Citizens Project et al v. Colorado Springs et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
District Judge S. Kato Crews
Civil Action No. 1:22-cv-01365-SKC-MDB
CITIZENS PROJECT,
COLORADO LATINOS VOTE,
LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF THE PIKES PEAK REGION, and
BLACK/LATINO LEADERSHIP COALITION,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF COLORADO SPRINGS, and
SARAH BALL JOHNSON, in her official capacity as City Clerk,
Defendants.
ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIM
FOR LACK OF ARTICLE III STANDING
AND FINDING AS MOOT DEFENDANTS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. 60)
The above-referenced motion for summary judgment is now before the Court.
Plaintiffs are four nonpartisan, nonprofit organizations who bring this action for
declaratory and injunctive relief under the Voting Rights Act against Defendants City
of Colorado Springs (“City”) and Sarah Ball Johnson in her official capacity as City
Clerk (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiffs bring a single claim arguing that the
timing of the City’s municipal elections—held in April of odd-years as opposed to in
November of even-years—violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), 52 U.S.C.
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§ 10301, by disparately impacting the City’s Black and Hispanic voters. They seek to
permanently enjoin the City from holding future non-November municipal elections.1
Plaintiffs assert jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(4).2
Discovery has closed, and Defendants have moved for summary judgment. The
matter is fully briefed. Dkts. 60 (Motion for Summary Judgment), 62 (Plaintiffs’
Opposition); 63 (Defendants’ Reply). Among other things, the parties argue over
whether Plaintiffs have Article III standing. Compare Dkt. 60, p.9 and Dkt. 63, pp.2-
3 with Dkt. 62, p.8. Because the Court finds Plaintiffs lack Article III standing, the
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and therefore, the Court dismisses this case
without prejudice and finds the Motion is moot.
UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
Founded in 1871, the City is a chartered home-rule municipality in El Paso
County, Colorado, with a population of about 480,000. It began conducting April
municipal elections at least as early as 1873.3 The City currently conducts its regular
municipal elections on the first Tuesday in April of odd-numbered years.
1 While Plaintiffs seek a “[d]eclar[ation] that the timing of Colorado Springs’ April
off-year municipal elections violate[ ] Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act . . . ,” they
seek 	only 	an 	injunction 	barring 	the 	City 	“from 	holding 	future 	non-November
municipal elections.” Dkt. 1, p.38.
2 Plaintiffs contend this Court also has jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28
U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202.
3 There is no evidence the City has ever conducted municipal elections in November.
Dkt. 60, ¶2; Dkt. 62, ¶2. There is also no evidence or allegation by Plaintiffs that the
City adopted or maintained any election regulations with the intent to suppress the
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As mentioned, Plaintiffs are four nonpartisan, nonprofit organizations that
operate in the City of Colorado Springs and the Pikes Peak region.4 Their respective
activities include get-out-the-vote and voter-participation efforts:
• 	Plaintiff Citizens Project (CP) was founded in 1992 to oppose
Colorado’s 	Amendment 	2, 	which 	sought 	to 	prohibit 	laws
protecting LGBTQ citizens from discrimination. Dkt. 1, ¶11.
Citizens Project’s mission has evolved, and today it advocates for
equity, inclusion, and justice in the Pikes Peak region. Id.
• 	Plaintiff Colorado Latinos Vote (CLV) was founded in 2020 to
encourage members of Colorado’s Latino community to register
and vote; it works to empower and educate members of the Latino
community in southern Colorado so they can participate in the
democratic process and encourages its members to vote in every
election, including the City’s April off-year elections. Id. at ¶15.
• 	Active since 1937, Plaintiff League of Women Voters of the Pikes
Peak Region (LWV-PPR) is the Colorado Springs-based chapter
of the League of Women Voters of the United States. Id. at ¶21.
It provides voter services and citizen education, and establishes
positions on various issues of public importance and uses its
positions to advocate for or against policies in the public interest.
Id.
• 	Plaintiff Black/Latino Leadership Coalition (BLLC) was formed
in 2006 in response to a lack of representation in civic decision
making and access to information about matters vital to raising
the quality of life for people of color in Colorado Springs and the
Pikes Peak region. Id. at ¶25. It is devoted to promoting and
advocating 	for 	positive 	change 	by 	bringing 	awareness 	to
marginalized people on a variety of issues, policies, and programs
available to them and by addressing their needs in the Pikes Peak
voting opportunity of any person on account of race, color, or language-minority
status. Dkt. 60, ¶4; Dkt. 62, ¶4.
4 The Colorado Office of Economic Development & International Trade identifies the
Pikes 	Peak 	Region 	to 	include 	El 	Paso, 	Park 	and 	Teller 	counties. 	See
https://choosecolorado.com/regional-profile/pikes-peak-region/.
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region; its purpose is to enhance political, economic, and social
cooperation between Black and Latino people. Id. at ¶¶25-26. In
the runup to each election, the organization engages in various
programmatic activities to boost voter turnout. Id. at ¶27.
• 	All 	Plaintiffs 	carry 	out 	their 	missions 	by 	working 	in 	their
community to ensure access to the right to vote, including through
voter 	education, 	voter 	registration, 	and 	get-out-the-vote
activities. Dkt. 62, ¶21.
Between late 2021 and early 2022, the Harvard Election Law Clinic contacted
three Plaintiffs about suing the City and using Section 2 of the VRA as a vehicle to
change the timing of the City’s municipal elections. That contact resulted in this
lawsuit filed in June 2022, wherein Plaintiffs assert one cause of action under Section
2’s “effects” test, claiming the City’s spring municipal elections discriminate against
Black and Hispanic voters, and asking the Court to permanently enjoin the City from
holding future non-November municipal elections.
No voters have joined this lawsuit, and Plaintiffs concede they do not sue on
behalf of their respective individual members. Compare Dkt. 60, ¶9 with Dkt. 62, ¶9.
Instead, Plaintiffs allege injury only to themselves as organizations, contending the
City’s election timing causes them to divert and duplicate resources for their voter
outreach. Compare Dkt. 60, ¶11 with Dkt. 62, ¶11. They also assert moving municipal
elections to November would enable them to fund more activities because outside
organizations are more willing to fund voter outreach in November of even years than
the spring of odd years. Id.
More specifically, Plaintiff Citizens Project describes its injuries in this way:
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13. . . . April off-year elections make it substantially more difficult for
Citizens Project to continue in its civic-engagement activities and to
further its mission by diverting time, money, and resources from its
other voter engagement activities, activities on other issues to advance
its mission, and its day-to-day operations. Citizens Project’s budget
provides for a limited staff of 2.5 full-time employees, and it relies, to a
substantial degree, on organizing volunteers to deliver many of its
services.
14. 	April 	off-year 	elections 	require 	Citizens 	Project 	to 	engage 	in
duplicative “get out the vote” efforts, which it already performs for
November elections. These duplicative “get out the vote” activities divert
capacity 	from 	Citizens 	Project’s 	other 	programmatic 	priorities.
Additionally, April off-year elections overlap with the Colorado state
legislative session, diverting limited employee and volunteer capacity
from Citizen Project’s legislative watchdog activities. Due to Citizen
Project’s limited budget and staff, it must deprioritize these other
activities 	preceding 	April 	off-year 	elections, 	despite 	continued
community need and demand during that time of the year.
Dkt. 1, pp.5-6; see also Dkt. 60, ¶11; Dkt. 61, ¶11. The other three Plaintiffs describe
their injuries in identical, or materially similar, fashion. Dkt. 1, ¶¶19-20 (Plaintiff
CLV), 23-24 (Plaintiff LWV-PPR), 30 (Plaintiff BLLC); see also Dkts. 60, ¶11; 61, ¶11.
LEGAL STANDARD
Defendants have moved for summary judgment. But the Court always has an
obligation to determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction,
the court must dismiss the action.”). As courts of limited jurisdiction, federal courts
must have a specific legal basis for their jurisdiction. See Morris v. City of Hobart, 39
F.3d 1105, 1111 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing Castaneda v. INS, 23 F.3d 1576, 1580 (10th
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Cir. 1994)). And Article III standing is an issue of a court’s jurisdiction. Kerr v. Polis,
20 F.4th 686, 692 (10th Cir. 2021).
The determination of a court’s subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law.
Madsen v. U.S. ex rel. U.S. Army, Corps of Eng’rs, 841 F.2d 1011, 1012 (10th Cir.
1987). “A court lacking jurisdiction cannot render judgment . . . .” Basso v. Utah Power
& Light Co., 495 F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir. 1974). “The burden of establishing subject-
matter jurisdiction is on the party asserting jurisdiction.” Montoya v. Chao, 296 F.3d
952, 955 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S.
375, 377 (1994)).
When a court recognizes a problem with its subject matter jurisdiction,
summary judgment becomes inapposite. Thompson v. United States, 291 F.2d 67, 68
(10th Cir. 1961) (“A motion for summary judgment lies whenever there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact. It is not a substitute for a motion to dismiss for want of
jurisdiction. If the court lacks jurisdiction it cannot render a judgment but must enter
an order dismissing the action.”). See also Moody v. United States, 202 F.3d 282
(Table), 1999 WL 1127634, at *2 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[I]t is well established summary
judgment is an inappropriate vehicle for raising a question concerning the subject
matter jurisdiction of the court. For these reasons, we agree the district court should
have determined whether it had subject matter jurisdiction in this case under Rule
12(b)(1) prior to considering a motion for summary judgment.” (cleaned up and
citations omitted)).
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ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
As a threshold matter, Defendants argue Plaintiffs lack Article III standing.5
Article III standing is a “bedrock constitutional requirement.” Food & Drug Admin.
v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 378 (2024) (quoting United States v. Texas,
599 U.S. 670 ,675 (2023)). Article III of the Constitution limits the federal courts’
jurisdiction to “Cases” and “Controversies.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 337
(2016). Because Article III standing is an issue of a court’s jurisdiction, a court must
first satisfy itself that it exists. Kerr, 20 F.4th at 692.
To possess Article III standing, a plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact
that is fairly traceable to the defendant’s challenged conduct and likely to be
redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560-61 (1992). These requirements are “an essential and unchanging part of the
case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.” Id. at 560. And they help to ensure
that a plaintiff is not “a mere bystander, but instead [has] a ‘personal stake’ in the
dispute.” All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 378 (quoting TransUnion LLC v.
Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021)). “The requirement that the plaintiff possess a
personal stake helps ensure that courts decide litigants’ legal rights in specific cases,
5 In a footnote, Plaintiffs say, “[i]t appears that the City concedes that Plaintiffs have
Article III standing and limits its argument on standing to the contention that
Plaintiffs lack statutory standing.” Dkt. 62, p.8, n.1. But the perceived concession is
an illusion. Dkt. 63, §I(B) (Defendant’s Reply stating, “[e]ven if that might support
Article III standing—which the City does not concede . . . .”).
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as Article III requires, and that courts do not opine on legal issues in response to
citizens who might ‘roam the country in search of governmental wrongdoing.’” Id. at
379 (citation omitted).
Organizations, 	like 	Plaintiffs, 	have 	two 	methods 	to 	achieve 	Article 	III
standing. Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll.,
600 U.S. 181, 199 (2023). They can claim organizational standing because they
suffered an injury of their own, or they can claim associational standing based on
injuries suffered by their members. Id. But Plaintiffs do not claim associational
standing. Compare Dkt. 60, ¶¶9, 11 with Dkt. 62, ¶¶9, 11. Thus, for Article III
purposes, they must demonstrate they have organizational standing. See New York
C.L. Union v. New York City Transit Auth., 684 F.3d 286, 295 (2d Cir. 2012) (plaintiff
sued under a theory of organizational standing, not associational standing, because
it did not sue on behalf of injured members).
As noted above, each Plaintiff claims a diversion of its resources for purposes
of the injury-in-fact component of Article III standing. Dkt. 1, ¶¶13-14, 19-20, 23-24,
30. According to Plaintiffs, these reroutes include things like diverting time, money,
and resources from their other civic or voter engagement activities and their day-to-
day operations; duplicating November “get out the vote” efforts; diverting limited
employee and volunteer capacity; and deprioritizing other activities preceding April
off-year elections. Dkt. 1, ¶¶13-14, 19-20, 23-24, 30; see also Dkt. 60, ¶11; Dkt. 61,
¶11.
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But these are the same types of injuries the medical-association plaintiffs
claimed in Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, and which the Supreme Court rejected
for purposes of organizational standing.6 All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 393-
96. There, four pro-life medical associations (along with physicians) sought judicial
review under the Administrative Procedure Act in their challenge to the Food and
Drug Administration’s (FDA) approval of standards surrounding the administration
of mifepristone—a medical abortion-inducing drug. Relying on the Supreme Court’s
decision in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982), the medical
associations claimed they had suffered their own injuries for Article III standing
purposes:
They claim to have standing not based on their mere disagreement with
FDA’s policies, but based on their incurring costs to oppose FDA’s
actions. They say that FDA has “caused” the associations to conduct
their own studies on mifepristone so that the associations can better
inform their members and the public about mifepristone’s risks. They
contend that FDA has “forced” the associations to “expend considerable
time, energy, and resources” drafting citizen petitions to FDA, as well
as engaging in public advocacy and public education. And all of that has
caused 	the 	associations 	to 	spend 	“considerable 	resources” 	to 	the
detriment of other spending priorities.
All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 394 (internal record citations omitted).
The Supreme Court deemed these injuries insufficient to confer organizational
standing. 	Drawing 	a 	contrast, 	it 	explained 	that 	the 	injuries 	claimed 	by 	the
organization in Havens directly affected and interfered with that organization’s “core
6 The Supreme Court’s decision in Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine issued nearly 10
months after full briefing on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.
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business activities [of providing housing counseling services to low-income persons]—
not dissimilar to a retailer who sues a manufacturer for selling defective goods to the
retailer.” Id. at 395. It found the FDA’s actions imposed no similar impediment on
the medical associations’ advocacy business. Id. And it cautioned that “Havens was
an unusual case, and this Court has been careful not to extend the Havens holding
beyond its context.” Id. at 396; see also Tenn. Conf. of the Nat’l Ass’n for the
Advancement of Colored People v. Lee, No. 24-5546, 2024 WL 3219054, at *12 (6th
Cir. June 28, 2024) (“Just weeks ago, the Supreme Court clarified that Havens’s
‘unusual’ facts did not support a categorical rule allowing standing whenever ‘an
organization diverts its resources in response to a defendant’s actions.’” (citation
omitted)). Speaking of the diversion-of-resource injuries claimed by the medical
associations, the Supreme Court explained that “an organization that has not
suffered a concrete injury caused by a defendant’s action cannot spend its way into
standing simply by expending money to gather information and advocate against the
defendant’s action. An organization cannot manufacture its own standing in that
way.” All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 394.
Yet this is what Plaintiffs appear to have done here—i.e., manufacture their
own 	standing. 	See id. 	at 	395 	(“Indeed, 	that 	theory 	would 	mean 	that 	all the
organizations in America would have standing to challenge almost every federal
policy that they dislike, provided they spend a single dollar opposing those policies.”).
To be sure, the timing associated with Plaintiffs’ purported diversion of resources
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suggests their fabrication of their standing. The City has held its municipal elections
in April as early as 1873. The Plaintiff organizations were founded multiple decades
(and sometimes over 100 years) later, meaning the City conducted April elections for
numerous years before these organizations existed, and it has continued to hold April
elections well after the founding of these organizations.7 It wasn’t until between 2021
and 2022, when the Harvard Election Law Clinic contacted Plaintiffs about suing the
City under Section 2 of the VRA to change the timing of its municipal elections, that
Plaintiffs brought this lawsuit. This chronology demonstrates the abstract nature of
Plaintiffs’ claimed injuries, which seem to be supported only by their decision to now
oppose the timing of the April elections in federal court, and to do so without any
voters as plaintiffs and without suing on behalf of their individual members.8
Even more, the summary judgment record shows that Plaintiffs have already
been using their respective resources on voter education programs and initiatives to
7 Plaintiff LWV-PPR active since 1937; Plaintiff CP founded in 1992; Plaintiff BLLC
founded in 2006; and Plaintiff CLV founded in 2020.
8 Contrast this timing with the timing of the diversion-of-resources injuries claimed
in the cases Plaintiffs cite in support of their standing argument. Dkt. 62, n.1 (citing
Havens and Common Cause Ind. v. Lawson, 937 F.3d 944, 952-55 (7th Cir. 2019)
(collecting cases)). In those cases, existing organizations were impacted by later
legislative enactments or other government actions the organizations then diverted
resources to address. See generally the cases cited in Dkt. 62, n.1. None of this is to
say that a party cannot appropriately challenge a statute, program, or practice that
preceded the party’s inception, but under the facts of this case, the timing militates
against finding an injury-in-fact.
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educate Black, Hispanic, and other voters.9 “Courts have distinguished between cases
where a defendant’s conduct forced a plaintiff to divert its resources and provide new
services, therefore giving rise to organizational standing, and cases where a plaintiff
was already providing the services at issue and therefore failed to allege any injury.”
Make the Rd. New York v. Cuccinelli, 419 F. Supp. 3d 647, 657 (S.D.N.Y. 2019), aff’d
as modified sub nom (citations omitted); see also New York v. United States Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., 969 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2020) (comparing cases); Fair Elections Ohio,
770 F.3d 456, 459-60 (6th Cir. 2014) (“[I]t is not an injury to instruct election
volunteers about absentee voting procedures when the volunteers are being trained
in voting procedures already[.]”); cf. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 394 (“[A]n
organization may not establish standing simply based on the ‘intensity of the
litigant’s interest’ or because of strong opposition to the government’s conduct, ‘no
matter how longstanding the interest and no matter how qualified the organization[.]’
A plaintiff must show ‘far more than simply a setback to the organization’s abstract
social interests.’” (internal citations omitted)).
The decision in Fair Elections Ohio, supra, further exemplifies the point.
There, an organization conducting voter outreach sued the Ohio Secretary of State
9 Dkt. 62-1 (CP depo.), 25:20-24, 29:3-30:25, 36:8-20, 79:21-80:25, 109:1-110:19; Dkt.
62-3 (LWV-PPR depo.), 19:20-25, 29:3-14,41:10-44:22; Dkt. 62-7 (BLLC depo.), 26:21-
27:7at 32:11-33:10; 41:6-42:15; 43:3-12; Dkt. 62-9 (CLV depo.), 34:8-25; 70:10-71:25;
see also Dkt 1, ¶¶15, 21, 27; Dkt. 62, ¶21 (“All of the Plaintiffs carry out their missions
by working in their community to ensure access to the right to vote, including through
voter education, voter registration, and get-out-the-vote activities.).
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and Attorney General for violating Section 2 of the VRA (among other constitutional
claims). Fair Elections Ohio, 770 F.3d at 459. The plaintiff challenged a “years-old”
absentee ballot procedure that allowed hospitalized voters to obtain absentee ballots
later than jailed voters. Id. at 459-60. The Sixth Circuit found the plaintiff had not
shown an injury in fact to give it standing to challenge the “years-old” law. Id. The
circuit court explained:
[I]f the armchair observer decides that the government is violating the
law, and decides to stop it by suing, that is not enough. This limit would
be eviscerated if an advisor or organization can be deemed to have
Article III standing merely by virtue of its efforts and expense to advise
others how to comport with the law, or by virtue of its efforts and
expense to change the law. Plaintiffs in this case have demonstrated no
more than this.
Id. at 460. The Court finds the reasoning in Fair Elections Ohio persuasive and
similarly applicable to the injuries Plaintiffs claim here.
Plaintiffs lack Article III standing because they have failed to demonstrate an
injury in fact. See, e.g., Colorado Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. Romer, 963 F.2d 1394, 1397
(10th 	Cir. 	1992) 	(“Appellants’ 	[standing] 	argument 	that 	they 	were 	forced 	to
counteract the Governor’s activities through the expenditure of additional funds is
purely conjectural.”); see also Murthy v. Missouri, --- U.S. ---, 2024 WL 3165801, at *7
(June 26, 2024) (“[f]ederal courts can only review statutes and executive actions when
necessary to redress or prevent actual or imminently threatened injury” (cleaned
up)); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006) (“If a dispute is not a
proper case or controversy, the courts have no business deciding it, or expounding the
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law in the course of doing so.”). But Plaintiffs speak in absolutes, contending that if
this Court endorses the argument that groups dedicated to serving voters lack
organizational standing, “it would be the first court, anywhere, to do so.” Dkt. 62, p.2.
At least two things demonstrate the lack of novelty around the Court’s conclusion
that these Plaintiffs lack Article III standing.
First, Plaintiffs’ categorical proposition is reckless and untrue—other federal
courts have found voter entities to lack organizational standing on voter issues. See
Texas State LULAC v. Elfant, 52 F.4th 248, 253-54 (5th Cir. 2022) (voter registration
organizations lacked standing to challenge Texas law revising requirements for voter
residency); Fair Elections Ohio, 770 F.3d at 460 (voter outreach organization lacked
standing to challenge state voting law); Wash. Election Integrity Coal. United v. Hall,
634 F. Supp. 3d 977, 984 (W.D. Wash. 2022) (voting rights organization lacked
standing 	to 	bring 	action 	alleging 	election 	auditor’s 	conduct 	violated 	federal
constitutional rights); Wisc. Voters All. v. Pence, 514 F. Supp. 3d 117, 120 (D.D.C.
2021) 	(voter 	groups 	lacked 	standing 	to 	seek 	declaration 	that 	federal 	statutes
governing electors and the counting of electoral votes were unconstitutional); Shelby
Cnty. Advocs. for Valid Elections v. Hargett, No. 2:18-cv-02706-TLP-DKV, 2019 WL
4394754, at *7 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 13, 2019), aff’d 947 F.3d 977 (6th Cir. 2020) (voting
organization lacked standing to challenge state and county voting systems).
Second, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in All. for Hippocratic Med.,
supra, susses out the narrow scope of the diversion-of-resources injury claimed by
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Plaintiffs here. The fact that Plaintiffs are dedicated to serving voters is not enough
to confer organizational standing. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War,
418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974) (“The assumption that if respondents have no standing to
sue, no one would have standing, is not a reason to find standing.” (citation omitted));
cf. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 396 (“[S]ome issues may be left to the political
and democratic processes[.]”). Plaintiffs must still satisfy the requisites of standing
under Article III. Murthy, 2024 WL 3165801, at *8 (plaintiff bears the burden to
establish standing as of the time it brought the lawsuit and keeping it thereafter).
They have not done so on this record.
* 	* 	*
For the reasons shared above, the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE
Plaintiffs’ claim because they lack Article III standing, and thus, this Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction.10 The Court FINDS AS MOOT Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment (Dkt. 60). The Court ORDERS that the Clerk of Court shall
terminate this action. The Court FURTHER VACATES the bench trial set to
commence on August 19, 2024, and any related deadlines.
10 Because the Court finds Plaintiffs lack Article III standing, it does not address
whether Plaintiffs have statutory standing under the VRA, nor does it address the
parties’ additional arguments on the merits.
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DATED: July 9, 2024
BY THE COURT:
_____________________________
S. Kato Crews
United States District Judge
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