Lisa Cato

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
In re: Case No. 25-00290-ELG
Lisa Cato, Chapter 7
Debtor.
ORDER DENYING MOTION
FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES TRUSTEE
On March 25, 2026, the Court held a hearing (the “Hearing”) on the Motion for Sanctions
Against the United States Trustee for Misconduct, Abuse of Process, Lack of Probable Cause,
Violation of Ethical Standards, and Improper Use of Prejudicial and Stale Material in a § 110
Proceeding (the “Motion for Sanctions”) (ECF No. 39) filed by Robert Miller, the bankruptcy
petition preparer for Lisa Cato (the “Debtor”), and responses thereto. The Motion for Sanctions is
riddled with muddled argument, fabricated legal citations,1 and arguments already addressed by
the Court. Giving the pro se Motion for Sanctions a liberal and generous reading, it appears that
Mr. Miller is requesting sanctions against the United States Trustee (the “UST”) based on
arguments presented to the Court by the UST in and related to the Motion to Disgorge Fees and
Impose Fines on Bankruptcy Petition Preparer for Violations of 11 U.S.C. § 110 (the
1 The Motion for Sanctions is not the first instance of Mr. Miller using incorrect citations, fabricated quotations, or
misstatements of law. See Order, ECF No. 83 (requiring that all of Mr. Miller’s future filings be accompanied by a
“certification stating whether generative AI was used in the drafting process and confirming that Mr. Miller conducted
a separate, independent review prior to the filing verifying the accuracy of all citations therein”). The continued use
of hallucinated caselaw undermines Mr. Miller’s legal assertions and arguments and may violate Bankruptcy Rule
9011(b).
The order below is hereby signed.
Signed: July 10 2026
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“Disgorgement Motion”) (ECF No. 31), which the Court previously granted and Mr. Miller
subsequently appealed.2 See Order Granting Motion to Disgorge Fees and Impose Fines on Robert
Miller, ECF No. 49; Notice of Appeal, ECF No. 58; see also Redmond v. Fulwood, 859 F.3d 11,
13–14, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (construing pro se allegations liberally and applying “most generous
reading” to civil complaint). At the Hearing, the Court heard argument from the UST and Mr.
Miller. For the reasons stated herein, the Motion for Sanctions is denied.
I. Background
As further articulated in the Order Granting Motion to Disgorge Fees and Impose Fines
on Robert Miller (the “Disgorgement Order”) (ECF No. 49), this case involves an honest but
unfortunate debtor who, notwithstanding Mr. Miller’s actions, received a chapter 7 discharge on
December 15, 2025. However, in seeking her discharge the Debtor chose to engage the services of
Mr. Miller, whose actions throughout the entirety of the case have run afoul of the Bankruptcy
Code and Bankruptcy Rules.3
On September 26, 2025, the UST filed the Disgorgement Motion, which was served on
Mr. Miller as indicated in the certificate of service attached thereto and signed by a paralegal
specialist within the UST (the “Certificate of Service”). Paragraph 18 of the Disgorgement Motion
reads, “Upon information and belief, Mr. Miller was previously charged with practicing law
without admission to the bar in 2003 in Harford County, MD” (“Paragraph 18”). As discussed
2 To the extent the Motion for Sanctions seeks to re-litigate issues surrounding the Disgorgement Motion, Mr. Miller’s
subsequent appeal has divested the Court of jurisdiction of the arguments related thereto. Griggs v. Provident
Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982) (“A notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional significance — it
confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case
involved in the appeal.”); see also In re Sealed Case, 77 F.4th 815, 828 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (“[But] [a]n appeal,
including an interlocutory appeal, divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the
appeal.”) (quoting Coinbase Inc. v. Bielski, 599 U.S. 736, 740 (2023)). Therefore, the Court lacks jurisdiction to
consider any argument pertaining to the merits of the Disgorgement Motion and order thereon.
3 Unless specifically indicated otherwise, all section references are to Title 11 of the United States Code (the
“Bankruptcy Code”). The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure shall be referred to as the “Bankruptcy Rules,” the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure shall be referred to as the “Civil Rules,” and the Federal Rules of Evidence shall be
referred to as the “Rules of Evidence” herein.
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infra, the Motion for Sanctions alleges that each of these items is sanctionable for different reasons.
In response to the Disgorgement Motion, Mr. Miller filed a Supplemental Memorandum of
Law in Support of Petitioner’s Opposition to the United States Trustee’s Motion to Disgorge Fees
and Impose Fines on Bankruptcy Petition Preparer for Alleged Violations of 11 U.S.C. § 110 (ECF
No. 33) and Response in Opposition to the United States Trustee’s Motion to Disgorge Fees and
Impose Fines on Bankruptcy Petition Preparer for Alleged Violations of 11 U.S.C. § 110 (ECF
No. 35) (collectively, the “Opposition”). The Opposition contained, inter alia, allegations
surrounding the sufficiency of the Certificate of Service.
The Court heard argument from both the UST and Mr. Miller on the Disgorgement Motion
on November 5, 2025 (the “Disgorgement Hearing”) and took the matter under advisement. While
the Disgorgement Motion was under advisement, on or about December 3, 2025, Mr. Miller filed
the Motion for Sanctions and a Consolidated Motion and Memorandum of Law to Dismiss and/or
Deny the United States Trustee’s Motion to Disgorge Fees and Impose Fines for Due Process
Violations, Statutory Defects, and Lack of Legal Merit (ECF No. 38) without leave of court and
without proper notice. On December 10, 2025, the Clerk’s Office issued a Notice of Deficient
Filing (ECF No. 40), and the Court entered the Disgorgement Order without considering either of
Mr. Miller’s December 3, 2025 pleadings. ECF No. 49, at 2 n.3. Thereafter, Mr. Miller filed a
Notice of Appeal (the “Notice of Appeal”) (ECF No. 63), appealing the Disgorgement Order. The
appeal remains pending as of the date of this Order.
On February 27, 2026, the Court docketed a Notice of Hearing with respect to the Motion
for Sanctions, and on March 9, 2026 the UST filed an Objection to the Motion for Sanctions (the
“UST Objection”) (ECF No. 77). Mr. Miller filed a Consolidated Response to the Objection of the
U.S. Trustee to the Motion for Sanctions and to Strike Pleading, with Supplemental Authority (the
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“Response”) (ECF No. 81) on March 23, 2026.
II. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334. This is
a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A). Venue is proper before this Court pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409. This Order sets forth the Court’s findings of fact and conclusions
of law in accordance with Bankruptcy Rule 7052. Findings of fact shall be construed as
conclusions of law and conclusions of law shall be construed as findings of fact where appropriate.
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7052.
III. Discussion
As an initial matter, the Motion for Sanctions appears to seek sanctions for arguments
within the Disgorgement Motion and arguments made by the UST at the Disgorgement Hearing.
Even providing the most liberal and generous reading, many arguments within the Motion for
Sanctions are indecipherable. To the best of the Court’s understanding, Mr. Miller raises four
arguments to support his request for an award of monetary sanctions: (1) the UST improperly filed
the Disgorgement Motion; (2) Paragraph 18 contains improper character evidence; (3) the Court’s
Local Bankruptcy Rules are in conflict with federal law; and (4) the UST has violated the Rules
of Professional Conduct.4 At the Hearing, however, Mr. Miller argued only two points: (1) the
Certificate of Service was improperly signed and therefore is invalid (thus purportedly invalidating
the Disgorgement Order); and (2) the reference to Mr. Miller’s “prior convictions” in the
Disgorgement Motion were “hearsay” and inadmissible.5 Hearing Recording, ECF No. 85, at
4 The Motion for Sanctions argues that the UST has violated the “ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.” The
ABA Model Rules do not govern any licensed attorney. However, they have been largely adopted by the District of
Columbia, and the Court will infer that Mr. Miller’s reference is meant to be to the District of Columbia Rules of
Professional Conduct.
5 Notably, and consistent with the unascertainable nature of Mr. Miller’s arguments, the Motion for Sanctions itself
does not contain a single argument on the validity of the Certificate of Service. However, in his Consolidated Response
to the Objection of the U.S. Tr. to the Mot. for Sanctions and to Strike Pleading, with Supp. Authority (ECF No. 81),
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1:35–2:44, 8:29–9:41, 15:44–16:20. Despite prompting from the Court regarding additional
arguments he may have, Mr. Miller asserted at the Hearing that he only intended to pursue the two
above points. Id. Thus, all other arguments contained within the Motion for Sanctions are deemed
abandoned and are denied. See Parker v. Hoglander, No. 15-926, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81588,
at *7–8 (D.D.C. June 23, 2016) (finding that a party’s deliberate choice not to defend certain claims
warrants them to be deemed abandoned and dismissed). Before turning to the merits of Mr.
Miller’s allegations, the Court first addresses Mr. Miller’s compliance with Bankruptcy Rule 9011.
A. Mr. Miller Failed to Comply with the Safe Harbor Provision of Bankruptcy Rule
9011(c)
Mr. Miller appears to ask for monetary sanctions against the UST under Bankruptcy Rule
9011. The UST argues that Mr. Miller failed to comply with the statutory requirements for doing
so, including but not limited to, the safe harbor provision that requires notice prior to filing.
Bankruptcy Rule 9011 requires a movant to serve upon the respondent a copy of their proposed
motion 21 days prior to filing the motion with the Court. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011(c)(2)(B); Kelleher
v. National Asset Mgmt. (In re Shelbourne North Water Sr. L.P.), 550 B.R. 391, 403 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 2016). The purpose of the mandatory safe harbor is to provide the alleged offending party an
opportunity to withdraw or correct any alleged misconduct prior to the filing of the motion. See
Elliott v. Tilton, 64 F.3d 213, 216 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Civil Rule 11(c)(1)(A)). Courts require
strict compliance with the safe harbor provision; not even informal notice is sufficient to award
sanctions.6 Cadle Co. v. Pratt (In re Pratt), 524 F.3d 580, 586 (5th Cir. 2008). “Compliance with
Mr. Miller asserts that the purported lack of validity of the Certificate of Service mandates the Court strike the
Disgorgement Motion.
6 Due to his pro se status, Mr. Miller was given an opportunity to speak on his Motion for Sanctions, despite extensive
precedent that allowed for the Court to refuse to hear a motion from a party that failed to meet the requisite safe harbor
standard. See Ettinger & Assocs., LLC v. Miller (In re Miller), 730 F.3d 198, 70 C.B.C.2d 403 (3d Cir. 2013); Thomas
v. Off. of the Tenn. AG, 2020 Bankr. LEXIS 3298 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. Nov. 23, 2020), appeal dismissed as moot, 2022
U.S. App. LEXIS 580 (6th Cir. Jan 7, 2022); Good Gateway, LLC v. NRCT, Inc. (In re Bay Circle Props., Inc.), 2022
Bankr. LEXIS 3150 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Nov. 11, 2022); In re Panthera Enters., LLC, 2021 Bankr. LEXIS 859 (Bankr.
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the service requirement is a mandatory prerequisite to an award of sanctions.” Id. The result of a
party’s failure to meet the mandatory prerequisite is dismissal or denial of the requested sanctions.
See Roth v. Green, 466 F.3d 1179, 1192 (10th Cir. 2006).
It is undisputed that Mr. Miller failed to comply with the safe harbor provisions of
Bankruptcy Rule 9011. At the Hearing, Mr. Miller appeared to argue that he need not comply with
the safe harbor provision because the UST failed to comply with other purported legal
requirements. He also appeared to argue that notice was sufficient because the UST appeared at
the Hearing. These arguments are neither persuasive nor legally accurate. See In re Pratt, 524 F.3d
at 586 (emphasizing that Bankruptcy Rule 9011 “is a mandatory prerequisite to an award of
sanctions”). Therefore, the Motion for Sanctions must be denied for Mr. Miller’s failure to comply
with the safe harbor provisions of Bankruptcy Rule 9011.
B. Even if Mr. Miller had Complied with the Safe Harbor Requirements, His
Arguments Lack Merit
Notwithstanding Mr. Miller’s failure to comply, he would not be entitled to sanctions
because his arguments misstate the law and are inherently flawed.
i. The UST’s Certificate of Service was Valid and Proper
The primary argument Mr. Miller raised at the Hearing was that the Certificate of Service
was improper because it was signed by a paralegal and not an attorney, and therefore all relief
granted related to the Disgorgement Motion should be void. In addition, Mr. Miller argued that the
purported improprieties of the Certificate of Service should be reviewed by the Court under
Bankruptcy Rule 9011(a). Each point is fatally flawed.
As an initial matter, the Court notes that certificates of service have a separate designation
N.D. W. Va. April 1, 2021); In re M.A.S. Realty Corp., 326 B.R. 31, 39 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005); In re McNichols, 258
B.R. 892, 902–903 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2001).
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from pleadings under the Civil Rules. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5. Notably, the notes of the Advisory
Committee on the Civil Rules (the “Advisory Notes”) state that the person making service must
certify that service was effectuated. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 advisory committee’s note to 1991
amendment. The language of both Civil Rule 5 and the Advisory Notes make a clear distinction
between the term “person” and the term “attorney.” Contrary to Mr. Miller’s argument, nothing in
the Civil Rule requires an attorney to complete service, and the language specifically requires that
the party actually effectuating service sign the certificate. Moreover, if the Court were to adopt
Mr. Miller’s argument, then a certificate of service would require a higher level of service than a
summons to initiate a case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (“Any person who is at least 18 years old and not
a party may serve a summons and complaint.”).
Further, although he represented to the Court that he had cited caselaw in support of his
argument, Mr. Miller failed to establish that a paralegal’s signature on a certificate of service is
insufficient under Civil Rule 5. Each of the cases referenced by Mr. Miller are distinguishable and
do not address the sufficiency of an executed certificate of service. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel
Entertainment Group does not reference the term “other document” or “certificate of service,” but
rather defines the term “person who signed” and emphasizes that the individual signer can be
sanctioned based on the pleading to which their signature is affixed. 493 U.S. 120, 121 (1989).
Similarly, Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises holds that the
signature of an attorney or pro se individual represents a certification that the signer has conducted
a reasonable inquiry into the facts and the law prior to filing a pleading. 498 U.S. 533, 535 (1991).
Each of the other cases cited by Mr. Miller are similarly distinguishable in that they embody true
and accurate representations of the law but do not address the question of sufficiency of a signature
on a certificate of service. See, e.g., In re Martin, 670 B.R. 636 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2025) (sanctioning
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an attorney for filing a petition that was not signed by the debtor and other filings that were “pre-
signed” by the debtor); Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding that
government officials breached duties in a matter unrelated to the signature requirement of Civil
Rule 11).
Mr. Miller also asserts that the paralegal’s signature on the Certificate of Service somehow
violates the Local Bankruptcy Rules of this Court. First, it is unclear to which, if any, Local
Bankruptcy Rules Mr. Miller refers. Local Bankruptcy Rule 9013-1 requires a certificate of service
to be filed for each “pleading, motion, and other paper” but is silent as to who must execute a
certificate of service. Moreover, the Local Bankruptcy Rules are consistent with federal law. But
even beyond this, courts can use local rules to fill gaps within or impose higher standards than the
federal rules. See DCt.LBR 9029-1 (authorizing the Court to make local rules); 6 Moore’s Fed.
Practice – Civil § 26.04 (2026) (acknowledging that many local rules “contain stricter or more
detailed requirements than those found in the federal rules”).
Finally, even if the Certificate of Service was found to be improperly filed (or, more
drastically, not filed at all), it would not ipso facto void either the underlying pleading or any
resulting orders. See Russell v. City of Milwaukee, 338 F.3d 662, 666 (7th Cir. 2003)(“[T]he
absence of a certificate does not require the invalidation of the paper where service is not contested
or where the court finds that service was accomplished.”). While a court may disregard a pleading
or other paper when a certificate of service is absent from a filing, it is not required to. Id. Mr.
Miller’s multiple responsive pleadings and appearance at the Disgorgement Hearing provide ample
evidence that he was on actual notice of the Disgorgement Motion.
ii. Allegations in a Pleading are not Evidence
Mr. Miller also appears to argue that Paragraph 18 includes sanctionable language because
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it violated Rules of Evidence 402, 403, and 404(a), and that the UST used it “to gain favor with
the Court.”7 Hearing Recording at 15:15–15:31, ECF No. 85. Even if this argument were not barred
by Mr. Miller’s appeal, a statement within a pleading is not evidence, and the Rules of Evidence
have no bearing on the pleading itself. See, e.g., Ward v. Dist. of Columbia, 950 F. Supp. 2d 9, 18
(D.D.C. 2013) (emphasizing that an allegation in a pleading, in this instance a complaint, are
“decidedly not evidence”) (quoting Garay v. Liriano, 943 F. Supp. 2d 1, 20 (D.D.C. 2013)); Long
v. Hooks, 972 F.3d 442, 463 (4th Cir. 2020) (“[C]ounsel’s arguments are not evidence in a case. It
is literally black letter law.”). Further, none of the findings in the Disgorgement Order rely upon
the language within Paragraph 18 of the Disgorgement Motion.
IV. Conclusion
The Motion is denied due to Mr. Miller’s failure to adhere to the safe harbor provisions of
Bankruptcy Rule 9011. Even if Mr. Miller had complied with the rigors thereof, his arguments as
to the Certificate of Service and contents of the Disgorgement Motion are also meritless. Mr. Miller
failed to advance any other arguments discernable from the Motion for Sanctions at the Hearing,
and they are denied as abandoned. Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and
DECREED that the Motion for Sanctions (ECF No. 39) is DENIED.
[Signed and dated above.]
7 In yet another inconsistency, Mr. Miller argues in the Motion for Sanctions that the UST’s reference to “prior
convictions” was inadmissible hearsay. Paragraph 18 does not reference a conviction, merely that “[u]pon information
and belief, Mr. Miller was previously charged with practicing law without admission to the bar in 2003 in Harford
County, MD.” Mr. Miller’s arguments regarding use of prior convictions are therefore inapplicable and separate and
distinct from the language he is challenging.
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Copies to: Recipients of CM/ECF Notices, and
Lisa Cato
1707 7th St NW
Apt 901
Washington, DC 20001
Robert Miller
Constitutional Law Advocates
601 Pennsylvania Ave NW
Suite 900
Washington, DC 20004
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