Y.S. v. John Doe

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 25-cv-03129-DDD-KAS
Y.S.,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOHN DOE et al.,
Defendant.
_____________________________________________________________________
ORDER
_____________________________________________________________________
ENTERED BY MAGISTRATE JUDGE KATHRYN A. STARNELLA
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Second Supplement and Request
for Non-Disclosure and Limited Service Regarding Motion for Renewed Early
Discovery [#40]1 (the “Motion”).2 The Motion [#40] has been referred to the undersigned.
See Order Referring Motion [#41].
The Motion [#40] includes a statement that this Motion [#40] “consolidates and
supersedes prior supplements[.]” Motion [#40] at 1 (alluding to similar motions and
supplements 	filed 	at 	[#3], 	[#10], 	[#12], 	[#21], 	[#24]).3 	Those 	prior 	motions 	and
1 [#40] is an example of the convention that the Court uses to identify the docket number assigned
to a specific filing by the Court’s case management and electronic case file system (CM/ECF).
This convention is used throughout this Recommendation.
2 Although styled a Supplemental Notice [#40], the Court construes this document as a motion.
Plaintiff’s Motion [#40] requests the same or substantially same relief as requested in his prior
Motions and Supplemental Notices. See [#3, #10, #12, #21, #24].
3 The Motion [#40] further states that “[a]ll factual allegations, legal arguments, and exhibits from
Plaintiff’s previously filed motions and supplement[s] are incorporated herein by reference.”
Motion [#40] at 1. This is improper. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) provides that “[a] statement in a pleading
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supplements have also been referred to the undersigned. See Orders Referring Motions
[#18, #27]. Therefore, for purposes of this Order, the Court considers the arguments
advanced in the instant Motion [#40] as all-encompassing.
The Court has reviewed the Motion [#40], Plaintiff’s related Supplemental Notices
[#21, #24] and Motions [#3, #10, #12], the entire case file, and the applicable law. For the
reasons set forth below, the Motion [#40] is DENIED without prejudice.
I. 	Background
This case arises from a cryptocurrency transaction wherein Plaintiff transferred
approximately $100,000.00 in digital currency to various operators, who allegedly later
blocked Plaintiff’s requested withdrawals and absconded with the remaining funds. First
Am. Compl. [#36] at 3-4. Through his Motion [#40], Plaintiff, who proceeds pro se4, seeks
leave to conduct expedited discovery so that he may issue subpoenas to entities he
believes possess information concerning the Doe defendants’ identities. Motion [#40] at
2.
The Motion [#40] is one of many motions filed by Plaintiff requesting the same or
similar relief. On October 3, 2025, Plaintiff filed his first Motion for Early Discovery [#3].
Three days later, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Expedited Consideration of his Motion for Early
may be adopted by reference elsewhere in the same pleading or in any other pleading or motion.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (emphasis added). But see D.C.COLO.LCivR 15.1(b) (prohibiting proposed
amended pleadings from incorporating by reference any part of the preceding pleading). “No
authority extends Rule 10(c) to incorporation of a party’s prior motion into a later motion[.]” See
Wilson v. Pauling, 457 F. Supp. 3d 965, 978 n.2 (D. Colo. 2020).
4 The Court must liberally construe a pro se litigant’s filings. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,
520-21 (1972). In doing so, the Court should neither be the pro se litigant’s advocate nor “supply
additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff's complaint or construct a legal theory on a
plaintiff’s behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1175 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Hall v.
Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991)). Additionally, pro se parties must follow the same
rules of procedure that govern other litigants. Nielsen v. Price, 17 F.3d 1276, 1277 (10th Cir.
1994) (citing Green v. Dorrell, 969 F.2d 915, 917 (10th Cir. 1992)).
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Discovery [#10]. Four days later, Plaintiff filed a Renewed Motion for Early Discovery
[#12]. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a Supplemental Notice [#21], wherein Plaintiff expands
upon his requested relief. Namely, the Supplemental Notice [#21] requested that the
subpoenaed third parties be subject to a nondisclosure order and that Plaintiff be allowed
to serve the subpoenas by email. Notice [#21] at 3-4. That same day, Plaintiff filed another
Supplemental Notice [#24], which contains the same relief he requested in the earlier
Supplemental Notice [#21]. See Notice [#24] at 3-4.
II. 	Applicable Law
Generally, formal discovery is not permitted until the parties have conferred
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f). See FED. R. CIV . P. 26(d)(1) (“A party may not seek discovery
from any source before the parties have conferred as required by Rule 26(f), except in a
proceeding exempted from initial disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1)(B), or when authorized
by these rules, by stipulation, or by court order.”). However, a court may exercise
discretion to “alter the timing, sequence, and volume of discovery.” See Qwest Commc’ns
Int’l, Inc. v. WorldQuest Networks, Inc., 213 F.R.D. 418, 419 (D. Colo. 2003).
In this District, courts have permitted expedited discovery upon a showing of good
cause. See, 	e.g., SEBO 	Am., 	LLC 	v. 	Does, 	No. 	21-cv-02865-RM-STV, 	2021 	WL
5167196, at *1 (D. Colo. Oct. 29, 2021) (citing Pod-Ners v. N. Feed & Bean of Lucerne
Ltd., 204 F.R.D. 675, 676 (D. Colo. 2002)); Liberty Media Holdings, LLC v. Colo. Members
of Swarm, No. 11-cv-01170-WJM-KMT, 2011 WL 1812554, at *1 (D. Colo. May 12,
2011) (citing same). “Good cause may exist where the plaintiff seeks a preliminary
injunction, where the moving party has asserted claims of infringement or unfair
competition, or ‘where physical evidence may be consumed or destroyed with the
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passage of time, thereby disadvantaging one or more parties to the litigation.’” SEBO
Am., LLC, 2021 WL 5167196, at *1 (quoting Qwest Commc’ns, 213 F.R.D. at 419).
However, “[i]n applying the ‘good cause’ standard under Rule 26(d), the court should
consider the scope of the requested discovery.” Qwest Commc’ns, 213 F.R.D. at 420.
A plaintiff’s inability to identify a defendant is “one of the few reasons that early
discovery is generally permitted.” Malibu Media, LLC v. John Doe Subscriber Assigned
IP Address 174.51.234.104, No. 13-cv-00307-WYD-MEH, 2013 WL 3753436, at *4 (D.
Colo. July 14, 2013) (citing 20/20 Fin. Consulting, Inc. v. Does 1-5, No. 10-cv-01006-
CMA-KMT, 2010 WL 1904530, at *1 (D. Colo. May 11, 2010)). In such situations, “the
plaintiff should be given an opportunity through discovery to identify the unknown
defendants, unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover the identities, or that the
complaint would be dismissed on other grounds.” 20/20 Fin. Consulting, 2010 WL
1904530, at *1.
III. Analysis
A. 	Request for Expedited Discovery
Plaintiff seeks to issue subpoenas to 13 third parties to identify the unknown Doe
defendants. See Motion [#40] at 2, 5-6. According to Plaintiff, these third parties are:
Coinbase, Inc., Binance Holdings Ltd./Binance US Inc., Kraken (Payward, Inc.), Gemini
Trust Company, LLC, KuCoin Global Ltd., Bitstamp USA Inc., OKX (OK Group / OKX HK
Ltd.), Foris DAX, Inc. (Crypto.com), Onchain Custody, Inc., Cloudfare, Inc., Dynadot LLC,
Namecheap, Inc., Meta Platforms, Inc. Id. [#40] at 5-6.
“Courts regularly authorize expedited discovery requests in . . . cryptocurrency
theft cases,” finding good cause to allow “expedited discovery to ascertain identifying
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information [for the unknown defendants.]” Ramirez v. Defendant 1, No. 25-1576, 2025
WL 2337134, at *3 (E.D. La. Aug. 13, 2025); see also Trainor v. Doe, No. 22-cv-00350-
RM-NYW, 2022 WL 444396, at *3 (D. Colo. Feb. 14, 2022) (permitting expedited
discovery 	in 	cryptocurrency 	case 	to 	uncover 	identifying 	information 	of 	unknown
defendants).
In the Motion [#40], Plaintiff argues good cause warrants early third-party discovery
because he cannot uncover the identities of the Doe defendants, leaving him unable to
serve them with process. See Motion [#40] at 2. In an earlier Motion [#12], Plaintiff
identified the unsuccessful efforts he has undertaken to identify the Doe defendants,
including independent analysis of blockchain data, review of WHOIS records5, and
outreach to various exchanges. Motion [#12] at 7. He further argued that additional delay
could result in the permanent destruction of identifying information because service
providers “regularly purge log data after short retention periods.” Id. Courts have
permitted expedited discovery where user activity logs are at risk of being purged, which
is common among internet service providers. See Arista Recs. LLC v. Does 1-9, No. 07-
cv-00628-EWN-MEH, 2007 WL 1059049, at *1-2 (D. Colo. Apr. 4, 2007). Therefore, the
Court finds that Plaintiff’s inability to identify the Doe defendants, in conjunction with the
risk of losing identifying information, presents good cause to warrant expedited discovery.
However, the Court must also consider the scope of Plaintiff’s requested discovery. See
Qwest Commc’ns, 213 F.R.D. at 420.
5 A Whois domain lookup permits tracing of a domain name’s ownership and tenure. See
https://www.whois.com/whois/ (last accessed on Nov. 19, 2025) (“Frequently Asked Questions”,
“What is a Whois domain lookup?”).
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The Court takes issue with the scope of Plaintiff’s requested discovery. See id. at
419 (“[I]n every case, the court has the discretion, in the interests of justice, to prevent
excessive or burdensome discovery.”). First, Plaintiff’s request to serve subpoenas on 13
third parties is excessive and repetitive. Plaintiff makes no real effort to explain why these
entities are the proper entities to be served or how he knows these entities possess the
information he seeks. See Motion [#40] at 5-6; see also Dozier v. Burns, No. 20-cv-00504-
KLM, 2021 WL 12325156, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 1, 2021) (limiting early discovery where
number of requested subpoenas was repetitive).
Second, the information Plaintiff requests is too broad. Early discovery must be
narrowly tailored to seek the necessary information. See Trainor, 2022 WL 444396, at *2.
Put differently, Plaintiff’s requested discovery should not operate as a fishing expedition.
See Advantage Sales & Mktg. LLC v. Gold, No. 18-cv-00312-RM, 2018 WL 6252781, at
*1 (D. Colo. Feb. 13, 2018). Here, Plaintiff’s request for expedited discovery is framed
solely for the purpose of identifying the Doe defendants. However, Plaintiff appears to
request the entire gambit of discovery in this matter. For instance, the information he
requests includes:
Legal names, aliases, date of birth, verified IDs, emails, phone numbers,
linked bank accounts (last 4 digits) . . . [d]eposits, withdrawals, TXIDs,
timestamps, balances, routing logs, and custodial tags . . . [l]ogin IPs,
timestamps, device identifiers, and geolocation data . . . [f]raud reports,
SARs, support messages, and internal freeze notes . . . [and] [c]urrent
balances, 	pending 	withdrawals, 	and 	custodial 	wallet 	status
(hot/warm/cold)[.]
Motion [#40] at 6.
He further requests that all subpoena recipients “[r]etain all responsive data, logs,
and backups pending further order” and that all information should be produced in the
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following format: “KYC in PDF/TIFF; transaction data in CSV/JSON; metadata in native
format (UTC timestamps).” Id. Plaintiff’s requested information and related demands
exceed the scope necessary to identify the Doe defendants and may otherwise be
obtained through the ordinary course of discovery. See Qwest, 213 F.R.D. at 420
(denying expedited discovery request as overly broad). While Plaintiff states in conclusory
fashion that each subpoena is narrowly tailored, he fails to explain how. Additionally, he
fails to provide copies of his proposed subpoenas, so the Court cannot determine whether
they are appropriately tailored.
The Court will not grant Plaintiff his requested expedited relief at this time.
However, the Court understands the frustration this may cause, as Plaintiff’s case
remains at a standstill until the proper parties are served. Therefore, the Court will allow
Plaintiff to file a single renewed motion for early discovery. In it, Plaintiff must narrowly
tailor his request to seek only that information necessary to identify the Doe defendants,
including 	their 	names, 	addresses, 	telephone 	numbers, 	email 	addresses, 	and 	IP
addresses. See Trainor, 2022 WL 444396, at *3 (finding a subpoena narrowly tailored
where it requested “account information that identities [sic] the true name, current and
permanent addresses, billing address, telephone numbers, email address, [and] IP
addresses” of the unknown defendants). Additionally, the Court will not permit Plaintiff to
serve subpoenas on 13 different third parties. Should Plaintiff choose to file a renewed
motion, he must identify no more than three third parties he wishes to serve, and he
must thoughtfully explain why he believes those third parties possess the identifying
information he seeks.
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B. 	Request for Nondisclosure Order
In his Motion [#40], Plaintiff asks the Court to require that all subpoenaed third
parties be subject to a nondisclosure order. Motion [#40] at 2-3. Specifically, Plaintiff
requests that each issued subpoena “include a nondisclosure provision prohibiting the
recipient from revealing the existence or contents of the subpoena, or the nature of its
response, until the first Defendant is identified and served, or for a period not exceeding
one hundred eighty (180) days[.]” Id. at 2. Plaintiff asserts that such a requirement will
“preserve the integrity of the proceeding and prevent further loss of traceable digital
assets.” Id.
1. 	Plaintiff’s 	Cited 	Legal 	Authority 	and 	Advisement 	of 	Rule 	11
Obligations
In support of this argument, Plaintiff states that courts routinely recognize “delayed
notice” is appropriate under these circumstances. Id. at 3. Plaintiff cites In re Subpoena
to Coinbase, Inc., No. 17-MC-80244, 2018 WL 1898913, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2018)
as authority for this point. Id. at 3. However, this case, as cited, does not exist. Plaintiff
also cited to this case in a different format in his prior Supplemental Notices [#21, #24],
citing instead to In re Subpoena to Coinbase, Inc., 2023 WL 177977, at 2 (N.D. Cal. Jan.
12, 2023). See Notice [#21] at 2; Notice [#24] at 2. This citation does not appear on
Westlaw. However, a Google search revealed a case from the Third Circuit styled “In re:
Coinbase, Inc.”, Case No. 23-1779.6 Ultimately, the Court is unable to locate the source
of Plaintiff’s authority and whether it supports his argument about delayed notice.
6 	See 	In 	re: 	Coinbase 	Inc 	(23-1779), 	COURT 	LISTENER,
https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/67273468/in-re-coinbase-inc/ 	(last 	updated 	Sept. 	27,
2024).
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In addition to citing court decisions that cannot be located, Plaintiff cites existing
cases for propositions that they do not support. For example, Plaintiff cites Hard Drive
Productions, Inc. v. Does 1-188, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2011), for the
same proposition—that courts recognize “delayed notice” in similar circumstances.
Motion [#40] at 3, 6. But Hard Drive Productions does not stand for that proposition.
There, a plaintiff requested to engage in early discovery to uncover the identity of
unknown defendants. Hard Drive Prods., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1153. The issued subpoenas
required the subpoenaed internet service providers to notify the subscribers of the IP
addresses whose information was to be released—the exact opposite of what Plaintiff
seeks here. Id. While that court authorized early discovery, it did not allow, nor did it
consider, this concept of “delayed notice.”
Plaintiff then relies on Strike 3 Holdings, LLC v. Doe, 964 F.3d 1203, 1209 (D.C.
Cir. 2020) for the proposition that the court there approved “delayed notice” to avoid
“tipping off” defendants. Motion [#40] at 3. There, the plaintiff sued an unknown defendant
for distributing copyrighted pornographic videos. Strike 3 Holdings, LLC, 964 F.3d at
1205-06. The plaintiff only possessed the defendant’s IP address, and it sought to issue
a subpoena on an internet service provider to uncover the identifying information for that
defendant. Id. at 1206. In doing so, the plaintiff also asked the court for a protective order
to allow the defendant to proceed anonymously given the sensitive nature of the litigation.
Id. (emphasis added). The proposition for which Plaintiff cites Strike 3 is patently incorrect
and not at all addressed in that opinion. The opinion contains zero discussion of
preventing an individual targeted in a subpoena from knowing the existence of that
subpoena.
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Plaintiff also cites Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. McDonnell, 287 F.
Supp. 3d 213 (E.D.N.Y. 2018), asserting the court permitted secrecy to preserve digital
assets. Motion [#40] at 3. Not so. McDonnell involved the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission’s standing to exercise its enforcement power over fraudulent sales of virtual
currencies and whether injunctive relief was appropriate. Id. at 217, 230. The opinion does
not discuss the preservation of digital assets, nor does it address the concept of “secrecy”
to protect those assets. See generally id. at 215-30. Finally, Plaintiff cites Paoloni v.
Goldstein, 	331 	F. 	Supp. 	2d 	1310 	(D. 	Colo. 	2004), 	to, 	once 	again, 	support 	his
nondisclosure argument. Motion [#40] at 6. That opinion does not mention the phrases
“early discovery,” “nondisclosure,” or “delayed notice.” See generally Paoloni, 331 F.
Supp. 2d at 1311-14. Instead, Paoloni involved a dispute regarding trust assets, and this
Court cannot identify why that case is otherwise applicable here. See id.
In sum, Plaintiff refers to cases that either the Court cannot locate or do not stand
for the asserted proposition. The latter may be due to Plaintiff’s lack of legal training and
inability to fully understand legal opinions. The former may be due to suspected use of
artificial intelligence to assist with drafting or legal research. While artificial intelligence
can be a beneficial tool, it is commonly known to “hallucinate” citations. This can occur in
several 	ways: 	by 	generating 	citations 	to 	nonexistent 	cases, 	or, 	attributing 	legal
propositions to real cases that do not at all stand for those propositions. Plaintiff is
reminded of his obligation to comply with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure7
7 For example, Rule 11(b) requires that, by virtue of filing a paper with the court, “an attorney or
unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief,
formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances[,] . . . the legal contentions are
warranted by existing law or by a non-frivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing
existing law or for establishing new law[.]”
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and warned that if he continues to supply this Court with non-existent or improperly
attributed legal authority, the Court is well within its authority to recommend sanctions.
See Coomer v. Lindell, No. 22-cv-01129-NYW-SBP, 2025 WL 1865282, at *8 (D. Colo.
July 	7, 	2025) 	(imposing 	Rule 	11 	sanctions 	where 	motion 	contained 	citations 	to
nonexistent case law). Such sanctions include, but are not limited to, monetary sanctions,
the striking of filings, or dismissal of Plaintiff’s action. See Ferris v. Amazon.com Servs.,
LLC, 778 F. Supp. 3d 879, 882 (N.D. Miss. 2025) (requiring pro se litigant to pay opposing
party’s attorneys’ fees); O’Brien v. Flick, No. 24-61529-CIV-DAMIAN, 2025 WL 242924,
at *7 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 10, 2025) (recognizing that pro se litigant’s citations to fabricated
case law could serve as a basis to dismiss his case without prejudice). Plaintiff’s pro se
status does not free him from his obligation to comply with the Federal Rules. Morgan v.
Cmty. Against Violence, No. 23-cv-353-WPJ/JMR, 2023 WL 6976510, at *7 (D.N.M. Oct.
23, 2023) (“Although courts make some allowances for [a] pro se [p]laintiff’s failure to cite
to proper legal authority, courts do not make allowances for a [p]laintiff who cites to fake,
nonexistent, misleading authorities.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
2. 	Merits of Plaintiff’s Nondisclosure Argument
Reaching the merits of Plaintiff’s requested relief, the Court nonetheless finds the
requested nondisclosure order inappropriate. First, the Court has not located any case
law which expressly permits nondisclosure orders under these circumstances. Plaintiff’s
citations to off-point case law fail to advance his argument or apprise the Court of the
governing 	authority. 	Second, 	the 	only 	instances 	the 	Court 	can 	find 	where 	such
nondisclosure orders are permitted are those governed by 18 U.S.C. § 2705, which is
titled “Delayed [N]otice.” This statute essentially permits the government to obtain a gag
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order prohibiting a subpoenaed service provider from disclosing the existence of that
subpoena to the subscriber or customer. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2705(a). However,
such a statutory provision is inapplicable to the instant case because Plaintiff is not a
“governmental entity” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2711(4). In sum, Plaintiff’s request for a
nondisclosure order or any form of delayed notice is off base and unsupported by existing
law.
C. 	Request to Serve Subpoenas by Email
Finally, Plaintiff seeks leave to serve the nonparty subpoenas via email. Motion
[#40] at 3. Rule 45(b)(1) provides that service of a subpoena “requires delivering a copy
to the named person[.]” FED. R. CIV . P. 45(b)(1). Courts in this District “ha[ve] determined
that personal service is not required under Rule 45 in every case.” Castle v. Nolan, No.
20-CV-02481-DDD-GPG, 2021 WL 12298816, at *5 (D. Colo. Dec. 3, 2021). Ultimately,
there is no “binding precedent in the Tenth Circuit favoring either position.” E.A. Renfroe
& Co. v. Moran, No. 08-cv-00733-REB-MJW, 2008 WL 1806200, at *4 (D. Colo. Apr. 21,
2008); see also Castle, 2021 WL 12298816, at *5.
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s request to serve third party subpoenas by email is
premature. Plaintiff has not had the opportunity to personally serve the third-party service
providers, 	nor 	has 	he 	demonstrated 	that 	the 	email 	addresses 	he 	provides8 	are
“reasonably calculated” to adequately put those third parties on notice. See Origins Tech,
Inc. v. Oak Equity Holdings II, LLC, No. 2:23-cv-00326, 2025 WL 2652482, at *2-3 (D.
Utah Sept. 16, 2025) (recognizing alternative service under Rule 45 may be permitted
8 The Court notes Plaintiff previously provided the email addresses for some of the third parties’
respective legal compliance departments. See Notice [#24] at 3-4. However, Plaintiff has since
increased the number of third parties he wishes to serve and has not provided email addresses
regarding those new third parties. See generally Motion [#40].
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where the moving party shows “unsuccessful, but diligent, efforts at personal service, and
show[s] the alternative method is reasonably calculated to provide the nonparty with
notice”). Additionally, Plaintiff has not had the opportunity to demonstrate that these third
parties have attempted to evade service, which may otherwise warrant alternative
service. See Amann v. Off. of Utah Att’y Gen., No. 2:18-cv-00341-JNP-DAO, 2021 WL
4949032, at *2 (D. Utah Oct. 25, 2021) (permitting email service of subpoena after
unsuccessful attempts to personally serve party).
Before the Court concludes, it must once more address Plaintiff’s inapplicable case
law citations. He cites “Arista Records LLC v. Does 1-27, 584 F. Supp. 2d 240, 254
(D.D.C. 2008)” for the proposition that the court “approv[ed] email service for early
discovery to identify anonymous infringers[.]” Motion [#40] at 3. But Arista Records is a
District of Maine decision, not a decision from the District Court for the District of
Columbia. See Arista Records LLC v. Does 1-27, 584 F. Supp. 2d 240, 254 (D. Me. 2008).
Moreover, Arista did not address whether service of Rule 45 subpoenas may be
effectuated via email. See generally Arista Records LLC, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 241-62.
Plaintiff 	then 	cites 	Hard 	Drive 	Productions, 	which 	is 	immediately 	preceded 	by 	a
parenthetical stating “(same).” Motion [#40] at 3. Plaintiff’s use of the parenthetical
language “same” implies that Hard Drive Productions also stands for the proposition that
Plaintiff claimed Arista stood for—i.e., that the court approved early discovery via email.
However, Hard Drive Productions stands for no such proposition and contains no
indication that the plaintiff attempted to serve Rule 45 subpoenas via email. See generally
Hard Drive Prods., Inc., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1151-65.
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IV. 	Conclusion
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion [#40] is DENIED without prejudice.
Plaintiff may file a single, amended motion for expedited discovery that: (1) is narrowly
tailored to information needed to identify the Doe defendants, as explained above, and
(2) identifies no more than three third parties he wishes to serve, and explains why those
third parties are most likely to possess the relevant identifying information.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Original Motion for Early Discovery [#3]
is DENIED as moot.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Expedited Consideration of
Motion for Early Discovery [#10] is DENIED as moot.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for Early Discovery
[#12] is DENIED as moot.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Supplemental Notice to Prevent Asset
Dissipation and Request for Nondisclosure and Limited Service Regarding Renewed
Motion for Early Discovery [#21] is DENIED as moot.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Supplemental Notice to Prevent Asset
Dissipation and Request for Nondisclosure and Limited Service Regarding Renewed
Motion for Early Discovery [#24] is DENIED as moot.
Dated: November 19, 2025 	BY THE COURT:
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Kathryn A. Starnella
United States Magistrate Judge
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