USA v. CARIAS TORRES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v. 	Case No. 1:25-mj-146-MJS
CHRISTIAN ENRIQUE CARIAS TORRES,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
In August 2025, Christian Enrique Carias Torres was charged with one count of assaulting,
resisting, or impeding federal officers in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1). Less than three weeks
later, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia moved to dismiss the case with
prejudice. The Court granted the motion and closed the case. Carias Torres now moves for the
expungement of his arrest record (ECF No. 12), which the government opposes. Because Carias
Torres has not established a basis for expungement, the Court DENIES the motion.
BACKGROUND
Given this case’s short-lived procedural history, the Court summarizes the background as
described in the government’s sworn affidavit in support of the criminal complaint.1
On the morning of Saturday, August 16, 2025, a group of (masked) Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) officers approached Carias Torres while he was walking from a
coffee shop in Northwest, Washington, D.C. to a parked scooter. (See ECF No. 1-1 at 1.)
1 That said, the Washington Post—among other news outlets—reported on the underlying encounter and
published at least some bystander video footage. See, e.g., Dan Rozenzweig-Ziff, et al., Federal officers
detain, tackle moped driver amid Trump D.C. police crackdown, Wash. Po. (Aug. 17, 2025), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2025/08/17/dc-arrests-violent-takedown-immigration.
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According to the government’s brief, the officers had previously observed Carias Torres
“operating [the] moped” and “making a traffic violation” before “parking along the curbside[,]”
although the precise nature of the alleged traffic violation remains unsaid. (ECF No. 13 at 1.)
In any event, Carias Torres reportedly tried to flee on foot when the officers approached.
(ECF No. 1-1 at 1.) The officers grabbed him, and, during the ensuing struggle, Carias Torres is
alleged to have kicked his right leg backwards, striking one of the officers. (Id.) The officers then
tased Carias Torres, and he fell to the ground. (Id. at 2.) Carias Torres continued to struggle and
got back to his feet, at which point he pushed against the officers and reportedly caused the group
to fall backwards. During the fall, one of the ICE officers struck his head on the pavement. (See
id.) The officers then tased Carias Torres again and ultimately secured him in a vehicle. (Id.)
Several of these moments are depicted in video stills included in the affidavit. (See id.)
From the scene, officers transported Carias Torres to an ICE facility in Chantilly, Virginia
for immigration processing. As the government reports, Carias Torres, a citizen of Venezuela, was
subject to a removal order issued by an immigration judge. (See ECF No. 13 at 2.)2
Two days later, on August 18, 2025, the government formally charged Carias Torres by
criminal complaint with one count of assaulting, resisting, or impeding federal officers in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1)—a felony offense, at least as charged, with a possible punishment of
imprisonment for up to eight years. On August 20, 2025, Carias Torres was presented in federal
court for his initial appearance, at which time the government moved to detain him pending trial.
The Court held a detention hearing on August 25, 2025, and Judge Zia M. Faruqui denied the
government’s motion and ordered that Carias Torres could be released on conditions, including
home detention, GPS monitoring, and other restrictions. (See Min. Entry, Aug. 25, 2025; see also
2 To be clear, there is no suggestion that the ICE officers knew this fact at the time they approached Carias
Torres that Saturday morning, or even that they had any particularized suspicion to that effect.
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ECF No. 9.) The Court’s release order was contingent, though, on Carias Torres’s release from
ICE custody.3 The Court also set a preliminary hearing for September 8, 2025.
On September 5, 2025—the Friday before the scheduled preliminary hearing—the
government filed a one-sentence motion to dismiss the case against Carias Torres with prejudice.
(ECF No. 10.) The Court granted the motion on September 8, 2025. (ECF No. 11.)4 Carias Torres
then filed the instant motion to expunge, which the government timely opposed. (ECF Nos. 12,
13.) The government reports that shortly after the dismissal of this case, the government carried
out the immigration court’s removal order and removed Carias Torres to Venezuela.
DISCUSSION
The D.C. Circuit has long recognized “that courts have the inherent, equitable power to
expunge arrest records.” Livingston v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 759 F.2d 74, 78 (D.C. Cir. 1985). On
the record 	presented 	here, 	though, 	Carias 	Torres 	comes 	up 	short 	in 	demonstrating 	any
circumstances that would warrant the Court’s invocation of that power. Before explaining why,
the Court first addresses a threshold question of its own authority to resolve this motion.
3 As a practical matter, then, Carias Torres remained in custody, albeit with ICE and not the U.S. Marshals.
4 The government’s charge-then-dismiss approach was not unique to this case. As part of the federal
policing “surge” in Washington, D.C. throughout August and September 2025, the U.S. Attorney’s Office
frequently charged similar violations of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a). In many of those cases, after charging and
arresting the defendants—and often incarcerating them for days (and sometimes longer)—the government
ended up dismissing the charges just before a scheduled preliminary hearing. See, e.g., United States v.
Summers, No. 25-mj-144 (D.D.C.); United States v. Allen, No. 25-mj-145 (D.D.C.); United States v.
Esquivel, No. 25-mj-162 (D.D.C.); United States v. Pichon, No. 25-mj-167 (D.D.C.); United States v.
Nguyen, No. 25-mj-170 (D.D.C.); United States v. Meath, No. 25-mj-180 (D.D.C.); United States v.
McIntyre, No. 25-mj-185 (D.D.C.); United States v. Tyree, No. 25-mj-195 (D.D.C.); United States v. Byrd,
No. 25-mj-208 (D.D.C.). In still other cases, the government charged individuals with violations of Section
111(a), only to dismiss the cases before they were arrested or presented on the charges. See, e.g., United
States v. Jeffery, No. 25-mj-177 (D.D.C.); United States v. Lagunas, No. 25-mj-178 (D.D.C.).
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I. 	Magistrate Judge Jurisdiction Over Expungement of Arrest Records
“Magistrate judges’ power comes from statutory, rather than constitutional, sources,”
United States v. Stewart, 810 F. Supp. 3d 65, 69 (D.D.C. 2025)—chief among them, 28 U.S.C. §
636. Magistrate judges are expressly empowered, for example, to issue orders concerning pretrial
release or detention under 18 U.S.C. § 3142, to conduct trials in misdemeanor criminal cases with
consent in keeping with 18 U.S.C. § 3401, to sentence for petty offenses, and more. See id.
§ 636(a). Further, district judges “may designate a magistrate judge to hear and determine any
pretrial matter pending before the court,” except for some enumerated matters. Id. § 636(b)(1)(A).
In keeping with that statutory authorization, our District’s Local Rules specifically vest magistrate
judges with a range of powers and responsibilities in criminal proceedings, including, as relevant
here, the power to “[i]ssue arrest warrants … for violations of the United States Code.” D.D.C.
LCrR 57.17(a)(2). Although no specific statute or rule authorizes the expungement of arrest
warrants, the lack of such an express authorization does not necessarily foreclose it. After all, by
statute, magistrate judges “may be assigned such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the
Constitution and laws of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3).5
Against that backdrop, another member of this Court recently concluded that magistrate
judges wield the statutory authority to expunge arrest warrants. As Judge Faruqui persuasively
reasoned, the “judicial authority to act carries with it the corollary power to undo the act.” United
States v. Riley, 806 F. Supp. 3d 38, 43 (D.D.C. 2025). And so, “[b]ecause magistrate judges have
the authority to issue an arrest warrant in the first place, they also have the authority to wipe that
5 “The generality of the category of ‘additional duties’ indicates that Congress intended to give federal
judges significant leeway to experiment with possible improvements in the efficiency of the judicial
process[.]” Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 932 (1991). That said, “[a]ny additional duties performed
pursuant to [that] general authorization in the statute reasonably should bear some relation to the specified
duties” assigned by statute. Id. at 930 (citing Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 863–64 (1989)).
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arrest warrant from the record.” Id. The undersigned agrees. The power to expunge an arrest record
in this context falls comfortably within the range of “additional duties” contemplated by Section
636(b)(3). It reasonably bears “some relation to the specified duties” that the statute assigns to
magistrate judges, Gomez, 490 U.S. at 864—namely, the power to issue the arrest warrant at the
outset. And more, this construction adheres to the “leeway” the Supreme Court encouraged in
demarcating the bounds of proper “additional duties” under the statute, with an eye toward
“improv[ing] the efficient administration of the courts’ dockets.” Peretz, 501 U.S. at 932, 934.
At least a few other cases applied this same overall logic in concluding that magistrate
judges can expunge even criminal convictions—not merely arrest warrants—in misdemeanor
cases where the magistrate judge presided over the case by consent and imposed the resulting
sentence. See United States v. Steelwright, 179 F. Supp. 2d 567, 572 (D. Md. 2002) (“The authority
to order expungement … is a natural extension of the magistrate judge’s authority to sentence in
the first place where the defendant has consented to such.”); United States v. Vasquez, 74 F. Supp.
2d 964, 967 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (“The authority of the magistrate judge to order expungement of a
misdemeanor conviction record is thus implicit in the authority to enter the conviction in the first
place.”); United States v. Loiseau, 2022 WL 780728, at *2 (D. Vt. Mar. 15, 2022) (similar). In
other words, those courts acknowledged the same give-and-take principle animating the Court’s
determination here: the power to “do” naturally encompasses the power to “undo.”
Simply put, the Court concludes that it is empowered to expunge an arrest warrant. The
Court turns next to the question of whether it should do so in this specific case.
II. 	Expungement Is Not Warranted On This Record
There is “no ‘standalone right to expungement of government records’ … recognized in
this Circuit.” United States v. Douglas, 282 F. Supp. 3d 275, 278 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting
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Abdelfattah v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 787 F.3d 524, 536 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). Instead, “[t]he
court may order expungement where it is required or authorized by statute, or in exercise of its
inherent equitable powers.” United States v. Derouen, 279 F. Supp. 3d 298, 299 (D.D.C. 2018)
(citing United States v. Archer, 2012 WL 5818244, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 13, 2012)). The Court’s
inherent powers are typically invoked only in cases that present evidence of “a lack of probable
cause coupled with specific circumstances, flagrant violations of the Constitution, or other unusual
and extraordinary circumstances.” Doe v. Webster, 606 F.2d 1226, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1979); United
States v. Blackwell, 45 F. Supp. 3d 123, 124 (D.D.C. 2014) (same).
The concept of “extraordinary circumstances” is a “nebulous” one in this context. See
Riley, 806 F. Supp. 3d at 44 (citing United States v. McKnight, 33 F. Supp. 3d 577, 584 (D. Md.
2014)). But courts have opined that such circumstances “most clearly exist in cases where the
underlying arrest or conviction was unlawful and/or unconstitutional, government misconduct is
alleged, or the statute on which the arrest was based is subsequently found unconstitutional.” Id.
As the D.C. Circuit has described the “general rule,” the “expungement of an arrest record is
appropriate when serious governmental misbehavior leading to the arrest, or unusually substantial
harm to the defendant not in any way attributable to him, outweighs the government’s need for a
record of the arrest.” Doe, 606 F.2d at 1231.6
Here, Carias Torres does not invoke any specific statutory authority in support of
expungement. Instead, he asks the Court to exercise its inherent equitable powers. His motion
6 The government has a legitimate interest in maintaining arrest records, including for future “investigative
and other law enforcement purposes.” Doe, 606 F.2d at 1241, 1243; United States v. Woods, 313 F. Supp.
3d 197, 200 (D.D.C. 2018) (“The government has both the statutory authority to maintain criminal records
and a demonstrated need to do so in order to conduct future criminal investigations efficiently.”); United
States v. Hall, 2020 WL 1286386, at *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 18, 2020) (“Retaining and preserving arrest records
serves the important function of promoting effective law enforcement and serves the compelling public
need for an effective and workable criminal identification procedure.”) (cleaned up).
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argues that the “over-the-top arrest was unlawful and for harassment, the facts are extraordinary,
and equitable considerations require expungement.” (ECF No. 12 at 2.) Beyond generalizations,
though, Carias Torres neglects to really develop these points any further. The Court acknowledges
that the events surrounding law enforcement’s encounter with Carias Torres—and similar events
during the timeframe of the “surge”—drew a certain amount of public backlash from the media
and the community. And if the government had chosen to press forward with its prosecution of
Carias Torres, it is certainly conceivable that its theory of the case might have met defeat in front
of a jury. See, e.g., United States v. Reid, No. 25-cr-244, ECF No. 70, Verdict Form (D.D.C. Oct.
16, 2025) (rendering “not guilty” judgment in case involving similar charges under 18 U.S.C. §
111(a)); United States v. Dunn, No. 25-cr-252, ECF No. 50, Verdict Form (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2025)
(same). But the Court cannot say—at least not without a more developed record—that the arrest
here was unlawful or so patently infected by government misbehavior as to justify expungement.
After all, another magistrate judge reviewed and approved this criminal complaint as supported by
probable cause. And even though the timing of the government’s dismissal deprived Carias Torres
of an opportunity to challenge the government’s evidence through a preliminary hearing, the Court
needs more than counsel’s contrary say-so to reach a different conclusion at this juncture. This
does not mean the Court endorses every aspect of the way that law enforcement, including the
masked ICE officers on the scene that morning, proceeded in the lead up to these proceedings. But
there is a high bar to secure expungement, and Carias Torres simply has not cleared it.
A few additional points. One, although Carias Torres does not rely on the Riley case in
seeking relief—presumably because that ruling was issued after he filed his motion—the Court
independently considered it. Riley expunged the defendant’s arrest record on firearms charges after
ruling that the search leading to the recovery of the offending firearm was “illegal,” based on a
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more developed record and analysis than presented here. See Riley, 806 F. Supp. 3d at 44–46.
Because Carias Torres neglects to present any similarly developed argument, the Riley case does
not sway the Court’s conclusion.
Two, the other cases Carias Torres relies upon are inapposite because the government did
not oppose expungement in those matters. See McKnight, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 584–85, 588 (“Finally
and critically, the Government did not oppose the expungement on any grounds[.]”); United States
v. Bohr, 406 F. Supp. 1218, 1219 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (similar). The same is not true here.
And last, to the extent Carias Torres says expungement is justified because the government
opted to dismiss the case with prejudice (an admittedly unusual step), that categorical argument
comes up short. See Livingston, 759 F.2d at 78 n.30 (“Dismissal of the complaint, without more,
will not justify expungement of the arrest record.”). To hold otherwise would disincentivize the
government from seeking dismissal with prejudice in appropriate cases. And here, the government
explains that its request to dismiss with prejudice was motivated by the fact that it understood
Carias Torres was likely to be removed to his home country of Venezuela in keeping with an
existing removal order, such that “it was in the interest of justice to not pursue this matter
further[.]” (ECF No. 13 at 5.) So, while not necessarily an irrelevant consideration altogether, the
Court disagrees that expungement is warranted any time the government dismisses with prejudice.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court DENIES the motion for expungement.
Dated: May 22, 2026
MATTHEW J. SHARBAUGH
United States Magistrate Judge
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