Lawrence v. Cherry Creek School District No. 5

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 24-cv-00678-DDD-KAS
MICHAEL LAWRENCE,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHERRY CREEK SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 5,
Defendant.
_____________________________________________________________________
ORDER
_____________________________________________________________________
ENTERED BY MAGISTRATE JUDGE KATHRYN A. STARNELLA
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions [#25] (the
“Motion”), arguing that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [#12] is frivolous and seeking Rule
11 sanctions. Defendant filed a Response [#27] in opposition to the Motion for Sanctions
[#25], and Plaintiff filed a Reply [#28]. The Motion [#25] has been referred to the
undersigned. See Order Referring Motion [#26]. The Court has reviewed the briefing, the
case file, and the applicable law. For the following reasons, the Motion [#25] is DENIED.
I. Background
In this employment discrimination case, Plaintiff Michael Lawrence, who proceeds
in this matter pro se,1 alleges that Defendant Cherry Creek School District No. 5 offered
1 Generally, the Court must liberally construe a pro se litigant’s filings. See Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). However, this general rule does not apply to legally trained pro se
litigants—even if they have been disbarred from practicing law. Cf. McNamara v. Brauchler, 570
F. App'x 741, 743 (10th Cir. 2014) (stating that pro se plaintiff was “not entitled to have his filings
liberally construed because he is a trained attorney.”) (citing Mann v. Boatright, 477 F.3d 1140,
1148 n.4 (10th Cir. 2007)). Here, Plaintiff is a disbarred former attorney. See People v. Lawrence,
No. 19PDJ061, 2019 WL 8503308 (Colo. O.P.D.J. Oct. 2, 2019) (denying this Plaintiff’s petition
for readmission to the practice of law). Therefore, the Court “see[s] no reason to hold [Plaintiff] to
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him a job as a cook conditioned on passing a criminal background check, then rescinded
its offer when his three prior arrests were revealed and he refused to explain them. See
Statement of Claim [#1-2], ¶¶ 6-11. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “apparently has an
employment policy that bars employment to anyone who has ever been arrested.” Id., ¶
14. Plaintiff, who also alleges he is Hispanic, contends that “barring people from
employment based on nothing more than arrest records is a violation of Title VII.” Id., ¶¶
15, 16 (citation omitted). He alleges that such policies have a disparate impact on
minorities, who “are arrested far more often than the majority population[.]” Id., ¶ 18.
Defendant acknowledges that it rescinded the job offer but asserts that it did so because
Plaintiff lied on his job application by stating “under the penalty of perjury” that “he had
never been convicted of a felony” when, per his background check, “he was convicted of
three felonies[.]” Motion to Dismiss [#12] at 3-4.
After Defendant moved to dismiss the Complaint [#1], Plaintiff filed his First Motion
for Sanctions [#19] pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, which the Court denied because of
Plaintiff’s apparent failure to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2)’s safe harbor provision.
See Minute Order [#24] at 2. In connection with the present Motion [#25], Plaintiff appears
to have cured that defect. See Pl.’s Email to Opposing Counsel [#25-1].
In response to the current Motion [#25], Defendant argues that Plaintiff has
presented 	no 	legal 	or 	factual 	basis 	to 	award 	sanctions. 	Response 	[#27] 	at 	4-5.
Additionally, Defendant points to the Court’s authority under Fed. R. Civ. P.11(c)(3) to
order Plaintiff to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed against him, given his
a less stringent standard than other legally trained individuals.” McNamara, 570 F. App’x at 743
n.2.
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“needless[] duplicat[ion] of these proceedings,” the “merit[less]” and unsubstantiated
contentions on which he bases his lawsuit, and his “persistent attempts to bend [and
“harass”] prospective employers to his will by leveraging the costs of litigation in his favor
[without] any reasonable justification.” Id. at 5-7. For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s
Motion [#25] is denied.
II. Legal Standard
Rule 11(c)(1) allows the court to impose sanctions on “any attorney, law firm, or
party that violated the rule” after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond. “[T]he
central purpose of Rule 11 is to deter baseless filings in district court,” and district courts
have “broad discretion to impose Rule 11 sanctions[.]” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.,
496 U.S. 384, 393, 407 (1990).
To impose Rule 11 sanctions, the Court must first find that a pleading, written
motion, or other paper violates Rule 11. Collins v. Daniels, 916 F.3d 1302, 1319 (10th Cir.
2019). To avoid sanctions, a litigant’s conduct must be objectively reasonable. Id. at 1320
(citing 	Adamson 	v. 	Bowen, 	855 	F.2d 	668, 	673 	(10th 	Cir. 	1988)). 	The 	objective
reasonableness standard “applies whether the person against whom sanctions are
sought is an attorney, a pro se litigant, or both.” McCormick v. City of Lawrence, Kan.,
218 F.R.D. 687, 690 (D. Kan. 2003) (citing Wesley v. Don Stein Buick, Inc., 184 F.R.D.
376, 378 (D. Kan. 1998)). For a legally trained litigant, the standard is “whether a
reasonable and competent attorney would believe in the merit of an argument.” Dodd Ins.
Servs., Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 935 F.2d 1152, 1155 (10th Cir. 1991).
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2) and (b)(3), by filing a motion with a court, “an
attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge,
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information, and belief,” “the claims, defenses and other legal contentions are warranted
by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing
existing law or for establishing new law” and that “the factual contentions have evidentiary
support.” Legal contentions are “frivolous,” and thus sanctionable under Rule 11, when
the party advancing them has not made reasonable inquiry into the governing law or the
relevant facts. Cf. Greeley Publ’g. Co. v. Hergert, 233 F.R.D. 607, 611 (D. Colo. 2006)
(citations omitted). However, the Rule 11 standard is difficult to satisfy because a zealous
advocate “can be rather aggressive and still be reasonable.” Predator Int’l, Inc. v. Gamo
Outdoor USA, Inc., 793 F.3d 1177, 1182 (10th Cir. 2015).
III. Analysis
Plaintiff 	argues 	that 	Defendant’s 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss 	[#12] 	is 	frivolous, 	not
warranted by existing law, and therefore sanctionable under Rule 11. Motion [#25] at 1-
2. The Court disagrees.
On February 18, 2025, the Court issued a Recommendation [#29] that Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss [#12] be granted and that Plaintiff’s Complaint [#1] be dismissed with
prejudice. In reaching that conclusion, the Court reasoned that “Plaintiff fails to plausibly
allege the existence of a specific employment policy.” Recommendation [#29] at 8. The
Court also reasoned that Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant “bars employment to anyone who
has ever been arrested” is “conclusory and implausible because it is supported only by
Defendant’s refusal to hire one person—Plaintiff—purportedly based on three arrests
identified in his criminal background check, which he refused to explain.” Id. The Court
also noted that Plaintiff’s own allegations that Defendant withdrew the employment offer
when he refused to explain his prior arrests belie his allegation of a purported policy or
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practice not to hire people who have been arrested. Id. at 9. Additionally, the Court
reasoned 	that 	“Plaintiff’s 	proffered 	nationwide 	and 	statewide 	statistical 	evidence
[concerning arrests of majority and minority populations] does not render his [disparate
impact] claim plausible.” Id. at 10-11. Finally, the Court recommended that Plaintiff’s
claims be dismissed with prejudice because of his failure to exhaust his administrative
remedies, which he attempted to excuse with “threadbare and unsupported” allegations
of chronic understaffing at the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission which would
have rendered any exhaustion attempts futile. Id. at 11-14.
In sum, the Court recommended dismissal with prejudice because of Plaintiff’s
failure to plausibly allege a disparate impact claim and his failure to exhaust administrative
remedies—the two reasons Defendant relied upon in its Motion to Dismiss [#12].
Defendant’s zealous advocacy was objectively reasonable and did not run afoul of Rule
11. Accordingly, the Motion [#25] is denied.
IV. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion [#25] is DENIED.
Dated: February 19, 2025 	BY THE COURT:
Kathryn A. Starnella
United States Magistrate Judge
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