Bamba v. Dominion Financial Services, LLC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 24-cv-00826-SKC-NRN
ABASS YAYA BAMBA,
Plaintiff,
v.
DOMINION FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC,
Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PLAINTIFF’S VARIOUS MOTIONS TO
REOPEN CASE AND FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER OR INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF (ECF Nos. 107, 108, 109, 121 and 126)
N. REID NEUREITER
United States Magistrate Judge
This matter is before the Court pursuant to Orders issued by Judge S. Kato
Crews referring a number of motions by Plaintiff Abass Yaya Bamba (“Plaintiff”).
Defendant Dominion Financial Services, LLC (“Defendant” or “Dominion”) has
responded in part to some of those motions. The Court heard oral argument on January
20, 2026. The Court has taken judicial notice of the Court’s file, considered the
applicable Federal Rules of Procedure and case law. Now, being fully informed and for
the reasons discussed below, the Court makes the following recommendation.
I. 	BACKGROUND
This matter concerns a dispute regarding foreclosure proceedings pursued by
Defendant upon real property located in Denver, Colorado. This property is the primary
residence for Plaintiff and his family. See ECF No. 7 at 4. Plaintiff, proceeding pro se,
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filed the original complaint on March 25, 2024. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff then filed the First
Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on April 1, 2024, asserting three claims for “predatory
lending practices,” “breach of contract and doctrine of contra proferentem,” and
“usurious practices.” ECF No. 6.
Throughout this litigation and in a variety of different filings, Plaintiff has
requested a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) halting foreclosure proceedings.
On May 3, 2024, Defendant notified the Court that Plaintiff had filed a Chapter 13
bankruptcy case on April 3, 2024 in the District of Colorado, and stated that “[i]n light of
Plaintiff’s bankruptcy filing, the claim for a [TRO] (the only claim in the Complaint) is
moot because the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362 stays Defendant Dominion
Financial Services, LLC from proceeding with the non-judicial foreclosure.” ECF No. 19.
Ultimately, because of the bankruptcy stay and because the validity of Plaintiff’s debt to
Dominion would likely be litigated within the bankruptcy context, the Court stayed and
administratively closed this matter. See ECF Nos. 89–90 (Orders adopting
Recommendation to administratively close case pending conclusion of bankruptcy
proceedings).
On November 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion to reopen the case. ECF No. 107.
He simultaneously filed a motion for expedited consideration, ECF No. 108, and a
motion to join the Denver Public Trustee as a Defendant, ECF No. 109. Plaintiff’s basis
for reopening the case was that the bankruptcy case was dismissed on October 31,
2025, lifting the automatic stay. Dominion had conducted a foreclosure sale on
November 20, 2025, which, in Plaintiff’s view, demonstrated an “immediate need for
federal adjudication.” ECF No. 107 at 1. Plaintiff continues to dispute the debt owed to
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Dominion, asserting that “Dominion does not hold a valid and enforceable contract
against Plaintiff.” Id. Thus, in ECF No. 107, Plaintiff asked that this matter, Case No. 24-
cv-00826-SKC-NRN, be reopened and restored to the active docket, and that Plaintiff
be allowed to “proceed with adjudication regarding the validity and enforceability of the
debt and underlying contract claimed by Dominion.” Id. at 2.
In ECF No. 109, Plaintiff asked that the Denver Public Trustee (“Trustee”) be
added as a defendant in this case because the Trustee “executed and completed the
essential statutory act that Plaintiff challenges as unlawful.” ECF No. 109 at 1. Plaintiff
asked that the Trustee be joined as a Defendant under Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. But Plaintiff
did not attach or provide an amended complaint describing claims against the Trustee.
On January 14, 2026, Plaintiff filed an “Emergency Motion” to reopen the case
and enjoin “ongoing unconstitutional state action.” ECF No. 121. Plaintiff asserted that
the matter requires “urgent federal intervention” because a county court eviction trial (a
forcible entry and detainer or “F.E.D. action”) is scheduled to occur on January 22,
2026. Plaintiff claimed that absent immediate relief he would “suffer irreparable and
irreversible constitutional injury.” Id. at 1.
Back on December 12, 2025, Dominion had responded to Plaintiff’s motion to
reopen the case. ECF No. 116. Dominion agreed that, with the dismissal of the
bankruptcy proceeding, this case should be reopened. But it should be reopened, not
for the purpose of litigating Plaintiff’s claims, but instead for the purpose of dismissing
the matter in its entirety. Dominion also provided additional background history to the
matter in its response, to wit:
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On April 3, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case in the United States
Bankruptcy Court, District of Colorado (the “Bankruptcy Court”), designated as Case
No. 24-11589-MER (the “Bankruptcy Case”).
In the Bankruptcy Case, Plaintiff objected to Dominion’s proof of claim of its debt.
The Bankruptcy Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the objection to claim on
November 14, 2025. On February 2, 2025, Judge Romero issued a 17-page single-
spaced order overruling Plaintiff’s objection to Dominion’s claim and allowed the claim in
its entirety. Judge Romero made numerous findings of fact and conclusions of law in his
order. See ECF No. 116-1. The bottom line was that Judge Romero found that
Dominion possessed a valid debt secured by the property.
Thereafter, Plaintiff filed two motions for reconsideration of the February 2nd
order which were both denied. Plaintiff appealed the bankruptcy orders and that appeal
was fully briefed before Judge Brimmer in Case No. 1:25-cv-00655 (the “Federal
Appeal”). In the Bankruptcy Court, Dominion filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s
Bankruptcy Case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 1307(c)(1) and (c)(3). On October 16, 2025, the
Bankruptcy Court granted the motion to dismiss via two orders entered October 31,
2025. As a result of the dismissal of the Bankruptcy Case, Judge Brimmer denied
Plaintiff’s appeals of Judge Romero’s order as moot and closed the case.
On November 20, 2025, nearly 3 weeks after the dismissal of the bankruptcy
case, the Trustee completed the non-judicial foreclosure of the Deed of Trust with
respect to the real property located at 995 South Locust Street, Denver, CO 80224 (the
“Property”). The Certificate of Purchase is found at ECF No. 116-4. There was no
injunction or automatic stay to prohibit the foreclosure at the time. On December 5,
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2025, the Trustee issued a Public Trustee’s Confirmation Deed (the “Deed”) conveying
the Property to Dominion. See ECF No. 116-5.
Dominion is of the view that an order allowing a claim in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy
case survives the dismissal of the bankruptcy case. Now that the bankruptcy case has
been dismissed and the appeal denied, Dominion argues that the allowance of the claim
is res judicata and is binding on Plaintiff.
Therefore, Dominion argues that the Court should reopen this case to dismiss
Plaintiff’s complaint for mootness, and because he seeks to relitigate the allowance of
Dominion’s claim despite the ruling by the Bankruptcy Court. ECF No. 116 at 4–5.
On the issue of Plaintiff’s “Emergency Motion” seeking to enjoin the F.E.D.
action, Dominion acknowledges that it filed the F.E.D. action on December 21, 2025 in
Denver County Court. See ECF No. 124 (Dominion’s Forthwith Motion to Reschedule
Status Conference). The trial in the F.E.D. action is scheduled for 8:45 a.m., on January
22, 2026 in Courtroom 186. The County Court has indicated that it will hear Plaintiff’s
motion to dismiss the FED action on jurisdictional grounds at the hearing. See ECF No.
124-2 (County Court Docket).
On January 12, 2026, in another lawsuit (a quiet title action) filed by Plaintiff
against Dominion, the Denver County District Court in Case No. 2025cv548 dismissed
Plaintiff’s claim. See ECF No. 124-3. In that decision, the Denver District Court relied in
part on the Bankruptcy Court ruling in agreeing that his quiet title action should be
dismissed:
Here, the Bankruptcy Court permitted Dominion’s secured claim in full.
Bamba now asks this Court to make the opposite determination and quiet
title in his favor. Such action is not permitted by res judicata. The Bankruptcy
Court made determinations regarding Dominion’s legal entitlement to the
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property, and these determinations are now binding. The Court will not allow
Bamba to waste judicial resources in what appear to be persistent and
continuous efforts to stymie Dominion’s claim to the property through forum
shopping. Because Bamba has failed to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted by this Court, the Court must dismiss and close this action
pursuant to C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5).
Id. (Order of January 12, 2026 in Bamba v. Dominion Financial Services, LLC, Case
No. 2025cv548, District Court, City and County of Denver, Colorado at 5–6).
Because of the claimed emergency and potential irreparable harm to Plaintiff due
to the scheduled F.E.D. trial on January 22, 2026, the Court held a status
conference/motion hearing on the afternoon of January 20, 2026. Plaintiff was allowed
to make his arguments as to why he should be entitled to immediate relief, presumably
seeking an order from a federal court enjoining the impending F.E.D. trial. He argued
that the doctrine of res judicata, stemming from Judge Romero’s bankruptcy order,
should not apply because he never had a chance to appeal or object to that decision
with the District Court because his appeal of Judge Romero’s adverse order was
dismissed as moot once the bankruptcy case was dismissed. The Denver District Court,
he argues, therefore was mistaken in dismissing his quiet title action on res judicata
grounds. He says he has never had the opportunity to fully litigate the issues decided by
Judge Romero and there has been no definitive, binding determination that the debt
Dominion’s claims he owes is valid. He also argues that the foreclosure sale was invalid
because it occurred in violation of Colorado law.
In a “Comprehensive Pre-Status Conference Memorandum,” ECF No. 133, filed
January 16, 2026, Plaintiff outlined the alleged emergency situation that he is facing:
“This is not a routine foreclosure or eviction matter. Plaintiff faces imminent
dispossession of his primary residence based on:
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• 	A deed of trust originated by an allegedly unlicensed entity
• 	A foreclosure conducted in violation of Colorado statutory requirements
• 	State court proceedings that refuse to adjudicate threshold questions of
capacity and standing
• 	Summary eviction proceedings in a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction.”
Id. at 1. He asserts violations of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights based on
the alleged deprivation of property without due process, and a denial of a meaningful
opportunity to be heard on threshold legal defenses. Id. at 2. Plaintiff claims that he
“does not seek to avoid a legitimate debt.” Id. at 9. Instead, he seeks “only what the
Constitution guarantees: a meaningful opportunity to be heard on threshold defenses
that, if proven, would invalidate the entire foreclosure.” Id. He asserts that “[t]hree years
of state court litigation have demonstrated that state forums are inadequate [and]
[f]ederal intervention is necessary to prevent irreparable constitutional injury.” Id. at 10.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
a. 	Pro Se Plaintiff
Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, the Court “review[s] his pleadings and other
papers liberally and hold[s] them to a less stringent standard than those drafted by
attorneys.” Trackwell v. U. S., 472 F.3d 1242, 1243 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).
However, a pro se litigant’s “conclusory allegations without supporting factual
averments are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based.” Hall v.
Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). A court may not assume that a plaintiff
can prove facts that have not been alleged, or that a defendant has violated laws in
ways that a plaintiff has not alleged. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal.
State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983); see also Whitney v. N. M., 113
F.3d 1170, 1173–74 (10th Cir. 1997) (the court may not “supply additional factual
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allegations to round out a plaintiff’s complaint”); Drake v. City of Fort Collins, 927 F.2d
1156, 1159 (10th Cir. 1991) (the court may not “construct arguments or theories for the
plaintiff in the absence of any discussion of those issues”). A plaintiff’s pro se status
does not entitle him to an application of different rules. See Montoya v. Chao, 296 F.3d
952, 957 (10th Cir. 2002).
b. Temporary Restraining Order or Injunction
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 governs the entry of injunctions and restraining orders. TROs
and preliminary injunctions are extraordinary remedies. See DigitalGlobe, Inc. v.
Paladino, 269 F. Supp. 3d 1112, 1118–19 (D. Colo. 2017); Flood v. ClearOne
Commc’ns, Inc., 618 F.3d 1110, 1117 (10th Cir. 2010). “Injunctive relief is not a
separate cause of action; rather it is one form of relief for the other legal violations
alleged.” Bellwether Cmty. Credit Union v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 3d
1070, 1088 (D. Colo. 2018) (citation omitted).
The standards for granting a TRO and a preliminary injunction are the same. See
Nellson v. Barnhart, 454 F. Supp. 3d 1087, 1091 (D. Colo. 2020). To succeed, the
movant must establish: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) that
irreparable harm will ensue if the request for a TRO is denied, (3) that the threatened
harm to the movant outweighs the harm that the TRO may cause the nonmovant; and
that (4) the TRO would not adversely affect the public interest. See ClearOne, 618 F.3d
at 1119; Briscoe v. Sebelius, 927 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1114 (D. Colo. 2013). The movant
must show that their right to relief is “clear and unequivocal.” DigitalGlobe, Inc., 269 F.
Supp. 3d at 1118. “[B]ecause a showing of probable irreparable harm is the single most
important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the moving party
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must first demonstrate that such injury is likely before the other requirements for the
issuance of an injunction will be considered.” Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. Echostar
Satellite Corp., 356 F.3d 1256, 1260 (10th Cir. 2004).
The issuance of a TRO or preliminary injunction will typically require the payment
of security in an amount the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages
sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 65(c).
III. 	ANALYSIS
The Court finds that the first factor of the TRO analysis, likelihood of success on
the merits, is dispositive of Plaintiff’s emergency request to stop the F.E.D. trial. Plaintiff
argues that res judicata should not apply because he never had an opportunity to
appeal Judge Romero’s ruling finding that Dominion was owed the debt which was
secured by the South Locust Street Property. Whether res judicata applies or not,
Judge Romero conducted an evidentiary hearing and issued a detailed opinion, replete
with factual findings, rejecting Plaintiff’s claims that somehow his debt to Dominion was
not valid. The fact that a respected United States bankruptcy judge conducted a full
evidentiary hearing and ruled against Plaintiff, is a strong indication that Plaintiff is not
likely to succeed on the merits of his claim challenging the debt. As far as the
supposed illegality of the foreclosure sale, or the upcoming F.E.D. action, if the debt is
valid, then the Court cannot perceive any reason why the foreclosure sale was not
valid. And to the extent Plaintiff wants to argue that the F.E.D. should not proceed
because the County Court lacks jurisdiction, he will have the opportunity to argue that
in front of the Denver County Court judge who will be hearing the matter on Thursday,
January 22, 2026.
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In sum, Plaintiff has not persuaded the Court that he is likely to succeed on any
of his claims. This is fatal to any effort to obtain injunctive relief. See Winter v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (“A plaintiff seeking a
preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is
likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of
equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.”). Beyond the
success on the merits, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the balance of the equities
tips in his favor. Here, Plaintiff borrowed money to build a house, with the debt secured
by the property. He eventually stopped making payments on the loan and yet insists
that he should continue to possess and live in the property. The balance of the equities
does not tilt in his favor. For the foregoing reasons, the Court will not recommend any
injunctive or preliminary relief that would stop the pending F.E.D. action.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons outlined above, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s
Request for Article III Judicial Review and Emergency Injunctive Relief, ECF No. 126,
be DENIED.
It is further RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion to Reopen Case
and to Enjoin Ongoing Unconstitutional State Action, ECF No. 121, be GRANTED IN
PART and DENIED IN PART. The motion is GRANTED to the extent that the case is
reopened. The motion is recommended to be DENIED to the extent that Plaintiff seeks
an injunction stopping the pending F.E.D. action.
Plaintiff’s Motion to Reopen Case, ECF No. 107, is GRANTED, to the extent that
the case is reopened.
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Plaintiff’s Motion for Expedited Consideration, ECF No. 108, is DENIED as moot,
in that the Court has heard argument and issued recommendations on the pending
motions.
Plaintiff’s Motion to Join the Denver Public Trustee as a Defendant, ECF No.
109, is recommended to be DENIED as procedurally incorrect. To the extent that
Plaintiff seeks to add the Denver Public Trustee as a Defendant in this case, he would
need to seek leave to file an amended complaint describing what the Denver Public
Trustee did and the claims he would assert against the Denver Public Trustee. The
Court cannot simply “add” a defendant, in a vacuum, without a pleading describing the
new defendant and the claims being brought against that defendant. Plaintiff would
need to seek leave to amend and include as an exhibit the proposed amended
complaint.
NOTICE: Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2),
the parties have fourteen (14) days after service of this recommendation to serve
and file specific written objections to the above recommendation with the District
Judge assigned to the case. A party may respond to another party’s objections
within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. The District Judge need
not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. A party’s failure to file
and serve such written, specific objections waives de novo review of the
recommendation by the District Judge, Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 148–53
(1985), and also waives appellate review of both factual and legal questions.
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Makin v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 183 F.3d 1205, 1210 (10th Cir. 1999); Talley v. Hesse,
91 F.3d 1411, 1412–13 (10th Cir. 1996).
Date: January 21, 2026
___________________________
The Hon. N. Reid Neureiter
United States Magistrate Judge
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