Morris v. Frontier Airlines, Inc.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Nina Y. Wang
Civil Action No. 25-cv-03912-NYW-KAS
CHRISTOPHER MORRIS, individually and on behalf of all similarly situated persons,
Plaintiff,
v.
FRONTIER AIRLINES, INC.,
Defendant.
______________________________________________________________________
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STAY
______________________________________________________________________
This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Stay All Proceedings Pending This
Court’s Determination of Plaintiff’s Forthcoming Motion for Remand Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(c), or in the Alternative, Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss (“Motion to Stay” or “Motion”), filed by Plaintiff on December 30, 2025.
[Doc. 20]. Defendant filed a Response in opposition, [Doc. 24], and Plaintiff filed a Reply,
[Doc. 25].
BACKGROUND
In this action, Plaintiff Christopher Morris (“Plaintiff” or “Mr. Morris”) alleges that
Defendant Frontier Airlines, Inc. (“Defendant” or “Frontier”) violated certain Colorado
wage laws by failing to pay wages and requiring Plaintiff to enter into an unlawful non-
compete agreement. 	See [Doc. 4 at ¶¶ 50–68]. 	Mr. Morris did not assert any federal
causes of action, instead (1) asserting a claim for unpaid wages in violation of the
Colorado Wage Claim Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 8-4-101, et seq. (“Count I”) and (2)
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challenging an unlawful restrictive covenant/training repayment agreement pursuant to
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-2-113 (“Count II”). 	[Id.]. Mr. Morris originally brought his case as a
putative class action in Colorado state court. See generally [Doc. 4; Doc. 20 at 2].
Frontier removed the case, invoking the Court’s original jurisdiction pursuant to the
Class Action Fairness Act as well as federal question jurisdiction, arguing that Mr. Morris’s
claims necessarily raise a question under the Fair Labor Standards Act. See [Doc. 1 at
2–3, 5–6, 14]. A week after removal, on December 12, 2025, Frontier filed a Motion to
Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. [Doc. 14; Doc.
14-1]. In its Motion to Dismiss, Frontier argues that (1) Mr. Morris lacks Article III standing
because he has not alleged any injury in fact and (2) Count II is preempted by the Railway
Labor Act (“RLA”) and falls outside of this Court’s jurisdiction. [Doc. 14-1 at 1–2, 6–7, 16].
Mr. Morris’s response to Frontier’s Motion to Dismiss was due January 2, 2026, see
D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.1(d), and Frontier states that it was agreeable to a 14-day extension
to January 16, 2026. See [Doc. 24 at 1].
On December 30, 2025, Mr. Morris filed the present Motion to Stay. [Doc. 20]. In
the Motion, Mr. Morris seeks a stay of all proceedings, or at the very least a stay of briefing
on the Motion to Dismiss, pending a ruling on his forthcoming Motion for Remand. [Id.].
Mr. Morris argues that the Parties agree that there is no subject matter jurisdiction in the
case, and therefore both the Motion to Dismiss and the forthcoming Motion for Remand
“would lead to remand for lack of jurisdiction.” See [id. at 2–3]. Mr. Morris contends that
the Motion to Dismiss “is the inappropriate vehicle requesting the inappropriate remedy,”
and will be mooted by his forthcoming Motion for Remand. 	See [id. at 2–4]. 	Thus, Mr.
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Morris concludes, the most efficient way to proceed is to stay all proceedings in this case
unrelated to his request for remand. [Id. at 3, 5].
In its Response to the instant Motion to Stay, Frontier argues that Mr. Morris’s legal
argument is wrong because if Count II is preempted by the RLA, the proper remedy is not
remand but rather dismissal. 	[Doc. 24 at 4–5]. 	Further, Frontier argues that Mr. Morris
failed to establish good cause for a stay or indefinite extension of time under the String
Cheese factors. [Id. at 2].
The Motion to Stay is respectfully DENIED without prejudice.
LEGAL STANDARD
“[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court
to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for
itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254–55 (1936).
In exercising its discretion, a court “must weigh competing interests and maintain an even
balance.” 	Id. 	“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for the stay of
proceedings while motions to dismiss or remand are pending. 	Instead, Rule 1 instructs
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ‘should be construed and administered to secure
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.’” Kremmling Sanitation
Dist. v. Everest Nat. Ins. Co., No. 09-cv-00635-PAB-BNB, 2009 WL 1324124, at *1 (D.
Colo. May 12, 2009).
Stays of proceedings while a dispositive motion is pending are generally disfavored
in this District. 	Kissing Camels Surgery Ctr., LLC v. Centura Health Corp., No. 12-cv-
03012-WJM-NYW, 2015 WL 9304625, at *4 (D. Colo. Dec. 22, 2015); Profitstreams LLC
v. Ameranth, Inc., No. 11-cv-01710-RBJ-KLM, 2011 WL 5024912, at *1 (D. Colo. Oct. 21,
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2011) (collecting cases). However, “decisions from this District have concluded that stays
are generally favored when a jurisdictional defense under Rule 12(b)(1) is asserted.”
United Food & Com. Workers Int’l Union, Loc. No. 7 v. King Soopers, Inc., No. 13-cv-
02335-RM-KMT, 2014 WL 2536489, at *1 (D. Colo. June 5, 2014) (emphasis in original);
see also Clarendon Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Glickauf, No. 18-cv-02549-CMA-NYW, 2019 WL
1897845, at *2 (D. Colo. Feb. 14, 2019) (“[C]ourts may be more inclined to stay discovery
pending the resolution of a Motion to Dismiss impacting immunity or jurisdictional
issues.”).
In determining whether a stay of proceedings or briefing is appropriate, courts in
this District consider the following factors: (1) the plaintiff’s interest in expeditiously
litigating this action and the potential prejudice to plaintiff of a delay; (2) the burden on the
defendant; (3) convenience to the court; (4) nonparties’ interest; and (5) the public
interest. String Cheese Incident, LLC v. Stylus Shows, Inc., No. 05-cv-01934-LTB-PAC,
2006 WL 894955, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2006); Howell v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., No. 24-
cv-00633-RMR-KAS, 2024 WL 5055585, at *2 (D. Colo. June 19, 2024). The “proponent
of a stay bears the burden of establishing its need.” Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 708
(1997).
ANALYSIS
Based on the record before it, the Court finds that a stay is not appropriate in this
case. As an initial matter, the Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Remand likely raise issues
regarding the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction that may be intertwined. 	Further, the
String Cheese factors weigh against a stay or indefinite extension of time to respond to
Frontier’s Motion to Dismiss.
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Plaintiff’s Interest in Proceeding. 	First, the Court notes that plaintiffs typically
have an interest in proceeding expeditiously with litigation. 	Here, though, Mr. Morris
argues that the stay is in his interest because otherwise he will “spend resources arguing
against dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) when he
agrees that there is no subject matter jurisdiction.” 	[Doc. 20 at 4]. 	The Court is
respectfully unpersuaded by this argument. 	The Court notes that the resources that a
party spends in responding to a motion are “not so special as to warrant a stay. Rather,
investing time to respond to a motion is an ordinary burden of litigating a case.” Bank of
Colorado v. Wibaux 1, LLC, No. 17-cv-02871-CMA-KMT, 2018 WL 2562662, at *4 (D.
Colo. June 4, 2018). Mr. Morris has not provided any other explanation for how he would
be burdened by having to respond to Frontier’s Motion to Dismiss, particularly when Mr.
Morris is entirely unclear as to the basis that he believes this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, i.e., whether he concedes he has suffered no injury-in-fact and/or that Count
II is preempted by the RLA. This factor therefore weighs against a stay.
Burden on Defendant. 	Second, Frontier is strongly opposed to a delay in the
case and specifically stresses that it should be allowed “its right to file a Reply in support
of the Motion to Dismiss.” 	See [Doc. 24 at 5]. 	Frontier further argues that it will be
burdened and prejudiced by an indefinite stay for a few reasons: (1) the general principle
that “[j]ustice delayed is justice denied,” (2) Frontier faces the possibility that witnesses’
memories will fade, witnesses will relocate, and documents may get misplaced or
destroyed; and (3) the stay may result in the Court’s attention pulled away from the Motion
to Dismiss. [Id. at 6–7]. Respectfully, this Court is unpersuaded by these arguments as
it does not anticipate the time required for the Court to rule on a Motion to Remand to
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substantially impact witness memories or document retention. 	Further, Defendant’s
suggestion that the Court’s “attention [would be] pulled in several unknown directions,
with several different requests, prior to ruling on Defendant’s timely-filed Motion to
Dismiss” is entirely speculative. This factor is neutral with respect to a stay.
Convenience to the Court. 	Third, the Court finds that it would be most efficient
to have the benefit of a fully-briefed Motion to Dismiss as well as Motion for Remand in
considering the relevant jurisdictional questions and any appropriate relief together. See
Howell, 2024 WL 5055585, at *2; Downey v. Am. Nat’l Prop. & Cas. Co., No. 1:11-cv-
00587-MCA-KBM, 2012 WL 13071548, at *11 (D.N.M. Mar. 31, 2012) (where motions to
dismiss challenge the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, “[i]n the interest of judicial
efficiency, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand and Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss should be
decided concurrently”); see also Arocho v. Nafzinger, No. 07-cv-02603-REB-KLM, 2008
WL 5101701, at *1 (D. Colo. Dec. 1, 2008) (“[T]he Court is inconvenienced by an ill-
advised stay because the delay in prosecuting the case which results from imposition of
a stay makes the Court’s docket less predictable and, hence, less manageable.”). This
factor weighs against a stay.
Public Interest. 	Finally, neither Party has identified any non-parties with a
significant interest in this case. 	But the public has a general “interest in the speedy
resolution of legal disputes” as well as “in ‘avoiding unnecessary expenditures of public
and private resources on litigation.’” 	Ashaheed v. Currington, No. 17-cv-03002-WJM-
SKC, 2019 WL 11690136, at *3 (D. Colo. Nov. 4, 2019). Those two public interests are
best served if the Court can consider jurisdictional issues and appropriate relief at once.
After all, “if removal was proper, then incomplete briefing on the Motion to Dismiss will
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delay a ruling as to whether this dispute should be litigated or arbitrated.” Howell, 2024
WL 5055585, at *3. This factor therefore weighs against a stay.
Having weighed all five relevant factors, the Court finds that a stay or extension of
time to respond to the Motion to Dismiss until after the forthcoming remand motion is
decided is not warranted.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, IT IS ORDERED that:
(1) 	The Motion to Stay All Proceedings Pending This Court’s Determination of
Plaintiff’s Forthcoming Motion for Remand Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c),
or 	in 	the Alternative, 	Motion 	for 	Extension 	of 	Time 	to 	Respond 	to
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, [Doc. 20], is DENIED; and
(2) 	Plaintiff shall file any response to the Motion to Dismiss, [Doc. 14], by
January 16, 2026.
DATED: January 8, 2026 	BY THE COURT:
_________________________
Nina Y. Wang
United States District Judge
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