BROWNER-EL v. PEPCO HOLDINGS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
EMANI BROWNER-EL, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-04090 (UNA)
)
PEPCO HOLDINGS, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s pro se “Universal Memorandum” (“Mem.”),
ECF No. 1, and Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP App.”). The Court
grants the IFP Application, and for the reasons discussed below, dismisses this matter for failure
to state a claim, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
Plaintiff, a resident of the District of Columbia, holds himself out as the “Principal Chief
Israel X, Authorized Representative” for the “Cashbox Trust Tribal Government,” and also
attempts to bring this action on behalf of the United States. See Mem. at 1. At the outset, the
Court notes that Plaintiff may not bring this case on behalf of the federal government. It is
“well-settled that a qui tam action may not be brought by a pro se plaintiff.” Walsh v. JPMorgan
Chase Bank, NA, 75 F. Supp. 3d 256, 263 (D.D.C. 2014) (collecting cases); see Idrogo v. Castro,
672 F. App’x 27, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“The district court correctly held that pro se plaintiffs,
such as appellant, may not file a qui tam action pursuant to the False Claims Act.”); Walker v.
Nationstar Mortg. LLC, 142 F. Supp. 3d 63, 65 (D.D.C. 2015) (holding that it is well established
that “pro se parties may not pursue actions on behalf of the United States.”) (citation omitted);
Canen v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 118 F. Supp. 3d 164, 170 (D.D.C. 2015) (noting that “courts
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in this jurisdiction consistently have held that pro se plaintiffs . . . are not adequately able to
represent the interests of the United States”) (citing cases). Put differently, where the United
States is “the real party in interest,” Cobb v. California, No. 15-cv-176, 2015 WL 512896, at *1
(D.D.C. Feb. 4, 2015), a pro se plaintiff may not file an action on its behalf, see Jones v. Jindal,
409 Fed. App’x. 356 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (per curiam); see also Gunn v. Credit Suisse Grp. AG, 610
Fed. App’x 155, 157 (3d Cir. 2015) (noting that “every circuit that has [addressed the issue] is in
agreement that a pro se litigant may not pursue a qui tam action on behalf of the Government.”)
(citing cases)); U.S. ex rel. Szymczak v. Covenant Healthcare Sys., Inc., 207 Fed. App’x 731, 732
(7th Cir. 2006) (“[A] qui tam relator—even one with a personal bone to pick with the
defendant—sues on behalf of the government and not himself. He therefore must comply with
the general rule prohibiting nonlawyers from representing other litigants.”). This prohibition is
rooted in the requirement that a plaintiff proceeding in federal court “may [only] plead and
conduct their own cases personally or by counsel.” 28 U.S.C. § 1654; Georgiades v. Martin–
Trigona, 729 F.2d 831, 834 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (individual “not a member of the bar of any court . .
. may appear pro se but is not qualified to appear in [federal] court as counsel for others”)
(citation and footnote omitted). In other words, Plaintiff has neither a constitutional nor a
statutory right to pursue the claims of the United States, or anyone else, without counsel.
Even if Plaintiff had brought this matter solely on his own behalf, it cannot survive.
Plaintiff has opened a civil case without filing an a complaint, which is prohibited. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 3; In re Sealed Case No. 98-3077, 151 F.3d 1059, 1069 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting that
a civil action “must be initiated by complaint[.]”) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 3); see also Adair v.
England, 193 F. Supp. 2d 196, 200 (D.D.C. 2002) (“A party commences a civil action by filing a
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complaint. . . [and] [w]hen no complaint is filed, the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the
plaintiff’s petition[.]”) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 3).
Insofar as Plaintiff’s “Universal Memorandum,” was intended to serve as a complaint, it
is nonetheless deficient. Pro se litigants must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987). Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure requires complaints to contain “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the
court’s jurisdiction [and] (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009);
Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668–71 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Rule 8 standard ensures that
defendants receive fair notice of the claim being asserted so that they can prepare a responsive
answer and an adequate defense and determine whether the doctrine of res judicata applies.
Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977).
Here, instead of pleading actionable claims, facts to support those claims, or setting forth
his injury or entitlement to damages, if any, Plaintiff has submitted a “Memorandum” that simply
recites law without context and, at best, insinuates that Plaintiff, as a member of Cashbox Trust
Tribal Government, is not responsible for payment of “any presumed commercial transaction or
loan.” See generally Mem. Indeed, even the intended defendants are unspecified; the Court
infers that Plaintiff appears to be attempting to void an outstanding expense issued to him by
PEPCO, based on the electricity bills attached as exhibits, see id. at 8–28, and based on the
caption of his IFP Application, see IFP App. at 1.
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements,” are insufficient to state a claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Although a pro se
complaint “must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,”
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Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted), it still “must plead ‘factual matter’ that permits the court to infer ‘more than the mere
possibility of [defendant’s] misconduct,’” Atherton v. District of Columbia Office of the Mayor,
567 F.3d 672, 681–82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; see Aktieselskabet AF
21. Nov.2001 v. Fame Jeans, Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 16 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“We have never accepted
‘legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations’ because a complaint needs some
information about the circumstances giving rise to the claims.”) (quoting Kowal v. MCI
Commc’ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
Plaintiff’s Memorandum offers less than threadbare allegations and recitations, falling
well short of the required standard to state a claim. Furthermore, to the extent that Plaintiff is
invoking the Indian Non-Intercourse Act and other Federal Indian Laws seeking to void his
outstanding financial obligation, the Cashbox Trust Tribal Government is not a recognized entity
by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/01/08/2024-
00109/indian-entities-recognized-by-and-eligible-to-receive-services-from-the-united-states-bureau-of
(last visited Mar. 5, 2026),1 and thus Plaintiff cannot bring a claim under the laws cited, see
Grant v. Wells, No. 2:24-mc-00391, 2024 WL 4173577, at *3 n.3 (D.S.C. Aug. 20, 2024) (citing
cases), R&R adopted, 2024 WL 4172688 (D.S.C. Sep. 12, 2024). And assuming arguendo it
was recognized, multiple federal courts of appeal have squarely held that only tribes, and not
tribal members, have standing to sue under such laws, see, e.g., James v. Watt, 716 F.2d 71, 72
(1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1209 (1984); San Xavier Development Authority v.
1 	The Court may take judicial notice of information from official public websites of
government agencies. See Cannon v. Dist. of Columbia, 717 F.3d 200, 205 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
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Charles, 237 F.3d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 2001); Thompson v. County of Franklin, 15 F.3d 245,
249 (2nd Cir. 1994), and, as explained above, pro se litigants can only bring individual claims.
For all of these reasons, this case is dismissed without prejudice. 	A separate Order
accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Date:
Tanya S. Chutkan
TANYA S. CHUTKAN
United States District Judge
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