MATTHEWS v. CENTRAL COLLECTIONS UNIT OFFICE OF FINANCE & TREASURY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ROBERT R. MATTHEWS, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
) 	Civil Action No. 1:26-cv-00402 (UNA)
v. 	)
)
CENTRAL COLLECTIONS UNIT OFFICE)
OF FINANCE & TREASURY, et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on its initial review of Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint, ECF
No. 1, and Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2. The Court grants the
in forma pauperis Application, and for the reasons discussed below, dismisses this case without
prejudice.
In the caption and introduction, Plaintiff sues the D.C. Central Collections Unit of the
Office of Finance and Treasury, and appears to ask this Court to vacate a garnishment and to enjoin
Defendant from “doing a specific action,” though he does not provide any more context or
supporting information in this regard. 	Instead, the remainder of the Complaint goes on to,
confoundingly, implicate the D.C. Public Library (“DCPL”) and unnamed Library employees. If
Plaintiff intended to sue DCPL and its employees, he should have included them in the case
caption, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a); D.C. LCvR 5.1(g). Furthermore, DCPL is non sui juris. See
Armstrong v. D.C. Pub. Libr., 154 F. Supp. 2d 67, 71 (D.D.C. 2001) (dismissing claims against
DCPL because it is non sui juris).
The allegations fare no better. Plaintiff alleges that he is a victim of “continuous pattern”
of criminal abuse by DCPL employees, including, but not limited to: violence, “impersonating a
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police officer,” failing to file police reports, “illegal search and seizure,” “stalking criminal
harassment and interstate stalking,” “[m]alicious insider threat cybersecurity,” including following
his activity via microchips and “RFID tags,” “GPS VIN: IMEI; or LoJack Stolen Vehicle Recovery
System,” “VHF radio frequency data signals,” “cellular phone systems,” and “VLUs”, all “used
for tracking and identification.” He contends that these unnamed bad actors have violated
provisions of Title 18 of the United States Code and the D.C. Criminal Code. He does not demand
any relief, instead stating that his Complaint serves as “a report of misuse of government resources
including utilization of government electronic equipment for the purpose of committing a crime.”
First, it is completely unclear what the allegations presented have to do with the named
Defendant, the D.C. Central Collections Unit, if anything. 	Federal Rule 8(a) The Rule 8 requires
pleading clear enough to provide a defendant with fair notice of the claims being asserted. 	See
Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977). 	Here, neither the Court nor the Defendant
have received any such notice.
Second, “[a] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A complaint that lacks “an arguable basis
either in law or in fact” is frivolous, Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), and here,
Plaintiff’s Complaint falls squarely into this category. 	This Court is obligated to dismiss a
complaint as frivolous “when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly
incredible,” 	Denton 	v. 	Hernandez, 	504 	U.S. 	25, 	33 	(1992), 	or 	“postulat[e] 	events 	and
circumstances of a wholly fanciful kind,” Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1307–08 (D.C. Cir.
1981); see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), because it cannot exercise subject matter jurisdiction over
a frivolous complaint, see Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974) (“Over the years, this
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Court has repeatedly held that the federal courts are without power to entertain claims otherwise
within their jurisdiction if they are ‘so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of
merit.’”) (quoting Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport, 193 U.S. 561, 579 (1904)); Tooley v.
Napolitano, 586 F.3d 1006, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (examining cases dismissed “for patent
insubstantiality,” including where the plaintiff allegedly “was subjected to a campaign of
surveillance and harassment deriving from uncertain origins.”).
Third, and even if Plaintiff’s claims were cognizable, his reliance on criminal statutes is
unavailing, because they do not create a private right of action. 	See North v. Smarsh, Inc., 160 F.
Supp. 3d 63, 77 (D.D.C. 2015) (citing RJ Prod. Co. v. Nestle USA, Inc., No. 10–0584, 2010 WL
1506914, at *2 n.1 (D.D.C. Apr. 15, 2010) (holding that because criminal statutes under Chapter
18 of the United States Code “do not provide for private causes of action, they cannot be used to
grant plaintiff access to federal courts”)); Peavey v. Holder, 657 F. Supp. 2d 180, 190–91 (D.D.C.
2009) (stating that no private right of action exists to enforce the federal criminal code)), aff’d, No.
09–5389, 2010 WL 3155823 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 9, 2010); Prunte v. Universal Music Group, 484 F.
Supp. 2d 32, 42 (D.D.C. 2007) (“[The] Supreme Court has refused to imply a private right of
action in a bare criminal statute.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Rockefeller v.
U.S. Court of Appeals Office, for Tenth Circuit Judges, 248 F. Supp. 2d 17, 23 (D.D.C. 2003)
(holding that federal criminal statutes do not convey a private right of action) (collecting cases).
Insofar as Plaintiff seeks an anti-stalking order, or seeks other relief under the D.C. Code, he must
file for such relief in the D.C. Superior Court. See D.C. Sup. Ct. Rule 12-I.
Fourth, the Court lacks jurisdiction to compel a criminal investigation into Plaintiff’s
“report.” See Otero v. U.S. Attorney General, 832 F.2d 141, 141–42 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam);
see also Jafree v. Barber, 689 F.2d 640, 643 (7th Cir. 1982). The Executive Branch has absolute
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discretion to decide whether to conduct such an investigation and those decisions are not subject
to judicial review. 	United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974); see Shoshone–Bannock
Tribes v. Reno, 56 F.3d 1476, 1480–81 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Powell v. Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 234,
234–35 (D.C. Cir. 1965); see also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (“[A]n agency's
decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision
generally committed to an agency's absolute discretion.”).
For all of these reasons, the Complaint, ECF No. 1, and this case, are dismissed without
prejudice. A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
DATE: May 26, 2026 	/s/ CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER
United States District Judge
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