CARTWRIGHT v. ALACHUA COUNTY FLORIDA et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
GAINESVILLE DIVISION
KELVIN CARTWRIGHT,
Plaintiff,
vs. 	Case No. 1:25cv375-AW-MAF
ALACHUA COUNTY,
FLORIDA, et al.,
Defendants.
_________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This case was initiated on December 12, 2025, when the pro se
Plaintiff filed a civil rights complaint, ECF No. 1, and paid the filing fee, ECF
No. 2. Plaintiff’s initial complaint, ECF No. 1, was reviewed and an Order
was entered explaining why the complaint was insufficient. ECF No. 4.
For example, Plaintiff was informed that his claims were barred by the
statute of limitations, were likely barred under Heck, and his claim for
malicious prosecution was barred because he has not had a criminal
proceeding terminated in his favor. 	Id. 	Nevertheless, because Plaintiff
paid the filing fee for this case, he was advised that he would be provided
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the opportunity to file an amended complaint if he believed there was a
basis to do so. 	Id. 	Alternatively, it was suggested that Plaintiff voluntarily
dismiss this case. 	Id.
On January 14, 2026, Plaintiff filed an amended § 1983 civil rights
complaint. ECF No. 5. The amended complaint has been reviewed to
determine if it is sufficient for service, if it is frivolous, or if amendment
would be futile. 1 See Vega v. Kahle, No. 23-12065, 2025 WL 3540349, at
*3, n.2 (11th Cir. Dec. 10, 2025) (concluding “that district courts have the
inherent authority to sua sponte dismiss without prejudice patently frivolous
suits even where the plaintiff has paid the filing fee”).
Plaintiff’s amended complaint [hereinafter “complaint”] is brought
against the City of Gainesville, Florida; Alachua County, Florida; and
unidentified “law enforcement officers, investigators, and supervisory
officials employed by the City of Gainesville and/or Alachua County” who
1 “A district court has the inherent authority to dismiss a patently frivolous
complaint.” Cuyler v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC, Nos. 12-11824-DD, 2012 WL
10488184, at *4 (11th Cir. Dec. 3, 2012); Fitzgerald v. First East Seventh Street
Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 2000) (recognizing that district courts may
dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte even when the plaintiff has paid the required
filing fee, just as courts of appeals may dismiss frivolous matters in like circumstances,
citing Mallard v. United States District Court, 490 U.S. 296 (1989)) (quoted in Vega v.
Kahle, No. 2:23-CV-267-JLB-NPM, 2023 WL 4211143, at *1 (M.D. Fla. June 1, 2023),
aff’d, No. 23-12065, 2025 WL 3540349 (11th Cir. Dec. 10, 2025)).
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allegedly “participated in the investigation, charging, prosecution, and post-
conviction concealment of exculpatory evidence in Plaintiff’s criminal case.”
ECF No. 5 at 1-2. Plaintiff’s criminal case, however, occurred “[i]n or about
1991-1992" in Alachua County, Florida. 	Id. at 3. 2 Thus, Plaintiff is
attempting to overturn a conviction which occurred more than 30 years
ago.
First “[f]ederal courts apply their forum state’s statute of limitations for
personal injury actions to actions brought pursuant to § 1983.” Ellison v.
Lester, 275 F. App’x 900, 901 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Uboh v. Reno, 141
F.3d 1000, 1002 (11th Cir. 1998); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a) (providing
that state law determines the statute of limitations applicable to a claim filed
pursuant to § 1983). The Eleventh Circuit has “held that the four-year
statute of limitations under Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3) applies to § 1983 claims
arising in Florida.” Ellison, 275 F. App’x at 901-02 (citing to Chappell v.
Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2003), and rejecting argument that
the one-year statute of limitations of Fla. Stat. § 95.11(5)(g) applies ).
2 Plaintiff has not clarified the specific year or identified the specific crime(s) for
which he was charged and convicted.
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In this case, Plaintiff alleged that his criminal prosecution occurred
between 1991 - 1992. Any claims which challenge actions pertaining to
Plaintiff’s prosecution and plea are barred by the statute of limitations.
Plaintiff cannot now litigate claims which are more than 30 old, and the
case should be dismissed as frivolous, time barred, and any attempt to
amend would be futile. 	See Vega v. Kahle, No. 2:23-CV-267-JLB-NPM,
2023 WL 4211143, at *3 (M.D. Fla. June 1, 2023), aff’d, No. 23-12065,
2025 WL 3540349 (11th Cir. Dec. 10, 2025) (dismissing claim of excessive
force which occurred on September 30, 2005, and was raised in a
complaint filed on April 18, 2023, pursuant to the court’s inherent authority).
Beyond the fact that Plaintiff’s claims are time barred, the claims are
vague, conclusory and frivolous. Plaintiff asserts that he was subjected to
“judicial coercion” in entering a plea to the criminal charge(s). ECF No. 5 at
3. He claims his October 1992 “court-ordered DNA and paternity testing”
conclusively “excluded him as the biological father with a zero percent
probability.” 	Id. 	He also claims that 4 years later, in May of 1996, “genetic
testing conclusively identified another individual as the biological father”
which, according to Plaintiff, affirmatively proved his “actual innocence of
the central allegation underlying the prosecution.” 	Id. at 4. Defendants
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then allegedly concealed exculpatory evidence and revoked Plaintiff’s
probation which resulted in his incarceration. 	Id. at 4. Plaintiff’s allegations
are vague and fail to clarify the crime charged or the reason paternity
evidence is material to Plaintiff’s criminal prosecution. The allegations are
also conclusory and unsupported by facts which connect the allegations to
the specific actions of any named Defendant.
Moreover, Plaintiff seeks to bring claims for “false arrest and unlawful
seizure” (count 1), “malicious prosecution” (count 2), “suppression of
exculpatory evidence” (count 3), “coerced plea and due process violations”
(count 4), “fabrication of evidence and false probable cause” (count 5),
“civil conspiracy to deprive constitutional rights” (count 6), and “municipal
liability” (count 7). ECF No. 5 at 4-7. However, Plaintiff’s amended
complaint is a shotgun pleading which the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals has condemned time and time again. 	See Weiland v. Palm Beach
Cty. Sheriff's Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015) (stating that a
complaint must present a claim succinctly such that a defendant can
discern the basis for the plaintiff’s claim and “frame a responsive pleading”)
(citation omitted). The Court explained the four categories of shotgun
pleadings as follows:
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The most common type—by a long shot—is a complaint
containing multiple counts where each count adopts the
allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive
count to carry all that came before and the last count to be a
combination of the entire complaint. The next most common
type, at least as far as our published opinions on the subject
reflect, is a complaint that does not commit the mortal sin of
re-alleging all preceding counts but is guilty of the venial sin of
being replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not
obviously connected to any particular cause of action. The third
type of shotgun pleading is one that commits the sin of not
separating into a different count each cause of action or claim
for relief. Fourth, and finally, there is the relatively rare sin of
asserting multiple claims against multiple defendants without
specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which
acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is
brought against. The unifying characteristic of all types of
shotgun pleadings is that they fail to one degree or another,
and in one way or another, to give the defendants adequate
notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which
each claim rests.
Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321–23.
Here, Plaintiff’s complaint presents 7 separate counts which are
based on conclusory and vague facts; Plaintiff has presented only legal
conclusions and he has failed to allege actual events - that is, the actions
committed by specific persons - which support the legal conclusions
asserted. Further, the facts Plaintiff did assert on pages 2-4 of the
amended complaint are “not obviously connected to any particular cause of
action.”
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Moreover, Plaintiff has asserted multiple claims against multiple
Defendants, but Plaintiff did not specify what action was taken by what
Defendant. That is the hallmark of an shotgun pleading and dismissal is
warranted.
Finally, Plaintiff was accused of a crime in 1991 or 1992 and
convicted based on a plea. ECF No. 5 at 3. He does not allege that in the
intervening 30+ years he has ever had his conviction vacated or otherwise
invalidated, yet Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well
as declaratory and injunctive relief. 	Id. at 8.
The general law is that a prisoner cannot seek monetary damages or
injunctive relief which would collaterally undermine a criminal conviction or
sentence. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500, 93 S. Ct. 1827, 1841,
36 L. Ed. 2d 439 (1973) (prohibiting injunctive relief which would result in
speedier or immediate release from a term of imprisonment); Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 2372, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994)
(barring a claim for monetary damages related to a conviction or sentence
until the plaintiff can show that the conviction or sentence has been
invalidated). “In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487, 114 S. Ct. 2364,
2372-73, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994), the Supreme Court ‘held that a state
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prisoner's claim for damages is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if ‘a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his
conviction or sentence,’ unless the prisoner can demonstrate that the
conviction or sentence has previously been invalidated.” Edwards v.
Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643, 117 S. Ct. 1584, 1586, 137 L. Ed. 2d 906
(1997) (quoted in Harden v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2003)).
It remains “an open question as to whether Heck applies to situations
where, as here, a § 1983 plaintiff may no longer seek habeas relief
because [he] is no longer in custody.” Teagan v. City of McDonough, 949
F.3d 670, 678 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing to Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S.
749, 752 n.2, 124 S.Ct. 1303, 158 L.Ed.2d 32 (2004)); see also Topa v.
Melendez, 739 F. App’x 516, 519, n.2 (11th Cir. 2018) (discussing a “circuit
split” on the issue of Heck and claimants who are not in custody and can
no longer bring a habeas action). Yet it is clear that “a cause of action for
malicious prosecution does not accrue until the criminal proceedings have
terminated in the plaintiff's favor.” Teagan, 949 F.3d at 678. Heck also
bars Plaintiff’s claim for false arrest (count 1) in light of his plea agreement.
Hoffman v. Beseler, 760 F. App’x 775, 779 (11th Cir. 2019).
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In short, Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be summarily
dismissed as frivolous. The claims are time barred, barred by Heck, and
§ 1983 claims cannot be based on the doctrine of respondeat superior.
Because Plaintiff paid the filing fee for this case, he was provided an
opportunity to file an amended complaint if there was a basis to do so.
ECF No. 4. The amended complaint has not corrected the deficiencies,
nor would further opportunities to amend be beneficial.
The Eleventh Circuit has also acknowledged a district court’s
“inherent power to sua sponte dismiss frivolous suits without giving notice
to the parties.” Davis v. Kvalheim, 261 F. App’x 231, 234 (11th Cir. 2008);
see also Mallard, 490 U.S. at 307-08, 109 S. Ct. at 1821. That is so, “even
. . . where the plaintiff pays the full filing fee.” Rosetta v. United States, No.
CV417-155, 2017 WL 4415674, at *1, n.1 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 29, 2017), report
and recommendation adopted, No. CV417-155, 2017 WL 4391720 (S.D.
Ga. Sept. 29, 2017) (citing Cuyler, 2012 WL 10488184 at * 2 (noting that
notwithstanding payment of the filing fee, “a district court has the inherent
authority to dismiss a patently frivolous complaint”)); Jefferson Fourteenth
Assocs. v. Wometco de Puerto Rico, Inc., 695 F.2d 524, 526, n.3 (11th Cir.
1983) (noting that courts may sua sponte dismiss actions for lacking merit
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“if the proper procedural steps are taken and if the determination is correct
on the merits”)); see also Brinson v. Welsh, No. CV416222, 2016 WL
10654065, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 13, 2016), report and recommendation
adopted, No. CV 416-222, 2016 WL 10654066 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 7, 2016),
aff’d, 709 F. App’x 582 (11th Cir. 2017).
A “complaint is frivolous if it is ‘without arguable merit either in law or
fact.’” Davis, 261 F. App’x at 234 (quoting Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346,
1349 (11th Cir. 2001)). Here, Plaintiff’s claims are without arguable merit
as a § 1983 case may not be used to challenge a conviction from more
than 30 years ago which has not been overturned on appeal or through a
habeas petition. Vega, 2023 WL 4211143, at *3 (dismissing claims as time
barred and permitting Plaintiff to file a new action “only after his convictions
are overturned”). Plaintiff is now advised for the second time that his
claims are insufficient and frivolous. If he disagrees, he shall have an
opportunity to file an objection to this Report and Recommendation. 	See
Morris v. Bush, No. 1:07-CV-00187-MP-AK, 2008 WL 4525016, at *1 (N.D.
Fla. Oct. 6, 2008) (finding it appropriate to dismiss the pro se plaintiff’s
complaint prior to service even though Plaintiff paid the filing fee). Yet
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allowing Plaintiff another opportunity to amend would be futile. Vega, 2025
WL 3540349, at *5.
RECOMMENDATION
In light of the foregoing, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that
Plaintiff’s amended complaint, ECF No. 5, be DISMISSED as frivolous
based on the Court’s inherent authority to dismiss such cases, even though
the Plaintiff paid the filing fee.
IN CHAMBERS at Tallahassee, Florida, on January 20, 2026.
S/ 	Martin A. Fitzpatrick
MARTIN A. FITZPATRICK
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this
Report and Recommendation, a party may serve and file specific written
objections to these proposed findings and recommendations. 	Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Any different deadline that may appear on the electronic
docket is for the Court’s internal use only and does not control. 	If a
party 	fails 	to 	object 	to 	the 	Magistrate 	Judge’s 	findings 	or
recommendations as to any particular claim or issue contained in this
Report and Recommendation, that party waives the right to challenge on
appeal the District Court’s order based on the unobjected-to factual and
legal conclusions. 	See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636.
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