HUNTER v. WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ERNEST HUNTER,
Plaintiff,
v.
WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN
TRANSIT AUTHORITY,
Defendant.
Civil Action No. 22-3552 (CKK)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
(March 3, 2026)
Plaintiff Ernest Hunter alleges in this case that his former employer, the Washington
Metropolitan Transit Authority (“WMATA”), unlawfully retaliated against him for filing a
complaint of discrimination, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (“Title VII”).1 See Compl., Dkt. No. 1, ¶¶ 51–58.
This Court denied in part and denied without prejudice in part WMATA’s initial motion
for summary judgment on Mr. Hunter’s claim of unlawful retaliation, concluding that the record
was not sufficiently developed and briefed to allow the Court to evaluate WMATA’s argument
that it had a non-retaliatory basis for terminating his employment. See Mem. Op. & Order, Dkt.
No. 20. WMATA has now filed a renewed motion for summary judgment and Mr. Hunter,
proceeding pro se, has filed a cross-motion. See Def.’s Mot., Dkt. No. 21; Pl.’s Mot., Dkt. No. 23.
1 Mr. Hunter also alleged, in Count II of his Complaint, that WMATA violated the District of Columbia Wage Payment
Collection Law, D.C. Code § 32-1301 et seq., and the District of Columbia Wage Theft Prevention Act, 61 D.C. Reg.
10157 (October 3, 2014). See Compl., Dkt. No. 1, ¶¶ 59–66. Mr. Hunter later consented to the dismissal of Count II
of his Complaint, which WMATA argued was barred because WMATA is an “interstate compact agency” not
susceptible to suit under those laws. See Def.’s Partial Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 6; Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Partial Mot.
to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 7. The Court therefore dismissed Count II. Minute Order (Apr. 25, 2023).
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Upon consideration of the parties’ submissions,2 the relevant legal authority, and the entire record,
the Court shall GRANT Defendant WMATA’s [21] Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment and
DENY Plaintiff Hunter’s [23] Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Hunter worked in the Small Business Program Office of WMATA’s Procurement and
Materials department as a Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (“DBE”) Compliance Specialist
from May 2013 until October 2017, when WMATA terminated his employment. See Def.’s Mot.
at 1; Def.’s Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute (“Def.’s Stmt.”), Dkt. No. 21-1, ¶¶ 1, 3.
Mr. Hunter’s union filed a grievance regarding his October 2017 termination. See Pl.’s
Ex., Dkt. No. 19-1; Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 3. After arbitration over that grievance and a ruling in Mr.
Hunter’s favor, an arbitration board concluded that he should be offered “reinstatement within the
bargaining unit to the position of Small Business Analyst or, if mutually agreed to by the parties[,]
another position within the bargaining unit.” Pl.’s Ex., Dkt. No. 19-1, at 2.
In May 2020, WMATA placed Mr. Hunter into a Contract Administrator II (“CA II”)
position in its Office of Procurement and Materials (“PRMT”). See Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 3. The CA II
position requires a “Bachelor’s Degree in Business Administration, Engineering, or a related
field.” See Def.’s Ex. 1, Dkt. No. 21-3, at 4. However, the job description provides that “[i]n lieu
of a Bachelor’s Degree,” a combination of a high school diploma or GED and relevant work
2 The Court’s consideration has focused on the following documents, including the attachments and exhibits thereto:
• Defendant WMATA’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Def.’s Mot.”), Dkt. No. 21;
• Plaintiff Hunter’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pl.’s Mot.”), Dkt. No. 23;
• Defendant WMATA’s Opposition to Plaintiff Hunter’s Motion (“Def.’s Opp’n”), Dkt. No. 25;
• Plaintiff Hunter’s Opposition to Defendant WMATA’s Motion (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), Dkt. No. 29;
• Defendant WMATA’s Reply in Support of its Motion (“Def.’s Reply”), Dkt. No. 28.
In an exercise of its discretion, the Court concludes that oral argument is not necessary to the resolution of the issues
pending before the Court. See LCvR 7(f).
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experience “may be considered.” Id. The job description further provides that the relevant work
experience for a person without a qualifying college degree must include “an additional four (4)
years of experience in developing and administering requests for proposals and/or quotations,
specifications, scope of work, and different types of contracts and agreements.” Id. Finally, the
job description provides that “[c]ertification from an accredited procurement program . . . must be
obtained within two (2) years of hire date and maintained thereafter.” Id. at 5; see Def.’s Stmt.
¶ 5.3 This certification requirement was added in September 2018. Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 5; see Def.’s
Ex. 1, Dkt. No. 21-3, at 1, 5.
WMATA had evaluated Mr. Hunter’s qualifications to hold the CA II position at least once
before, in September 2017; at that time, it found that Mr. Hunter was not qualified for the position.
Pl.’s Ex., Dkt. No. 23-1 at 6. Mr. Hunter alleged both in the Charge of Discrimination he filed
with the EEOC and in his complaint in this case that he still lacked the “prerequisite experience”
for the CA II position at the time he was placed in the position in 2020. See Pl.’s Charge of
Discrimination, Dkt. No. 17-8 at 14–23; Compl. ¶ 43.
On March 26, 2021, Mr. Hunter filed a grievance alleging that in the 10 months since his
reinstatement in May 2020, his managers had not been assigning him work, had failed to provide
him a mid-year review, and had improperly referred him to WMATA’s Employee Assistance
Program (“EAP”) without his request or consent. See Pl.’s Exs., Dkt. No. 19-1 at 12. About two
weeks later, on April 7, 2021, Mr. Hunter filed a formal discrimination complaint with WMATA’s
Office of Equal Employment Opportunity, in which he alleged that WMATA took these actions
3 In his cross-motion for summary judgment, Mr. Hunter argues that the job description indicates that the certification
requirement is marked “Preferred” or “N/A.” See Pl.’s Mot. at 4. However, this interpretation of the job description
is unreasonable and lacks any support in the record. See See Ass’n of Flight Attendants-CWA, AFL-CIO v. Dep’t of
Transp., 564 F.3d 462, 465–66 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Understood in context, the word “Preferred” is clearly a section
heading, and “N/A” indicates that there are no qualifications in that category—that is, that there are no “preferred”
qualifications for the CA II role. See Def.’s Ex. 1, Dkt. No. 21-3, at 5.
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in retaliation for his prior complaint to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”). See id. at 14–15. WMATA later investigated these allegations and concluded on June
4, 2021, that they were “unsupported.” Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. 5, Dkt. No. 29 at 12.
On April 15, 2021, eight days after Mr. Hunter filed his discrimination complaint with
WMATA’s Office of Equal Employment Opportunity, a WMATA executive named T. Suzette
Moore sent a memorandum to “All PRMT Contracting Personnel,” including Mr. Hunter,
describing the certification requirement that applied to Mr. Hunter’s position and several other
positions in the same department. See Def.’s Ex. 2., Dkt. No. 21-4. This memorandum stated that
individuals in covered positions must “obtain . . . certification within two (2) years of hire as
established in their associated job description.” Id. at 1. It also stated that “[i]ndividuals who fail
to obtain and maintain certification will be subject to termination.” Id. at 2.
Ms. Moore later sent a memo directly to Mr. Hunter on June 1, 2021, restating the policy
requirement and advising him that his position was “an applicable position that requires
certification/recertification” and that he would be required to obtain certification by May 25, 2022,
in order to maintain his position. Def.’s Ex. 3, Dkt. No. 21-5; Decl. of T. Suzette Moore (“Moore
Decl.”), Dkt. No. 21-2, ¶ 8. Ms. Moore also sent similar letters to three other PRMT employees
on the same day. Def.’s Ex. 4, Dkt. No. 21-6.4
On March 14, 2022, Ms. Moore emailed Mr. Hunter and reminded him that he needed to
obtain the required certification by May 25, 2022, or he would be terminated, attaching a copy of
the earlier policy memorandum to her email. See Def.’s Ex. 5, Dkt. No. 21-7; Moore Decl. ¶ 9;
Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 9.
4 Mr. Hunter objects that WMATA raised this fact for the first time in its renewed motion for summary judgment. See
Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Stmt., Dkt. No. 29 at 15–16. However, Mr. Hunter has not produced any evidence to dispute this
fact or argued that WMATA improperly withheld relevant evidence from him. Accordingly, the fact is properly
considered undisputed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
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Mr. Hunter did not become certified, and WMATA terminated his employment on October
7, 2022. See Def.’s Ex. 6, Dkt. No. 21-8.
Mr. Hunter filed this action in November 2022, alleging that WMATA had unlawfully
retaliated against him for complaining about workplace discrimination and unlawful retaliation.
See generally Compl., Dkt. No. 1, ¶¶ 51–58. In his Complaint, Mr. Hunter contends that WMATA
set him up to fail by placing him in the CA II position, despite knowing that he lacked the requisite
certification and experience. See Compl. ¶ 57. He contends that he was not assigned work in the
new position, id. ¶ 41, that he filed a complaint about his lack of work, id. ¶ 42, and that Ms. Moore
only informed him about the certification requirement after he filed that complaint, id. ¶ 43.
WMATA moved for summary judgment on Mr. Hunter’s retaliation claim, which this
Court denied in part and denied without prejudice in part. See Mem. Op. & Order, Dkt. No. 20.
WMATA has now filed a renewed motion for summary judgment and Mr. Hunter, proceeding pro
se, opposes WMATA’s motion and has filed a cross-motion. See Def.’s Mot., Dkt. No. 21; Pl.’s
Mot., Dkt. No. 23; Pl.’s Opp’n, Dkt. No. 29. WMATA opposes Mr. Hunter’s cross-motion. See
Def.’s Opp’n, Dkt. No. 25.
In his cross-motion for summary judgment, Mr. Hunter adds two new allegations, not
mentioned in his Complaint or his underlying EEOC Charge of Discrimination, that he argues
support his claim that WMATA unlawfully retaliated against him. See Pl.’s Mot. at 4–5; cf.
Compl. ¶ 56 (alleging other adverse actions); Charge of Discrimination, Dkt. No. 25-1 (same).
First, Mr. Hunter alleges that in April 2021, his supervisor required him to provide documentation
from a medical provider in connection with his use of sick leave, which he alleges was irregular.
See Pl.’s Mot. at 4; Pl.’s Exs. 5–6, Dkt. No. 23-1 at 17–18. Second, Mr. Hunter alleges that in
March 2022, he sent an email to WMATA’s then-Executive Vice President for Internal Business
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Operations, Diana Rosborough, to share his complaint about being placed in a role requiring a
certification he did not possess. See Pl.’s Mot. at 5; Pl.’s Exs. 9–10, Dkt. No. 23-1 at 22–23.
The parties’ motions for summary judgment are now ripe for decision.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment should be granted to the movant if the pleadings, the discovery
materials in the record, and any affidavits show “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986).
To withstand a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must identify a
genuine issue of material fact. “[A] material fact is ‘genuine’ . . . if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The
district court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence; instead, the evidence
must be analyzed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, with all justifiable inferences
drawn in his favor. Id. at 255.
However, the party opposing a motion for summary judgment “may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of his pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (quoting First
Nat’l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288 (1968)). To demonstrate a genuine
issue, the opposing party must “cit[e] to particular parts of materials in record, including
depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, [or]
stipulations.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
When parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, the court considers each motion
separately, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and determines whether each
motion satisfies the standards of Rule 56. See Baylor v. Mitchell Rubenstein & Assocs., P.C., 857
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F.3d 939, 952 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (noting that a court considering cross-motions for summary
judgment “must accord both parties the solicitude owed non-movants”).
On a motion for summary judgment, the district court’s task is to determine “whether the
evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-
sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–52. In order to
establish that a fact is or cannot be genuinely disputed, a party must (a) cite to specific parts of the
record—including deposition testimony, documentary evidence, affidavits or declarations, or other
competent evidence—in support of its position, or (b) demonstrate that the materials relied upon
by the opposing party do not actually establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Conclusory assertions offered without any factual basis in the record cannot
create a genuine dispute sufficient to survive summary judgment. See Ass’n of Flight Attendants-
CWA, AFL-CIO v. Dep’t of Transp., 564 F.3d 462, 465–66 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Moreover, where “a
party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party’s
assertion of fact,” the district court may “consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
III. ANALYSIS
WMATA is entitled to summary judgment on Mr. Hunter’s retaliation claim because
Mr. Hunter has failed to produce evidence sufficient to allow a reasonable fact-finder to conclude
that WMATA’s stated reason for terminating his employment was pretextual.
To prevail on a claim of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must show (1) that he
“opposed a practice made unlawful by Title VII,” (2) that his employer “took a materially adverse
action against him,” and (3) “the employer took the action ‘because’ the employee opposed the
practice.” McGrath v. Clinton, 666 F.3d 1377, 1380 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
3(a)). A “materially adverse” employment action is one that “could well dissuade a reasonable
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worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry.
Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006). To establish that an employer acted “because” the employee
engaged in a protected activity, “the employee must proffer evidence from which a reasonable jury
could infer the employer’s retaliatory intent.” McGrath, 666 F.3d at 1387; Montgomery v. Chao,
546 F.3d 703, 707 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
Courts evaluate Title VII claims based on circumstantial evidence, including retaliation
claims, under the burden-shifting framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 901 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Montgomery,
546 F.3d at 706. In a retaliation case, the plaintiff must first “establish a prima facie case of
retaliation.” Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 901. If the plaintiff meets this burden, “the employer must
articulate a legitimate nonretaliatory reason for its action.” Id. If the employer offers such a
reason, “the plaintiff has the ultimate burden of establishing that the reason asserted by the
employer is pretext for retaliation.” Id.
However, courts “need not—and should not—decide whether the plaintiff actually made
out a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas” where (1) “an employee has suffered an adverse
employment action,” and (2) “an employer has asserted a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
for the decision.” Brady v. Office of Sgt. at Arms, U.S. House of Reps., 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C.
Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original).
Instead, at the summary judgment stage, the Court ordinarily must determine only whether
the employee has produced sufficient evidence to allow a “reasonable jury not only could
disbelieve the employer’s reasons, but also could conclude that the employer acted, at least in part,
for a prohibited reason.” Walker v. Johnson, 798 F.3d 1085, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 2015). In resolving
this central question, courts look to, among other things, “(1) the plaintiff’s prima facie case; (2)
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any evidence the plaintiff presents to attack the employer’s proffered explanation for its actions;
and (3) any further evidence of discrimination [or retaliation] that may be available to the plaintiff
(such as independent evidence of discriminatory [or retaliatory] statements or attitudes on the part
of the employer).” Hampton v. Vilsack, 685 F.3d 1096, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
As in any context in which the plaintiff would bear the burden of proof on a dispositive
issue at trial, at the summary judgment stage, the plaintiff bears the burden of production to identify
competent evidence of facts showing that there exists a genuine dispute requiring trial. Ricci v.
DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 586 (2009) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 324). To carry
this burden, the plaintiff must present more than a “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in
support of the [its] position.” Anderson, 477 U.S at 252. The evidence must be such that “the jury
could reasonably find for the [non-moving party].’’ Id.; see also Figueroa v. Pompeo, 923 F.3d
1078, 1087 (D.C. Cir 2011) (applying four-factor analysis when weighing evidence of legitimate,
non-discriminatory reasons). Ultimately, “courts are without authority to ‘second-guess an
employer’s personnel decision absent demonstrably discriminatory motive.’” Waterhouse v.
District of Columbia, 298 F.3d 989, 995 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Fischbach v. Dist. of Columbia
Dep’t of Corr., 86 F.3d 1180, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
Here, WMATA proffers that it terminated Mr. Hunter’s employment because he failed to
satisfy a certification requirement of the CA II position that Mr. Hunter voluntarily accepted as
part of the resolution of his prior arbitration. See Def.’s Stmt. ¶ 10; Moore Decl. ¶ 10. That non-
retaliatory justification supports the award of summary judgment in WMATA’s favor.
Mr. Hunter disputes WMATA’s explanation, arguing that it terminated him in retaliation
for the protected activity of filing a complaint about being denied work after his reinstatement in
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2020. See Pl.’s Ex. 13 (“Hunter Dep.”), Dkt. No. 23-1 at 28–57, at 15:1–9. In support of this
contention, Mr. Hunter proffers his own testimony that WMATA and Ms. Moore “set [him] up to
fail” by placing him into a position it knew that he was not qualified to hold. See Hunter Dep. at
11:16–19; see also id. at 14:17–21. He also cites the fact that, in September 2017, WMATA had
found him to be unqualified for the position into which he agreed to be reinstated in March 2020.
See Pl.’s Exs., Dkt. No. 23-1 at 6. Finally, he proffers that he received notice that the relevant
certification requirement applied to his position for the first time on June 1, 2021, shortly before
WMATA notified him that it had concluded its investigation of the formal complaint of retaliation
he filed in April 2021. See Pl.’s Mot., Dkt. No. 23, at 5; Pl.’s Ex. 7, Dkt. No. 23-1 at 23-1.
However, Mr. Hunter has not offered any evidence that WMATA applied the certification
requirement differently to him than to other similarly situated employees. Cf. Holmes v.
Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 723 F. Supp. 3d 1, 26 (D.D.C. 2024) (JEB) (noting that
comparator evidence is “the most commonly employed method of demonstrating that an
employer’s explanation is pretextual”). On the contrary, WMATA has proffered unrebutted
evidence that it sent a notice to “All PRMT Contracting Personnel” describing the certification
requirement that applied to Mr. Hunter’s position and several other positions in the same
department. See Def.’s Ex. 2., Dkt. No. 21-4. Later, on the same day on which WMATA
personally notified Mr. Hunter that he needed to satisfy the certification requirement or risk
termination, it sent nearly identical notices to three other similarly situated employees. See Def.’s
Ex. 4, Dkt. No. 21-6. Mr. Hunter has not introduced any evidence that WMATA later waived the
requirement for any other employee. The absence of any evidence that Mr. Hunter was treated
differently than similarly situated employees cuts against his argument that a reasonable jury could
find WMATA’s explanation for his termination to be pretextual.
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A further obstacle to Mr. Hunter’s retaliation claim is that he has not introduced any
evidence that Ms. Moore—the official who decided to terminate his employment—was personally
aware of his April 2017 complaint. “[T]o establish the requisite causal nexus between the
protected activity and the employer’s materially adverse action, a plaintiff must demonstrate by
direct or circumstantial evidence that the employer had actual knowledge of the protected activity
and took adverse action against him because of it.” Brisbon v. Tischner, 639 F. Supp. 3d 164,
184–85 (D.D.C. 2022) (RBW) (quoting Sledge v. District of Columbia, 63 F. Supp. 3d 1, 19
(D.D.C. 2014) (KBJ)), aff’d, No. 23-5007, 2023 WL 5162363 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 9, 2023). Mr.
Hunter contends that Ms. Moore must have known about his complaint because she supervised
each of the managers whom he alleged had failed to give him meaningful work. See Pl.’s Opp’n
at 3. However, “an employee cannot survive summary judgment if a jury can do no more than
‘speculate’ that [his] employer knew of [his] protected activity.” Morris v. McCarthy, 825 F.3d
658, 674 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Talavera v. Shah, 638 F.3d 303, 313 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). The absence
of evidence that Ms. Moore knew about Mr. Hunter’s complaint further narrows the grounds that
may be available to support a finding that WMATA’s explanation was pretextual.
Contrary to Mr. Hunter’s arguments, the timing of WMATA’s April 2021 and June 2021
notices about the certification requirement for Mr. Hunter’s position does not support a reasonable
inference of retaliation. See Pl.’s Mot. at 5. Each of these notices came from Ms. Moore, and as
the Court has just explained, there is no evidence in the record that Ms. Moore knew about Mr.
Hunter’s April 2021 complaint. Moreover, “temporal proximity alone is not enough to prove
pretext.” Crowley v. Perdue, 318 F. Supp. 3d 277, 289 (D.D.C. 2018) (APM). To “defeat the
presumption that the [employer’s] proffered explanations are genuine” and withstand a motion for
summary judgment, an employee must offer “positive evidence beyond mere proximity.”
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Woodruff v. Peters, 482 F.3d 521, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2007). If the rule were otherwise, “then protected
activities would effectively grant employees a period of immunity, during which no act, however
egregious, would support summary judgment for the employer in a subsequent retaliation claim.”
Id. Accordingly, the mere fact that Mr. Hunter received direct notice of the certification
requirement for his position close in time to his April 2021 complaint does not support an inference
that WMATA’s stated reasons for its actions are a pretext for unlawful retaliation.
For the same reason, the timing of Mr. Hunter’s message to Ms. Rosborough in
March 2022 does not support a reasonable inference of retaliation. At the threshold, it is doubtful
that Mr. Hunter could withstand summary judgment by relying on evidence of protected activity
that is not cited in either his EEOC Charge of Discrimination or his complaint. Cf. Park v. Howard
Univ., 71 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that a Title VII claim must be reasonably related
to the allegations presented in an EEOC charge). Even if he could do so, there is no evidence in
the record that Ms. Moore knew of Mr. Hunter’s complaint to Ms. Rosborough, and several months
passed between the complaint and Mr. Hunter’s eventual termination. There is no other evidence
in the record linking the two events. On this record, a reasonable jury could not infer that
WMATA’s stated reason for terminating him was a pretext for unlawful retaliation for his March
2022 complaint to Ms. Rosborough.
Mr. Hunter’s allegations that his supervisors did not provide him with enough work and
required him to provide documentation in connection with his use of sick leave do not support his
claim of retaliation, either.5 Mr. Hunter has not alleged in this case that any of these actions was,
5 The Court assumes, without deciding, that Mr. Hunter’s allegation about the requirement to provide additional
documentation in connection with his use of sick leave is properly before the Court as it evaluates whether Mr. Hunter
has proffered evidence from which a reasonable jury to infer a retaliatory motive. Cf. Crawford v. Duke, 867 F.3d
103, 108 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (explaining that, at least at the motion to dismiss stage, courts consider supplemental
material filed by pro se litigants if doing so helps clarify to the plaintiff’s claims). However, as WMATA notes,
allegations outside the scope of a properly filed Charge of Discrimination generally cannot form the basis for a Title
VII claim. See Def.’s Opp’n, Dkt. No. 25 at 2 n.2, Park, 71 F.3d at 907.
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on its own, sufficiently adverse to constitute actionable retaliation. See Compl. ¶ 56; cf. Burlington
N., 548 U.S. at 57 (holding that an employment action is “adverse” if it “could well dissuade a
reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination”). Mr. Hunter also has
not introduced any evidence linking these actions to WMATA’s ultimate decision to terminate him
for failure to obtain a required certification—a reason that does not depend on Mr. Hunter’s
performance or attendance record. On this record, Mr. Hunter’s allegations about lack of work
and being required to provide documentation to use sick leave do not support a reasonable
inference that WMATA’s stated reason for his termination was pretextual.
Finally, Mr. Hunter’s testimony that he believed WMATA had “set [him] up to fail” by
placing him in the CA II role is not sufficient to support his claim of retaliation in this case. See
Hunter Dep. at 11:16–19. WMATA’s consistently stated reason for terminating his employment
is that he failed to obtain a certification that was required for his position. See Def.’s Mem. at 3–
4; Def.’s Ex. 6, Dkt. No. 21-8. Although Mr. Hunter suggests that WMATA’s other conduct shows
that it did not intend for him to succeed in his new position, he has not introduced evidence from
which a reasonable jury could conclude that WMATA’s stated reason was pretextual. As
WMATA correctly notes, Mr. Hunter voluntarily accepted the CA II position, and WMATA sent
him a personal reminder about the certification requirement for this position nearly a full year
before the deadline to obtain certification passed. See Def.’s Opp’n at 1–2. WMATA sent three
other employees similar reminders, showing both that WMATA expected others to comply with
this requirement and that Mr. Hunter was not the only employee who did not have a necessary
certification at the time of being hired into a position that required one. See Def.’s Ex. 4, Dkt. No.
21-6. On this record, Mr. Hunter’s own testimony is insufficient to create a genuine dispute of
material fact about WMATA’s motive for firing him.
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In sum, because Mr. Hunter has not proffered evidence from which a reasonable jury could
infer that WMATA acted with "retaliatory intent" when it terminated his employment, WMATA
is entitled to summary judgment. See McGrath, 666 F.3d at 1387. The Court shall therefore grant
WMATA's motion and deny Mr. Hunter's cross-motion.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court shall GRANT WMATA's [21] Renewed Motion for
Summary Judgment and DENY Plaintiff Hunter's [23] Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. An
appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Dated: March 3, 2026
COL~ 	O~~O~~
United States District Judge
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