WALKER v. J-PAY SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
GAINESVILLE DIVISION
ERIC L. WALKER, II,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 1:25cv338-AW-HTC
J-PAY, LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
_____________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Eric Walker, a prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, has
filed an amended civil rights complaint alleging the Defendants violated the Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause by denying him access to electronic tablets during his
incarceration. Doc. 16. The Court screened Walker’s original complaint (Doc. 1),
advised him that his allegations failed to state a claim under the applicable legal
standards, and gave him an opportunity to amend his complaint to state a viable
claim. 	Doc. 10. 	Walker filed an amended complaint but, upon review, the
undersigned concludes it continues to fail to state a claim. Thus, this case should be
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
I. 	Background
Walker sues two Defendants: (1) J-Pay LLC/Securus Technologies, the
company which provides electronic tablets to inmates within the Florida Department
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of Corrections (“FDOC”); and (2) D. Woodall, a property room sergeant at Mayo
Correctional Institution Annex (“Mayo CI”). Walker’s amended complaint contains
the following factual allegations, which are accepted as true for purposes of this
Report and Recommendation.
Walker purchased three electronic tablets from J-Pay while incarcerated in the
FDOC—one in September 2018 for $75, one in February 2020 for $189, and one in
March 2020 for $189. At the time he made these purchases, the FDOC considered
the tablets to be Walker’s personal property.
However, the FDOC later changed its tablet policy. 	In December 2020,
FDOC personnel confiscated the tablets Walker purchased, told him those tablets
would be returned to J-Pay, and promised to provide him a functional state-owned
tablet as “just compensation for the taking.”1
In October 2022, FDOC personnel conducted a statewide “search and
removal” of all J-Pay tablets possessed by inmates. 	During this search, FDOC
personnel confiscated the tablet that had been issued to Walker after his purchased
tablets were taken in December 2020.
1 See Peterka v. Dixon, 2023 WL 7272116, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 10, 2023), report and
recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 7182114 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 1, 2023), opinion vacated in part
on reconsideration, 2023 WL 11938137 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 6, 2023) (considering Florida prisoner’s
allegation that by August 2020 the FDOC had “informed prisoners that they must relinquish
possession of their JP5 tablets by November 30, 2020, but would be provided a JP6 ‘loaner’
tablet”).
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In May 2025, Walker was issued a defective tablet. In October 2025, Sergeant
Woodall ordered Walker to give confinement staff the defective tablet. 	Woodall
was required to secure the defective tablet and return it to J-Pay so it could be
replaced with a functional tablet, but she failed to do so. Thus, Walker asserts he is
being denied a functional tablet.
Based on the foregoing, Walker alleges J-Pay and Sergeant Woodall violated
his Fifth Amendment right not to be deprived of property without just compensation
by taking his tablets in December 2020, October 2022, and October 2025. As relief,
he requests $3,000 in reimbursement “for the total multiple years of loss without a
properly functional tablet, and the continued ‘loss’ of property by” Woodall.
II. 	Legal Standard
Because Walker is a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must
dismiss his complaint, or any portion thereof, if it determines it is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 	See 	28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B). To state a claim, Walker must plead factual content which allows
the Court to draw the reasonable inference the Defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged. 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 	The Court must liberally
construe pro se allegations, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), but
conclusory allegations and legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are not
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entitled to a presumption of truth. 	Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681; Papasan v. Allain, 478
U.S. 265, 286 (1986).
III. 	Discussion
As Walker was previously advised: (1) his claim related to the December 2020
confiscation of his purchased tablets is barred by the four-year statute of limitations;
and (2) he cannot state a Takings Clause claim based on being deprived of FDOC-
issued tablets in October 2022 and October 2025 because he did not own those
tablets. Thus, this case should be dismissed with prejudice.
A. 	Walker’s Takings Clause claim related to the loss of his purchased
tablets is untimely.
Claims brought directly under the Takings Clause and constitutional claims
brought under § 1983 are subject to a four-year statute of limitations.2 See Ellison
v. Lester, 275 F. App’x 900, 901-02 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he four-year statute of
limitations under Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3) applies to § 1983 claims arising in Florida.”);
see also Fulton, 148 F.4th at 1236 (The limitations period for Takings Clause claims
is “the forum state’s limitations period applicable to the state cause of action that
2 Walker does not specify whether his claims are brought directly under the Takings Clause or
under § 1983, but it does not matter to resolution of his claims. See Fulton v. Fulton Cnty. Bd. of
Comm’rs, 148 F.4th 1224 (11th Cir. 2025) (holding plaintiffs can bring a cause of action directly
under the Takings Clause without using § 1983).
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bears the closest substantive resemblance to the federal cause of action.”) (citation
omitted); Fla. Stat. 95.11(3)(g).3
Here, Walker alleges that in December 2020 the FDOC confiscated the tablets
he previously purchased and told him he would receive a state-issued tablet as a
replacement. 	Thus, his Takings Clause claim related to the loss of his personal
property accrued in December 2020. See Van Poyck v. McCollum, 646 F.3d 865, 867
(11th Cir. 2011) (The statute of limitations on a § 1983 claim begins to run when
“the facts which would support a cause of action are apparent or should be apparent
to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights.”) (quoting McNair v.
Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1173 (11th Cir. 2008)); Boling v. United States, 220 F.3d 1365,
1370 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“In general, a takings claim accrues when ‘all events which
fix the government’s alleged liability have occurred and the plaintiff was or should
have been aware of their existence.’”). 	Because Walker did not file his original
complaint in this case until October 19, 2025 (Doc. 1 at 1), and his claim accrued
3 In Fulton, the court concluded Georgia’s four-year limitations period for the recovery of personal
property applied to a Takings Clause claim based on the seizure of the plaintiff’s horses. Fulton,
148 F.4th at 1236-37 (“We conclude that the limitations period for the recovery of personal
property—four years—governs.”). Here, Walker’s Takings Clause claim most closely resembles
an action “for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property,” which is subject to a four-year
limitations period in Florida. See Fla. Stat. 95.11(3)(g); see also 3630 Inv. Corp. v. Miami-Dade
Cnty., 2018 WL 3213489, at *5 (S.D. Fla. June 29, 2018) (“[A]n inverse condemnation claim
under Florida law is subject to a four-year statute of limitation.”).
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more than four years before that date (i.e., before October 19, 2021), the claim is
barred by the statute of limitations.4
B. 	Walker cannot state a Takings Clause claim related to being
deprived of a state-issued tablet in October 2022 and October 2025.
Walker also claims J-Pay and Sergeant Woodall violated his rights under the
Takings Clause by confiscating the state-issued tablets in October 2022 and October
2025. 	While Walker suggests the FDOC and J-Pay provided him these tablets as
“compensation” for the purchased tablets he surrendered in December 2020, he does
not allege he purchased or had any ownership interest in the tablets that were taken
in October 2022 and October 2025. 	See Fla. Admin. Code r. 33-602.900(5)(a) (“a
tablet may be obtained from the vendor by an inmate authorized to possess a tablet
at no cost to the inmate”); Fla. Admin. Code r. 33-602.900(5)(b) (“Possession of a
tablet by an inmate is a privilege that may be forfeited by any inmate who fails to
abide by the rules of the Department or any applicable state or federal law.”).
Because the tablets confiscated in October 2022 and October 2025 were not Walker’s
4 Although Walker suggests the confiscation of both his purchased and state-issued tablets between
December 2020 and October 2025 “were all a part of a ‘continuing practice’ of actions” (Doc. 16
at 6), the undersigned concludes the continuing violations doctrine does not apply here because
the confiscation of the purchased tablets in December 2020 was a discrete event and the only
instance where tablets Walker purchased were taken. 	See Doe as Next Friend of Doe #6 v.
Swearingen, 51 F.4th 1295, 1305 (11th Cir. 2022) (noting “[a] prior violation of a plaintiff’s
constitutional rights is not a continuing violation simply because its effects linger into the present”
and “[o]nly ongoing violations satisfy the continuing violation doctrine and remain timely despite
accruing outside the statutory limitation period”).
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private property, their confiscation cannot support a Takings Clause claim.5 See U.S.
Const. amend. V (“nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation”) (emphasis added); Am. Pelagic Fishing Co., L.P. v. United States,
379 F.3d 1363, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“It is axiomatic that only persons with a valid
property interest at the time of the taking are entitled to compensation.”) (citation
omitted).
IV. 	Conclusion
The Court previously advised Walker of the legal standards applicable to his
claims and gave him an opportunity to file an amended complaint that states a viable
claim. 	Walker’s amended complaint, however, continues to fail state a claim—
namely, his claim related to the confiscation of his purchased tablets is time-barred,
and he does not have a property interest in the state-issued tablets that could support
a Takings Clause claim. 	Because Walker has failed to cure the deficiencies
identified in his prior complaint through amendment, this case should be dismissed
with prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
5 Walker also could not state a due process claim based on being deprived of a state-issued tablet.
See Doc. 10 at 12-14 (explaining such a claim would fail because Walker does not have a property
interest in the tablet, and he does not have a liberty interest in the tablet since its loss does not
impose an atypical and significant hardship in relation to ordinary prison life). And while Walker
alleges the Defendants violated various FDOC regulations, “[v]iolations of departmental rules or
regulations do not, standing alone, infringe on an inmate’s federal constitutional rights.” Newton
v. Wheeler, 2015 WL 6746511, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 2, 2015), report and recommendation
adopted, 2015 WL 6756134 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 4, 2015); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,
481-82 (1995) (prison regulations are not intended to confer rights or benefits on inmates but are
merely designed to guide correctional officials in the administration of prisons).
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See Brennan v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 626 F. App’x 939, 945-46 (11th Cir.
2015) (“A pro se litigant must be given at least one opportunity to amend his
complaint before the court dismisses the action with prejudice if it appears that a
more carefully drafted pleading would state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.”).
Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that:
1. 	This case be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) due to Walker’s failure to state a claim on which relief may be
granted.
2. 	The clerk close the file.
At Pensacola, Florida, this 23 rd day of March, 2026.
/s/ Hope Thai Cannon
HOPE THAI CANNON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
Objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must be filed within
fourteen (14) days of the date of the Report and Recommendation. Any different
deadline that may appear on the electronic docket is for the court’s internal use only
and does not control. An objecting party must serve a copy of its objections upon
all other parties. A party who fails to object to the magistrate judge’s findings or
recommendations contained in a report and recommendation waives the right to
challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on the unobjected-to factual and
legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1.
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