Thompson v. Ford Motor Company

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Magistrate Judge Maritza Dominguez Braswell
Civil Action No. 22–cv–00541–MDB
LORELLE THOMPSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
FORD MOTOR COMPANY, a Delaware company,
Defendant.
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Ford Motor Company’s Motion to Exclude Richard
Hille Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment.
([“Motion”], Doc. No. 396.) Plaintiff has responded in opposition (Doc. No. 398) and Defendant
has replied in support. (Doc. No. 403.) Additionally, the Court conducted a Daubert Hearing (the
“Hearing”) on July 22, 2025, during which it heard the testimony of Plaintiff’s expert, Richard
Hille. (Doc. Nos. 391; 392; 395.) After reviewing the Motion, briefing, relevant transcripts, and
applicable law, it is ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
This is a products liability action concerning a 1998 Ford Expedition owned by Plaintiff,
Lorelle Thompson. On December 27, 2016, Plaintiff was driving the vehicle in her neighborhood
and stopped near her mailbox to check her mail. Upon exiting the vehicle, Plaintiff fell to the
ground. While Plaintiff was on the ground, the vehicle rolled backward over her left leg.
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At a high-level, it is Plaintiff’s contention that when she exited the vehicle, she slipped on
ice, fell to the ground and lay there for a few seconds before the vehicle began rolling rearward
and over her leg (the “false park” theory). She attributes the rearward movement to worn
bushings that became loose and eventually dislodged, allowing her to shift into “false park”
when she believed the vehicle was in park. Then, and with the vibrations of the running engine,
the vehicle self-shifted into reverse, at which point it rolled over her. Defendant on the other
hand, contends Plaintiff must have attempted to shift into park but mistakenly shifted into
reverse instead. As she was existing the vehicle to grab her mail, she took her foot off the brake
and the vehicle immediately began to roll back, knocking her down and running her over (the
“drive to reverse” theory).
The Court held an eight-day jury trial from April 8 to April 17, 2024. (See Doc. Nos.
302–09.) At the end of trial, the jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor of Plaintiff and
against Defendant, awarding Plaintiff $11,575,000 in compensatory damages and $45,000,000 in
punitive damages.1 (See Doc. No. 298.)
Subsequent to trial, the Court granted Defendant’s Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(a)(1)(A) motion, finding Defendant was entitled to a new trial on multiple grounds. (Doc. No.
368.) As is relevant to the instant Motion, the Court determined that Plaintiff’s expert, Neil
Hanneman, improperly served as a mouthpiece for Richard Hille, another of Plaintiff’s experts
and co-author of the Hille/Hanneman expert report. (Id. at 20–24.) Though Plaintiff represented
Mr. Hille would testify at trial, and though Mr. Hille’s anticipated trial testimony was central to
1 The award was for Plaintiff’s Strict Liability and Negligence claims. The Court dismissed all
other claims asserted by Plaintiff during the course of this action. (See Doc. No. 228 at 28–35;
Doc. No. 282; Doc. No. 306 at 1060:20–1069:23.)
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surviving the 702 challenge on the exemplar testing (see Doc. No. 228 at 24–25), Mr. Hille was
never called at trial. (Id. at n. 4.) The Court found that Plaintiff improperly shielded Mr. Hille
from cross examination by having Mr. Hanneman testify as to the results of Mr. Hille’s testing
on the exemplar vehicle. (Id.)
The Court further noted it was “clear” that “Mr. Hille will need to testify [at any new
trial] in order for Plaintiff to satisfy her causation burden.” (Id. at n. 11.) However, the Court also
determined that Plaintiff’s trial strategy had “raised meaningful doubts” as to whether Mr. Hille
could satisfy the reliability threshold under Rule 702. (Id.) Accordingly, the Court ordered the
Hearing, during which Mr. Hille testified about his qualifications, methodology, principles, and
opinions in this matter. (Doc. No. 391.)
Following the Hearing, Defendant filed the instant Motion, arguing that pursuant to Rule
702, Mr. Hille should be excluded from any new trial. (Doc. No. 396 at 6–17.) Defendant argues
Mr. Hille’s opinions are unreliable and ipse dixit. (Id.) Defendant also argues that if the Court
excludes Mr. Hille’s testimony, Plaintiff cannot carry her causation burden at trial, requiring
summary judgment in Defendant’s favor. (Id. at 17–24.)
LEGAL STANDARD
I. 	Federal Rule of Evidence 702
The standard for admitting expert testimony is set forth in Rule 702 as interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 509 U.S. 579
(1993). As amended in December 2023, Rule 702 provides:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the proponent
demonstrates to the court that it is more likely than not that: (a) the expert’s
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
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understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based
on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles
and methods; and (d) the expert’s opinion reflects a reliable application of the
principles and methods to the facts of the case.
Under Daubert, district courts “must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence
admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589. In this sense, a court acts
as a “gatekeeper” in admitting or excluding expert testimony. Bitler v. A.O. Smith Corp., 400
F.3d 1227, 1232 (10th Cir. 2005); Pinon Sun Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Atain Specialty Ins. Co., 2020
WL 1452166, at *3 (D. Colo. Mar. 25, 2020). Fulfilling this gatekeeping function requires a two-
part analysis. First, the Court must consider whether the expert testimony is relevant. Expert
testimony is relevant if it would assist “the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. Second, the Court must consider whether the expert
opinions are scientifically sound and reliable. Mitchell v. Gencorp Inc., 165 F.3d 778, 781 (10th
Cir. 1999).
In conducting the reliability inquiry, courts may consider: (1) whether a theory has been
or can be tested or falsified, (2) whether the theory or technique has been subject to peer review
and publication, (3) whether there are known or potential rates of error with regard to specific
techniques, and (4) whether the theory or approach has “general acceptance.” Bitler, 400 F.3d at
1233 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94). However, “this list is neither definitive nor
exhaustive,” and courts have “wide discretion both in deciding how to assess an expert’s
reliability and in making a determination of that reliability.” Id. (citing Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 at 150, 152–53 (1999)). Generally, courts should focus not on “the
precise conclusions reached by the expert, but on the methodology employed in reaching those
conclusions.” Id. (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595). “Although it is not always a straightforward
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exercise to disaggregate method and conclusion, when the conclusion simply does not follow
from the data, a district court is free to determine that an impermissible analytical gap exists
between premises and conclusion.” Id. (citing General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146
(1997); Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 328 F.3d 1212, 1222 (2003)). “Thus it is the specific relation
between an expert’s method, the proffered conclusions, and the particular factual circumstances
of the dispute, and not asymptotic perfection, that renders testimony both reliable and relevant.”
Id. at 1234
The burden to show the expert’s testimony is relevant and reliable (and therefore
admissible), is on the proponent of the testimony. United States v. Nacchio, 555 F.3d 1234, 1241
(10th Cir. 2009).
II. 	Summary Judgment
The Court may grant summary judgment if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The
moving party has the burden of showing an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving
party’s case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). “Once the moving party meets
this burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial on a
material matter.” Concrete Works, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513, 1518 (10th Cir.
1994) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325). The nonmoving party may not rest solely on the
allegations in the pleadings, but instead, must designate “specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
“A ‘judge’s function’ at summary judgment is not ‘to weigh the evidence and determine
the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Tolan v.
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Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 249
(1986)). Whether there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact depends upon “whether the
evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury,” or conversely,
whether the evidence “is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Carey v.
U.S. Postal Serv., 812 F.2d 621, 623 (1987) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–52). A disputed
fact is “material” if “under the substantive law it is essential to the proper disposition of the
claim.” Adler v. Wal−Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Anderson,
477 U.S. at 248). A dispute is “genuine” if the evidence is such that it might lead a reasonable
jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Thomas v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 631 F.3d 1153,
1160 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). “Where the record taken as a whole
could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the [nonmovant], there is no ‘genuine issue for
trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citing First
Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)).
ANALYSIS
I. 	Rule 702
In their joint expert report, Mr. Hille and Mr. Hanneman concluded that during the
incident in question Plaintiff shifted her vehicle into false park and was run over after the shift
lever moved into powered reverse. (Doc. No. 399 at 20–22.) This conclusion, and the expert
report as a whole, places significant reliance on the exemplar testing conducted by Mr. Hille.
Defendant challenges the reliability of Mr. Hille’s testing, methods, and related testimony. (See
Doc. No. 396 at 6–17.)
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“When considering reliability, ‘the purpose of the ... inquiry is always ‘to make certain
that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience,
employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an
expert in the relevant field.’” Crew Tile Distribution, Inc. v. Porcelanosa Los Angeles, Inc., 763
F. App’x 787, 796 (10th Cir. 2019) (quoting Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 328 F.3d 1212, 1222–23
(10th Cir. 2003)). “The plaintiff need not prove that the expert is undisputably correct ....
[However,] the plaintiff must show that the method employed by the expert in reaching the
conclusion is scientifically sound and that the opinion is based on [reliable] facts.” Mitchell, 165
F.3d at 781. At a minimum, a party proffering an expert must do more than ask the Court to
“simply tak[e] the expert’s word for it.” White v. Gen. Motors LLC, 2024 WL 4100855, at *2 (D.
Colo. Feb. 29, 2024) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702 (advisory committee note)). “[A]ny step that
renders the analysis unreliable renders the expert’s testimony inadmissible.” Crew Tile
Distribution, Inc., 763 F. App’x at 796 (quoting Dodge, 328 F.3d at 1222) (internal quotation
omitted).
Mr. Hille conducted testing on an exemplar Ford Expedition on February 17, 2023.2
(Doc. No. 154-6 at 18.) This testing was not well documented or controlled. Mr. Hille took just
eight photographs3 and no videos during his testing. (Id. at 53:6–12; 75:2–24.) Thus, the Court
was not able to review any footage of the testing. Moreover, Mr. Hille apparently did not create
2 Mr. Hille also spent time with the exemplar vehicle in January 2023. However, at the time, the
exemplar had a malfunctioning bushing that led to the shift cable repeatedly coming detached,
preventing Mr. Hille from conducting meaningful testing. (Doc. No. 392 at 44:7–10.)
3 Defendant describes these photographs as “inconsequential” because they fail to demonstrate
anything about Mr. Hille’s testing methodology or results. (Doc. No. 396 at 5.) The Court agrees
with this characterization and Plaintiff does not appear to dispute it. (See generally Doc. No.
388.)
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any contemporaneous written record of his testing conditions or results. (See Doc. No. 404 at ¶
20; see also Doc. No. 392 at 69:23–70:5 (in which Mr. Hille did not dispute the Court’s
statement that there were “no notes” made during the testing); Doc. No. 392 at 75:24 (testifying
that “I trust people will believe me” when explaining the lack of documentation for the exemplar
testing).)
Additionally, Mr. Hille’s testimony revealed that the testing was inexact in several ways.
First, he testified that he moved the exemplar vehicle’s shifter from drive to park “approximately
100” times, that “about half the time” the shift lever failed to reach the park detent and instead
ended up in false park, and that on “two occasions” the shift lever fell from false park into
powered reverse. (Doc. No. 392 at 23:21–25:12 (emphasis added).) Second, Mr. Hille broadly
testified “it [took] seconds” for the shift lever to fall from false park to reverse on those two
occasions, but he did not offer an exact time. (Id. at 57:17–19.) Third, Mr. Hille testified that he
did not measure the force with which he moved the shifter from drive to park, and that he
deliberately perched the shifter into false park “[a] couple of times.” (Doc. No. 392 at 73:22–
74:20.) Fourth, although the testing conditions varied throughout the day, there is no indication
that these variations were documented or accounted for. Specifically, the exemplar vehicle’s shift
cable was initially secured to the shift lever with “gorilla tape” due to a malfunctioning bushing
and was later reattached using a newly purchased bushing. (Id. at 22:8–20.) Mr. Hille testified
that “75, 80 percent” of the testing was done with the new bushing, and the rest was done with
the tape, but he did not specify how many tests were conducted with tape as opposed to the new
bushing. (Doc. No. 392 at 22:32–23:1.) Moreover, Mr. Hille did not identify which
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configuration—the tape or the new bushing—was in use when the shifter moved from false park
to powered reverse.
As the Court noted during the Daubert hearing, Mr. Hille’s lack of documentation
essentially requires the Court to “just believe him” in order to admit his opinions. (Id. at 113:12.)
While an expert need not adhere to any one documentation protocol, the near-total absence of
records here, makes meaningful review of Mr. Hille’s methodology impossible. And though the
Court was initially of the view that the gaps it saw on paper could be addressed through cross-
examination, (see Doc. No. 228 at 20–27), the Hearing revealed that is not the case. Mr. Hille’s
testimony during the Hearing made it clear that the purported results of the exemplar testing rest
on little more than his own say-so, which is an insufficient basis on which to admit expert
testimony under Rule 702. See Fed. R. Evid. 702 (advisory committee note) (“The trial court’s
gatekeeping function requires more than simply taking the expert’s word for it.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). “Plaintiff bears the burden of showing that his expert’s opinions and
testimony are ‘based on sufficient facts and data.’” White, 2024 WL 4100855, at *6 (quoting
Fed. R. Civ. P. 702). Plaintiff has not carried her burden here, and Mr. Hille will not be permitted
to testify about his exemplar testing at any new trial.
II. 	Summary Judgment
With Mr. Hille’s testimony excluded, the Court must consider Defendant’s renewed
request for summary judgment, on causation grounds. The question to be resolved is
straightforward: is Plaintiff’s causation evidence sufficient to reach the jury on her false park
theory?
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Defendant contends it is not, arguing that proving causation here requires expert
testimony, and Plaintiff’s other experts, Mr. Vosburgh and Mr. Hanneman, cannot provide
sufficient causation evidence to satisfy Plaintiff’s burden. (Doc. No. 396 at 17–24.) Plaintiff
argues that the jury can infer causation from circumstantial evidence, or, alternatively, that Mr.
Vosburgh and Mr. Hanneman provide sufficient causation evidence. (Doc. No. 398 at 12–24.)
“In Colorado, a plaintiff must establish causation beyond ‘mere possibility or
speculation.’” Nash v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2017 WL 5188339, at *9 (D. Colo. Feb. 15, 2017)
(quoting Truck Ins. Exch. v. MagneTek, Inc., 360 F.3d 1206, 1214 (10th Cir. 2004)), aff’d, 709 F.
App’x 509 (10th Cir. 2017). And “when proof of causation requires answering technical
questions which are beyond the discernment capacity of laypersons[,]” “expert testimony is
generally required.” White v. Gen. Motors LLC, 2024 WL 4213764, at *3 (D. Colo. Sept. 17,
2024) (quoting Mathison v. United States, 619 F. App’x 691, 694 (10th Cir. 2015)) (collecting
cases); see Park Rise Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Res. Const. Co., 155 P.3d 427, 430 (Colo. App.
2006) (observing that expert testimony may be needed “where the issue does not lie within the
ambit of common knowledge of ordinary persons”).
It is true that in some instances, “causation may also be inferred by a jury if the Plaintiff
has provided evidence that would make the inference reasonable.” Nash, 2017 WL 5188339, at
*9 (citing Truck Ins. Exch., 360 F.3d at 1214). But here, causation is not plainly identifiable by
an average layperson. Indeed, to establish the vehicle was in false park and then shifted into
reverse at the time of the accident, Plaintiff must answer complex technical questions that fall
well outside lay competence. A juror who learns that a vehicle rolled backward after the driver
exited has no basis, without expert guidance, to conclude whether that movement resulted from a
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mechanical defect or an inadvertent gear shift. Resolving that question requires specialized
knowledge of transmission mechanics and accident reconstruction that falls outside common
experience. Without expert testimony connecting the alleged defect to the vehicle’s movement,
any causation finding would rest on speculation rather than evidence.
Thus, the question becomes whether Plaintiff’s remaining experts—Mr. Hanneman and
Mr. Vosburgh—can provide sufficient evidence, such that, in combination with the other
evidence in this case, a jury may reasonably infer that Plaintiff’s injuries were caused by a
defect, pursuant to her false park theory.
As a threshold matter, neither Mr. Vosburgh nor Mr. Hanneman conducted testing to
demonstrate precisely how Plaintiff’s vehicle shifted from false park into reverse. Mr. Vosburgh
is an accident reconstructionist who specifically testified in his deposition that he was “not
opining on the design defects or the design or ... failure analysis or failure modes of this ...
mechanism.” (Doc. No. 396-4 at 23:1.5–21.) Moreover, Mr. Hanneman “focused on the design
of the shift system” and identified alternative designs for the shift system. (Doc. No. 162 at 37–
38.) But he did not undertake any direct testing on causation, which was left for Mr. Hille. (See
id. at 37 (saying Mr. Hanneman’s work “addresses different aspects of the analysis from Mr.
Hille”).)
Still, Plaintiff argues Mr. Hanneman and Mr. Vosburgh can present enough evidence to
support her theory of causation under “a process of reasoning to the best inference” theory. (Doc.
No. 398 at 15–18); see Bitler, 400 F.3d at 1237; Roe v. FCA US LLC. 42 F.4th 1175, 1182–83
(10th Cir. 2022). Inference theory “requires a process of eliminating possible causes as
improbable until the most likely one is identified.” Bitler, 400 F.3d at 1237. Thus, “an inference
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to the best explanation for the cause of an accident must eliminate other possible sources as
highly improbable, and must demonstrate that the cause identified is highly probable.” Id. at
1238. To this end, Plaintiff must do more than show her theory is a “mere possibility.” Id.
According to Plaintiff, her false park theory satisfies this standard because Mr. Vosburgh
and Mr. Hanneman have “eliminated” Defendant’s theory that Plaintiff shifted from drive to
reverse during the incident in question.4 Plaintiff points to Mr. Hanneman’s use of a “differential
analysis ‘to rule out unlikely scenarios prior to developing a theory,’” and his opinion that the
incident would not have occurred absent a design defect. (Doc. No. 398 at 17–18 (citing Doc.
No. 399-17 at 4).) She also says Mr. Vosburgh found “Ms. Thompson did not shift into reverse
when she stopped by her mailbox, ruling out that scenario.” (Id. at 18; see id. at 3 (describing
Mr. Vosburgh’s testing and opinion).)
Plaintiff misses the mark. Having her experts leap to the conclusion that her theory is
correct and Defendant’s is wrong, does not satisfy the best inference standard. It is true that Mr.
Vosburgh’s reconstruction showed the vehicle moving backward “almost immediately” when
placed in reverse, (Doc. No. 398 at 3), allowing him to “conclude[ ] the vehicle must have been
in false park when Ms. Thompson got out of it, because it did not move for 5-6 seconds after she
got out of the vehicle.” (Id.) But the 5-to-6-second timeframe, the linchpin of this conclusion, is
derived almost entirely from Plaintiff’s self-serving statements and hearsay statements made by
L.T., a nine-year old child who was inside the vehicle during the incident. (Id. (citing Plaintiff’s
4 Plaintiff also argues that certain testimony by Defendant’s experts supports her best inference
theory, including Hugh Malden’s testimony that Plaintiff’s vehicle could be placed in “hydraulic
neutral” resulting in unintended vehicle movement. (See Doc. No. 398 at 18.) But testimony that
something is possible, does not make something probable, nor does it make something else
highly improbable.
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Additional Disputed Facts (“PADF”) ¶¶ 76–77); see PADF ¶¶ 76–77 (noting Mr. Vosburgh
testified his opinion was consistent with L.T.’s statements) (citing Doc. No. 302 at 99:23–
100:11, 109:6–110:7).) Those factual statements may be enough to make the false park theory
possible, but it does not offer the type of expert evidence that makes the theory “highly
probable.” See Bitler, 400 F.3d at 1238.
Mr. Hanneman’s opinion, which also relied heavily on the 5–6 second period described
by L.T., fares no better. (Doc. No. 398 at 4 (saying “Mr. Hannemann relied upon the facts of the
incident, which established that the vehicle did not move for 5-6 seconds after Ms. Thompson
took her foot off of the brake”).) And, to the extent Mr. Hanneman’s opinions are at least in part
predicated on Mr. Hille’s exemplar testing, they have lost a key pillar of support.
Moreover, though the Hille/Hanneman expert report says the experts conducted a
“differential diagnosis” analysis to “rule out unlikely scenarios” (Doc. No. 399-17 at 4 (internal
quotation marks omitted)), Plaintiff does not describe what this analysis consisted of, nor does
she explain how it meets the best inference standard. (See Doc. No. 399 at 17 (merely stating that
the Hille/Hanneman expert report “used a method of differential analysis to rule out unlikely
scenarios prior to developing a theory.”(internal quotation marks omitted)).) In any event, the
best inference standard requires more than “ruling out” different possibilities as “unlikely,” it
requires an expert to “eliminate other possible sources as highly improbable, and ... demonstrate
that the cause identified is highly probable.” Bitler, 400 F.3d at 1238.
In short, the best inference standard does not rescue Plaintiff’s causation case. Without
the exemplar testing and additional explanation flowing from the exemplar testing, there is an
“analytical gap,” similar to the one discussed in Roe. 42 F.4th at 1182 (“Without this testing or
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additional explanation, it is totally unsupported why the experts believe the shifter could shift on
its own into reverse after remaining in false park for sufficient time.”).5 Just as the Roe court
rejected the best inference analysis because plaintiff’s experts had “not demonstrated that their
[false park] hypothesis was even possible—let alone highly probable,” id. at 1183, the Court
rejects it here.6
Plaintiff’s causation case was weak from the outset. The Court nonetheless permitted
Plaintiff to advance a patchwork of evidence and theories past Defendant’s initial Rule 702
challenge. (Doc. No. 228 at 15–28.) Central to that ruling, however, was the Court’s
understanding that Mr. Hille would testify at trial, and through his exemplar testing, demonstrate
that Plaintiff’s theory was not merely possible, but probable. (Id. at 24–25.) But at the eleventh-
hour Plaintiff withdrew Mr. Hille as a witness. Now, with the benefit of hearing directly from
5 In considering Defendant’s post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law, the Court
wrestled with, and ultimately rejected, Defendant’s Roe argument. (See Doc. No. 368 at 13–15.)
Specifically, the Court concluded that, though “the facts and issues in Roe are strikingly similar
to those here,” Roe involved essentially no causation evidence, whereas Plaintiff did, during trial,
put forward at least some causation evidence—specifically, and as relevant here, Plaintiff offered
Mr. Hanneman’s testimony about Mr. Hille’s exemplar testing. (Id. (emphasis added).)
However, now that the Court has excluded Mr. Hille’s exemplar testing testimony, the linchpin
of Plaintiff’s causation case is gone. That makes Roe almost directly on point, and, indeed,
controlling.
6 Plaintiff also invokes the malfunction doctrine, a res ipsa loquitur-style theory permitting proof
of a defect through circumstantial evidence where the incident “(a) was of a kind that ordinarily
occurs as a result of product defect; and (b) was not, in the particular case, solely the result of
causes other than product defect existing at the time of sale or distribution.” Restatement (Third)
of Torts: Product Liability § 3 (1998); see Olivero v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 291 F. Supp. 3d 1209,
1220 (D. Colo. 2017) (saying the malfunction doctrine “has been embodied in” section 3 of the
Third Restatement of Torts); Heikkila v. Kahr Firearms Grp., 2023 WL 2375082 (D. Colo. Mar.
6, 2023). That doctrine does not apply here. Plaintiff cannot satisfy the first element—that the
accident was of a kind that ordinarily occurs as a result of a product defect. To the contrary,
Defendant’s drive-to-reverse theory offers a straightforward, non-defect explanation for how the
accident may have occurred. Where an equally plausible, indeed simpler, alternative cause exists,
the malfunction doctrine’s foundational premise is not established.
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Mr. Hille at the Hearing, the Court has no doubt that Defendant was right—Mr. Hille’s trial
testimony would offer nothing more than ipse dixit. Perhaps that is why Plaintiff made the last-
minute call to take Mr. Hille off the witness list.
Without Mr. Hille’s exemplar testing testimony, Plaintiff cannot offer the type of expert
testimony necessary to support her causation case. Because the record taken as a whole cannot
“lead a rational trier of fact to find for [Plaintiff], there is no ‘genuine issue for trial,’” and
Defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475
U.S. at 587.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is
ORDERED that Ford Motor Company’s Motion to Exclude Richard Hille Pursuant to
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. No. 396) is
GRANTED. It is further
ORDERED that Ford’s Motion for Oral Argument (Doc. No. 405) is DENIED as moot.
The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.
Dated this 24 th day of March, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
___________________________
Maritza Dominguez Braswell
United States Magistrate Judge
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