John Alan Sakon

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
HARTFORD DIVISION
In re:
John Alan Sakon,
Debtor.
Chapter 7
Case No. 19-21619 (JJT)
Re: ECF No. 1161
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER
GRANTING MOTION FOR AUTHORITY TO SEVER AND
BIFURCATE BANKRUPTCY ESTATE’S NEGLIGENCE CLAIM
Before the Court is the Chapter 7 Trustee’s Motion for Authority to Sever and
Bifurcate Bankruptcy Estate’s Negligence Claim (Motion, ECF No. 1161). In the
Motion, the Chapter 7 Trustee seeks what may be in effect a comfort order1 that
would allow her special counsel to request that the Connecticut Superior Court
sever and bifurcate Count One of the Complaint in Sakon v. Roberts, No. HHD-CV-
20-6130471-S (Conn. Super. Ct.) (Superior Court Action) from the other counts in
the case. As noted by the Trustee, the remaining counts in the Superior Court
Action—which belong to the Debtor individually2—have either been dismissed or
summary judgment has been granted on them in favor of the defendants, leaving
only Count One—which belongs to the bankruptcy estate—still pending before the
Superior Court. The Debtor alone, meanwhile, has taken an appeal of the judgment
1 Whether this decision is in the ordinary course and authority of the Trustee under 11 U.S.C. § 704
or requires Court authorization under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) is a close call given the Debtor’s persistent
claims over management of the litigation and his challenge to each of the Trustee’s substantive
decisions during the course of this case.
2 The Chapter 7 estate initially retained the personal injury counts (Counts One through Four), with
the other counts being abandoned to the Debtor on June 18, 2021 (ECF No. 456). Counts Two
through Four were later abandoned to the Debtor on September 11, 2025 (ECF No. 1156).
Case 19-21619 Doc 1167 Filed 12/03/25 Entered 12/03/25 17:38:50 Page 1 of 6

2
granted on the other counts, which has had the effect of stalling the Trustee’s
efforts to resolve or try Count One.3
The Debtor filed opposition papers to the Motion (ECF No. 1162), in which he
says that the Superior Court has already ruled on the issue. He also complains of
the legal representation of the Trustee by her special counsel in the Superior Court
Action and argues that he has an interest in Count One because of injuries that
manifested after the petition date. The Court held a hearing on the Motion on
November 6, 2025, at which the Debtor spent much of his time launching into
tirades about alleged malpractice committed by the Trustee and her special counsel
regarding their strategic and procedural management of the Superior Court Action.
The Court then took the matter under advisement.4
The Court first addresses the Debtor’s argument that the Superior Court
already ruled on the issue of the severance of Count One. The Court notes that it is
not clear from the Superior Court docket where that court supposedly ruled on the
issue; however, at the November 6, 2025 hearing before this Court, the Debtor
simply stated that the issue had been decided and that res judicata and collateral
estoppel precluded the Trustee from asking for severance of Count One from the
remaining counts now. The Debtor is mistaken. Res judicata and collateral estoppel
apply only when there is a final judgment. See Mazziotti v. Allstate Ins. Co., 240
3 Defendant Michael Roberts moved for a stay of the Superior Court Action pending final
determination of the Debtor’s appeal, which the Superior Court granted.
4 The Court has taken judicial notice of the rulings and proceedings in the Superior Court Action.
The Court also once again reviewed its own docket to survey the Motions, Rulings, and Decisions
issued by this Court in the face of the Debtor’s multiple, abrasive, and unsupported attacks on the
Trustee, her special counsel, and this Court. Any claims of malpractice are premature at this
juncture and unsupported by an expert opinion, as the case has not gone to trial or final judgment.
Case 19-21619 Doc 1167 Filed 12/03/25 Entered 12/03/25 17:38:50 Page 2 of 6

3
Conn. 799, 812–13, 695 A.2d 1010, 1017 (1997). Final judgment has not entered in
the Superior Court action, at least not as to Count One. Thus, these preclusion
doctrines are no impediment to asking the Superior Court to consider (or even
reconsider) severing and bifurcating the counts.5
As for the Debtor’s complaints about the Trustee’s and her special counsel’s
performance in the Superior Court action, he is simply in no position to complain
because he is, in effect, a stranger to Count One. Further, if there is any alleged
malpractice by special counsel, that is, in the first instance, the Chapter 7 estate’s
claim to make, not the Debtor’s. Moreover, his request that the Trustee and her
special counsel receive unspecified “judicial supervision” by this Court ignores that
they are already supervised by the United States Trustee and, ultimately, by this
Court in the administration of this estate. Such efforts of control by the Debtor, or
this Court, are unprecedented, with the Debtor having again provided no legal
authority for this Court to enter any such extraordinary orders.6
Furthermore, the Debtor’s allegations of malpractice and case
mismanagement are rooted in mere speculation and his to this point
5 The Debtor has also failed to support this argument with proper citation to facts, law, or the
relevant ruling in his brief. Such is enough to rule to that the Debtor’s argument is effectively
waived. See United States v. Fayton, 704 F. Supp. 3d 449, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (“[A] party may be
deemed to have waived an argument through inadequate briefing, such as a perfunctory one-
sentence argument.”).
6 Indeed, the Supreme Court has cautioned that bankruptcy courts must exercise their equitable
powers under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) “within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code.” Law v. Siegel, 571
U.S. 415, 421 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Conversely, if the Trustee’s request is
considered under the § 105(a) paradigm, such is permissible because it is in furtherance of the Code’s
commands. See 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(1) (“The trustee shall . . . collect and reduce to money the property
of the estate for which such trustee serves, and close such estate as expeditiously as is compatible
with the best interests of parties in interest[.]”).
Case 19-21619 Doc 1167 Filed 12/03/25 Entered 12/03/25 17:38:50 Page 3 of 6

4
unsubstantiated and inflated visions of the merits of his wide-ranging and
expansive claims against the Town of Glastonbury and others; his assertions that
the Superior Court Action is worth in excess of $5 million is based on no more than
his internet sleuthing and imaginings. When asked by this Court if he had an
expert who could testify to such damages, the Debtor, after much obfuscation, said
he did not. He also declined to explain why he did not previously substantiate or
assert these now allegedly valuable claims either prepetition or while he was a
debtor in possession in control of his then-Chapter 11 case.
The Debtor has also complained that the Superior Court invaded the province
of the jury by deciding certain matters on summary judgment. He simply overlooks
that these matters were addressed on summary judgment by the Superior Court
consistent with the procedural mandates of the Connecticut Practice Book. If the
Superior Court has acted improperly, as the Debtor alleges—and this Court makes
no such conclusions—such is a matter to be resolved in the Debtor’s pending
appeals before the Connecticut Appellate Court; those allegations simply have
nothing to do with the instant Motion.
Finally, the Debtor argues that not all damages arising out of the Count One
negligence claim belong to the bankruptcy estate because either there are
postpetition damages or that he has claimed an exemption in any damages award.
Any allowed exemption would be limited by statute, see 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(11)(D),
such that his protests at this point are mere speculation. He also overlooks that he
has failed to properly assert an appropriate exemption consistent with his
Case 19-21619 Doc 1167 Filed 12/03/25 Entered 12/03/25 17:38:50 Page 4 of 6

5
contentions in this bankruptcy case.7 Additionally, his argument that he maintains
a cognizable legal interest in this negligence count because of postpetition
manifested injuries from an alleged prepetition tort in 2018 is speculative at best.
There are also, unaddressed by the Debtor, factual credibility issues about the
alleged incident and causation issues that must be considered by a factfinder.
Nevertheless, given its experience and jurisdiction in these matters, the Superior
Court is in the better position to determine whether the Debtor’s claimed injuries
can be proximately traced to liability on the negligence claim or otherwise.
The Trustee, in this instance, is simply asking for this Court’s permission to
seek the severance and bifurcation of Count One, which currently and indisputably
belongs to the Chapter 7 estate; whether to grant such a motion to separately
advance Count One in the interests of justice and efficiency will be the prerogative
of the Superior Court. The Trustee, as mandated by the Bankruptcy Code, is
seeking the expeditious administration of a Chapter 7 estate for a bankruptcy case
filed in 2019, periodically impeded by the delays, frivolous arguments, and evasive
behaviors from the Debtor.8 Nevertheless, nothing stops the Debtor from arguing
7 The Trustee objected to the Debtor’s claims of exemptions, particularly related to the Superior
Court Action, on the basis that the Debtor mixed federal and state exemptions, improperly sought to
exempt proceeds for pain and suffering, and failed to specify a set dollar amount for the exemption
(ECF No. 960). The Court sustained that objection (ECF No. 993). The Debtor has yet to properly
revise his schedules to claim any appropriate exemption.
8 See, e.g., Memorandum of Decision on Debtor’s Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 922), at 6 &
n.3 (“The record of this bankruptcy case is replete with frivolous, meritless motions submitted and
actions taken by the Debtor that have served only to frustrate the expeditious resolution of this
case.”).
Case 19-21619 Doc 1167 Filed 12/03/25 Entered 12/03/25 17:38:50 Page 5 of 6

6
against a Motion to Sever or Bifurcate in the proceedings before the Superior
Court.9
The Court finds that the proposed severance and bifurcation of Count One, as
proposed in the Motion, is within the reasonable judgment, strategic prerogative,
and discretion of the Trustee and her special counsel, and is consistent with her
duties under 11 U.S.C. § 704 to promptly and efficiently administer the Chapter 7
estate for its benefit and that of its creditors. Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED: Bonnie C. Mangan, as Chapter 7 Trustee, is authorized through
her special counsel, BBB Attorneys, to file and prosecute an appropriate pleading or
motion in the Superior Court Action to sever and bifurcate the bankruptcy estate’s
negligence claim in Count One against Michael Roberts from all other counts filed
by the Debtor, John Alan Sakon, in the case entitled Sakon v. Roberts, No. HHD-
CV-20-6130471-S (Conn. Super. Ct.); and it is further
ORDERED: The Trustee and her special counsel are authorized to execute
any documents and to take such actions as are reasonable and necessary to
effectuate this Order.
Date: December 3, 2025
Hartford, Connecticut
9 The Debtor’s protestations that Count One may be settled by the Trustee within policy limits to his
detriment is equally speculative and premature. If indeed the Trustee resolves Count One, any
settlement would require notice and hearing of this Court to secure its approval. See Fed. R. Bankr.
P. 9019. It that context, these protests might be relevant.
Case 19-21619 Doc 1167 Filed 12/03/25 Entered 12/03/25 17:38:50 Page 6 of 6