WHITMAN v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE et al

Page 1 of 3
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
No. 25-cv-478 (TSC)
KEVIN LEWIS WHITMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION & ORDER
Pro se Plaintiff Kevin Lewis Whitman, a self-proclaimed “Sovereign Israelite Principal”
and “Treaty Beneficiary of the House of David,” filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, seeking
to compel the Justice Department “to investigate treaty violations” arising out of the “ethnic
cleansing, medical neglect, and genocide against 30 million Israelites.” See Pl.’s Mot. for
Contempt & Sanctions at 1, ECF No. 5. Plaintiff has since filed five motions, including one which
falsely claims that the court entered a sealed order on April 23, 2025, directing the Government to
disburse $100 million to Plaintiff’s escrow account “for emergency medical relief to mitigate
genocide harm”—an order the court never issued. Id. at 2. Because the court lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s patently insubstantial mandamus petition, it will sua sponte DISMISS
this case and DENY as moot all pending motions. See Cherdak v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 443 F.
Supp. 3d 134, 158 (D.D.C. 2020) (“Because the court lacks jurisdiction over this case, the court
cannot resolve the other pending motions.”).
Although “pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than other complaints,
even a pro se plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the court has subject-matter
jurisdiction.” Carmichael v. Pompeo, 486 F. Supp. 3d 360, 366 (D.D.C. 2020) (quoting Curran
Case 1:25-cv-00478-TSC Document 15 Filed 12/17/25 Page 1 of 3

Page 2 of 3
v. Holder, 626 F. Supp. 2d 30, 33 (D.D.C. 2009)). Federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction
over any complaint that is “patently insubstantial,” such that it “present[s] no federal question
suitable for decision.” Tooley v. Napolitano, 586 F.3d 1006, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Best
v. Kelly, 39 F.3d 328, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1994)); see also Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536 (1974)
(“Over the years this Court has repeatedly held that the federal courts are without power to
entertain claims . . . if they are . . . wholly insubstantial, obviously frivolous, [or] plainly
unsubstantial[.] (cleaned up)). Claims qualify as “patently insubstantial” if they rely on “any
bizarre conspiracy theories.” Best, 39 F.3d at 330. In evaluating subject-matter jurisdiction, the
court “may consider materials outside the pleadings.” Leopold v. Manger, 630 F. Supp. 3d 71, 77
(D.D.C. 2022) (quoting Jerome Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir.
2005)). Thus, to understand Plaintiff’s near unintelligible mandamus petition, the court will
consider Plaintiff’s more comprehensible expression of his request for mandamus as set forth in
his Motion for Contempt and Sanctions. See Pl.’s Mot. for Contempt & Sanctions at 2–3.
The court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s mandamus petition because it fails to present a
federal question suitable for decision. Tooley, 586 F.3d at 1010. Plaintiff relies on the bizarre
conspiracy theory that a group of 30 million “sovereign Israelites,” of which he is a “Principal,”
are being subject to ethnic cleansing, medical neglect, and genocide, in violation of an assortment
of treaties including the Paris Treaty of 1763, which ended the French and Indian War, and the
Lateran Treaty of 1929, under which Italy recognized the sovereignty of Vatican City. See Pl.’s
Mot. for Contempt & Sanctions at 2–3. Plaintiff’s unsupported allegations are so fanciful and his
legal theories so insubstantial that Plaintiff’s petition is “absolutely devoid of merit” and therefore
insufficient to invoke this court’s jurisdiction. See Hagans, 415 U.S. at 536 (cleaned up).
Case 1:25-cv-00478-TSC Document 15 Filed 12/17/25 Page 2 of 3

Page 3 of 3
Even if the court had jurisdiction, it would dismiss Plaintiff’s mandamus petition for failure
to state a claim. A district court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim
when “it is patently obvious” that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts alleged in the complaint.
Baker v. Director, U.S. Parole Comm’n, 916 F.2d 725, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also Rollins v.
Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 703 F.3d 122, 127 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (same). A “writ of mandamus is an
extraordinary remedy, to be reserved for extraordinary situations.” Gulfstream Aerospace Corp.
v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 289 (1988). Thus, a “party seeking mandamus has the burden
of showing that its right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable.” Id. (cleaned up). Plaintiff
“does not have a clear and indisputable right” to a writ of mandamus ordering the Justice
Department to investigate alleged treaty violations “because the Executive Branch has absolute
discretion to decide whether to conduct an investigation or prosecute a case.” Berry v. FBI, 464
Fed. App’x 6 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 16, 2012) (per curiam) (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,
693 (1974)). Therefore, it is patently obvious that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for the
extraordinary remedy of mandamus relief.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Petition for a Writ of Mandamus, ECF
No. 1, is DISMISSED and all pending motions are DENIED. The Clerk of the Court shall close
this case.
SO ORDERED.
Date: December 17, 2025
Tanya S. Chutkan
TANYA S. CHUTKAN
United States District Judge
Case 1:25-cv-00478-TSC Document 15 Filed 12/17/25 Page 3 of 3