DONAHUE v. AIKEN et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
BLEU BLAZE DONAHUE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
v. ) Civil Action No. 26-1343 (UNA)
)
ANN L. AIKEN, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on consideration of plaintiff’s application for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) and his pro se complaint (ECF No. 1). The Court
GRANTS the application and, for the reasons discussed below, DISMISSES the complaint.
“Defendant Ann L. Aiken is a United States District Judge for the District of Oregon. At
all times relevant to this complaint, she was acting . . . in her official capacity as a judge.”
Compl., Attach. (ECF No. 1-1) at 7 (page numbers designated by CM/ECF). She presided over a
civil RICO action plaintiff filed against the State of Oregon, its Governor, and other state
officials. See id. at 8. Judge Aiken initially dismissed the complaint in that case, permitted
plaintiff to amend, and, on September 5, 2025, dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice
and without leave to amend a second time. See id. After dismissal of the case, Judge Aiken
directed the Clerk of Court to docket submissions from plaintiff dated November 12, 2025,
November 13, 2025, and December 16, 2025, as correspondence. However, on December 23,
2025, Judge Aiken issued an order stating, “This case is closed. The Court will accept no further
filings.” Id. According to plaintiff, “[t]he timing and nature of the December 23, 2025 order
were retaliatory,” id., denied him access to the courts and due process, see id. at 9, and furthered
a conspiracy with the civil RICO defendants “to retaliate against [p]laintiff for exposing the state
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racketeering enterprise,” id. Plaintiff has demanded, among other relief, compensatory damages
“for emotional distress, reputational harm, and loss of access to the courts.” Id. at 10. In
addition, plaintiff demanded an order enjoining Judge Aiken from presiding over any of
plaintiff’s other pending cases. See id.
Plaintiff’s own factual allegations require this Court to dismiss the complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. “Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than
the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial
jurisdiction[.]” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553–54 (1967); see Sindram v. Suda, 986 F.2d
1459, 1460 (D. C. Cir.1993). “In determining whether a judge was acting in his judicial capacity,
courts should look to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed
by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his
judicial capacity.” Thomas v. Wilkins, 61 F. Supp. 3d 13, 19 (D.D.C. 2014) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted), aff’d, No. 14-5197, 2015 WL 1606933 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 23, 2015).
Without question, the acts about which plaintiff complains – dismissing a complaint and refusing
to accept further filings in a closed case – are acts a judge normally performs. See Cannady v.
Kyndryl Holdings, Inc., No. 24-cv-3638 (AHA), 2025 WL 2977582, at *3 (D.D.C. Oct. 22,
2025) (“Issuing bond orders and denying motions are actions routinely performed by judges.”);
Soto Santini v. Marxuach, No. 23-cv-0091 (CKK), 2023 WL 315594, at *2 (D.D.C. Jan. 19,
2023) (concluding that judge’s actions, such as “dismissing one of [plaintiff’s] cases as against
individual defendants, denying her motions, denying her appointed legal representation, and
informing her that she did not properly serve defendants,” are judicial acts immune from suit);
Thomas, 61 F. Supp. 3d at 19 (finding that federal district judge “was clearly acting in his
judicial capacity when he refused to file various court documents submitted by Plaintiff,” as
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“decision to file or deny a party’s motions or requests is an action routinely performed by a judge
in the course of litigation, and thus would constitute a judicial act immune from suit”). Thus,
Judge Aiken was acting in her judicial capacity when she issued the orders to which plaintiff
objects and is entitled to absolute judicial immunity from suit. See Mirales v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9,
11 (1991) (holding that “judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate
assessment of damages”).
Plaintiff is no more successful in having this Court bar Judge Aiken from presiding over
any of plaintiff’s pending cases, or in having those cases reassigned to another judge. This Court
“is a trial level court in the federal judicial system,” and therefore “generally lacks appellate
jurisdiction over other judicial bodies, and cannot exercise appellate mandamus over other
courts.” United States v. Choi, 818 F. Supp. 2d 79, 85 (D.D.C. 2011). For this reason, this
federal district court “cannot compel . . . other Article III judges in this or other districts or
circuits to act.” Sibley v. U.S. Supreme Court, 786 F. Supp. 2d 338, 345 (D.D.C. 2011) (JDB).
A separate Order will issue.
DATE: May 18, 2026 /s/
CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER
United States District Judge
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