USA v. Garcia

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Nina Y. Wang
Criminal Action No. 24-cr-00106-NYW-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
1. 	RICO TOMAS GARCIA,
Defendant.
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Defendant Rico Tomas Garcia (“Defendant” or “Mr. Garcia”) is charged with nine
counts of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 and six counts of money laundering
and aiding and abetting the same in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1957(a) and 2. He moves
to suppress evidence obtained, via search warrant, from seven email accounts. 	See
[Doc. 237 (the “Motion” or “Motion to Suppress”)]. The Government opposes the Motion,
[Doc. 238], and Mr. Garcia has filed a reply, [Doc. 241]. For the reasons set forth below,
the Motion to Suppress is respectfully DENIED.
BACKGROUND
The Government alleges that, in the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic,
Defendant devised and participated in a scheme to defraud by misrepresenting that he
would procure millions of bottles of hand sanitizer in exchange for approximately $2.5
million. 	[Doc. 1 at ¶ 5]. 	According to the Government, instead of delivering the hand
sanitizer as agreed, Defendant “stole the money for personal use, and then subsequently
falsified bank records to conceal how” he spent the funds. [Id. at ¶¶ 5, 11].
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On May 25, 2023, former United States Magistrate Judge Kristen L. Mix signed a
search warrant authorizing the search of electronic information for evidence of wire fraud.
See [Doc. 237-1]. The search warrant’s attachments describe the items to be searched
for or seized. 	Attachment A states that the “warrant applies to information associated
with” seven email accounts: 	orders@botani-labs.com, rico.garcia@botani-labs.com,
arbitration@botani-labs.com, 	sr.ricogarcia@gmail.com, 	hamsaholdings@gmail.com,
granadaholdings18@gmail.com, 	and 	mangrana.group@gmail.com. 	[Id. 	at 	21].
Elsewhere, the warrant describes how these email accounts were allegedly used in the
charged crimes. 	See [id. at ¶¶ 17–18, 23–27, 32, 37, 40–43, 47, 49]. 	Attachment B
describes “Particular Things to be Seized.” 	[Id. at 22]. 	Specifically, Attachment B.I
describes “Information to be disclosed by Google LLC” and states that “[t]o the extent that
the information described in Attachment A” (i.e., the information associated with the email
accounts) “is within the possession, custody, or control of Google, . . . Google is required
to disclose to the government,” for each email account, “the following information from
March 15, 2020 to the present”:
a. 	All business records and subscriber information, in any form kept,
pertaining to the Account, including:
1. 	Names (including subscriber names, user names, and screen
names);
2. 	Addresses (including mailing addresses, residential addresses,
business addresses, and email addresses, including alternate
and recovery email addresses);
3. 	Telephone numbers, including SMS recovery and alternate sign-
in numbers;
4. 	Records of session times and durations, and the temporarily
assigned network addresses (such as Internet Protocol (“IP”)
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addresses) associated with those sessions, including log-in IP
addresses;
5. 	Telephone or instrument numbers or other subscriber numbers
or identities, including any temporarily assigned network address,
SMS recovery numbers, Google Voice numbers, and alternate
sign-in numbers[;]
6. 	Length of service (including start date and creation IP) and types
of service utilized;
7. 	Means and source of payment (including any credit card or bank
account number); and
8. 	Change history.
b. 	All device information associated with the Account, including but not
limited to, manufacture names, model numbers, serial number, media
access control (MAC) addresses, international mobile equipment
identifier 	(IMEI) 	numbers, 	FCC 	ID 	numbers, 	Android 	IDs, 	and
telephone numbers;
c. 	Records of user activity for each connection made to or from the
Account(s), including, for all Google services, the date, time, length,
and method of connection, data transfer volume, user names, source
and destination IP address, name of accessed Google service, and all
activity logs[.]
[Id. at 22–23]. 	Attachment B.II describes “Information to be seized by the government”
and states:
All information described above in [Attachment B.I] that constitutes fruits,
contraband, evidence, and/or instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1343, those violations involving Rico Tomas Garcia or Botani Labs and
occurring after March 15, 2020, including, for each Account or identifier
listed on Attachment A, information pertaining to the following matters:
a. 	Any business dealings involving: IPF Sourcing, Hamsa Holdings, LLC,
Granada Holdings, LLC or VYF Holdings, LLC;
b. 	Any business dealings relating to hand sanitizer or similar products;
c. 	Any arbitration matters relating to IPF Sourcing, excluding attorney-
client privileged materials;
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d. 	Evidence indicating how and when the Account was accessed or used,
to determine the geographic and chronological context of account
access, use, and events relating to the crime under investigation and
to the email account owner;
e. 	Evidence indicating the Account owner’s state of mind as it relates to
the crime under investigation;
f. 	The identity of the person(s) who created or used the Account,
including records that help reveal the whereabouts of such person(s).
g. 	The identity of the person(s) who communicated with the Account
about matters relating to Botani Labs, including records that help
reveal their whereabouts.
[Id. at 24].
Mr. Garcia moves to suppress all evidence obtained through this search warrant,
arguing that the warrant lacks the level of particularity required by the Fourth Amendment.
[Doc. 237].
LEGAL STANDARD
The Fourth Amendment “protects the people from unreasonable searches and
seizures of ‘their persons, houses, papers, and effects.’” Soldal v. Cook Cnty., 506 U.S.
56, 62 (1992) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV). 	“For a search . . . to be reasonable, it
must ordinarily be supported by a warrant based on probable cause.” 	United States v.
Chavez, 985 F.3d 1234, 1240 (10th Cir. 2021).
A search warrant “must particularly describe the things to be seized, as well as the
place to be searched.” 	Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 255 (1979) (quotation
omitted). 	This particularity requirement “ensures that a search is confined in scope to
particularly described evidence relating to a specific crime for which there is demonstrated
probable cause.” 	Voss v. Bergsgaard, 774 F.2d 402, 404 (10th Cir. 1985). 	To satisfy
Fourth Amendment requirements, a warrant must “describe the items to be seized with
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as much specificity as the government’s knowledge and circumstances allow.” 	United
States v. Sells, 463 F.3d 1148, 1154 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). The test used
to determine whether a warrant is sufficiently particular “is a practical one.” United States
v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 600 (10th Cir. 1988). 	A warrant meets the particularity
requirement if its description “enables the searcher to reasonably ascertain and identify
the things authorized to be seized.” 	United States v. Pulliam, 748 F.3d 967, 972 (10th
Cir. 2014). 	But a warrant lacks particularity if it “vest[s] the executing officers with
unbridled discretion to conduct an exploratory rummaging through the defendant’s
property in search of criminal evidence.” United States v. Cotto, 995 F.3d 786, 798 (10th
Cir. 2021) (cleaned up).
ANALYSIS
Mr. Garcia argues that the search warrant “lacks particularity as to the search of
information and data from the enumerated Google Accounts.” 	[Doc. 237 at 9]. 	He
specifically challenges the fact that the warrant “did not limit the disclosure of evidence
[by Google to the Government] to areas of the Google Account(s) that would produce
evidence of wire fraud based on the information the Government possessed,” and instead
“requested disclosure of all areas of the Google Accounts.” [Id.]. In his view, by permitting
the Government to search “every piece of information or data in each Google Account,”
the warrant “fail[s] to meet the requirement of particularity.” [Id. at 10].
The Government’s response is two-fold. First, it argues that the warrant complied
with the requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41, which sets out a two-
step procedure for searching electronic data. [Doc. 238 at 2]; see also Fed. R. Crim. P.
41(e)(2)(B). Then, the Government argues that because Attachment B.II contains limiting
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principles describing the specific the items that the Government may seize, the search
warrant was sufficiently particular. 	[Doc. 238 at 3–5]. 	And alternatively, it argues that
even if the warrant lacked particularity, the good-faith exception applies and the evidence
need not be excluded. [Id. at 5–7].
The Court respectfully agrees with the Government and concludes that the search
warrant complies with the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirements. Because the
warrant authorizes the search of electronic information, Rule 41(e)(2)(B) applies. Under
Rule 41(e)(2)(b), a warrant “may authorize the seizure of electronic storage media or the
seizure or copying of electronically stored information,” and “[u]nless otherwise specified,
the warrant authorizes a later review of the media or information consistent with the
warrant.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e)(2)(B). “Because electronic devices ‘commonly contain
such large amounts of information that it is often impractical for law enforcement to review
all of the information during execution of the warrant at the search location,’” Rule 41
“‘acknowledges the need for a two-step process: 	officers may seize or copy the entire
storage medium and review it later to determine what electronically stored information
falls within the scope of the warrant.’” United States v. Jama (Jama II), No. 22-cr-00225-
NEB-DTS, 2025 WL 227296, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 17, 2025) (emphasis added) (quoting
Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 advisory committee’s note to 2009 amendments).
Defendant asserts that Rule 41 does not displace the Fourth Amendment’s
particularity requirement and compliance with Rule 41 does not equate to compliance
with the Fourth Amendment. 	[Doc. 241 at 1–2]. 	While Mr. Garcia is technically correct
that Rule 41 and the Fourth Amendment are not coextensive, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 41
advisory committee’s note to 2009 amendments (explaining that Rule 41 “does not
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address the specificity of description that the Fourth Amendment may require in a warrant
for electronically stored information”), Rule 41 provides important context for the Court’s
determination of whether the warrant’s contents satisfy the Fourth Amendment.
Turning to Attachment B.I, Defendant insists that it lacks particularity because it
authorizes Google’s broad disclosure of information associated with the seven subject
email accounts. 	[Doc. 237 at 10]. 	This argument ignores the remainder of the warrant
and the weight of authority across the country. Courts have consistently recognized that
a warrant requiring the disclosure of a large set of records (for instance, a wide range of
information associated with an email account, like in Attachment B.I), but limiting the
information 	subject 	to 	seizure 	during 	a 	later 	review 	(like 	in 	Attachment 	B.II), 	is
constitutionally permissible. See, e.g., United States v. Karkalas, No. 13-cr-00273-SRN-
JJK, 2016 WL 2710879, at *4 (D. Minn. Feb. 1, 2016) (“[N]umerous courts have found
that the two-step process set forth in Criminal Rule 41 does not violate the Fourth
Amendment.” 	(collecting 	cases)), 	report 	and 	recommendation 	adopted, 	2016 	WL
2342116 (D. Minn. May 3, 2016); United States v. Lee, No. 1:14-cr-00227-TCB-2, 2015
WL 5667102, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2015) (“[T]he weight of the authority supports the
conclusion that a warrant that requires disclosure of the entire contents of an email
account and then describes a subset of that information that will be subject to seizure is
reasonable.”); see also Jama II, 2025 WL 227296, at *2–3; United States v. Manavalan,
No. 2:23-cr-00192-LK, 2026 WL 21420, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 5, 2026). Indeed, “courts
have long recognized the practical need for law enforcement to exercise dominion over
documents not within the scope of the warrant in order to determine whether they fall
within the warrant.” In re Warrant for All Content & Other Info. Associated with the Email
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Acct. xxxxxxx@gmail.com Maintained at Premises Controlled By Google, Inc., 33 F.
Supp. 3d 386, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); cf. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n. 11
(1976) (“In searches for papers, it is certain that some innocuous documents will be
examined, at least cursorily, in order to determine whether they are, in fact, among those
papers authorized to be seized.”).
Of course, this does not mean that the Government has unfettered discretion to
broadly seize and search electronic information without restraint. For example, “[s]everal
courts have required the Government to specify a date range” for information subject to
disclosure. 	United States v. Jama (Jama I), No. 22-cr-00225-NEB-DTS, 2024 WL
5381447, at *5 (D. Minn. Nov. 21, 2024) (collecting cases), report and recommendation
adopted, 2025 WL 227296. Here, Attachment B.I does provide a limiting date range, see
[Doc. 237-1 at 22 (requiring disclosure of information “from March 15, 2020 to the
present,” i.e., May 25, 2023)], and Defendant does not challenge the reasonableness of
this timeframe, see [Doc. 237]. And the Government is similarly limited by the remainder
of the search warrant and Attachment B.II, which describes the specific data that may be
seized. 	See [Doc. 237-1 at 24]; see also In re Search of Info. Associated with
[redacted]@mac.com that is Stored at Premises Controlled by Apple, Inc., 13 F. Supp.
3d 157, 164 (D.D.C. 2014) (“[L]aw enforcement discretion is constrained and limited to
the items to be seized that are specified in Attachment B to the warrant.”); Jama II, 2025
WL 227296, at *2 (“[That] Attachment B requires Google or Microsoft to disclose the entire
contents of email accounts (that were specifically identified in Attachment A) does not
mean that law enforcement can search for anything in that disclosure”). Defendant does
not argue that the categories of evidence to be seized, as outlined in Attachment B.II, are
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insufficiently particular. See [Doc. 237]. And finally, the warrant identifies seven specific
email addresses allegedly used by Mr. Garcia to communicate about actions that form
the basis of the Indictment. See [Doc. 237-1]. Mr. Garcia does not argue that the search
violated the Fourth Amendment by capturing inappropriate email accounts. See generally
[Doc. 237].
These limiting principles render Defendant’s reliance on United States v. Otero,
563 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2009), unpersuasive. 	Defendant insists that the categories of
items to be disclosed in Attachment B.I “are in line with wide-ranging search requests
previously found to be invalid,” citing Otero in support. 	[Doc. 237 at 10 (quotation
omitted)]. 	But Otero is distinguishable. 	In that case, a defendant challenged the
constitutionality of a search warrant that permitted the seizure of, inter alia, “[a]ny and all
information and/or data stored” on her computer. Otero, 563 F.3d at 1130. Because the
warrant “ha[d] no limiting instruction whatsoever” and impermissibly “authorize[d] a wide-
ranging search of” the defendant’s computer, the Tenth Circuit found the warrant invalid
for lack of particularity. Id. at 1132–33. Unlike Otero, the warrant at issue here does have
limiting principles. It limits the required disclosure of information to seven email accounts.
[Doc. 237-1 at 21–22]. It contains a temporal limitation. [Id. at 22]. And unlike Otero, it
limits the items that the Government may seize to specific categories of information. [Id.
at 24]; see also Jama II, 2025 WL 227296, at *3 (finding similar search warrant sufficiently
particular); Lee, 2015 WL 5667102, at *9 (warrant that permitted disclosure of “entire
contents of [email] accounts” but “limited the items authorized to be seized by the
government to evidence reasonably connected to the crime” was constitutional).
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Defendant nevertheless asserts that the search warrant should have limited the
items subject to disclosure with more particularity, suggesting that the Government could
have, and should have, “limit[ed] disclosure . . . to emails between certain accounts or
emails that contain certain ‘buzzwords’ or limiting the disclosure of internet search history
to certain ‘buzzwords.’” 	[Doc. 237 at 11]. 	He also suggests that the Government could
have “sen[t] a request [to Google] with the specific data sought” and Google could have,
in turn, responded “with precisely that data.” 	[Doc. 241 at 2 (quotation omitted)]. 	The
Court respectfully disagrees with these arguments. “[N]othing in the Fourth Amendment
requires law enforcement to cede to non-law enforcement their power to search and
determine which matters are subject to seizure.” United States v. Deppish, 994 F. Supp.
2d 1211, 1220 (D. Kan. 2014). 	“[T]here are serious practical problems with requiring
private parties to ‘search through e-mails and electronic records related to the target
account and determine which e-mails are responsive to the search warrant.’” 	Jama I,
2024 	WL 	5381447, 	at 	*4 	(quoting 	In 	re 	Search 	of 	Info. 	Associated 	with
[redacted]@mac.com, 13 F. Supp. 3d at 165). It would be “unworkable and impractical”
to require service-provider employees, presumably untrained in criminal investigations,
to determine whether certain documents or data contained in the email accounts
constitute fruits, contraband, evidence, or instrumentalities of wire fraud. 	See In re
Search of Info. Associated with [redacted]@mac.com, 13 F. Supp. 3d at 165; see also In
re 	Warrant 	for 	All 	Content 	& 	Other 	Info. 	Associated 	with 	the 	Email 	Acct.
xxxxxxx@gmail.com, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 395 (“Google employees would not be able to
interpret the significance of particular emails without having been trained in the substance
of the investigation.”).
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“[S]o long as a warrant specifies with particularity what evidence the government
intends to seize, establishes probable cause that the evidence is connected to a specific
criminal statute, and includes some limitations (such as a date range) to prevent the
potential of a general search, the warrant meets the Fourth Amendment particularity
requirement.” In re Search of Info. Associated with Email Addresses Stored at Premises
Controlled by the Microsoft Corp., 212 F. Supp. 3d 1023, 1036–37 (D. Kan. 2016). Here,
the warrant follows the familiar two-step process recognized in Rule 41(e)(2)(B) and
contains sufficient limiting principles to meet Fourth Amendment particularity standards.
Finally, even if the warrant did lack particularly (which the Court does not hold), the
Court would find that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies. 	“When
officers rely on a warrant, [courts] presume they acted in objective good faith.” 	United
States v. Edwards, 813 F.3d 953, 970 (10th Cir. 2015). 	“[T]he good-faith exception
provides that evidence seized under a defective warrant should not be suppressed if
executing officers had reasonably relied on the warrant’s validity.” United States v. Dunn,
719 F. App’x 746, 752 (10th Cir. 2017) (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922
(1984); further citation omitted). 	“But the good-faith exception does not apply when the
warrant is so lacking in particularity that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume
the warrant to be valid.” 	Id. 	“In the ordinary case,” however, “an officer cannot be
expected to question the [magistrate judge’s] . . . judgment that the form of the warrant is
technically sufficient.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 921.
Defendant contends that the warrant was so lacking in particularity that officers
could not have reasonably presumed the warrant was valid, [Doc. 241 at 6–7], but the
Court disagrees. 	Numerous courts have found warrants just like the one issued here
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constitutionally valid; therefore, the warrant was “not so facially deficient that officers
could not reasonably presume [its] validity.” 	Cf. Jama II, 2025 WL 227296, at *4
(explaining that good-faith exception applies “when court decisions conflict on a legal
issue”). 	Because numerous federal judges have reasonably concluded that similar
warrants are constitutionally sufficient, the executing officers here could reasonably
presume that the warrant was valid.
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Suppress is respectfully DENIED.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, it is ORDERED that:
(1) 	Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Google Account Information and Emails
Unlawfully Obtained by a Warrant Lacking Particularity [Doc. 237] is
DENIED.
DATED: January 16, 2026 	BY THE COURT:
_________________________
Nina Y. Wang
United States District Judge
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