iSun, Inc.

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IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
In re:
iSun, Inc., et al.
Debtors.
Chapter 7
Case No. 24-11144 (TMH)
Jointly Administered
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
I. INTRODUCTION
Before they filed for bankruptcy on June 3, 2024 (the “Petition Date”), the
Debtors2 provided a suite of solar energy services, including residential systems
installation.3 Sometime in 2018 and/or 2019, Andre Barnett (“Mr. Barnett”) and
Kimberly Barnett (“Mrs. Barnett”) (together, the “Barnetts”) contracted to have
Debtor Hudson Valley install solar panels in their home (the “Installation”). As
described more fully below, the Debtors later won an arbitration award after the
1 On October 9, 2026, Mr. Barnett filed his notice of appeal [D.I. 942] (the “Notice of
Appeal”) of this Court’s Order Denying Andre Barnett and Kimberly Barnett’s
Motion for Relief from Stay [D.I. 939]. This is the Court’s written opinion that
supplements the order and the Court’s oral ruling. See Bankr. D. Del. L.R. 8003-2.
2 The Debtors in these Chapter 11 cases, along with the last four (4) digits of their
federal tax identification numbers, are: (i) iSun, Inc. (“iSun”) (0172) (ii) Hudson
Solar Service, LLC (“Hudson”) (1635); (iii) Hudson Valley Clean Energy, Inc.
(“Hudson Valley”) (8214); (iv) iSun Corporate, LLC (“iSun Corporate”) (4391); (v)
iSun Energy, LLC (“iSun Energy”) (1676); (vi) iSun Industrial, LLC (“iSun
Industrial”) (4333); (vii) iSun Residential, Inc. (“iSun Residential”) (3525); (viii) iSun
Utility, LLC (“iSun Utility”) (4411) ; (ix) Liberty Electric, Inc. (“Liberty”) (8485); (x)
Peck Electric Co. (“Peck”) (5229); (xi) SolarCommunities , Inc. (“SolarCommunities”)
(7316); and (xii) Sun CSA 36, LLC (“Sun CSA”) (7316) (collectively, the “Debtors”).
3 See D.I. 4, ¶ 14.
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Barnetts failed to pay the entire balance due for the Installation (the “Award”).
Since then, the Barnetts have serially challenged the Award in state court, to no
avail. They did so most recently on August 14, 2026. Four days later, the Barnetts
moved this Court for relief from the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay of the
commencement or continuation of a judicial action that was or could have been
commenced against the Debtors pre-petition (the “Motion”).4
More specifically, the Barnetts so moved “to prosecute their pending” action
to vacate the Award “in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of
Dutchess [the “Dutchess County Court”] . . . through final judgment and any appeal
therefrom[.]”5 George L. Miller, the Debtors’ Chapter 7 Trustee (the “Trustee”),
responded in opposition to the Motion,6 and the Barnetts replied (the “Reply”).7 On
September 29, 2026, the Court held a hearing on the Motion (“the Hearing”), at
which the Trustee and Mr. Barnett submitted oral arguments. The Court denied the
Motion at the Hearing and entered an accompanying Order,8 which this Opinion
supports.
II. JURISDICTION
The District Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this contested matter
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). The Debtors’ cases have been referred to this Court
4 D.I. 912. See also 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1).
5 Mot. at 1, 7.
6 D.I. 930.
7 D.I. 933.
8 D.I. 939.
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under 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) and the District Court’s Standing Order of February 29,
2012. The Motion constitutes a core matter under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(G).
III. FINDINGS OF FACT9
In April of 2019, Mr. Barnett signed a purchase and sale agreement for the
Installation (the “Agreement”);10 per this Agreement, any disputes regarding the
Installation were to be “resolved by binding arbitration in accordance with
Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association
[“the AAA”].”11 And the parties agreed that “[t]he venue of any arbitration
proceeding shall be Dutchess County, New York.”12 Accordingly, on March 12, 2020,
Hudson Valley filed a demand for arbitration with the AAA, alleging that the
Barnetts breached the Agreement by refusing to fully compensate Hudson Valley
for the completed Installation.13 In their answer, the Barnetts counterclaimed,
alleging $99,000 in damages for defective design and installation.14
After a day-long hearing, a AAA arbitrator issued the Award on August 7,
2020, therein denying the Barnetts’ counterclaims and directing them to pay
$20,471.89.15 The arbitrator reasoned that: (1) the Installation was completed as
9 These findings are based on the Court’s review of the relevant pleadings and the
exhibits attached thereto.
10 In the Motion, the Barnetts submit that they first contracted for the Installation
sometime in September of 2018. See Mot. at 1–2.
11 D.I. 930-A-1 at 5–6.
12 Id. at 5.
13 See id. at 1–2.
14 D.I. 930-A-2.
15 D.I. 930-A-4.
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required under the Agreement; (2) any unfinished work was the fault of the
Barnetts, who twice turned away Hudson Valley employees dispatched to the
Barnetts’ residence to complete punchlist items; (3) any failure to wire the Barnetts’
electric boilers was a product of delay in obtaining municipal approvals, against
which the Agreement specifically exculpated Hudson Valley; and (4) the Barnetts
did not pay in full for the Installation.16 The Award—which was transmitted to the
parties’ counsel that same day—issued “in full settlement of all claims and
counterclaims submitted to [the] arbitration.”17
On October 19, 2020, pursuant to New York Civil Practice Law and Rules
(“CPLR”) §§ 7510 and 7514, Hudson Valley petitioned the Dutchess County Court
for an order confirming and enforcing the Award (the “CPLR Petition”).18 The
Barnetts moved to dismiss the CPLR Petition on November 23, 2020 (the “First
Motion”).19 They argued that the CPLR Petition failed to state a claim because,
among other things, the Installation contract was fraudulently induced by Hudson
Valley, which allegedly failed to perform as promised by, for example, neglecting to
wire the electric boilers.20 Nevertheless, on December 1, 2020, the Dutchess County
Court issued an Order granting the CPLR Petition (the “First Order”).21 The
16 Id.
17 Id. at 3; D.I. 930-A-5.
18 D.I. 930-A.
19 D.I. 930-C.
20 See id. ¶ 6.
21 D.I. 930-D at 2.
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Dutchess County Court reasoned that the Award should stand because the Barnetts
“[did] not raise any of the grounds for vacatur set forth in CPLR §7511.”22
Unsatisfied with the First Order, Mr. Barnett moved for leave to renew and
reargue the Petition and/or the First Motion (the “Third Motion”).23 By this Third
Motion, Mr. Barnett also appeared to request vacatur of the Award and/or the First
Order pursuant to CPLR § 7511.24 The Dutchess County Court denied the Third
Motion on January 14, 2021, again reasoning that Mr. Barnett had failed to
demonstrate any grounds for vacating the Award.25 Roughly one year later, Mr.
Barnett filed a flurry of documents with the Dutchess County Court;26 these
culminated in a “Notice for Hearing for Defendant” (the “Fourth Motion”), which, on
April 25, 2022, the Dutchess County Court denied as improper while noting that the
Award matter was closed.27
More than three years later, and approximately a year-and-a-half after the
Petition Date, on January 2, 2026, Mr. Barnett then moved to vacate a judgment
entered on February 8, 2021 (the “February 2021 Judgment”), wherein the
Dutchess County Court decreed that Hudson Valley was entitled to execute on the
Award, plus interest (the “Fifth Motion”).28 This Fifth Motion was grounded in
22 Id. (citing CPLR § 7510).
23 See D.I. 930-B at 2; D.I. 930-E at 1; D.I. 930-F at 1.
24 See D.I. 930-E at 4–5, ¶ 6.
25 D.I. 930-F at 2.
26 See D.I. 930-B at 2–3.
27 D.I. 930-H.
28 D.I. 930-B at 3; D.I. 930-I at 1.
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alleged fraud under CPLR § 5105(a)(3).29 On February 13, 2026, the Dutchess
County Court denied the Fifth Motion because: (1) although CPLR § 5105(a)(3)
carries no specific statute of limitations, the Barnetts’ nearly five-year delay in
filing the Motion was unreasonable as a matter of law; (2) the allegations of fraud
contained therein were presented during arbitration as well as in the First Motion;
and (3), under CPLR § 5105(a), the Barnetts should have presented the Fifth
Motion as a proposed order to show cause.30 Even so, on March 17, 2026, the
Barnetts again moved by ordinary notice of motion to vacate the February 2021
Judgment, which was accordingly denied for lack of jurisdiction.31
Finally, on August 14, 2026, the Barnetts moved anew—this time by
proposed order to show cause—seeking vacatur of the January 2026 Order and no
less than $450,000.00 in damages (the “Seventh Motion”).32 In their supporting
memorandum the Barnetts acknowledged the Debtors’ bankruptcies and stated that
the Seventh Motion rested on two principal grounds: (1) the February 2021
Judgment is void ab initio under CPLR § 5105(a)(4) because the arbitrator lacked
jurisdiction to enter the Award since the Agreement, along with its associated
arbitration clause, was induced by fraud (i.e., Hudson Valley’s false promise to
perform services that went unrendered—like the promise to wire the Barnetts’
boilers); and (2) the Award is susceptible to vacatur under CPLR §§ 5105(a)(3)
29 Id.
30 Id. at 1–2.
31 D.I. 930-J.
32 D.I. 930-K at 7.
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and 7511(b)(1)(i) because Hudson Valley committed a fraud on the arbitration
proceeding when its Vice President falsely testified that a certain kind of electrical
panel was installed at the Barnetts’ residence.33 On August 24, 2026, these
arguments were rejected by the Dutchess County Court, which reasoned that: (1)
the fraud allegations remained untimely; (2) the Barnetts waived any jurisdictional
objection by appearing through counsel at the arbitration hearing; and (3) that
Court lacked authority to vacate the Award anyway given the Debtors’ ongoing
bankruptcies.34
On August 18, 2026, the Barnetts filed the Motion.35
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard
When a bankruptcy petition is filed, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) automatically stays
the commencement or maintenance of all legal action against the debtor.36 However,
relief from the stay is available “for cause” shown under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1). Apart
from inadequate protection of the movant’s interest in property, the Bankruptcy
33 Id. at 1–2. See also Mot. at 1–2.
34 D.I. 930-L.
35 In his Notice of Appeal, Mr. Barnett disputes that Mrs. Barnett was a movant.
However, the Motion is titled “Andre Barnett and Kimberly Barnett, Motion for
Relief from Automatic Stay Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1).” The first paragraph
begins “Andre Barnett and Kimberly Barnett . . . hereby move this Court . . . for
relief from the automatic stay . . . .” The Motion contains a “Relief Requested”
paragraph that recites that “Movants Andre Barnett and Kimberly Barnett
respectfully request that this Court enter an Order” granting certain relief.
36 Acands, Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co., 435 F.3d 252, 259 (3d Cir. 2006) (“The
scope of the automatic stay is broad and covers all proceedings against a debtor,
including arbitration.”).
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Code does not define “cause” within the meaning of section 362(d)(1). Therefore, the
“cause” inquiry is generally understood to encompass “a fact intensive, case-by-case
balancing test,” whereby courts typically “examin[e] the totality of the
circumstances to determine whether sufficient cause exists to lift the stay.”37
Accordingly, when determining if cause exists to lift the automatic stay so
that the movant may litigate against the debtor in a non-bankruptcy forum, courts
in this District consider whether: (1) any great prejudice to the bankruptcy estate or
debtor will result from commencement or continuation of the action; (2) the
hardship to the movant by maintenance of the stay considerably outweighs the
hardship to the debtor by maintenance of the action; and (3) the creditor is likely to
prevail in the action on the merits.38 The initial burden of going forward with this
test is borne by the party seeking stay relief.39
B. Application
1. Prejudice to the Estates
The Barnetts argue that lifting the automatic stay will not prejudice the
Debtors’ bankruptcy estates because the Barnetts seek only to litigate the validity
37 In re Trump Ent. Resorts, Inc., 526 B.R. 116, 120 (Bankr. D. Del. 2015) (quoting In
re The SCO Group, Inc., 395 B.R. 852, 856 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007)).
38 In re Rexene Prods. Co., 141 B.R. 574, 576 (Bankr. D. Del. 1992). Accord In re:
Leisure Invs. Holdings LLC, et al., No. 25-10606 (LSS), 2026 WL 2247604, at *9
(Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 4, 2026).
39 In re DBSI, Inc., 407 B.R. 159, 166 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009) (“The movant bears the
initial burden to produce evidence that cause exists to grant relief from the
automatic stay; if the movant meets its burden, then the burden shifts to [the]
opposing party.”).
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of the Award.40 This argument fails for at least two reasons. First, in support of the
Seventh Motion, the Barnetts represented to the Dutchess County Court that they
sought no less than $450,000 in damages for the very fraud they claimed
invalidated the Award.41 The Barnetts sought $99,000 for similar counterclaims
they advanced during the arbitration.42 And Mr. Barnett clarifies in his Reply brief
that he still seeks at least $150,000 from the Debtors.43 Thus, the Barnetts have
made it abundantly clear that they intend to make the Debtors pay. Any such
award would drain the Debtors’ liquid assets, and, by extension, their estates.44
Second, given the nature of the Barnetts’ claims, the Trustee would have no
choice but to defend against them. This, too, would burden the Debtors’ estates,
especially as the Barnetts telegraph their intention to appeal from another adverse
judgment in the Dutchess County Court.45 Even assuming the Debtors’ ultimate
success on the merits, there can be no assurance that they would recoup their
litigation costs. Yet “[t]he automatic stay was designed [in part] ‘to . . . forestall the
depletion of the debtor’s assets due to legal costs in defending proceedings against
40 Mot. at 5.
41 E.g., D.I. 930-K at 7.
42 D.I. 930-A-2.
43 See Reply at 22.
44 Mr. Barnett also argues for the first time in his Reply that the Barnetts’ claims
are not prejudicial because they arise from pre-petition conduct and therefore do not
implicate property of the Debtors’ estates. Reply at 8. Yet, as just discussed, the
Barnetts’ claims for damages obviously implicate whatever cash the Debtors could
generate to satisfy an award; this constitutes quintessential estate property.
45 Mot. at 7, 9.
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it[.]”46 Consequently, the Barnetts have failed to meet their burden of going forward
on the first Rexene factor.
2. Balance of Hardships
The Barnetts contend that the balance of hardships tips entirely in their
favor. In support, the Barnetts argue that they could be permanently deprived of
their claims against the Debtors if these bankruptcies close before the claims can be
prosecuted. This is unpersuasive. The Barnetts have been prosecuting these causes
of action in one form or another since lodging their counterclaims in the arbitration
proceedings. And the Barnetts have taken—by this Court’s count47—seven further
bites at that apple in the Dutchess County Court, which has consistently ruled
against them.48 The Barnetts have had their days in court—many of them in fact.
So, the Barnetts will not be prejudiced by an order denying them a further
opportunity to challenge the Award or pursue the Debtors for damages—especially
when they filed the Seventh Motion before moving for relief from the automatic
stay. Meanwhile, as discussed above, the Debtors estates will be prejudiced if the
Trustee is required to defend against such a motion.
46 Borman v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 946 F.2d 1031, 1036 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting
Ass’n of St. Croix Condo. Owners v. St. Croix Hotel Corp., 682 F.2d 446 (3d
Cir.1982)).
47 See D.I. 930-B.
48 Mr. Barnett also requested, for the first time in his Reply brief, stay relief for the
purpose of prosecuting an action against the Debtors in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York. Reply at 9. But “[t]he party filing the
opening brief may not reserve material for the reply brief that should have been
included in a full and fair opening brief.” Del. Bankr. L.R. 7007-2(b)(ii). Therefore,
Mr. Barnett’s request is not properly before the Court.
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The Barnetts offer another argument on this ground. Namely, that the
February 2021 Judgement is causing “direct collateral harm” to Mrs. Barnett,
whose financial consultancy license may by imperiled thereby.49 But the Barnetts
offer no evidence in support of this claim, which the Court is accordingly unwilling
to credit. Therefore, the Barnetts have failed to meet their burden of going forward
on the second Rexene factor.
3. Success on the Merits
“The required showing” under the third Rexene factor “is very slight.”50 The
Barnetts submit that they clear this low bar. More specifically, the Barnetts
contend that the Seventh Motion presents three statutory bases for vacating the
Award: (1) under CPLR § 5015(a)(3), the Award rests on fraudulent and/or
fabricated evidence; (2) under CPLR § 5105(a)(4), the arbitrator lacked subject
matter jurisdiction because the Agreement was procured by fraud; and (3) the
arbitrator erred in allowing the false testimony of Hudson Valley’s Vice President.
This submission fails for three reasons. First, the Dutchess County Court has
repeatedly dismissed these arguments, in one form or another, on the merits.
Indeed, it did so most recently in disposing of the Seventh Motion. Second, the
Barnetts failed to timely invoke any of these statutory predicates. For example, in
denying the Fifth Motion, the Dutchess County Court held that it was unreasonable
49 Mot. at 6.
50 Rexene, 141 B.R. at 578 (Bankr. D. Del. 1992). Accord In re Cont’l Airlines, Inc.,
152 B.R. 420, 426 (D. Del. 1993) (“Even a slight probability of success on the merits
may be sufficient to support lifting an automatic stay in an appropriate case.”).
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as a matter of law for the Barnetts to wait nearly five years before moving under
CPLR § 5015(a); and the Dutchess County Court cited binding precedent in support
of that holding.51
Furthermore, the Barnetts claim, without evidence, that they “filed a timely
demand to vacate [the Award] with the AAA on August 13, 2020.”52 Yet they cite no
authority for the proposition that filing such a demand on an arbitrator tolls the
statute of limitations under CPLR § 7511(a), which provides that “[a]n application
to vacate or modify an award may be made by a party within ninety days after its
delivery to him.” Meanwhile, the CPLR further provides that “[a] special proceeding
shall be used to bring before a court” located in the county specified in the
arbitration agreement, “the first application arising out of an arbitrable controversy
which is not made by motion in a pending action.”53 Here, the venue specified in the
Agreement was Dutchess County. But the Barnetts did not seek to vacate the
Award in the Dutchess County Court until (at the earliest) November 23, 2020,
when they moved to dismiss the CPLR Petition. This happened 108 days after the
Award was transmitted to the Barnetts’ counsel on August 7, 2020. Thus, it appears
that the Barnetts failed to comply with the statute of limitations under CPLR §
7511(a).
51 D.I. 930-I (citing In re Perrenod, 243 A.D.3d 794, 795–96, 247 N.Y.S.3d 92 (2025),
leave to appeal dismissed in part, denied in part sub nom. Matter Perrenod, No.
2026-14, 2026 WL 2834548 (N.Y. Sept. 22, 2026)).
52 Mot. at 3.
53 See CPLR § 7502(a)(i) (emphasis added).
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Third, and most importantly, because the Dutchess County Court has already
denied the Seventh Motion, there are no live claims for the Barnetts to pursue
unless they can somehow appeal from said denial. In some cases, stay relief is
appropriate to allow a party to litigate an appeal in state court.54 But this is not
such a case. The Barnetts filed the Seventh Motion well after the automatic stay
went into effect. Indeed, they filed that Motion after they became aware of these
bankruptcies, which they acknowledged in their supporting memorandum. Thus,
the Seventh Motion was itself void ab initio.55 It follows that the Seventh Motion
cannot be appealed from, any more than it could ever have been maintained in the
first place. Accordingly, the Barnetts have failed to meet their burden of going
forward on the third Rexene factor.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in this Opinion and on the record at the Hearing
conducted on the Motion on September 29, 2026, the Motion is denied.
Dated: October 15, 2026 __________________________________
Wilmington, Delaware Thomas M. Horan
United States Bankruptcy Judge
54 In re Wilson, 116 F.3d 87, 90 (3d Cir. 1997).
55 E.g., Harrison v. Soroof Int’l, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 3d 602, 628 (D. Del. 2018) (“In the
Third Circuit, actions taken in violation of an automatic stay are generally void ab
initio and thus, should be dismissed.” (citing In re Siciliano, 13 F.3d 748, 750 (3d
Cir. 1994))).
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