Peddada v. Catholic Health Initiatives Colorado et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Magistrate Judge Maritza Dominguez Braswell
Civil Action No. 23–cv–01921–NYW–MDB
DR. ANUJ PEDDADA,
Plaintiff,
v.
CATHOLIC HEALTH INITIATIVES COLORADO d/b/a CENTURA HEALTH-PENROSE-
ST. FRANCIS HEALTH SERVICES, and
COMMONSPIRIT HEALTH FOUNDATION d/b/a COMMONSPIRIT HEALTH,
Defendants.
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions. ([“Motion”], Doc.
No. 179.) Plaintiff filed a response, to which Defendants replied. ([“Response”], Doc. No. 185;
[“Reply”], Doc. No. 189.) After reviewing the Motion, briefing, and relevant law, the Court
GRANTS the Motion in part.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings various claims for violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and
Rehabilitation Act, wrongful discharge, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy. (Doc. No. 104
at ¶¶ 159–226.) He filed this action on July 27, 2023. (Doc. No. 1.) Discovery has long been
closed but the parties have had ongoing disputes that the Court has managed through a series of
joint status reports and conferences.
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The parties also filed motions for summary judgment in June and July of this year. (Doc.
Nos. 164, 167.) In support of their motion for summary judgment Defendants attached, among
other things, three declarations. The first is a June 23, 2025, declaration from Andrew Gaasch,
the President of CommonSpirit Mountain Region. (Doc. No. 167-1.) In it, Mr. Gaasch discusses
Defendants’ corporate history and explains who was and was not involved in forming the
agreement with, or terminating, Plaintiff. (Id.) The second is a June 16, 2025, declaration from
Angela Skinner, the Director of the Office of Medical Affairs for the Colorado/Utah/Kansas
Division of CommonSpirit Mountain Region. (Doc. No. 167-4.) She attaches and seeks to
authenticate an application Plaintiff purportedly signed and submitted for employment
credentialing. (Id.) The third is a November 21, 2024, declaration from a physician in Colorado
Springs who served as Plaintiff’s primary care provider “for many years.” (Doc. No. 167-3.) She
says the last time she spoke to Plaintiff was in April, 2022—days before his termination. (Id.)
The physician’s statements tend to contradict some of what Plaintiff says in support of his
claims. (Id.)
Plaintiff argues all three declarations were sprung on him, with the first two (Gaasch and
Skinner) never identified as witnesses in Defendants’ disclosures, the second (Skinner) including
an undisclosed attachment (the credentialing application), and the third (Plaintiff’s treater)
amounting to an improper withholding of information that was responsive to Plaintiff’s Request
for Production Number 4:
All documents and communications discussing Plaintiff’s medical
condition or ‘burnout,’ complaints of derogatory references about
his health status, requests for medical leave of absence or other
accommodations, and any medical paperwork or diagnosis
provided to Defendants by Plaintiff or his treating physicians.
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(Doc. No. 179 at 7.) Plaintiff seeks a bevy of sanctions including, striking Defendants’ pending
summary judgment motion, precluding the testimony of Mr. Gaasch and Ms. Skinner altogether,
precluding the introduction of the credentialing application, precluding the introduction of the
treater’s declaration, allowing Plaintiff to depose the treater at Defendants’ expense, and ordering
Defendants to pay Plaintiff’s reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred in
connection with these discovery violations. (Id. at 12.)
Defendants respond that it was Plaintiff who disclosed Mr. Gaasch by producing his
LinkedIn page during discovery, and Defendants’ initial disclosures list “[a]ll witnesses
disclosed by other parties in this matter” and “[a]ny person named in the documents relevant to
this lawsuit.” (Doc. No. 185 at 5.) Defendants also argue they “could have relied on deposition
excerpts” for the same information, but “it was cleaner to find an executive currently in place,
following the disaffiliation of Centura, who could sign a declaration.” (Id. at 6.)
As to Ms. Skinner, Defendants again rely on generic statements in their initial disclosures
and argue that Ms. Skinner is merely authenticating documents that were only recently
discovered and immediately disclosed after they were discovered. (Id. at 3.) Defendants argue
the failure to discover the documents earlier was due to internal restructuring and Plaintiff’s
failure to be forthcoming during discovery. (Id. at 3-5.)
Finally, with respect to the declaration of Plaintiff’s treater, Defendants rely on a handful
of cases to argue it is work product and not discoverable. (Id. at 10-11 (citing Hickman v Taylor,
329 U.S. 495 (1947), Abell v. Babbitt, 1999 WL 215403 (10th Cir. 1999), Enos-Martinez v.
Board of County Com’rs of the County of Mesa, 2012 WL 1079442 (D. Colo. 2012)).)
LEGAL STANDARD
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Rule 26(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that parties provide “the
name, and if known, the address and telephone number of each individual likely to have
discoverable information—along with the subject of that information—that the disclosing party
may use to support its claims or defenses, unless the information is offered solely for
impeachment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(i). Such disclosures must be supplemented through
discovery when “the party learns that in some material respect the disclosure or response is
incomplete or incorrect, and if the additional or corrective information has not otherwise been
made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(e)(1)(A). Pursuant to the plain language of the Rule, supplementation must occur in a timely
manner. Id.
Mandatory disclosures serve several purposes, including giving the opposing party
information about the identification and location of knowledgeable individuals to determine
whether an individual should be deposed during discovery. See Jama v. City and County of
Denver, 304 F.R.D. 289, 295 (D. Colo. 2014). A party violates Rule 26 by failing to disclose
witnesses prior to the close of discovery. See Four Corners Nephrology Assocs., P.C. v. Mercy
Medical Ctr. Of Durango, 2007 WL 1613352, at *1 (D. Colo. June 1, 2007).
Rule 37(c) provides that if a party fails to disclose information or identify witnesses as
required by Rule 26(a), the party is precluded from using that witness or information “to supply
evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at trial, unless the failure to disclose is substantially
justified or harmless.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). Moreover, if a court finds a violation of
discovery rules, it must consider the appropriate sanction to be imposed and in doing so, must
determine whether the Rule 26 violation is justified or harmless. See Woodworker’s Supply, Inc.
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v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 170 F.3d 985, 993 (10th Cir. 1999). In determining whether the
failure to disclose or other discovery violation was substantially justified or harmless, Courts
consider the following factors: (1) the prejudice and surprise to the party against whom the
testimony is offered; (2) the ability of the party to cure the prejudice; (3) the extent to which
introducing such testimony would disrupt the trial; and (4) the moving party’s bad faith or
willfulness. These are often referred to as the “Woodworker’s Factors” See Jacobsen v. Deseret
Book Co., 287 F.3d 936, 953 (10th Cir. 2002).
The nonmoving party bears the burden of showing that it was substantially justified in
failing to comply with Rule 26(a) or that such failure was harmless. See Sender v. Mann, 225
F.R.D. 645, 655 (D. Colo. 2004) (citation omitted). If a court determines that the violation is
neither justified nor harmless, the court must choose a sanction that is both just and related to the
particular violation. See Jama, 304 F.R.D. at 300.
ANALYSIS
As a threshold matter, the Court finds Defendants did not meet their disclosure
obligations by including generic statements such as, “[a]ll witnesses disclosed by other parties in
this matter,” or “[a]ny person named in the documents relevant to this lawsuit.” (Doc. No. 185 at
5.) Those statements do not provide adequate notice that Defendants intended to use any of the
three witnesses in support of their defenses, nor do they identify the subject of the relevant
information. As other courts have noted, “[g]iving credence to [the] assertion” that general
identification is sufficient, “would require the Court to attribute an uncanny level of prescience
to [the opposing party]” indeed, “knowledge of the existence of a person is distinctly different
from knowledge that the person will be relied on as a fact witness.” Watts v Anthem, Inc., 2020
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WL 13933266, *3 (D. Colo. Feb. 21, 2020) (quoting Auraria Student Housing at the Regency,
LLC v. Campus Village Apartments, LLC, 2014 WL 2933189, at *2 (D. Colo. June 30, 2014)).
Moreover, that Plaintiff produced a LinkedIn page for Mr. Gaasch, or that the physician was
known to Plaintiff, is of no moment because Plaintiff’s own disclosures and general knowledge
do not satisfy Defendants’ obligations. See, e.g., Gustafson v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 2012 WL
5904048, at *8 (D. Colo. Nov. 26, 2012) (finding the defendant’s failure to disclose its intention
to call the plaintiff’s identified expert witness at trial violated Rule 26). Thus, the Court will
move on to consider whether the failure to disclose was substantially justified or harmless.
I. 	Andrew Gaasch
Defendants spend little-to-no time justifying this late disclosure, other than to say it was
“cleaner” this way and hypocritical of Plaintiff to complain about late disclosures. (See Doc. No.
185 at 6.) Even if both of those things were true, they would not justify the late disclosure.
Defendants could have streamlined matters through Mr. Gaasch’s declaration earlier. And one
party’s shortcomings in litigation do not automatically justify another’s. Defendants have not
carried their burden on substantial justification, and the Court moves on to consider whether the
failure to disclose was harmless.
The Court finds no willfulness or bad faith on Defendants’ part, but the prejudice and
surprise to Plaintiff is meaningful. Mr. Gaasch is an executive who offers substantive testimony
about Defendants’ corporate structure. (See generally Doc. No. 167-1.) Plaintiff has not had an
opportunity to test his assertions via deposition. And while it may be possible to cure the
prejudice through a late deposition, discovery in this case has been so drawn out and mired in
disputes that additional discovery on these issues would surely cause significant disruption.
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Having weighed the Woodworker’s Factors, the Court finds the failure to disclose was not
substantially justified or harmless. The appropriate sanction here—particularly given
Defendants’ proffer that the same information can be secured from other witnesses—is to strike
the Gaasch declaration. (See Doc. No. 185 at 6 (Defendants’ admission that they “could have
relied on deposition excerpts” for the same information).)
II. 	Angela Skinner
Defendants say Ms. Skinner is merely an authenticating witness, and in reviewing her
declaration that appears to be true. Moreover, Defendants offer several reasons why the
credentialing application was not discovered sooner, including that Plaintiff gave misleading
testimony. (See generally Doc. No. 185 at 3-5.) Although Defendants might have discovered the
application sooner with greater diligence, there does not appear to be any bad faith or willfulness
on their part. Moreover, the application is something Plaintiff purportedly signed and presumably
knew about, making the relative surprise and prejudice minimal. The disruption is minimal as
well. Unlike other declarations that may require substantive testimony from the declarants (and
thus a long deposition and potentially follow-up discovery), this declaration merely purports to
authenticate a document that Plaintiff himself filled out, and it is Plaintiff—not the declarant—
who will provide the substantive testimony. Thus, while the late disclosure is not substantially
justified, it is effectively harmless. Moreover, precluding the Skinner Declaration could make the
factfinder’s truth-seeking function more difficult. Thus, the Court will not strike the Skinner
Declaration.
III. 	Plaintiff’s Treater
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Defendants secured this declaration almost a year ago and appear to have been lying in
wait. That is precisely the trial by ambush the rules seek to prevent. See Jama, 280 F.R.D. 581, at
584 (saying “[a] key policy goal of requiring parties to keep their disclosures current is ‘to avoid
trial by ambush’” and finding the plaintiffs’ late disclosure during the pendency of a motion for
summary judgment “akin to trial by ambush, only on paper”). Moreover, as Plaintiff notes, even
if Defendant was justified in withholding the declaration under some work product protection,
Defendants should have logged it, giving Plaintiff an opportunity to challenge the alleged
protection.
Defendants spend most of their time arguing the significance of the declaration and how
it undercuts so many of Plaintiff’s assertions and claims. (See generally Doc. No. 185 at 6–10.)
That may be true, but it is precisely why the surprise and prejudice are so significant. The
declaration goes to the heart of Plaintiff’s damages arguments,1 and it would be unfair to deprive
Plaintiff of an opportunity to challenge it. Relatedly, the level of disruption at this juncture is
high and Plaintiff’s ability to cure is limited given the procedural posture of this case. Weighing
these factors together, the Court finds Defendants’ failure to disclose either the declaration or at a
minimum a privilege log, is not substantially justified or harmless.2
Plaintiff asks the Court to strike the treater’s declaration and permit the deposition of the
treater at Defendant’s expense. (Doc. No. 179 at 12.) Striking the declaration is appropriate, but
1 The Court declines to detail the contents of the declaration because it has been filed under
restriction.
2 The Court does not reach the question of whether the declaration is work product because if it
is work product, it should have been logged. If it is not work product, it should have been
disclosed. Either way, Defendants’ failure is not substantially justified or harmless.
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ordering a deposition at Defendants’ expense is not. The treater met with Plaintiff in or around
the time of the core interactions and incidents in this case. (See Doc. No. 167-3 at (noting she last
spoke to Plaintiff on April 22, 2022).) Clearly the treater would have information relevant to the
claims and defenses in this case. Yet Plaintiff made the decision not to depose her. If Plaintiff
seeks to depose his treater now, he may do so at his own expense.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, the Court GRANTS IN PART Plaintiff’s Motion for
Sanctions and orders the following:
(1) The Gaasch Declaration is stricken.
(2) The declaration from Plaintiff’s treater is stricken.
(3) Plaintiff shall be awarded 2/3 of the fees and costs associated with this Motion.
Accordingly, Plaintiff is ordered to submit an affidavit for fees and costs associated
with this Motion on or before January 30, 2026.
(4) Both pending motions for summary judgment (Doc. Nos. 164; 167) are stricken
without prejudice to refiling after the parties consider the implications of this order.
The Court sets the following deadlines:
a. 	Deadline to complete the deposition of Plaintiff’s treater and/or Ms. Skinner,
if Plaintiff so chooses: January 23, 2026.
b. 	Deadline for new summary judgment motions: February 19, 2026.
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Dated this 6 th day of January, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
___________________________
Maritza Dominguez Braswell
United States Magistrate Judge
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