECF No. 8. 	Petitioner Beagles filed a reply, with exhibits, on
September 20, 2024. ECF No. 15.
The matter was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate
Judge for report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and
Northern District of Florida Local Rule 72.2(B). 	After careful consideration,
the undersigned has determined no evidentiary hearing is required for the
disposition of this matter. 	See Rule 8(a), R. Gov. § 2254 Cases. 	For the
reasons stated herein, the filings before the Court show Petitioner is not
entitled to federal habeas relief, and this § 2254 petition should be denied.
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Procedural Background
By information filed September 4, 2018, in Holmes County Circuit
Court Case 2018-CF-316, the State of Florida charged Petitioner Johnny
Dalton Beagles with one count of arson, a first degree felony, contrary to
section 	806.01(1)(a), 	Florida 	Statutes, 	in 	connection 	with 	events 	that
occurred on January 5, 2018. Ex. A at 24.1 Beagles proceeded to a jury trial
August 26 through August 28, 2019. Ex. A at 154-248; Ex. B (trial transcript).
He did not testify at the trial. See Ex. B at 349-51. The jury found him guilty
as charged. Ex. A at 118; Ex. B at 512. On September 11, 2019, the judge
adjudicated Beagles guilty and sentenced him to twenty (20) years in prison.
Ex. A at 137-43, 266-77.
Beagles appealed to the First DCA, assigned case number 1D19-
3527, and his counsel filed an initial brief raising four points. 	Ex. C. 	The
State filed an answer brief, Ex. D, and Beagles’ counsel filed a reply brief,
Ex. E. On June 24, 2020, the First DCA affirmed the case without a written
opinion. Ex. F; Beagles v. State, 301 So. 3d 197 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (table).
Beagles, through counsel, filed a Motion for Rehearing, Clarification, Written
Opinion, or Rehearing En Banc, Ex. G, which the First DCA denied by order
1 Hereinafter, all citations to the state court record, “Ex. –,” refer to exhibits submitted with Respondent’s
answer, ECF No.8.
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on September 1, 2020, Ex. H. The mandate issued September 1, 2020. Ex.
I. 	Beagles did not seek review in the Florida Supreme Court or the U.S.
Supreme Court. 	See ECF No. 1 at 2; ECF No. 8 at 2.
On November 3, 2020, Beagles filed a pro se Motion for Postconviction
Relief, pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, raising ten (10)
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC). 	Ex. J at 23-55 (exclusive
of attachments). By order on December 14, 2020, the state post-conviction
trial court found the claims facially insufficient and allowed Beagles sixty (60)
days to file an amended motion. Id. at 79-80. On or about January 29, 2021,
Beagles filed an amended Rule 3.850 motion, raising six (6) IAC claims. 	Id.
at 81-94. 	By order on August 18, 2021, the state post-conviction trial court
denied Ground 1, ordered the State to respond to Grounds 2 through 5 within
sixty (60) days, and reserved ruling on Ground 6, which alleged cumulative
error. 	Id. at 97-101 (exclusive of attachments).
On August 25, 2021, before the State filed a response, Beagles filed a
second amended Rule 3.850 motion, raising nine (9) IAC claims. Id. at 108-
53. 	By order on October 13, 2021, the court struck the second amended
Rule 3.850 motion as an abuse of procedure and unauthorized. 	Id. at 154-
55. Later that day, the State filed its response to Grounds 2 through 5 of the
amended Rule 3.850 motion. 	Id. at 156-60 (exclusive of attachments).
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On November 23, 2021, Beagles filed a pro se motion for leave to
amend his Rule 3.850 motion and supplement Ground 2, id. at 171-73, and
a supplemental amended motion, id. at 174-79. On March 30, 2022, through
counsel, Beagles filed a motion requesting that the State be ordered to
respond or, in the alternative, that an evidentiary hearing be set or a final
order be entered on his request for post-conviction relief. 	Id. at 183-84.
The state post-conviction trial court entered three orders on April 6,
2022. In the first order, the court granted Beagles’ motion for leave to amend
Ground 2 and accepted the supplemental amended motion for consideration.
Id. at 187-88. 	In the second order, the court struck the motion filed March
30, 2022, with leave to re-file because counsel had filed the motion without
filing any notice of appearance in the case. Id. at 185-86. In the third order,
the court determined an evidentiary hearing should be held on Ground 2,
summarily denied Grounds 3, 4, and 5, and reserved ruling on Ground 6 until
after the evidentiary hearing. 	Id. at 189-95 (exclusive of attachments).
The evidentiary hearing took place on August 10, 2022. 	Id. at 469-
510. 	Beagles was represented by counsel. 	See id. at 471. 	In a final order
rendered October 13, 2022, the state post-conviction trial court denied the
remaining claims for relief in Ground 2 as amended and Ground 6. 	Id. at
345-352 (exclusive of attachments).
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Beagles appealed to the First DCA and filed a pro se initial brief in
assigned 	case 	number 	1D22-3947, 	challenging 	only 	the 	state 	post-
conviction trial court’s denial of Ground 2. Ex. K. The State filed an answer
brief. 	Ex. L. 	Beagles filed a reply brief. 	Ex. M. 	On October 10, 2023, the
First DCA affirmed the case per curiam without a written opinion. 	Ex. N;
Beagles v. State, 372 So. 3d 258 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023) (table). The mandate
issued November 7, 2023. Ex. O.
As indicated above, on January 26, 2024, Beagles filed his § 2254
petition. 	ECF No. 1. 	The petition presents one ground, alleging his trial
counsel provided IAC by “failing to convey a favorable 36-month plea offer
and advise him with all the information necessary to make an informed
decision.” 	Id. at 12. Respondent filed an answer, with exhibits, ECF No. 8,
and Petitioner Beagles filed a reply, with exhibits, ECF No. 15.
Analysis
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), federal courts may grant
habeas corpus relief for persons in state custody. Section 2254(d) provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be
granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the
merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the
claim –
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(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 	See, e.g., Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 180-83
(2011); Gill v. Mecusker, 633 F.3d 1272, 1287-88 (11th Cir. 2011). 	“This is
a ‘difficult to meet’ and ‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court
rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the
doubt.’” Cullen, 563 U.S. at 181 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86,
102 (2011), and Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002)). This Court’s
review 	“is 	limited 	to 	the 	record 	that 	was 	before 	the 	state 	court 	that
adjudicated the claim on the merits.” 	Id.
For IAC claims, the United States Supreme Court has adopted a two-
part test:
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was
deficient. 	This requires showing that counsel made errors so
serious 	that 	counsel 	was 	not 	functioning 	as 	the 	“counsel”
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced
the defense. 	This requires showing that counsel’s errors were
so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose
result is reliable.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 	To demonstrate
ineffectiveness, a “defendant must show that counsel’s performance fell
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below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688. To demonstrate
prejudice, a defendant “must show that there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.” 	Id. at 694. 	“A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” 	Id. 	For this Court’s
purposes, importantly, “[t]he question ‘is not whether a federal court believes
the state court’s determination’ under the Strickland standard ‘was incorrect
but whether that determination was unreasonable – a substantially higher
threshold.’” 	Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (quoting
Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007)). 	“And, because the
Strickland standard is a general standard, a state court has even more
latitude to reasonably determine that a defendant has not satisfied that
standard.” 	Id. 	It is a “doubly deferential judicial review that applies to a
Strickland claim evaluated under the § 2254(d)(1) standard.” 	Id. 	The
Strickland test applies to IAC claims arising out of the plea process. 	Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57-58 (1985).
In the only ground presented in the § 2254 petition, Beagles challenges
the state courts’ rejection of his IAC claim alleging his trial counsel, Richard
Kerry Adkison, did not convey a favorable plea offer and advise him with all
the necessary information to make an informed decision regarding the plea
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offer. 	ECF No. 1 at 12. 	In particular, Beagles asserts the state post-
conviction trial court did not make the proper factual findings regarding the
prejudice prong of Strickland, id. at 14, and the court’s factual findings are
not supported by the record, id. at 18. As Respondent indicates, ECF No. 8
at 12, Beagles exhausted his state court remedies as to this claim. 	See 28
U.S.C. § 2254(c); O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999).
In denying the claim, the state post-conviction trial court made the
following findings regarding Beagles’ allegations:
In Ground Two, the Defendant alleges that counsel was
ineffective for failure to convey a plea offer of 36 months DOC.
[Ex. J at 176; 471.] 	In his motion, Defendant submits that this
plea offer was discussed with the Defendant’s father, Chad
Beagles, but never Defendant. [Ex. J at 172, 175.]
For this type of ineffective of assistance of counsel claim,
while the first prong of Strickland remains the same, to establish
the 	prejudice prong, 	a defendant 	must 	allege and prove a
reasonable probability that 1) he would have accepted the offer
with correct advice, 2) the state would not have withdrawn the
offer, 3) the court would have accepted the offer, and 4) the
sentence would have been less severe. See Alcorn v. State, 121
So. 3d 419, 430 (Fla. 2013).
In the State’s response, they articulate that Defendant's
allegations are without merit. 	[Ex. J at 157-58.] 	The State
attached letters reflecting plea offers from the ASA to defense
counsel in the instant case. [Ex. J at 161-70.] Further, the State
submits that they have found nothing to indicate a 30 month plea
offer ever having being made. 	[Ex. J at 158.] 	However, the
Defendant supplemented his motion as to this ground to submit
that it was a 36 month plea offer. [Ex. J at 176.]
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Either way, whether it was 30 months or a 36 months offer,
the Court is unable to refute Defendant’s allegations from the
record after reviewing the transcripts and/or open court recorded
proceedings. 	Thus, the Defendant was entitled to a limited
evidentiary hearing as to this issue. See Mills v. State, 312 So.
3d 153 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021); see also Hartfield v. State, 312 So.
3d 172 (Fla.1st DCA 2021).
Ex. J at 348. 	The court made findings regarding Beagles’ testimony at the
evidentiary hearing:
At 	the 	evidentiary 	hearing, 	the 	Court 	first 	heard 	from
Defendant, Johnny Dalton Beagles. [Ex. J at 473-84.]
Mr. Beagles testified that to his knowledge, he was not
aware of any plea offer until after trial and while he was at DOC
serving his present sentence in this case, wherein he learned of
a 36 month DOC offer. [Ex. J at 474-75; see Ex. J at 481-82.] In
effect, Mr. Beagles submits that he never discussed any plea
offer with his counsel. 	[Ex. J at 475; see Ex. J at 481-82.]
However, Mr. Beagles articulates that had his attorney advised
him of the offer, he would have accepted it, and it was in his best
interest, and he would not be serving a 20-year DOC sentence.
[Ex. J at 475.]
[On cross-examination,] Mr. Beagles testified that he was
married to Hannah Beagles. [Ex. J at 476.] Further, Mr. Beagles
agreed 	that 	Hannah 	Beagles 	testified 	in 	his 	favor 	at 	trial;
however, she gave conflicting statements to law enforcement a
month before the trial. [Ex. J at 476.] But, he was sure that with
Hannah Beagles’ testimony he would be found not guilty to
corroborate his alibi that he was not even in Holmes County at
the time of [the] arson [offense]. [Ex. J at 476-79.] Based upon
her testimony, Mr. Beagles agreed that he was pretty confident
[he would be] found not guilty based upon Hannah Beagles’
testimony and alibi. 	Thus, he was confident by [sic] the advice
of his counsel, [“if the judge followed by the law, he was going to
give me judgment of acquittal, exact words out of Kerry Adkison’s
mouth.”] 	[Ex. J at 479.] 	Accordingly, even knowing all of that,
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Mr. Beagles testified and reiterates that he would still take the 36
months DOC plea offer. [Ex. J at 479.]
Further, when questioned, Mr. Beagles remembered being
on conditional release for an unrelated offense in Holmes County
before trial. 	[Ex. J at 479-80.] 	However, Mr. Beagles does not
remember telling the probation officer, Ms. Cook, that he was not
getting convicted of the arson offense. [Ex. J at 479.]
Additionally, 	Mr. 	Beagles 	stated 	that 	he 	does 	not
remember or recall talking to counsel [in] the weeks before trial.
[Ex. J at 479-80.] Further, Mr. Beagles does not remember any
48 months DOC plea offer or it ever being conveyed by counsel.
[Ex. J at 481-82.]
Ex. J at 348-49. 	The court then made findings regarding the testimony of
Beagles’ trial counsel at the evidentiary hearing:
Next, the Court heard from Defendant’s trial counsel, Kerry
Adkison, Esq. 	[Ex. J at 484-92]. 	Mr. Adkison was Defendant’s
trial counsel, and he has been practicing law for the last 30 years.
[Ex. J at 485.] 	In testimony, Mr. Adkison testified that the trial
occurred in August 2019. [Ex. J at 485.]
Before 	trial, 	Mr. 	Adkison 	articulated 	that 	the 	defense
initially received a plea offer from the State for 48 months DOC.
[Ex. J at 485-86.] 	However, on August 19, 2019, the State
updated the plea offer to 36 months DOC. 	[Ex. J at 486.] 	Mr.
Adkison stated that he conveyed the plea offers to the Defendant
and spoke to him; however, he does not have a written record of
it. 	[Ex. J at 486.] 	Mr. Adkison stated that based upon his
calendar, he was in constant contact with the defendant in this
case either in court or at his office. [Ex. J at 486.] . . . Mr. Adkison
submitted that his standard operating procedure and common
practice [is] to convey plea offers to his clients. [Ex. J at 486-87.]
According to Mr. Adkison, . . . Defendant felt that his wife,
Hannah Beagles, would testify that he was with her the entire
time during the criminal offense and he did not set any fires. [Ex.
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J at 487.] Therefore, Mr. Adkison testified that Hannah Beagles
was a good witness for the defense. 	[Ex. J at 487.] 	More
importantly, Mr. Adkison explained how the Defendant conveyed
to counsel that he would not have accepted the plea offers from
the State. 	[Ex. J at 487.] 	When asked why, Mr. Adkison states
that Defendant [“]was adamant he was going to trial.[”] [Ex. J at
487.] 	In fact, Mr. Adkison explained that he was sure that
Defendant would have not accepted any [plea] offer involving
DOC time, including even a non-prison sanction. [Ex. J at 487.]
According to Mr. Adkison, Defendant was confident about his
success at trial. [Ex. J at 487.]
Further, during Mr. Adkison’s representation of his client,
Mr. 	Adkison 	described 	or 	classified 	the 	volatile 	relationship
between Defendant and Hannah Beagles. 	[Ex. J at 487-88.]
However, when Defendant and Hannah Beagles would come
into his office, Mr. Adkison would act as an intermediary between
the two to make peace between them because she (Hannah
Beagles) was a key witness for the defense in this case. 	[Ex. J
at 488.] Thus, Mr. Adkison described how he would have to get
onto Defendant, and say she is your witness, and do nothing to
affect that for your trial. [Ex. J at 488.]
According to Mr. Adkison, if Hannah Beagles testified as
she 	would 	have 	without 	giving 	that 	statement 	to 	a 	law
enforcement officer prior to trial, [he believed] Defendant would
have been found not guilty at trial. 	[Ex. J at 488.] 	However,
Hannah 	Beagles 	conflicting 	statements 	to 	law 	enforcement
changed the outcome or a key point in the entire trial. 	[Ex. J at
488-89.] 	Hannah 	Beagles 	was 	very 	adamant 	up 	until 	the
statement to law enforcement close to trial that Defendant was
with her, and he did not commit the arson. 	[Ex. J at 488-89.]
However, when Hannah Beagles’ statement came out to law
enforcement [in August 	2019], Mr. Adkison stated that she
attempted to retract that statement at some point in time. [Ex. J
at 489.] 	Despite this fact, counsel discussed this with the
Defendant and he was still confident she was going to testify at
trial for him and ultimately to her detriment, which resulted in a
perjury charge for Hannah Beagles. [Ex. J at 489.]
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Mr. 	Adkison 	testified 	that 	Defendant 	would 	have 	not
accepted any plea offers even if it was in his best interest. 	[Ex.
J at 489.] 	However, counsel reiterated that it was his standard
practice to convey all plea offers to his clients. [Ex. J at 489-90.]
Additionally, [on cross-examination,] Mr. Adkison testified that
the 	State 	had 	no 	eyewitnesses 	up 	until 	Hannah 	Beagles
statement to law enforcement. [Ex. J at 490.] Thus, there were
no surprises at trial to the best of counsel’s knowledge. [Ex. J at
490-91.] [On redirect, he testified that] [h]owever, unfortunately,
when Hannah Beagles did testify at trial, it resulted in her
statement being published and played to the jury due to her
conflicting statements. [Ex. J at 492.] Mr. Adkison testified that
he argued that vigorously at the trial level concerning Hannah
Beagles’ statement being admitted and published and on appeal.
[Ex. J at 492.]
Ex. J at 349-50. The court next made findings regarding the testimony of the
third, and final, witness at the evidentiary hearing, Holmes County Probation
Officer Tanya Cook:
Finally, the Court heard from Ms. Tanya Cook, Holmes
County Probation Officer. [Ex. J at 494.] According to Ms. Cook,
she has been a probation officer for 18 years. [Ex. J at 494.] In
testimony, Ms. Cook articulated that she was supervising the
Defendant on conditional release for an unrelated case during
the time of the instant arson case including all the way up until
trial in this cause. [Ex. J at 494-95.] The last day of Defendant’s
supervision by Ms. Cook included August 26, 2019. 	[Ex. J at
495.] 	Ms. Cook testified about Defendant’s demeanor of his
arson charge, and how Defendant was assured he was going to
get off for the arson offense. 	[Ex. J at 495.] 	In fact, Ms. Cook
described how the Defendant was sure of himself and arrogant.
[Ex. J at 495.] 	However, Ms. Cook could not recall whether
Defendant stated that he was not going to take a plea. [Ex. J at
495.]
Ex. J at 350. 	The court set forth the Strickland standard, id., and then
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explained conflicts 	in the hearing testimony, 	credited the testimony 	of
Adkison and Cook over that of Beagles, and denied relief:
Defendant testified that he was not aware of any plea offers
either 48 months DOC, or 36 months DOC. 	[Ex. J at 474-75,
481-82.] 	However, it was Mr. Adkison’s common practice and
procedure to convey all plea offers to his clients. 	[Ex. J at 486-
87.] 	Thus, there is a conflict in the testimony presented. 	The
Court finds that the Defendant’s testimony is unreliable and
subject to credibility issues. 	According to testimony of defense
counsel and Ms. Cook, Defendant believed that he had a very
good chance at winning his trial. 	[Ex. J at 487-89, 495.] 	The
Court finds that the testimony of Mr. Adkison and Ms. Cook to be
credible.
Although 	defense 	counsel 	argued 	vigorously 	at 	trial
concerning Hannah Beagles statement to law enforcement, after
her trial testimony, the statement was ultimately played to the jury
due to conflicting statements after the trial judge’s ruling. 	(TT
256-325; 358-372; 382-390) 	Despite the foregoing, Defendant
submits in testimony that he would have accepted the plea offer
[Ex. J at 479]; however, Defendant’s demeanor and arrogance
reflects that he [believed he] would have been acquitted. 	Thus,
no matter what the State’s plea offer was in this case, it is
apparent from the testimony of counsel that the Defendant was
adamant about going to trial. 	Defendant fully believed that
Hannah Beagles’ testimony was his ace in the hole, but for her
conflicting statements before trial, and the cross examination, the
trial likely would have gone in a completely different direction.
Defendant’s ground clearly falls short in this case at the
time of the trial. 	Defendant wanted a trial and got a trial and an
opportunity to prove his innocence, and he thought that he would
get off, due to Hannah Beagles’ testimony, but unfortunately, it
didn’t go in his favor and the trial court ruled differently. Further,
it is unethical for a defense attorney to promise and/or advise as
to a particular outcome. Here, defense counsel does not have a
crystal ball. However, counsel stated that it was a circumstantial
case, with not much evidence, until Hannah Beagles conflicted
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and contradicted her own testimony at trial. [Ex. J at 490-92.]
The Court finds that the Defendant failed to show that trial
counsel’s 	performance was 	deficient, 	and that 	the 	deficient
performance 	prejudiced 	him 	in 	any 	way. 	The 	Defendant's
allegations 	fail 	to 	establish 	either 	prong 	of 	Strickland 	v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). As a result, this ground
is due to be denied.
Ex. J at 350-51.
On appeal, the First DCA per curiam affirmed the case without a written
opinion. 	Ex. N. 	This adjudication on the merits is entitled to AEDPA
deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), even though no reasoning is set forth
in the decision. See Richter, 562 U.S. at 99 (“When a federal claim has been
presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be
presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the
absence 	of 	any 	indication 	or 	state-law 	procedural 	principles 	to 	the
contrary.”); Wright v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 278 F.3d 1245, 1254-55 (11th Cir.
2002). A review of the record supports the state courts’ determination. 	See
Wilson v. Sellers, -- U.S. --, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018) (“We hold that the
federal court should ‘look through’ the unexplained decision to the last
related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale. It should
then presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.”).
In particular, the record references in brackets in the quoted portions
of the state post-conviction trial court’s order, above, support the court’s
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findings regarding the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing. 	In
denying the claim, the state post-conviction trial court judge accepted the
testimony of Beagles’ trial counsel, Kerry Adkison, and Beagles’ probation
officer, 	Tanya 	Cook, 	over 	that 	of 	Beagles 	where 	conflicts 	occurred,
particularly in determining that Beagles would not have accepted any plea
offer and wanted to proceed to trial, believing the jury would find him not
guilty. 	The state post-conviction trial court judge sits as the fact-finder and
determines witness credibility in a Rule 3.850 proceeding. 	See, e.g.,
Consalvo v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 664 F. 3d 842, 845 (11th Cir. 2011)
(“Determining the credibility of witnesses is the province and function of the
state courts, not a federal court engaging in habeas review.); Smith v. State,
697 So. 2d 991, 992 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(d). “Federal
habeas courts have ‘no license to redetermine credibility of witnesses whose
demeanor was observed by the state court, but not by them.’” 	Consalvo,
664 F.3d at 845 (quoting Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434 (1983)).
Given this credibility determination, as the state post-conviction trial
found, Beagles has not shown prejudice because he has not demonstrated
that he would have accepted the plea offer but for the alleged ineffectiveness
of counsel. See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 164 (2012) (clarifying that
Sixth 	Amendment 	right 	to 	effective 	assistance 	of 	counsel 	extends 	to
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Case No. 4:24cv093-AW/MAF
negotiation and consideration of plea offers that lapse or are rejected, and
concluding that, to establish prejudice, defendant must show reasonable
probability that but for counsel’s ineffectiveness: (1) “the plea offer would
have been presented to the court (i.e., that the defendant would have
accepted the plea and the prosecution would not have withdrawn it in light of
intervening circumstances)”; (2) “the court would have accepted its terms”;
and (3) “the conviction or sentence, or both, under the offer’s terms would
have been less severe than under the judgment and sentence that were in
fact imposed”). The record, particularly the testimony of Adkison and Cook
at the evidentiary hearing, supports the post-conviction trial court’s finding,
affirmed by the First DCA, that Beagles’ assertion that he would have
accepted the plea is not credible given the testimony presented at the
evidentiary hearing that he wanted to go to trial because he felt confident the
jury would find him not guilty.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, Petitioner Beagles has not shown that the
state courts’ rejection of this ground involved an unreasonable application of
clearly established federal law or that it was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). Accordingly, this
ground, and the § 2254 petition, should be denied.
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Certificate of Appealability
Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United
States District Courts provides that “[t]he district court must issue or deny a
certificate of 	appealability when it 	enters 	a final order adverse to the
applicant,” and if a certificate is issued “the court must state the specific issue
or issues that satisfy the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).” Rule
11(b) provides that a timely notice of appeal must still be filed, even if the
court issues a certificate of appealability.
Petitioner fails to make a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,
483-84 (2000) (explaining substantial showing) (citation omitted). Therefore,
the Court should deny a certificate of appealability. The second sentence of
Rule 11(a) provides: “Before entering the final order, the court may direct the
parties to submit arguments on whether a certificate should issue.” 	The
parties shall make any argument regarding a certificate by filing objections
to this Report and Recommendation.
Leave to appeal in forma pauperis should also be denied. See Fed. R.
App. P. 24(a)(3)(A) (providing that before or after notice of appeal is filed,
the court may certify appeal is not in good faith or party is not otherwise
entitled to appeal in forma pauperis).
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Recommendation
It is therefore respectfully RECOMMENDED that the Court DENY the
§ 2254 petition (ECF No. 1). It is further RECOMMENDED that a certificate
of appealability be DENIED and that leave to appeal in forma pauperis be
DENIED.
IN CHAMBERS at Tallahassee, Florida, on December 17, 2025.
S/ Martin A. Fitzpatrick
MARTIN A. FITZPATRICK
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this
Report and Recommendation, a party may serve and file specific
written objections to these proposed findings and recommendations.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). A copy of the objections shall be served upon
all other parties. 	A party may respond to another party’s objections
within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. 	Fed.
R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). 	Any different deadline that may appear on the
electronic docket is for the Court’s internal use only and does not
control. 	If a party fails to object to the magistrate judge’s findings or
recommendations as to any particular claim or issue contained in a
Report and Recommendation, that party waives the right to challenge
on appeal the district court’s order based on the unobjected-to factual
and legal conclusions. 	See 11th Cir. R. 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636.
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