DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. PRO-FOOTBALL, INC. et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Civil Action No. 22-cv-3813
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
Plaintiff,
v.
PRO-FOOTBALL INC. d/b/a,
WASHINGTON COMMANDERS, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, the District of Columbia, moves to remand this case to D.C. Superior Court,
arguing that this court lacks diversity jurisdiction. 	Pl.’s Mot. to Remand at 6–12, ECF No. 16
(“Remand Mot.”). It also requests attorneys’ fees associated with its remand motion. Id. at 13–
14. For the reasons below, the court will GRANT in part and DENY in part the District’s motion.
I. 	BACKGROUND
In the summer of 2020, media reports claimed that the Washington Commanders, the
District’s professional football team, and its owner, Dan Snyder, had fostered a culture of sexual
harassment and verbal abuse. 	Compl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 13 (“Compl.”). 	These revelations sparked
public criticism and raised consumer concerns. Id. ¶ 4. Responding to the growing backlash, the
National Football League (“NFL”) announced an independent investigation, and the Commanders
pledged their full cooperation. 	Id. ¶¶ 4, 7. 	The District claims that “[d]espite their public
proclamations promising to uphold the integrity of the investigation,” the Commanders and the
NFL “worked to thwart the investigation and suppress its results” by entering into an agreement
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whereby Snyder could “block the public release of any information” stemming from the
investigation. Id. ¶ 8.
On November 10, 2022, the District brought a consumer protection enforcement action in
D.C. Superior Court against the Commanders, Snyder, the NFL, and NFL Commissioner Roger
Goodell, under the District’s Consumer Protection Procedures Act (“CPPA”). Id. at 3; D.C. Code
§§ 28-3901 et seq. 	That act “establishes an enforceable right to truthful information from
merchants about consumer goods and services that are or would be purchased, leased, or received
in the District.” 	D.C. Code § 28-3901(c). 	The District’s Attorney General has the authority to
“bring an action in the Superior Court” representing the District’s “public interest.” 	Id. § 28-
3909(a). The District can “obtain a temporary or permanent injunction prohibiting the use of [a]
method, act, or practice” and require “the violator to take affirmative action, including the
restitution of money or property.” Id.
Count One of the Complaint alleges that Defendants misled consumers and failed to
disclose material information related to the Washington Commanders’ internal investigation, in
violation of D.C. Code §§ 28-3904(e)–(f-1). 	Compl. ¶¶ 149–55. 	Count Two asserts that the
Washington Commanders and Snyder misled the public as to their knowledge of, and Snyder’s
role in, the Commanders’ hostile work environment, violating D.C. Code §§ 28-3904(e)–(f-1). Id.
¶¶ 156–63. The District seeks, inter alia, injunctive relief, civil penalties, and restitution. Id. ¶ 11.
On December 23, 2022, Defendants—none of whom are District citizens—timely removed
the case to this court based on diversity jurisdiction. 	Notice of Removal ¶¶ 8–27, ECF No. 1
(“Notice of Removal”); Compl. ¶¶ 14–18. On December 30, 2022, the District moved to remand
this case. Remand Mot. at 3–14.
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II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. EPA, 363 F.3d
442, 448 (D.C. Cir. 2004). A defendant may therefore only remove a civil action to federal
district court if the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(a). Where, as here, a plaintiff moves to remand a case to state court, the removing
defendant “bears the burden of proving that removal was proper.” Arenivar v. Manganaro
Midatlantic, LLC, 317 F. Supp. 3d 362, 367 (D.D.C. 2018) (quotations and citation omitted).
Courts construe the removal statute narrowly. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S.
100, 108 (1941). “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
III. 	ANALYSIS
A. Diversity Jurisdiction
Defendants assert that 	federal jurisdiction exists pursuant to the court’s diversity
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 	See Notice of Removal ¶¶ 8–27. 	To satisfy diversity
jurisdiction, the parties must be citizens of different states, and the amount in controversy must
exceed $75,000. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). 	It is undisputed that none of the Defendants are
citizens of D.C., but “a State is not a ‘citizen’ for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.” 	Moor v.
Alameda Cnty., 411 U.S. 693, 717 (1973). As such, states cannot typically sue or be sued in federal
court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. See id. The same principle applies to the District of
Columbia. 	28 U.S.C. § 1332(e) (specifying that the District is a state for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction); Long v. District of Columbia, 820 F.2d 409, 413 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“We think we
must treat the District like a state . . . .”). The citizenship of a nominal or formal party, however,
is disregarded in determining the existence of diversity, and only those with a real and substantial
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interest in the controversy are considered. 	Navarro Sav. Ass’n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 460–61
(1980).
Defendants argue that the court has diversity jurisdiction because the District is merely a
nominal party and not a real party in interest, with the real plaintiffs being only those customers
who relied on Defendants’ alleged deceptive conduct. 	See generally, Defs.’ Opp’n to Remand
Mot. at 3–12, ECF No. 30 (“Defs.’ Opp’n”). In assessing whether the District is a real party in
interest, thereby destroying diversity jurisdiction, the court examines: (1) whether the District has
asserted a quasi-sovereign interest in this lawsuit by articulating “an interest apart from the
interests of particular private parties” involved in the case; and (2) whether the challenged conduct
affects a “sufficiently substantial segment” of the District’s population. Alfred L. Snapp & Son,
Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982).
i. 	Quasi-Sovereign Interest
A state “has a quasi-sovereign interest in the health and well-being—both physical and
economic—of its residents in general.” Id. This interest includes advocating for “the continuing
prosperity of [a state’s] econom[y].” Pennsylvania v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
As noted above, the District is suing Defendants for their alleged “public misrepresentations,
omissions, and ambiguities of material fact” to customers regarding Defendants’ cooperation with
an 	investigation 	into 	complaints 	of 	sexual 	misconduct, 	harassment, 	and 	a 	hostile 	work
environment. 	Compl. at ¶¶ 1–11. 	Courts in this district have found that when the District sues
under the CPPA, a quasi-sovereign interest exists because the CPPA provides an avenue for the
District to protect “the economic well-being of their citizens who were defrauded.” 	District of
Columbia v. JTH Tax LLC, No. 22-cv-3165, 2023 WL 130736, at *3 (D.D.C. Jan. 9, 2023)
(quotations and citation omitted); District of Columbia v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 640 F. Supp. 3d 95,
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110 (D.D.C. 2022), aff’d, 89 F.4th 144 (D.C. Cir. 2023).
So too here. The CPPA’s statutory framework makes clear that the District has a quasi-
sovereign interest in “prosecuting consumer protection violations.” 	Exxon Mobil Corp., 640 F.
Supp. 3d at 110. 	For instance, the CPPA authorizes the District to sue “in the public interest,”
rather than solely to recover for private individuals. D.C. Code § 28-3909(a). It also empowers
the District to seek forms of relief unavailable to private citizens, such as civil penalties, id. § 28-
3909(b), and to seek injunctive relief without demonstrating actual damages, id. § 28-3909(a). As
other judges on this court have noted, these distinctions show that the District has its own
“pecuniary interest in this lawsuit distinct from the private financial interests of individual
citizens,” thereby establishing a quasi-sovereign interest that goes beyond merely advocating on
behalf of injured consumers. Exxon Mobil Corp., 640 F. Supp. 3d 95 at 111 (cleaned up); see also
JTH Tax, 2023 WL 130736, at *3.
Defendants advance three counter arguments, none of which are persuasive. 	First, they
contend that the CPPA should not categorically confer quasi-sovereign status just because it is
invoked and that the court should instead assess whether such an interest exists by examining “the
essential nature and effect of the proceeding.” Defs.’ Opp’n at 5–10 (citation omitted). While it
is 	true 	that 	courts 	must 	“look 	behind 	the 	pleadings 	to 	ensure 	that 	parties 	are 	not
improperly . . . destroying diversity jurisdiction,” Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp.,
571 U.S. 161, 174 (2014), Defendants fail to meaningfully differentiate the nature of the District’s
interest in this litigation—to prosecute allegedly deceptive business activities “calculated to
mislead consumers so they would continue to support the Team financially,” Compl. ¶ 2,—from
the quasi-sovereign interests that courts have recognized in other consumer protection cases. See,
e.g., JTH Tax, 2023 WL 130736, at *3–4 (recognizing the District’s quasi-sovereign interest in a
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CPPA action against a tax preparation business that allegedly deceived consumers); Exxon Mobil
Corp., 640 F. Supp. 3d 95 at 110–11 (recognizing the District’s quasi-sovereign interest in a CPPA
action against energy companies for alleged misrepresentations regarding the harmful effects of
fossil fuels); New York by Abrams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 547 F. Supp. 703, 705–07 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (recognizing New York’s quasi-sovereign interest in an action against a car company for
deceptive business practices involving defects in a type of transmission); Nevada v. Bank of Am.
Corp., 672 F.3d 661, 671 (9th Cir. 2012) (recognizing “Nevada’s sovereign interest in protecting
its citizens and economy from deceptive mortgage practices”).
Defendants’ second argument is that the District does not allege that it suffered any actual
injury as a result of the alleged misstatements, but Defendants cite no caselaw requiring such
allegations to show a quasi-sovereign interest. See Defs.’ Opp’n at 10. Indeed, requiring a state
to allege a direct injury would be superfluous in the context of prosecuting consumer protection
violations because such actions, by definition, seek to protect consumers. In any event, the CPPA
makes clear that unfair and deceptive business practices run afoul of the District’s public interest.
See D.C. Code § 28-3909(a) (authorizing the District to act “in the public interest” in bringing
CPPA enforcement actions). 	Such harm to the District’s public interest therefore satisfies any
injury requirement under the quasi-sovereign interest inquiry. See JTH Tax, 2023 WL 130736, at
*3.
Finally, Defendants claim that the District lacks a quasi-sovereign interest because the
relief sought would primarily benefit District consumers and is available to “affected individuals
themselves, were they to file a complaint on their own behalf.” 	Defs.’ Opp’n at 11 (citation
omitted). Not so. “The fact that private parties may also benefit from the District’s lawsuit does
not negate the District’s substantial interest in this case.” JHH Tax, LLC, 2023 WL 130736, at *4.
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Moreover, the District also seeks civil penalties, which individuals cannot obtain. Compl. at 37;
D.C. Code § 28-3909(b). 	It also seeks injunctive relief for violations without having to prove
damages, which private citizens cannot do. Compl. at 37; compare D.C. Code § 28-3903(b), with
D.C. Code § 28-3905(k). “These distinctions make clear that the District has its own pecuniary
interest in this lawsuit distinct from the private financial interests of individual citizens.” Exxon
Mobil Corp., 640 F. Supp. 3d 95 at 111 (quotations and citation omitted); see also Bank of Am.
Corp., 672 F.3d at 671–72 (highlighting various forms of relief sought by the state that were not
available to individual citizens).
ii. 	Substantial Injury
Under the substantial injury factor, in determining whether a state is a real party in interest,
there are no “definitive limits on the proportion of the population of the State that must be
adversely affected by the challenged behavior.” Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at 607. And, in
evaluating whether a substantial segment of a state’s population has been harmed, courts look
beyond those directly affected to consider the broader, indirect effects of the alleged injury. Id. A
state may therefore satisfy this jurisdictional factor where only 0.03% of its population is directly
involved. 	See id. at 599, 609. 	Courts in this district have similarly found that harm directly
affecting as little as “.2% of the District’s population” can qualify as a sufficiently substantial
segment to establish that the District is a real party in interest. JTH Tax, 2023 WL 130736, at *5.
Defendants 	suggest 	that 	the 	challenged 	conduct 	affects 	only 	a 	narrow 	group 	of
consumers—specifically, those who purchased tickets and merchandise after July 2020 and who,
despite “consider[ing] withdrawing financial support,” continued to make purchases “with the
understanding that a thorough, unbiased investigation was underway.” 	Defs.’ Opp’n at 13.
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Defendants argue that the substantial injury requirement is unmet because this group represents a
fraction of the District’s population. Id.
It is true that the District does not quantify the total number of consumers who were
affected by the conduct alleged in its lawsuit, and the targeted population may in fact be a “smaller
subset of an identifiable group.” 	Defs.’ Opp’n at 13; see generally Compl. at 1–47. 	As noted
above, however, even if the District’s targeted consumer population is minuscule, that number can
still satisfy the substantial injury factor and weigh against finding federal jurisdiction. See JTH
Tax, 2023 WL 130736, at *5; Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at 609. Indeed, “numerous other
courts” have “found that ‘the raw number of individuals directly’ affected is not determinative of
whether a state has alleged injury to a substantial segment of its population.” JTH Tax, 2023 WL
130736, at *5 (quoting People by Vacco v. Mid Hudson Med. Grp., P.C., 877 F. Supp. 143, 148
(S.D.N.Y. 1995)).
This is particularly true where, as here, Defendants’ alleged misconduct indirectly impacts
a far broader range of individuals than just those who purchased tickets with the understanding
that an unbiased investigation was underway. See Pl.’s Reply at 11–12, ECF No. 32. “Allowing
Defendant to continue deceiving District residents would undermine the integrity of D.C. law,
weaken the marketplace, and enable other residents to be harmed in the future.” JTH Tax, 2023
WL 130736, at *5. 	In light of these potential downstream harms, the court finds that there is a
sufficiently substantial segment of D.C.’s population affected by Defendants’ alleged misconduct.
The court therefore finds that the District qualifies as a real party in interest, that the court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and that the case must be remanded to D.C. Superior Court.
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B. Attorneys’ Fees
When granting a motion to remand, a district court may award attorneys’ fees under 28
U.S.C. § 1447(c). 	The court may only award such fees “where the removing party lacked an
objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.” Martin v. Franklin Cap. Corp., 546 U.S. 132,
141 (2005). 	The threshold for objective reasonableness is quite low, requiring only that the
defendant’s grounds for removal had “at least some logical and precedential force.” 	Knop v.
Mackall, 645 F.3d 381, 383 (D.C. Cir. 2011). When “non-removability is obvious or contrary to
well-settled law,” however, courts can impose associated costs and expenses. Ballard v. District
of Columbia, 813 F. Supp. 2d 34, 39, 45 (D.D.C. 2011) (citation omitted).
The District argues that the court should award it fees and costs because Defendants have
“failed to provide any objectively reasonable basis for removal.” Remand Mot. at 13. Defendants,
on the other hand, argue that even if the court remands, it should still not award fees and costs
because no “on-point case law from the D.C. Circuit” exists. Defs.’ Opp’n at 15. Defendants have
the better argument.
Although the court disagrees with Defendants’ theory of jurisdiction in support of removal,
they presented a position supported by logical reasoning and relevant precedent. 	They cited
applicable case law, made coherent arguments that a court could reasonably accept, and relied on
decisions from this district, such as Exxon and JTH Tax. 	See, e.g., Defs.’ Opp’n at 3–14.
Moreover, whether the District can sue under diversity jurisdiction and the CPPA is not a settled
question in this Circuit. The Circuit’s review in Exxon focused on federal question jurisdiction.
89 F.4th at 148. Therefore, Defendants’ decision to seek removal—despite adverse precedent from
district courts in Exxon and JTH Tax—was not contrary to well-settled law.
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Consequently, because Defendants had an objectively reasonable basis for seeking
removal, the court will deny the District’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the District’s
Remand Motion, ECF No. 16. A corresponding order shall follow.
Date: November 10, 2025
Tanya S. Chutkan
TANYA S. CHUTKAN
United States District Judge
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