Peddada v. Catholic Health Initiatives Colorado et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Nina Y. Wang
Civil Action No. 23-cv-01921-NYW-MDB
DR. ANUJ PEDDADA,
Plaintiff,
v.
CATHOLIC HEALTH INITIATIVES COLORADO, and
COMMON SPIRIT HEALTH,
Defendants.
_______________________________
CATHOLIC HEALTH INITIATIVES COLORADO, and
COMMON SPIRIT HEALTH,
Counterclaimants,
v.
DR. ANUJ PEDDADA,
Counter-Defendant.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
______________________________________________________________________
This matter is before the Court on the following:
(1) 	Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. 203, filed February
19, 2026];
(2) 	Defendants’ Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 208, filed
February 19, 2026];
(3) 	Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions [Doc. 257, filed April 21, 2026]; and
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(4) 	Defendants’ Motion for Clarification [Doc. 261, filed August 14, 2026].
These Motions are fully briefed, see [Doc. 228; Doc. 240; Doc. 244; Doc. 258; Doc.
259; Doc. 262], and the Court finds that oral argument will not materially assist in the
resolution. 	For the reasons set forth below, this Court respectfully GRANTS in part
Defendant’s Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment; DENIES as moot Plaintiff’s
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; DENIES as moot Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike; and
DENIES as moot Defendants’ Motion for Clarification.
BACKGROUND
This case arises from a failed employment relationship between Plaintiff Dr. Anuj
Peddada 	(“Plaintiff” 	or 	“Dr. 	Peddada”) 	and 	Defendants 	Catholic 	Health 	Initiatives
Colorado 	d/b/a 	Centura 	Health-Penrose-St. 	Francis 	Health 	Services 	(“CHIC” 	or
“Penrose”) 	and 	CommonSpirit 	Health 	Foundation 	d/b/a 	CommonSpirit 	Health
(“CommonSpirit” and together, “Defendants”). 	Dr. Peddada initiated this action against
Defendants on July 27, 2023, bringing ten claims for relief against Defendants. [Doc. 1].1
On April 9, 2024, Plaintiff sought leave to amend, [Doc. 50], which the Court
granted on October 31, 2024, [Doc. 102]. 	In his Amended Complaint, Dr. Peddada
asserted the same ten claims for relief. See [Doc. 104]. Specifically, Claims 1, 2, and 3
assert that Defendants denied Dr. Peddada employment opportunities because (1) of his
disability, (2) because they regarded him as disabled,2 and/or (3) because of the need to
1 When referring to documents filed in this action, this court uses the convention [Doc.
__], referring to the docket and page number assigned by the court’s Electronic Court
Files (“ECF”) System. In citing to deposition transcripts, this court uses the convention of
citing to the document number assigned by the ECF system, but page and line number
from the original deposition transcript for consistency purposes.
2 Plaintiff does not assert that he is disabled based upon a record of impairment. 	[Doc.
240 at 19 n.13].
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provide reasonable accommodation for his disabilities, in violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”). 	[Id. at ¶¶ 159–66]. 	Claim 4 asserts that Defendants failed to
provide 	Dr. 	Peddada 	reasonable 	accommodation 	and 	denied 	him 	employment
opportunities because of his request for reasonable accommodation, in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 12111(8)–(10). 	[Id. at ¶¶ 167–79]. 	Claims 5 and 6 assert that Defendants
retaliated against Dr. Peddada for engaging in protected activity by requesting reasonable
accommodation and interfered with his exercise of rights under the ADA. [Id. at ¶¶ 180–
90]. Claim 7 asserts a violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. [Id. at ¶¶ 191–
97]. Claim 8, 9, and 10 assert state law claims for wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy, respectively. [Id. at ¶¶ 198–226]. Plaintiff
invoked 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337,3 and 1343 as the basis of this Court’s federal question
subject matter jurisdiction, and 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) as the basis for pendent jurisdiction
over Claims 8, 9, and 10. [Id. at ¶¶ 8–9]. As relief, Dr. Peddada seeks a declaration that
Defendants violated his state and federal rights, compensatory damages, punitive
damages, front pay in lieu of reinstatement, pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, and
attorneys’ fees and costs.
On November 15, 2024, Defendants filed their Answer to Amended Complaint and
Counterclaim (“Answer and Counterclaim”). [Doc. 113]. Defendants denied liability as to
all Plaintiff’s causes of action, [id. at 15–18]; asserted affirmative defenses including but
3 After Congress broadened the scope of § 1331 by eliminating the amount in controversy
requirement, § 1337 and similar specific statutes granting federal jurisdiction have
become unnecessarily redundant. 	See also Dutcher v. Matheson, 733 F.3d 980, 985
(10th Cir. 2013) (“[B]ecause the phrase ‘arising under’ has the same meaning in both
statutes, § 1337 is superfluous.” (quoting 13D Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal Prac.
& Proc. § 3574 (3d ed., April 2013 update))).
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not limited to the failure to mitigate damages, [id. at 18–19]; and asserted a Counterclaim
seeking a loan repayment obligation under a Physician Recruitment Agreement and
Promissory Note,4 [id. at 19]. 	Plaintiff then sought to dismiss Defendants’ Counterclaim
[Doc. 117], which the Court denied, [Doc. 178].
The Parties have proceeded through discovery, and on February 19, 2026, Plaintiff
filed his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, seeking judgment in his favor as to
Defendants’ failure to mitigate defense. 	[Doc. 203]. 	That same day, Defendants filed
their renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, seeking judgment in their favor on all of Dr.
Peddada’s claims. Specifically, Defendants argue that Defendant CommonSpirit should
be dismissed because it had no role in the actions at issue in this case. 	[Id. at 21].
Further, Defendants contend that all Plaintiff’s disability claims fail because (1) he “did not
have a disability and certainly not any impairment that inhibited him from communicating;”
(2) he never committed to employment, so he was not a “qualified individual” under the
ADA; and (3) Defendants had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason to withdraw their
offer of employment. [Id. at 23–30 (emphasis omitted)]. Defendants further contend that
they are entitled to judgment in their favor on Claim 8 for wrongful discharge because Dr.
Peddada was never employed or discharged, [id. at 30], and Claim 9 for unjust enrichment
because “it is not unjust to decline to hire an applicant who refuses to communicate” about
the terms of employment and because Plaintiff “was already compensated—through his
employment with ROPC—for his prior efforts that he claims resulted in enrichment to
Pensorse, which defeats his claim for further reimbursement,” [id. at 31]. 	Finally,
4 Defendants do not actually identify a specific cause of action in their Counterclaim. See
[Doc. 113 at 19–20]. And in seeking to dismiss the Counterclaim, Plaintiff likewise does
not characterize the cause of action. [See Doc. 117]
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Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim for conspiracy also fails because Dr. Peddada fails
to establish that he is disabled, and he admitted during his deposition that there was no
conspiracy between Defendants and Dr. Alan Monroe, his former medical practice
partner. [Id. at 31–32].
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A dispute is genuine if there is sufficient evidence so that a rational
trier of fact could resolve the issue either way. A fact is material if under the substantive
law it is essential to the proper disposition of the claim.” Crowe v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc.,
649 F.3d 1189, 1194 (10th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up). “There is no genuine issue of material
fact unless the evidence, construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, is
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” 	Bones v.
Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 366 F.3d 869, 875 (10th Cir. 2004).
At summary judgment, a movant that does not bear the ultimate burden of
persuasion at trial does not need to disprove the other party’s claim; rather, the movant
must only point the Court to a lack of evidence for the other party on an essential element
of that party’s claim. Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 671 (10th Cir. 1998).
Once this movant has met its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party
to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” 	Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). In order for there to be a genuine issue for
trial, there must be more than “the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of
the plaintiff’s position.” Id. at 252.
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When considering the evidence in the record, the Court cannot and does not weigh
the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses. See id. at 255; Fogarty v. Gallegos,
523 F.3d 1147, 1165 (10th Cir. 2008). At all times, the Court views the record in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Banner Bank v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 916 F.3d
1323, 1326 (10th Cir. 2019).
UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
The following undisputed material facts are drawn from the record before the
Court.
1. 	Dr. Anuj Peddada is a board-certified radiation oncologist. 	[Doc. 104 at
¶ 16; Doc. 113 at ¶ 16].
2. 	Dr. Peddada and Dr. Alan Monroe were partners in a practice group called
Radiation Oncology, P.C. (“ROPC”). [Doc. 104 at ¶ 24; Doc. 113 at ¶ 24].
3. 	ROPC contracted exclusively to provide services to Centura at Penrose
Cancer Care Center, in Colorado Springs from approximately 1999 to 2022. [Doc. 104 at
¶¶ 25–26; Doc. 113 at ¶¶ 25–26; Doc. 208 at ¶ 1; Doc. 240 at 2 ¶ 1; Doc. 208-1 at 3–25].
4. 	The Exclusive Professional Services Agreement for Radiation Oncology
Services executed between Dr. Peddada and Centura Health-Penrose-St. Francis Health
Services expressly classifies ROPC as an independent contractor in all capitals and bold
font. [Doc. 208-1 at 10 § 3.01].
5. 	Between January 2019 and August 2023, Common Spirit had essentially no
involvement in the day-to-day decision-making of running Penrose or St. Francis Medical
Center, was not involved in managing or operating those facilities, and did not exercise
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any direct oversight or control over Dr. Peddada’s employment negotiations. [Doc. 208-
48 at 154:9–23].
6. 	In 2020, CHIC requested that ROPC to provide services at St. Francis
Medical Center beginning in July 2021. [Doc. 104 at ¶ 65; Doc. 113 at ¶ 65].
7. 	Centura facilitated the hiring of a third physician, Dr. Madeera Kathpal,
through a Physician Recruitment Agreement. [Doc. 104 at ¶ 66; Doc. 113 at ¶ 66; Doc.
208-1].
8. 	Near the end of 2021, the relationship between Drs. Peddada and Monroe
became irretrievably broken. 	[Doc. 208 at ¶ 2; Doc. 240 at 2 ¶ 2]. 	By that time, Drs.
Peddada and Monroe had not spoken for approximately eight months. [Doc. 208 at ¶ 2;
Doc. 240 at 2 ¶ 2; Doc. 208-54 at 158:17–19].
9. 	Around the same time, Dr. Kathpal left ROPC, triggering a loan repayment
obligation under the Physician Recruitment Agreement. [Doc. 208 at ¶ 3; Doc. 240 at 2
¶ 3].
[Doc. 241-4 at 16].
10.
[Doc. 241-6; Doc. 241-7; Doc. 241-8].
[Doc. 241-5].
11. 	In December 2021, Centura informed ROPC that it would not renew the
exclusive contract for ROPC to perform medical services at Penrose and St. Francis once
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the contract expired on June 1, 2022. 	[Doc. 104 at ¶ 74; Doc. 113 at ¶ 74]. Therefore,
as of April–May 2022, Dr. Peddada was still a partner in ROPC and was not an active
employee of Defendants. See [Doc. 104 at ¶ 74; Doc. 113 at ¶ 74].
12. 	Penrose offered to hire Drs. Peddada and Monroe as employees, and then
separate them at two different hospitals after the expiration of the Exclusive Professional
Services Agreement for Radiation Oncology Services. 	[Doc. 208 at ¶ 2; Doc. 240 at 2
¶ 2].
13. 	On December 2, 2021, Dr. Peddada told his brother that the termination of
the ROPC contract was the result was “what I hoped for. . . . 	But they want to employ
both of us at separate locations. I’m not sure I want to be employed.” [Doc. 208-37 at 1].
14. 	On April 5, 2022, Penrose sent Dr. Peddada a draft of a Physician
Employment Agreement. [Doc. 208 at ¶ 5; Doc. 240 at 4 ¶ 5].
15. 	On April 16 and 19, 2022, there were communications between Dr. Peddada
and the cancer team about Dr. Peddada’s need for a recharge break or leave before
starting employment. [Doc. 208 at ¶ 10; Doc. 240 at 5 at ¶ 10]. As of April 27, 2022, Dr.
Peddada had communicated to Dr. Jeffrey Albert (“Dr. Albert”), the Enterprise Medical
Director of Radiation Oncology and Integrative Cancer Care, that he would like to take
some time off before starting as an employee at Penrose. [Doc. 208 at ¶ 10; Doc. 240 at
5 ¶ 10; Doc. 208-21].
16. 	During this same time period, Dr. Peddada was consulting with his attorney
about taking disability leave under the ROPC contract. [Doc. 208 at ¶ 11; Doc. 240 at 5
¶ 11; 208-54 at 144:16–24].
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17.
[Doc. 241-3].
[id. at 3–4].
18.
[Id. at 1].
19.
[Id. at 4]. Dr. Peddada’s own retained expert,
Dr. Michael F. Myers, MD (“Dr. Myers”), concurred with the health professionals whom he
consulted that his burnout was entirely work-related. [Doc. 240-36 at 11].
20. 	Dr. Setty did not have any concerns regarding Dr. Peddada’s physical
health, memory, or cognition. [Doc. 208-57 at 21:25–22:3]. From her clinical evaluation,
she did not believe that his condition interfered with his ability to perform major life
activities such as breathing, sleeping, walking, working, communicating, or thinking. [Id.
at 24:9–14]. Nor did she feel like he needed, or did she order, any restrictions on normal
life activities. [Id. at 24:2–8, 15–20].
21.
[Doc. 241-4 at 38; Doc. 208-
57 at 20:19–25].
5 The Parties, and thus this Court, refers to Dr. Selagamsetty as Dr. Setty. See [Doc. 208
at ¶ 13; Doc. 240 at 5 ¶ 13].
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22. 	On April 25, 2022, Dr. Peddada informed his ROPC partner, Dr. Monroe,
that he would be taking leave beginning on May 1, 2022, for a period of three months.
[Doc. 208-7]. He later took issue with Dr. Monroe’s characterization of his leave request
as being based on a mental health condition. [Doc. 208-53 at 65:2–66:4; Doc. 208-13].
23. 	Dr. Peddada informed Defendants that he was out of the office for his
scheduled vacation from April 23–30, 2022.6 [Doc. 208-15 at 3].
24. 	On 	April 	26, 	2022, 	Defendants 	emailed 	Dr. 	Peddada 	a 	Physician
Employment Agreement, including a provision for loan repayment, and also sent a payor
credentialing packet for signature. [Doc. 208 at ¶ 16; Doc. 240 at 7 ¶ 16]. Dr. Peddada
viewed that email that same day. [Doc. 208-4 at ¶ 16; id. at 8]. During his deposition, Dr.
Peddada conceded that he had no factual basis to dispute that he viewed the email,
despite disputing that he had. [Doc. 208-53 at 56:10–15].
25. 	Dr. 	Peddada 	did 	not 	execute 	the 	April 	26 	Physician 	Employment
Agreement. [Doc. 208 at ¶ 17; Doc. 240 at 8 ¶ 17; Doc. 208-53 at 57:7–9].7 Nor did Dr.
Peddada communicate with Defendants regarding the proposed Physician Employment
Agreement. [Doc. 208-53 at 56:25–57:17].
26. 	Around 	the 	same 	time, 	Defendants 	also 	sent 	Dr. 	Peddada 	a 	Loan
Settlement Agreement. 	[Doc. 208 at ¶ 12; Doc. 240 at 5 ¶ 12]. 	Dr. Peddada did not
execute the Loan Settlement Agreement. [Doc. 208-53 at 30:15–21, 31:4–6].
6 While Dr. Peddada testified at his deposition that he was placed on medical leave as
soon as he saw Dr. Setty, this Court respectfully disagrees that this later testimony can
create a genuine issue of material fact that he informed Defendants that he was on
vacation from April 23–30, 2022.
7 While Dr. Peddada denied Defendants’ proposed undisputed fact, Dr. Peddada did not
deny 	that 	he 	did 	not 	execute 	the April 	26 	Physician 	Employment Agreement 	or
communicate with Defendants regarding any of the terms of his employment.
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27. 	Dr. Peddada also did not return Mr. Koval’s text message requesting to
speak on April 27, 2022. [Doc. 208-2 at ¶ 18; Doc. 208-53 at 57:18–58:7].
28. 	On or about April 27, 2022, Dr. Peddada spoke with Dr. William Plauth, Chief
Medical Officer at CHIC, who stated that Dr. Peddada declined to speak about the
Physician Employment Agreement. 	[Doc. 208-14 at 2; Doc. 208 at ¶¶ 20–21; Doc. 240
at 8 ¶¶ 20–21]. 	Dr. Peddada further informed Dr. Plauth that he was unwilling to discuss
the Physician Employment Agreement during the entirety of his leave which was
anticipated to last until August 1, 2022. [Doc. 208-54 at 114:8–13].
29. 	Because physician credentialing with payors takes 90 to 100 days and
cannot be started without a signed agreement, it was urgent that Dr. Peddada commit to
employment and sign the agreements so that Penrose could move forward with its plans.
[Doc. 208 at ¶ 9; Doc. 240 at 5 ¶ 9; Doc. 208-2 at ¶ 21].
30. 	On May 2, 2022, Dr. Peddada discussed with and formally requested
medical leave from Dr. Caryn Baldouf, CHIC Medical Staff President. [Doc. 203-7; Doc.
203-8].
31. 	Dr. Monroe executed his Physician Employment Agreement on May 16,
2022 and his Loan Settlement Agreement on May 24, 2022. [Doc. 240-13; Doc. 241-2].
32.
[Doc.
241-4 at 17, 33].
[Id. at 21–22].
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[Id. at 23].
33.
[Id. at 25].
34.
[Id.
at 17].
35.
[Id. at 35].
36.
[Id. at 37].
[Id.].
37. 	By letter dated May 9, 2022, Defendants told Mr. Peddada that they were
“treating [his] failure to execute the Employment Agreement as a rejection of its offer of
employment,” and indicated 	that 	they 	would 	not 	be 	extending a 	revised offer of
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employment. 	[Doc. 208-15 at 1]. 	This letter was transmitted to Dr. Peddada by email
dated May 10, 2022. [Id. at 2–3].
38.
[Doc. 241-4 at 39].
[Id. at 40].
[Id.].
39.
[Id. at 41].
40.
See generally [id. at 30–43].
[Id.].
[Id. at 33].
41.
[Id. at 39].
ANALYSIS
Dr. Peddada invokes both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act as bases for his
claims for disability discrimination by Defendants based on their denial of “employment
opportunities,” “retract[ion] [of employment] offer,” and “exclu[sion] . . . from employment.”
[Doc. 104 at ¶¶ 162, 172, 194].8 By enacting the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, Congress
8 Title I of the ADA prohibits qualified employers from “discriminat[ing] against a qualified
individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
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sought to ensure that disabled individuals received full and equal opportunities to
participate in society by prohibiting discrimination based on an individual's disability. See
42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(a)–(b); 29 U.S.C. § 701(a)–(b). The ADA makes it unlawful for a
covered employer to discriminate against any “qualified individual on the basis of
disability.” 	42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). 	Likewise, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits
exclusion of a disabled individual from “any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance” because of that individual's disability. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). To remedy alleged
discrimination, both statutes allow private citizens to sue for damages for alleged statutory
violations. See Guttman v. Khalsa, 669 F.3d 1101, 1109 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 12133 (incorporating by reference 29 U.S.C. § 794(a))). 	Because the ADA and
Rehabilitation Act “involve the same substantive standards, [courts] analyze them
together.” 	Miller ex rel. S.M. v. Bd. of Educ. of Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 565 F.3d 1232,
1245 (10th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, the Court's analysis of these issues largely focuses
on the ADA, but this analysis applies equally to the Rehabilitation Act. See Rivero v. Bd.
of Regents of Univ. of N.M., 950 F.3d 754, 758 (10th Cir. 2020) (recognizing that courts
apply the same standards to the Rehabilitation Act claims and ADA claims).
Because there is no direct evidence of disability discrimination, Dr. Peddada’s
claims for disability discrimination proceed under the framework set forth in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 	See [Doc. 240 at 25; Doc. 258 at 12];
Carter v. Pathfinder Energy Servs., Inc., 662 F.3d 1134, 1141 (10th Cir. 2011). Under that
approach, Dr. Peddada bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and
other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
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discrimination by demonstrating that (1) he was a disabled person as defined by the ADA;
(2) he was qualified, with or without reasonable accommodation, to perform the essential
functions of his job; and (3) he was denied employment with Defendants because of his
disability. 	Carter, 662 F.3d at 1142. 	If he is able to do so, then the burden shifts to
Defendants to offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for their employment action.
See Lincoln v. BNSF Ry. Co., 900 F.3d 1166, 1193 (10th Cir. 2018). 	If the employer
articulates a satisfactory reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that
the employer's stated reason is a pretext for discrimination. Id. (citing DePaula v. Easter
Seals El Mirador, 859 F.3d 957, 970 (10th Cir. 2017)).
I. 	Summary Judgment in Favor of CommonSpirit Based On Corporate Form Is
Warranted.
Defendants first argue that Common Spirit should be dismissed because “it had
no involvement in in any decision involving Dr. Peddada and exercised no control over
the entities or individuals involved in those decisions.” [Doc. 208 at 21]. In support of this
argument, Defendants cite to authority that a parent corporation is not liable for the acts
of its subsidiaries and testimony by its administrators. [Id.]. Plaintiff argues that “there is
sufficient evidence that Defendants are jointly liable as joint employers and/or an
integrated enterprise, both of which turn on control over employment conditions.”9 [Doc.
240 at 29].
The Court first notes that most of the witness testimony cited by Defendants does
not state that no one associated with CommonSpirit had any involvement in any decision
9 Dr. Peddada does not make any different arguments with respect to Claims 8–10, which
assert state law claims for wrongful discharge; unjust enrichment; and civil conspiracy,
and thus, this Court treats all of the claims collectively as the Parties do.
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involving Dr. Peddada. See [Doc. 208 at 21 (citing Doc. 208-49 at 134:21–135:18; Doc.
208-48 at 153:19–154:23; Doc. 208-56 at 97:10–100:8; Doc. 208-58 at 16:22–17:11; Doc.
208-59 at 23:22–24:8; Doc. 208-60 at 44:1–9; Doc. 208-50 at 38:15–40:19; 41:12–14)].
But Dr. Albert, in his capacity as the corporate designee of CHIC, testified that CHIC was
result of a joint operating agreement between Common Spirit and Advent Health, and that
Common Spirit was considered a parent, or “sponsor” organization that owned the assets
for certain hospitals. 	[Doc. 208-48 at 153:19–154:2]. 	He further testified that CHIC
operated these hospitals on behalf of Common Spirit and Advent Health. [Id. at 154:4-8].
Importantly, Dr. Albert testified that Common Spirit had “essentially no involvement, you
know, in the day-to-day decision-making, the processes around this” or in the day-to-day
operations of the Penrose and St. Francis hospitals, and that Common Spirit “would not
have been exercising any direct oversight or control over this situation.” 	[Id. at 154:9–
23]. 	In response, Dr. Peddada simply argues that Defendants “are jointly liable as joint
employer and/or an integrated enterprise, both of which turn on control over employment
conditions,” without pointing to any specific facts to support his theory. [Doc. 240 at 29–
30].
“The doctrine of limited liability creates a strong presumption that a parent
company is not the employer of its subsidiary's employees, and the courts have found
otherwise only in extraordinary circumstances.” Bowles v. Grant Trucking, LLC, 842 F.
App’x 236, 242 (10th Cir. 2021) (quoting Frank v. U.S. W., Inc., 3 F.3d 1357, 1362 (10th
Cir. 1993)). 	While Dr. Peddada invokes the joint employer and/or integrated enterprise
theories, and cites Bristol v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Clear Creek, 312 F.3d 1213, 1218
(10th Cir. 2002) and Frank, 3 F.3d at 1362, he fails entirely to engage in any legal
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analysis—including 	but 	not 	limited 	to 	differentiating 	between 	the 	two 	theories 	or
identifying the factual evidence that supports his argument. [Doc. 240 at 29]. It is not the
place, nor the obligation, of this Court to make argument on behalf of any party,
particularly one that has been represented by able counsel since the inception of this
action. See United States v. Yelloweagle, 643 F.3d 1275, 1284 (10th Cir. 2011); Phillips
v. Hillcrest Med. Ctr., 244 F.3d 790, 800 n.10 (10th Cir. 2001) (observing that a court has
no obligation to make arguments or perform research on behalf of litigants).
The only evidence that Dr. Peddada appears to offer to support his claim that
Common Spirit and CHIC were joint employers, or a single, integrated enterprise, is
testimony by Dr. Albert that there were Common Spirit leaders on the CHIC Board of
Directors, and by Jason Tacha, the Chief Operating Officer for AdventHealth Medical
Group—who was testifying as an individual—that he did not have an understanding of
the difference between CHIC and Common Spirit. 	[Doc. 240 at 14 at ¶ 49 (citing Doc.
240-26 at 17:12–15); Doc. 240-26 at 17:1–15]. 	Even construing this evidence in Dr.
Peddada’s favor, this testimony is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact
that Common Spirit shared or co-determined those matters governing the essential terms
and conditions of Dr. Peddada’s employment as joint employers. 	Bristol, 312 F.3d at
1218. 	Nor is there any evidence that Common Spirit exercised significant control over
CHIC employees generally. Id.
Similarly, Dr. Peddada points to no evidence that demonstrates that Common Spirit
exercised control over CHIC that exceeded control normally exercised by a parent
corporation to justify a finding of a single, integrated entity. 	See Frank, 3 F.3d at 1362.
Indeed, the Frank court expressly rejected Dr. Peddada’s contention that the fact that Mr.
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Tacha ultimately reported to a Board of Directors comprised of some Common Spirit
leaders created a genuine issue of material fact, because “[t]o hold otherwise would mean
that there would always be a material factual dispute as to this prong because the top
officer of a subsidiary is, at some point, always held accountable to an officer of the parent
corporation.” 	Id. 	Rather, Frank court posited that “[t]he critical question is, what entity
made the final decisions regarding employment matters related to the person claiming
discrimination?” Id. at 1363 (cleaned up). There is simply no evidence in the record that
Common Spirit was such entity as to the employment actions related to Dr. Peddada.
Accordingly, this Court respectfully concludes that Defendant Common Spirit is
entitled to summary judgment in its favor against Dr. Peddada as to all claims.10
II. 	Dr. Peddada Fails To Satisfy His Prima Facie Burden That He Is Actually
Disabled.
The ADA defines a disability as, inter alia, “a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). “To satisfy
this definition, a plaintiff must (1) have a recognized impairment, (2) identify one or more
appropriate major life activities, and (3) [allege] the impairment substantially limits one or
more of those activities.” 	Carter v. Pathfinder Energy Servs., Inc., 662 F.3d 1134, 1142
(10th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted).
Plaintiff incorrectly argues that Defendants do not challenge Dr. Peddada’s prima
facie case of disability discrimination. [Doc. 240 at 25]. Defendants expressly argue that
10 For ease of reference, the Court continues to use “Defendants” because the Motion for
Summary Judgment was filed on behalf of both CHIC and Common Spirit, though CHIC
remains the only remaining defendant as to certain claims, and because, to the extent
that this Court is incorrect about whether Common Spirit is an appropriate defendant, the
remainder of its analysis applies equally to Common Spirit.
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Dr. Peddada was not “disabled,” an element of the prima facie case of disability
discrimination. [Doc. 208 at 24, 27, 32; Doc. 258 at 14]. Indeed, Dr. Peddada concedes
that “the relevant question is whether Dr. Peddada’s impairments substantially limited a
major life activity,” and he asserts that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether he is disabled, because his expert who was hired in anticipation of litigation,
concluded that his condition substantially impaired his major life activities such as
sleeping, thinking, concentrating, and communicating. 	[Doc. 240 at 16 ¶ 6 (citing Doc.
240-36 at 12–14); id. at 21]. 	Looking at the relevant regulation from the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, “major life activities” includes “caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, sitting,
reaching, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking,
communicating, interacting with others, and working.” See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i); Carter,
662 F.3d at 1142–43. “An impairment is a disability within the meaning of this section if it
substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared
to most people in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ii).
“Whether the plaintiff has identified a major life activity is normally a question of
law for the court, while the degree of substantial limitation is ordinarily a question of fact
for the jury.” Freeman v. City of Cheyenne, 660 F. Supp. 3d 1155, 1162 (D. Wyo. 2023)
(citing Crowell v. Denver Health & Hosp. Auth., 572 F. App’x 650, 657 (10th Cir. 2014);
Berry v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 490 F.3d 1211, 1216 (10th Cir. 2007)), aff’d, No. 23-8022,
2024 WL 464069 (10th Cir. Feb. 7, 2024). 	Based on the record before it, this Court
concludes that Dr. Peddada does not adduce sufficient evidence to establish a genuine
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issue of material fact that he has a disability that substantially impairs his major life
activities of sleeping, thinking, concentrating, and communicating.
Sleeping. As an initial matter, contrary to his assertion at [Doc. 240 at 16 ¶ 6], Dr.
Peddada’s expert, Dr. Michael F. Myers, MD (“Dr. Myers”), does not conclude that Dr.
Peddada’s condition substantially impaired his sleeping. Rather, he simply states that Dr.
Peddada’s responses to the CPHP Intake Form “suggest that Dr. Peddada’s sleep may
not have been as restful or restorative as usual.” [Doc. 240-36 at 12]. Dr. Peddada points
to no contemporaneous reports of a substantial impairment to his ability to sleep, and
indeed, does not argue it within the substance of the Response. 	See [Doc. 240 at 21].
The citation to which Dr. Peddada points for the assertion that he often did not want to
get out of bed does not substantiate that assertion. See [Doc. 240 at 16 ¶ 7 (citing Doc.
240-11 at 41:7–14; 210:2–11)].11 	Dr. Setty also testified that she did not believe Dr.
Peddad’s condition interfered with his ability to perform major life activities such as
breathing, sleeping, walking, working, communicating, or thinking and believed that Dr.
Peddada was fully capable of conducting all normal life activities without interference and
that all of his normal bodily functions were unimpaired. [Doc. 208-57 at 24:9–20]. 	And
while it is Dr. Peddada’s—not the Court’s—responsibility to identify evidence in the record
to support his claim of disability, see Alvariza v. Home Depot, 506 F. Supp. 2d 451, 459
(D. Colo. 2007) (“Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in the record.”
11 Dr. Peddada did not even attach page 210 as part of his Exhibit 11. See [Doc. 240-11].
Although it was not required to do so, this Court cross-referenced the citation to Dr.
Peddada’s deposition transcript as submitted by Defendants. 	[Doc. 208-54]. 	While Dr.
Peddada testified that “I quit going to tumor boards some because I just didn’t want to
wake up to go to tumor board,” [Doc. 208-54 at 210:3–5], this testimony does not support
the proposition that he “often did not want to get out of bed.”
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(cleaned up) (quoting United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir.1991)), even
viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, this Court does not find sufficient
evidence that rises to more than a scintilla that would allow a jury to conclude that Dr.
Peddada’s sleeping was substantially impaired to justify a finding of disability under the
ADA and Rehabilitation Act.
Thinking, Concentrating, and Communication. As discussed above, Dr. Setty
did not believe that Dr. Peddada’s condition impaired—let alone substantially impaired—
his major life activities, including thinking and communicating, even after clinically
examining him contemporaneously with his complaints. [Doc. 208-57 at 24:9–14]. Even
accepting Dr. Peddada and Dr. Myers’s contentions that Dr. Peddada’s condition
substantially 	impaired 	the 	major 	life 	function 	of 	thinking, 	concentrating, 	and
communication, both implicitly concede that these functions were only impaired as to the
performance of his specific job of being a radiation oncologist.
It is undisputed that
[Doc. 241-3 at 4] (emphasis
added). And Dr. Myers expressly stated: “I agree with the health professionals whom he
consulted that this [burnout] was entirely work-related.” 	[Doc. 240-36 at 11 (emphasis
added)]. 	Plaintiff points to no evidence within the record that outside of performing his
professional duties, Dr. Peddada’s thinking or concentrating was impaired at all. 	See
Doebele v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 342 F.3d 1117, 1131 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that
plaintiff failed to show that her activities were significantly limited for purposes of the ADA
because plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that her impairments substantially impaired
her ability to interact with people in general on a regular basis).
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[Doc. 241-3 at 4]. 	And Dr. Peddada himself took issue with Dr. Monroe’s
characterization of any impairment as a mental health issue. [Doc. 208-53 at 65:2–66:4;
Doc. 208-13]. Similarly, Plaintiff has failed to point to sufficient evidence to create a
genuine issue of material fact that his communication was substantially impaired outside
of work. 	See Steele v. Thiokol Corp., 241 F.3d 1248, 1255 (10th Cir. 2001). 	Even Dr.
Myers does not opine that Dr. Peddada’s condition substantially limits him to think,
concentrate or communicate as compared to most people in the general population.
Compare [Doc. 240-36] with 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ii).
As reflected in the EEOC regulation, work is considered a major life activity. 	29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(i). 	But courts consider the major life activity of working only as a last
resort, Carter, 662 F.3d at 1146, and a person is only substantially limited in his ability to
work if he is significantly restricted to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of
jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training,
skills, and abilities, see EEOC v. Heartway Corp., 466 F.3d 1156, 1162 (10th Cir. 2006).
But Dr. Peddada does not argue that his major life activity of working is substantially
impaired, or adduce evidence that he is significantly restricted to perform either a class
of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person
having comparable training, skills, and abilities. 	See generally [Doc. 240]. 	Dr. Myers
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does not opine that Dr. Peddada’s major life activity of working was substantially impaired.
[Doc. 240-36 at 12–13].
[Doc. 241-4 at 33]. Moreover, Dr. Peddada cites no legal authority,
and this Court could find none, where a court has concluded that work-induced stress
qualified as a disability under either the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.12 And this Court
again respectfully declines to make or consider an argument not made by Plaintiff himself
(beyond what it already has), particularly given the fact that Dr. Peddada has been
represented by able counsel since the inception of this case. See Yelloweagle, 643 F.3d
at 1284; Phillips, 244 F.3d at 800 n.10.
12 Defendants cite a number of cases for the proposition that “[a] host of cases unitedly
declare that work-related stress or anxiety, or any other potential impairment that is
created or exacerbated by a particular work environment or a specific work situation does
not qualify as a disability under the ADA, even if it results in work-related limitations,”
including Gonzagowski v. Widnall, 115 F.3d 744, 746–47 (10th Cir. 1997). See [Doc. 208
at 22 & n.8]. Plaintiff takes issue with Defendants’ interpretation of this case law, arguing
that these cases were determined on a different prong of the analysis, i.e., whether the
plaintiff was “otherwise qualified” and could perform the essential functions of the job, with
or without accommodation. 	See [Doc. 240 at 19–20]. 	Plaintiff is correct that the Tenth
Circuit did not decide Gonzagowski based on whether the plaintiff was disabled under the
Rehabilitation Act. Instead, it assumed, without deciding, that the anxiety disorder alleged
by Gonzagowski was a disability under the Rehabilitation Act while observing that a
mental impairment limited to and arising out of a specific stressful work situation would
not qualify as a disability. Gonzagowski, 115 F.3d at 746-47. While the proposition of law
appears to remain sound, the EEOC regulation upon which it relies was amended
effective 2012 and no longer includes the language that “[t]he inability to perform a single,
particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of
working.” See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2. Therefore, this Court does not consider Gonzagowski
dispositive, but finds the principle articulated by the Ninth Circuit that the temporary
inability to work based upon acute work-related stress without evidence of a long-term or
permanent impairment due to that stress does not qualify as a disability under the
Rehabilitation Act or the ADA. See Hosea v. Donley, 584 F. App’x 608, 611 (9th Cir. 2014)
(citing Sanders v. Arneson Prods., Inc., 91 F.3d 1351, 1354 (9th Cir. 1996)).
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III. 	There Is No Genuine Issue of Material Fact as to Whether Defendant
Regarded Plaintiff as Disabled.
The ADA also includes within its definition of a “disabled person,” inter alia, an
individual who is regarded as having an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C). A person
is regarded as having an impairment if he has been subjected to an action because of a
perceived physical or mental impairment. 	Id. at § 12102(3)(A). But a perceived
impairment does not meet this definition if it is “transitory and minor,” i.e., if others perceive
the person of having an impairment with an actual or expected duration of six months or
less. 	Id. at § 12102(3)(B). 	Thus, in order to survive summary judgment, Dr. Peddada
must first adduce sufficient evidence that: 	(1) Defendants perceived him as having an
impairment, (2) the impairment had a duration of more than six months, (3) Defendants
perceived the impairment when they terminated his offer of employment, and (4)
Defendants terminated his offer of employment because of this perceived impairment.
Manna v. Phillips 66 Co., 820 F. App’x 695, 704 (10th Cir. 2020) (citing § 12102(3)(A);
Adair v. City of Muskogee, 823 F.3d 1297, 1306 (10th Cir. 2016)). The Court focuses on
the second element, as it finds it dispositive.
Defendants argue that Dr. Peddada cannot survive summary judgment on his
disability 	discrimination 	claims 	because 	any 	impairment 	was 	transitory 	and 	minor
because it had a duration of less than six months. 	[Doc. 208 at 23]. 	Dr. Peddada
concedes that the ADA has an exception for impairments that are “transitory and minor.”
[Doc. 240 at 22]. But he insists that he has adduced enough evidence such that “a jury
could reasonably infer that Defendants believed Dr. Peddada’s condition would cloud his
professional future well beyond six months and pose continuing risks of medical errors
and workplace disruptions.” 	[Id.]. 	In doing so, Dr. Peddada cites his responses to
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Defendants’ 	proposed 	Undisputed 	Material 	Disputed 	Facts 	(“UMDF”) 	14–15, 	his
proposed Supplemental Additional Disputed Facts (“SADF”) 4–5 and 9–11, and certain
exhibits. [Id.]. Even viewing these facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, this Court
concludes that Dr. Peddada has failed to adduce sufficient evidence to establish that there
is a genuine issue of material fact that his condition was not transitory.
First, with respect to Dr. Peddada’s reliance on deposition testimony by Drs.
Thompson and Plauth, see [Doc. 240 at 21–22 (citing SADF 9–10)], this testimony relates
to general opinions regarding physician burnout, not specific to their perceptions of Dr.
Peddada. 	See [Doc. 240-17 at 44:23–45:2, 46:10–25, 51:1–6; Doc. 240-37 at 33:14–
34:15, 37:9–38:18]. 	In their respective testimony, neither physician connects these
opinions regarding burn-out to the Defendants’ perception of Dr. Peddada specifically.
[Id.]. Nor does the letter cited in SADF 11 reflect Defendants’ perception that Dr. Peddada
had an impairment that had a duration of greater than six months. [Doc. 240-38]. Rather,
the letter requests that Dr. Peddada engage with CPHP for an assessment within the first
30 days and allow Defendants access to that information. [Id.].
Significantly, none of the evidence in the record to which Dr. Peddada points
creates a genuine issue of material fact that Defendants’ decisionmakers perceived that
his condition would extend beyond six months as of May 9, 2022 when they terminated
his offer of employment. 	Nor does any of the evidence cited by Dr. Peddada factually
support the conclusion that Defendants believed Dr. Peddada’s condition would cloud his
professional future and pose continuing risks of medical errors and workplace disruptions.
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See [id. at 31–32].
Dr. Peddada’s testimony that there were “rumors” circulating that he was having a
“nervous breakdown,” [Doc. 240 at 16 ¶ 4], do not persuade this Court otherwise. First,
some of the cited evidence make no mention of these alleged rumors of a “nervous
breakdown” at all. 	[Doc. 240-6 at 50:6–52:6; Doc. 240-34]. 	Second, to the extent that
this 	Court 	even 	considers 	the 	hearsay-upon-hearsay-upon-hearsay 	offered 	by 	Dr.
Peddada in his deposition regarding Dr. Chris Oliver telling Dr. Peddada that Dr. Monroe
“volunteered to this patient that I had a nervous breakdown,”13 [Doc. 240-11 at 221:1–25],
this testimony does not constitute evidence of a widespread rumor or any perception by
Defendants that his “condition would cloud his professional future well beyond six months
and pose continuing risks of medical errors and workplace disruptions.” 	Without more
factual evidence, Dr. Peddada’s argument does not rise beyond mere speculation, and it
is well-settled that “mere speculation, conjecture, or surmise cannot defeat a summary-
judgment motion, because unsubstantiated allegations carry no probative weight in
13 Inadmissible hearsay may not be relied upon at the summary judgment stage. 	See
Herrera v. United Airlines, Inc., 300 F. Supp. 3d 1284, 1295 (D. Colo. 2017) (citing Thomas
v. Int'l Bus. Mach., 48 F.3d 478, 485 (10th Cir. 1995)), aff’d, 754 F. App’x 684 (10th Cir.
2018). It is unclear how this statement by Dr. Peddada would be admissible at trial, and
Dr. Peddada offers no other competent evidence that Dr. Monroe made this statement or
was otherwise spreading rumors about him having a “nervous breakdown.” 	But
Defendants do not raise this argument, and like with Plaintiff, this Court respectfully
declines to make one on their behalf. See Yelloweagle, 643 F.3d at 1284; Phillips, 244
F.3d at 800 n.10.
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summary judgment proceedings.” Alcala v. Ortega, 128 F.4th 1298, 1306 (10th Cir. 2025)
(cleaned up).
Because Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden to establish a genuine issue of
material fact as to being disabled pursuant the ADA or Rehabilitation Act, any portions of
Claims 1, 2, 3, 4, and 7 that rely upon the theory that Defendants failed to provide
reasonable accommodation necessarily fails. 	See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(h). 	Accordingly,
this Court respectfully GRANTS summary judgment in favor of Defendants and against
Plaintiff on Claims 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7. In so doing, this Court respectfully makes clear that
such a ruling should not be construed as a conclusion that professional burn-out can
never, as a matter of law, be found as a disability; rather, this conclusion is driven by this
particular factual record.
IV. 	Plaintiff Adduces Insufficient Evidence to Create a Genuine Issue of Material
Fact as to Pretext.
The Court next turns to Claims 5 and 6, Dr. Peddada’s retaliation claims. As an
initial matter, the Court observes that the Parties do not meaningfully engage with these
claims. 	See generally [Doc. 208; Doc. 240; Doc. 258]. 	Indeed, Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment fails to include the terms “retaliate” or “retaliation” at all, fails to set
forth the distinct legal standard for retaliation claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation
Act, and in turn fails to engage in any type of meaningful discussion of the elements of
such a claim. 	See generally [Doc. 208]. 	Instead, each side generally extends their
arguments with respect to pretext to Claims 5 and 6.
The ADA provides that “[n]o person shall discriminate against any individual
because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter
or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
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manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.” 	42 U.S.C.
§ 12203(a). But an individual need not be disabled or perceived as disabled in order to
bring a claim for retaliation under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act.14 	Rather, a plaintiff need
only show that he had a reasonable, good-faith belief that he was disabled. See Foster
v. Mountain Coal Co., 830 F.3d 1178, 1186 (10th Cir. 2016). 	To establish a prima facie
case of retaliation, Dr. Peddada must prove that: (1) he engaged in a protected activity,
(2) 	he 	was 	subjected 	to 	an 	adverse 	employment 	action 	subsequent 	to 	or
contemporaneous with the protected activity, and (3) there was a causal connection
between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. 	Id. at 1187. 	Dr.
Peddada is correct, in the specific context of his retaliation claims, that Defendants do not
challenge whether he has satisfied his burden to establish a prima facie case. 	See
generally [Doc. 208; Doc. 258].15
Given the lack of direct evidence of discrimination, the application of the McDonnell
Douglas test then shifts the burden to Defendants to articulate a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for withdrawing Dr. Peddada’s offer of employment—the focus of
Defendants’ arguments. Defendants contend that Dr. Peddada’s offer of employment was
withdrawn on May 10, 2022, due to his lack of communication with them regarding the
14 Like for disability discrimination claims, the standard for retaliation claims under the
Rehabilitation Act is the same as the standard for retaliation claims under the ADA.
Reinhardt v. Albuquerque Pub. Schs. Bd. of Educ., 595 F.3d 1126, 1131 (10th Cir. 2010).
15 Defendants’ lone, unsupported header, that “There Is No Prima Facie Inference of
Discrimination/Retaliation,” [Doc. 258 at 11], is simply insufficient to mount a substantive
challenge. Further, this Court notes that there is at least a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether Dr. Peddada had a good faith belief that he was disabled; that he requested
leave based on that good faith belief; that his offer of employment was retracted after he
requested disability leave; and there is a sufficient temporal proximity of a few weeks
between his protected activity of requesting leave and when Defendants retracted his
employment offer.
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Physician Employment Agreement; the need to have a signed Physician Employment
Agreement and resolution of loan repayment or forgiveness to proceed with credentialing
and 	resolve 	compliance 	concerns; 	and 	their 	concerns 	regarding 	Dr. 	Peddada’s
commitment to the practice after finding out that he had placed his house in Colorado
Springs on the market for sale. [Doc. 208 at ¶ 48; id. at 26–30]. Without Dr. Peddada’s
willingness to communicate, Defendants were unable to resolve their questions or
concerns with him in the time frame that they believed was necessary. 	[Id.; Doc. 208-2
at ¶¶ 20–22, 24, 26]. In addition, Defendants had concerns regarding his professionalism,
given his refusal to communicate. [Doc. 208-2 at ¶ 20]. This Court finds, and Dr. Peddada
does not dispute, that these are legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons, and the burden
shifts back to Dr. Peddada to adduce sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of
material fact as to pretext. When reviewing Dr. Peddada's contention of pretext, this Court
examines the facts as they appeared to Defendants as they made their determination
terminate the offer of employment to Dr. Peddada. 	See Dewitt v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 845
F.3d 1299, 1307 (10th Cir. 2017).
As an initial matter, the close temporal proximity between Dr. Peddada’s request
for disability leave and Defendants’ decision to withdraw the offer of employment,
standing alone, is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext. See
Annett v. Univ. of Kansas, 371 F.3d 1233, 1241 (10th Cir. 2004) (observing that while
temporal proximity can establish causation for the purposes of a prima face case, it was
not permitted to act as a proxy for evidence of pretext). 	Thus, the operative inquiry is
whether Dr. Peddada's evidence of temporal proximity combined with other factors
demonstrate 	“such 	weaknesses, 	implausibilities, 	inconsistencies, 	incoherencies, 	or
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contradictions” in the Defendants’ proffered reasons for their failure to hire him such that
“a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence.” 	Id. at 1241
(quotations omitted).
Dr. Peddada first argues that a jury could find Defendants’ claim that he refused to
communicate to be false. [Doc. 240 at 26]. In the April 27, 2022 timeframe, Dr. Peddada
was still a principal of ROPC, [Doc. 104 at ¶ 74; Doc. 113 at ¶ 74], and had advised
Defendants that he was on vacation, [Doc. 208-15 at 3]. He had also advised Dr. Monroe
that his medical leave would begin on May 1. [Doc. 208-7]. Whether or not Defendants
told Dr. Peddada that he had to sign the April 26 Physician Employment Agreement by a
date certain, it is undisputed that Dr. Peddada did not do so by May 10, 2022, when
Defendants transmitted the letter withdrawing his offer of employment. 	It is further
undisputed that Dr. Peddada either ignored Defendants’ overtures or expressly declined
to discuss this Agreement when Defendants reached out to him prior to May 10. 	Dr.
Peddada did not return Mr. Koval’s text message requesting to speak on April 27, 2022.
[Doc. 208-2 at ¶ 18; Doc. 208-53 at 57:24–58:7]. Around the same time, Dr. Peddada
spoke with Dr. Plauth and declined to speak about the agreements. 	[Doc. 208-14 at 2;
Doc. 208 at ¶ 21; Doc. 240 at 8 ¶ 21]. 	In their letter dated May 9, 2022, Defendants
accurately stated that their attempts to reach Dr. Peddada had not been successful. [Doc.
208-15]. And Dr. Peddada does not dispute that he declined to speak with Defendants
about his employment arrangement until after his leave was complete on August 1, 2022,
or that without such communication, Defendants could not unilaterally resolve their
issues.
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Next, Dr. Peddada argues that the jury could find that Defendants’ claim that they
wanted prompt execution of the Physician Employment Agreement was contrived
because Dr. Peddada had already completed the credentialing packet and the proposed
start date was months away on August 1, 2022, and that Dr. Monroe executed his
agreements after Dr. Peddada’s offer was withdrawn. [Doc. 240 at 26; Doc. 240-13; Doc.
241-2]. 	But Dr. Peddada does not dispute that because physician credentialing with
payors takes 90 to 100 days and cannot be started without a signed agreement, it was
urgent that Dr. Peddada commit to employment and sign the agreements so that Penrose
could move forward with its plans. 	[Doc. 208 at ¶ 9; Doc. 240 at 5 ¶ 9; Doc. 208-2 at
¶ 21]. Given this timing, even if Dr. Peddada executed the agreements on August 1, 2022,
he may not have been credentialed until December 2022. And while Dr. Monroe signed
his paperwork on May 16 and May 24 after Defendants rescinded Dr. Peddada’s offer of
employment, Dr. Peddada points to no evidence that indicated that Dr. Monroe declined
to discuss his respective Physician Employment Agreement or the Loan Settlement
Agreement with Defendants at any time—let alone before August 1, 2022—or that the
timing of the execution of Dr. Monroe’s agreements jeopardized their ability to properly
credential him in time for his start date as Defendants’ employee.
With respect to Defendants’ articulated concerns regarding commitment concerns
and Dr. Peddada’s prior interpersonal issues with Dr. Monroe, Dr. Peddada does not
specifically address these with disputed facts. 	[Doc. 240 at 26]. 	Nor does he address
Defendants’ articulated concerns regarding his prior difficulties with interactions with other
colleagues that dated back to at least one incident in 2012—well before his self-reported
onset of burnout. 	It is undisputed that Dr. Peddada had not communicated with Dr.
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Monroe for months, [Doc. 208 at ¶ 2; Doc. 240 at 2 ¶ 2; Doc. 208-54 at 158:17–19];
, [Doc. 241-4 at 16];
, [Doc. 241-4 at 17; Doc. 241-6; Doc. 241-7; Doc.
241-8]. 	Dr. Peddada does not satisfy his obligations to establish a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether these reasons were unworthy of belief. 	See DePaula, 859
F.3d at 977–78.
Instead, Dr. Peddada simply argues that the jury could label these issues as
“litigation inventions, not legitimate reasons,” and generally, that the jury could simply not
believe Defendants’ various explanations of their reasons for rescinding their offer of
employment. [Doc. 240 at 26]. 	It is axiomatic that this Court cannot weigh evidence or
credibility at the summary judgment stage. See Fogarty, 523 F.3d at 1165 (observing that
“[o]n summary judgment, a district court may not weigh the credibility of the witnesses”).
But “[t]he general rule is that specific facts must be produced in order to put credibility in
issue so as to preclude summary judgment. Unsupported allegations that credibility is in
issue will not suffice.” Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2726 (4th ed.). Conclusory
statements or those based on speculation, conjecture, or surmise provide no probative
value on summary judgment. See Nichols v. Hurley, 921 F.2d 1101, 1113 (10th Cir. 1990).
And this Court does not inquire as to whether Defendants’ reasons “were wise, fair
or correct,” but rather whether Defendants “honestly believed” that Dr. Peddada’s ongoing
issues with colleagues coupled with his refusal to communicate about his Physician
Employment Agreement and Loan Settlement Agreement jeopardized their ability to move
forward his employment, “and acted in good faith upon those beliefs.” DePaula, 859 F.3d
at 971 (quotations omitted). Applying this framework, this Court respectfully concludes
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that Dr. Peddada has failed to adduce sufficient facts to demonstrate that Defendants did
not honestly believe that Dr. Peddada’s lack of communication coupled with his prior
treatment of colleagues were sufficient grounds to rescind his offer of employment.
Based on the record before it, this Court respectfully concludes that Plaintiff has
failed to adduce sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext.
Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of Defendants is appropriate as to Claims 5 and
6.
V. 	This Court Respectfully Declines to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction
Over the State Law Claims and Counterclaim, and the Remaining Pending
Motions are Moot.
Having found summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all of Plaintiff’s federal
claims, this Court respectfully declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Claims
8–10 that arise from state law. 	See Wittner v. Banner Health, 720 F.3d 770, 781 (10th
Cir. 2013) (noting that the court has discretion to dismiss supplemental state law claims
once it dismisses federal claims); see also Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604
U.S. 22, 30 (2025) (“With the loss of federal-question jurisdiction, the court loses as well
its supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims”). As a result, the Court does not reach
the Parties’ substantive arguments related to Claims 8–10. 	The Court also declines to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Defendant’s Counterclaim that also appears to
arise under Colorado state law, though the precise legal basis, e.g., breach of contract
and/or unjust enrichment, is not articulated. 	[Doc. 113 at 19–20 (alleging “Plaintiff is in
violation of his share of the repayment obligation and will be unjustly enriched” and “Under
the terms of the Promissory Note, Plaintiff must reimburse Penrose for the associated
attorneys’ fees”)].
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In addition, because no claims remain against Defendants, Plaintiff’s Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment with respect to the affirmative defense of failure to mitigate
[Doc. 203], Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions [Doc. 257], and Defendants’ Motion for
Clarification [Doc. 261] are all DENIED as moot. 	The issue of reasonable fees as
contemplated by the Order dated January 6, 2026 [Doc. 195; Doc. 200] REMAINS
PENDING before the Honorable Maritza Dominguez Braswell and will be subject to
separate order. Cf. Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196 (1988) (observing
that the determination of attorney’s fees may remain pending after an order ending the
litigation on the merits and does not impact the finality of judgment).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that:
(1) 	Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. 203] is DENIED as
moot;
(2) 	Defendants’ 	Renewed 	Motion 	for 	Summary 	Judgment 	[Doc. 	208] 	is
GRANTED in part;
(3) 	The Clerk of the Court shall ENTER judgment in favor of Defendant
Common Spirit Health and against Plaintiff Dr. Anuj Peddada as to all claims;
(4) 	The Clerk of the Court shall ENTER judgment in favor of Defendants
Catholic Health Initiatives Colorado as to Claims 1–7;
(5) 	Claims 8–10 are DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c);
(6) 	Defendants’ Counterclaim is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c);
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(7) 	Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions [Doc. 257] is DENIED as moot;
(8) 	Defendants’ Motion for Clarification [Doc. 261] is DENIED as moot;
(9) 	Defendants, as the prevailing party, are AWARDED their costs pursuant to
Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 54.1;
(10) 	The issue of reasonable fees as contemplated by the Order dated January
6, 2026 [Doc. 195; Doc. 200] REMAINS PENDING before the Honorable Maritza
Dominguez Braswell; and
(11) 	The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to TERMINATE this case.
DATED: September 16, 2026 	BY THE COURT:
_________________________
Nina Y. Wang
United States District Judge
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