Bryan Ashley International et al v. United States

Slip Op. 14-132
UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
________________________________
MARK DAVID, A DIVISION OF 	:
BAKER, KNAPP & TUBBS, INC., 	:
:
Plaintiff, 	: 	Before: Nicholas Tsoucalas,
: 	Senior Judge
and 	:
: 	Consol. Court No.: 13-00233
BRYAN ASHLEY INTERNATIONAL, 	:
METROPOLIS MANUFACTURING, INC. 	:
(DBA VAUGHAN BENZ), AND 	:
MGM RESORTS INTERNATIONAL 	:
DESIGN, 	:
:
Consolidated 	:
Plaintiffs, 	:
:
v. 	:
:
UNITED STATES, 	:
:
Defendant, 	:
:
and 	:
:
AMERICAN FURNITURE MANUFACTURERS:
COMMITTEE FOR LEGAL TRADE and 	:
VAUGHAN-BASSETT FURNITURE CO., 	:
INC., 	:
:
Defendant-Intervenors.:
OPINION
[Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the agency record is denied]
Dated: November 18, 2014
Alexander 	H. 	Schaefer 	and 	Hea 	J. 	Koh, 	Crowell 	& 	Moring 	LLP, 	of
Washington, DC, for Mark David, a division of Baker, Knapp & Tubbs,
Inc., plaintiff.
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Peter Koenig, Squire Patton Boggs LLP, of Washington, DC, for Bryan
Ashley 	International, 	Metropolis 	Manufacturing, 	Inc., 	and 	MGM
Resorts International Design, consolidated plaintiffs.
Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General, Jeanne E. Davidson,
Director, Patricia M. McCarthy, Assistant Director, and Douglas G.
Edelschick, 	Trial 	Attorney, 	Commercial 	Litigation 	Branch, 	Civil
Division, 	U.S. 	Department 	of 	Justice, 	of 	Washington, 	DC, 	for
defendant. 	Of 	counsel 	on 	the 	brief 	was 	Shana 	A. 	Hofstetter,
Attorney, 	Office 	of 	the 	Chief 	Counsel 	for 	Trade 	Enforcement 	and
Compliance, U.S. Department of Commerce, of Washington, DC.
Joseph W. Dorn, J. Michael Taylor and P. Lee Smith, King & Spalding
LLP, 	of 	Washington, 	DC, 	for 	American 	Furniture 	Manufacturers
Committee 	for 	Legal 	Trade 	and 	Vaughan-Bassett 	Furniture 	Company,
Inc., defendant-intervenors.
TSOUCALAS, 	Senior 	Judge: 	Plaintiff, 	Mark 	David, 	a
division 	of 	Baker, 	Knapp, 	and 	Tubbs, 	Inc. 	(“Mark 	David” 	or
“Plaintiff”), 	moves 	for 	judgment 	on 	the 	agency 	record 	contesting
defendant 	United 	States 	Department 	of 	Commerce’s 	(“Commerce”)
determination 	in 	Wooden 	Bedroom 	Furniture 	From 	the 	People’s
Republic 	of 	China: 	Final 	Results 	of 	Antidumping 	Duty
Administrative Review; 2011, 78 Fed. Reg. 35,249 (June 12, 2013).
Consolidated 	Plaintiffs, 	Bryan 	Ashley 	International, 	Metropolis
Manufacturing, 	Inc., 	and 	MGM 	Resorts 	International 	Design, 	join
and 	supplement 	Plaintiff’s 	motion. 	See 	Pls. 	Adoption 	of 	Pl. 	Br.
at 	1–3. 	Commerce 	and 	defendant-intervenors, 	American 	Furniture
Manufacturers 	Committee 	for 	Legal 	Trade 	and 	Vaughan-Bassett
Furniture Company, Inc., oppose Plaintiff’s motion. 	Def.’s Resp.
to Pl.’s and Consolidated Pls.’ Rule 56.2 Mot. for J. on the Agency
R. 	at 	1–2. 	The 	AFMC’s 	Resp. 	in 	Opp’n 	to 	Mark 	David’s 	Rule 	56.2
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Mot. 	for 	J. 	on 	the 	Agency 	R. 	at 	1. 	For 	the 	following 	reasons,
Plaintiff’s motion is denied.
Background
In 	January 	2005, 	Commerce 	issued 	an 	antidumping 	duty
order covering wooden bedroom furniture (“WBF”) from the People’s
Republic of China (“PRC”). 	Notice of Amended Final Determination
of 	Sales 	at 	Less 	Than 	Fair 	Value 	and 	Antidumping 	Duty 	Order: 	WBF
From 	the 	PRC, 	70 	Fed. 	Reg. 	329, 	330 	(Jan. 	4, 	2005). 	Commerce
acknowledged 	Shanghai 	Maoji 	Imp 	And 	Exp 	Co., 	Ltd. 	(“Maoji”) 	as
qualifying for a separate rate status and assigned a dumping margin
of 	6.68%. 	WBF 	From 	the 	PRC: 	Corrected 	Notice 	of 	Court 	Decision
Not in Harmony With the Final Determination of Sales at Less Than
Fair 	Value 	and 	Notice 	of 	Amended 	Final 	Determination 	of 	Sales 	at
Less Than Fair Value and Antidumping Duty Order Pursuant to Court
Decision, 76 Fed. Reg. 53,409, 53,411–53,412 (Aug. 26, 2011).
Commerce 	initiated 	the 	seventh 	administrative 	review
during 	the 	period 	of 	review 	beginning 	on 	January 	1, 	2011 	through
December 31, 2011. 	WBF From the PRC: Initiation of Administrative
Review, 	77 	Fed. 	Reg. 	12,235, 	12,237 	(Feb. 	29, 	2012). 	During 	the
seventh administrative review, Commerce named Maoji as a mandatory
respondent. 	WBF From the PRC: Preliminary Results of Antidumping
Duty Administrative Review; 2011, 78 Fed. Reg. 8493, 8494 (Feb. 6,
2013) 	(“Preliminary 	Results”). 	Maoji 	responded 	to 	Commerce’s
antidumping questionnaire and supplemental questionnaires between
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July and October 2012. 	Decision Memorandum for Preliminary Results
of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review: WBF from the PRC, at 3
(February 	1, 	2013) 	(“Preliminary 	Decision 	Memorandum”). 	During
the review Maoji notified Commerce that it was not practicable for
it 	to 	provide 	a 	response 	to 	the 	Section 	D 	questionnaire 	or 	the
supplemental 	Section 	A 	questionnaire. 	See 	Letter 	from 	Maoji 	to
Commerce 	re: 	WBF 	from 	PRC 	(Aug. 	3, 	2012), 	Pub. 	Rec. 	325, 	Attach.
1 at 1. 1
Commerce 	issued 	its 	preliminary 	results 	on 	February 	6,
2013. 	Preliminary 	Results, 	78 	Fed. 	Reg. 	at 	8493. 	Commerce
preliminarily determined that Maoji failed to answer all sections
of 	Commerce’s 	questionnaire, 	and 	thus 	failed 	to 	establish 	its
eligibility for a separate rate status. 	Id. at 8494. 	As a result,
Commerce 	treated 	Maoji 	as 	part 	of 	the 	PRC-wide 	entity. 	Id. 	at
8494.
Commerce also preliminarily determined that the PRC-wide
entity, 	including 	Maoji, 	did 	not 	cooperate 	to 	the 	best 	of 	its
ability 	during 	the 	review. 	Id. 	at 	8494. 	Therefore, 	Commerce
relied on adverse facts available (“AFA”) to determine the dumping
margin 	for 	the 	PRC-wide 	entity. 	Id. 	at 	8494. 	Commerce 	assigned
an 	AFA 	rate 	of 	216.01 	percent 	to 	the 	PRC-wide 	entity, 	including
Maoji, 	which 	was 	calculated 	based 	on 	a 	2004-2005 	New 	Shipper
1 	Hereinafter, 	documents 	in 	the 	public 	record 	will 	be 	designated
“PR” without further specification except where relevant.
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Review. 	WBF 	From 	The 	PRC: 	Final 	Results 	of 	the 	2004-2005 	Semi-
Annual New Shipper Reviews, 71 Fed. Reg. 70,739, 70,741 (December
6, 2006). 	Commerce stated that the rate had been corroborated in
previously completed administrative reviews in which it found that
the 216.01% rate for the PRC-wide entity was within “the range of
the calculated margins on the record of the [fifth] administrative
review.” Preliminary Results at 15.
On 	March 	8, 	2013, 	Plaintiff, 	Mark 	David 	USA
(“Plaintiff”), an importer of WBF, filed case briefs with Commerce.
WBF 	from 	the 	PRC: 	Issues 	and 	Decision 	Memorandum 	for 	the 	Final
Results 	of 	Review, 	at 	1 	(June 	5, 	2013) 	(“Decision 	Memorandum”).
Mark 	David 	contests 	whether 	the 	216.01% 	margin, 	as 	assigned 	to
Maoji as part of the PRC-wide entity was reasonable.
Commerce 	maintained 	its 	preliminary 	findings 	in 	its
Final 	Results. 	WBF 	From 	the 	PRC: 	Final 	Results 	of 	Antidumping
Duty Administrative Review; 2011, 78 Fed. Reg. 35,249, 35,249 (June
12, 2013) (“Final Results”).
JURISDICTION and STANDARD OF REVIEW
This 	Court 	has 	jurisdiction 	pursuant 	to 	28 	U.S.C. 	§
1581(c) (2006) and Section 516A(a)(2)(B)(iii) of the Tariff Act of
1930 as amended, 19 U.S.C. §1516a(a)(2)(B)(iii)(2006).
This 	Court 	will 	uphold 	Commerce’s 	determination 	unless
it 	is 	“unsupported 	by 	substantial 	evidence 	on 	the 	record, 	or
otherwise 	not 	in 	accordance 	with 	law.” 	19 	U.S.C.
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§1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). 	Substantial 	evidence 	“means 	such 	relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a 	conclusion.” 	Universal 	Camera 	Corp. 	v. 	NLRB, 	340 	U.S. 	474, 	477
(1951).
Additionally, 	“courts 	look 	for 	a 	reasoned 	analysis 	or
explanation for an agency’s decision as a way to determine whether
a 	particular 	decision 	is 	arbitrary, 	capricious, 	or 	an 	abuse 	of
discretion.” 	Wheatland 	Tube 	Co. 	v. 	United 	States, 	161 	F.3d 	1365,
1369 	(Fed. 	Cir. 	1998). 	“An 	abuse 	of 	discretion 	occurs 	where 	the
decision 	is 	based 	on 	an 	erroneous 	interpretation 	of 	the 	law, 	on
factual 	findings 	that 	are 	not 	supported 	by 	substantial 	evidence,
or 	represent 	an 	unreasonable 	judgment 	in 	weighing 	relevant
factors.” 	Welcom 	Prods., 	Inc. 	v. 	United 	States, 	36 	CIT 	____, 	865
F.Supp.2d 	1340, 	1344 	(2012) 	(citing 	Star 	Fruits 	S.N.C. 	v. 	United
States, 393 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005). “An agency action is
arbitrary when the agency offers insufficient reasons for treating
similar 	situations 	differently.” 	SKF 	USA 	Inc. 	v. 	United 	States,
263 F.3d 1369, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
DISCUSSION
Maoji 	does 	not 	dispute 	that 	they 	failed 	to 	participate
fully in the review, and that they therefor can be subjected to an
AFA rate. 	The issue before the court is instead whether Commerce’s
application 	of 	the 	216.01% 	PRC-wide 	AFA 	rate 	to 	Maoji 	was
reasonable. 	Plaintiff 	argues 	that 	the 	216.01% 	PRC-wide 	AFA 	rate
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was neither reliable nor relevant. See Pl.’s Mem. Supp. R. 56.2 J.
Agency R. at 5–10 (“Pl.’s Mem.”). 	According to Plaintiff, Commerce
applied an “outdated” and “unsupported” margin that did not reflect
Maoji’s commercial reality. 	Id.
In 	antidumping 	duty 	proceedings 	involving 	merchandise
from 	a 	non-market 	economy 	(“NME”), 	as 	is 	the 	case 	here, 	Commerce
presumes 	that 	all 	respondents 	are 	government 	controlled 	and
therefore 	subject 	to 	the 	country-wide 	rate. 	See 	Sigma 	Corp. 	v.
United 	States, 	117 	F.3d 	1401, 	1405 	(Fed. 	Cir. 	1997). 	Commerce
does 	allow 	respondents 	to 	rebut 	this 	presumption, 	however, 	by
establishing 	the 	absence 	of 	both 	de 	jure 	and 	de 	facto 	government
control. 	Id. 	Respondents who make this showing are eligible for
a separate rate. 	Id. 	When a company fails to rebut the presumption
of 	government 	control, 	Commerce 	employs 	that 	presumption 	and
applies the country-wide rate to its merchandise. 	See id.
Plaintiff does not appear to dispute Commerce’s finding
that 	Maoji 	failed 	to 	rebut 	the 	presumption 	of 	government 	control
in 	the 	Final 	Results. 	During 	the 	review 	Maoji 	notified 	Commerce
that 	it 	was 	not 	practicable 	for 	it 	to 	provide 	a 	response 	to 	the
Section 	D 	questionnaire 	or 	the 	supplemental 	Section 	A
questionnaire. 	See 	PR 	325 	attach. 	1 	at 	1. 	Commerce 	determined
that Maoji was a part of the PRC-wide entity. 	See Shandong Mach.
Imp. & Exp. Co. v. United States, 33 CIT 810, 815 (2009). 	Because
Maoji failed to respond to Commerce’s questionnaires regarding its
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separate 	rate 	eligibility 	during 	the 	review, 	Commerce 	reasonably
concluded 	that 	Maoji 	failed 	to 	demonstrate 	its 	absence 	of
government control. 	See Sigma Corp., 117 F.3d at 1405.
The 	main 	issue 	for 	the 	court 	to 	evaluate 	is 	therefor
whether Commerce’s application of the 216.01% PRC-wide AFA rate to
Maoji, 	which 	has 	not 	demonstrated 	its 	independence 	from 	the 	PRC-
wide 	entity, 	was 	reasonable. 	A 	margin 	based 	upon 	AFA 	must 	be 	“a
reasonably 	accurate 	estimate 	of 	the 	respondent’s 	actual 	rate,
albeit with some built-in increase intended as a deterrent to non-
compliance.” 	F.Lli de Cecco di Filippo Fara S. Martino S.p.A. v.
United States, 216 F.3d 1027, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 	“[A]lthough
a 	higher 	AFA 	rate 	creates 	a 	stronger 	deterrent, 	Commerce 	may 	not
select 	unreasonably 	high 	rates 	having 	no 	relationship 	to 	the
respondent’s actual dumping margin.” 	Gallant Ocean (Thai.) Co. v.
United 	States, 	602 	F.3d 	1319, 	1323 	(Fed. 	Cir. 	2010) 	(citing 	de
Cecco, 	216 	F.3d 	at 	1032). 	“Commerce 	must 	select 	secondary
information 	that 	has 	some 	grounding 	in 	commercial 	reality.” 	Id.
at 1324.
These standards grow out of 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c), which
provides 	that 	when 	Commerce 	relies 	on 	secondary 	information, 	it
“shall, 	to 	the 	extent 	practicable, 	corroborate 	that 	information
from 	independent 	sources 	that 	are 	reasonably 	at 	[its] 	disposal.”
19 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1677e(c). 	To 	corroborate 	secondary 	information,
Commerce 	must 	find 	that 	it 	has 	“probative 	value.” 	KYD, 	Inc. 	v.
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United 	States, 	607 	F.3d 	760, 	765 	(Fed. 	Cir. 	2010). 	Secondary
information 	has 	“probative 	value” 	if 	it 	is 	both 	reliable 	and
relevant 	to 	the 	respondent. 	Mittal 	Steel 	Galati 	S.A. 	v. 	United
States, 31 CIT 730, 734, 491 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1278 (2007).
Plaintiff 	relies 	heavily 	on 	Lifestyle 	Enter., 	Inc. 	v.
United 	States 	to 	support 	its 	argument 	that 	the 	216.01% 	rate 	was
unreasonable. 	Lifestyle Enterprise, Inc. v. United States, 35 CIT
___, 	___, 	768 	F. 	Supp. 	2d 	1286 	(2011) 	(“Lifestyle 	I”), 	after
remand, 	36 	CIT 	___, 	844 	F.Supp.2d 	1283 	(2012) 	(“Lifestyle 	II”),
after 	second 	remand, 	36 	CIT 	___, 	865 	F.Supp.2d 	1284 	(2012)
(“Lifestyle 	III”), 	after 	third 	remand, 	37 	CIT 	___, 	896 	F.Supp.2d
1297 	(2013) 	(“Lifestyle 	IV”). 	Pl’s 	Mem. 	at 	7–9. 	Specifically,
Plaintiff 	contends 	that 	this 	Court 	previously 	discredited 	the
application of the 216.01% PRC-wide AFA in Lifestyle I. 	The court
disagrees. 	In 	Lifestyle 	I, 	importers 	challenged 	the 	third
administrative 	review 	of 	WBF 	from 	the 	PRC. 	See 	Lifestyle 	I, 	768
F. 	Supp. 	2d 	at 	1292. 	Orient, 	a 	mandatory 	respondent, 	was
originally 	subject 	to 	an 	antidumping 	margin 	of 	216.01%. 	See 	id.
at 	1297. 	However, 	in 	Lifestyle 	I, 	Orient 	was 	not 	assigned 	the
PRC-wide 	rate 	because 	“Orient 	had 	affirmatively 	demonstrated 	an
absence 	of 	de 	jure 	or 	de 	facto 	control.” 	See 	id. 	at 	1296–1297,
1298 n. 12 (“Commerce did not assign the PRC-wide rate per se, but
rather selected the same rate based on separate considerations.”).
Furthermore, 	the 	Court 	found 	in 	Lifestyle 	I 	that 	Commerce 	failed
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to 	address 	the 	“dramatic 	increase 	in 	Orient’s 	rate 	from 	7.68% 	to
216.01%.” 	Id. 	at 	1299. 	Because 	Orient 	qualified 	for 	separate
rate 	status, 	the 	Court 	in 	Lifestyle 	I 	held 	that 	Commerce 	was
required 	to 	either 	explain 	its 	determination 	or 	corroborate
Orient’s 	AFA 	rate 	so 	that 	it 	relates 	to 	Orient’s 	commercial
reality. 	Id. 	at 	1298–1299. 	Contrary 	to 	Plaintiff’s 	assertion,
the 	Court 	in 	Lifestyle 	I 	did 	not 	hold 	that 	the 	PRC-wide 	rate 	is
uncorroborated.
Following 	three 	subsequent 	remands 	where 	the 	Court
instructed 	Commerce 	to 	calculate 	an 	AFA 	rate 	which 	has 	some
grounding 	in 	Orient’s 	commercial 	reality, 	the 	Court 	in 	Lifestyle
IV 	sustained 	Commerce’s 	findings 	in 	its 	Third 	Remand 	Results 	of
WBF from the PRC, applying a rate of 83.55% to Orient’s exports of
WBF. 	Lifestyle 	IV, 	896 	F. 	Supp. 	2d 	at 	1301-1302. 	The 	Court
determined 	that 	the 	rate 	was 	sufficiently 	corroborated 	and
reflected Orient’s commercial reality. 	Id.
Unlike 	Orient 	in 	Lifestyle 	I, 	here, 	Maoji 	failed 	to
qualify 	for 	separate 	rate 	status. 	As 	a 	result 	it 	received 	the
PRC-wide AFA rate. 	Because Maoji was part of the PRC-wide entity,
Commerce was not required to calculate a separate AFA rate relevant
to Maoji’s commercial reality. 	See Peer Bearing, 32 CIT at 1313,
587 F. Supp. 2d at 1327 (“[T]here is no requirement that the PRC-
wide entity rate based on AFA relate specifically to the individual
company.”). 	Commerce was only required to corroborate the rate to
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the PRC-wide entity. 	See id. 	Therefore, Plaintiff’s reliance on
Lifestyle I is misplaced. 	Lifestyle I does not call into question
the 	PRC-wide 	rate 	as 	applied 	to 	the 	PRC-wide 	entity, 	rather 	it
only 	discredits 	its 	application 	to 	Orient, 	which 	successfully
established 	the 	absence 	of 	both 	de 	jure 	and 	de 	facto 	government
control. 	Id.
Plaintiff 	also 	argues 	that 	Commerce 	has 	previously
applied 	significantly 	lower 	rates 	to 	cooperating 	respondents 	in
nine 	other 	administrative 	reviews 	of 	WBF 	in 	support 	of 	its
contention 	that 	the 	rate 	is 	unreliable. 	Pl.’s 	Mem. 	at 	8–9. 	The
court does not find that these rates support Plaintiff’s argument.
The 	rates 	that 	Plaintiff 	relies 	on 	were 	assigned 	to 	cooperating
separate 	rate 	respondents. 	See 	id. 	The 	rates 	were 	not 	assigned
to 	respondents 	who 	were 	considered 	to 	be 	a 	part 	of 	the 	PRC-wide
entity. 	Plaintiff 	does 	not 	show 	how 	these 	rates 	conflict 	with 	a
rate 	applied 	to 	a 	respondent 	who 	fails 	to 	qualify 	for 	separate
rate status. 	In the instant case, as discussed above, unlike the
nine cooperating respondents, Maoji is an uncooperative respondent
that was found to be a part of the PRC-wide entity.
Additionally, Plaintiff insists that the “continued use”
of 	the 	216.01% 	margin 	in 	the 	Final 	Results 	is 	“contrary 	to 	this
Court’s 	precedent 	and 	disregards 	information 	that 	decisively
rejects the reliability or relevance of the PRC-wide entity rate.”
Pl.’s Mem. at 9. 	Plaintiff’s argument is unpersuasive. 	This Court
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has noted that, “[u]nlike other sources of information, there are
no 	independently 	verifiable 	sources 	for 	calculated 	dumping
margins, other than previous administrative determinations.” 	Peer
Bearing Co.-Changshan v. United States, 32 CIT 1307, 1314, 587 F.
Supp. 	2d 	1319, 	1328 	(2008). 	Therefore, 	when 	calculating 	the 	AFA
rate for the PRC-wide entity, “the reliability of the calculation
stems 	from 	its 	basis 	in 	prior 	verified 	information 	in 	previous
administrative 	reviews,” 	and 	“[i]f 	Commerce 	chooses 	a 	calculated
dumping 	margin 	from 	a 	prior 	segment 	of 	the 	proceeding, 	it 	is 	not
necessary 	to 	question 	the 	reliability 	of 	the 	margin 	if 	it 	was
calculated from verified sales and cost data.” 	Id., 587 F. Supp.
2d at 1328. 	Here, Commerce calculated the rate based on the 2004-
2005 	New 	Shipper 	Review. 	Decision 	Memorandum 	at 	9–10. 	During 	a
2009 	administrative 	review 	of 	WBF, 	Commerce 	corroborated 	the
216.01% rate for the PRC-wide entity. 	Id. at 10. 	Commerce deemed
this 	rate 	to 	be 	relevant 	to 	this 	administrative 	review. 	Id. 	at
10. 	As discussed, Plaintiff failed to provide evidence indicating
that this rate was unreliable. 	Because the 216.01% rate has been
corroborated 	for 	the 	PRC-wide 	entity, 	and 	the 	evidence 	Plaintiff
provided 	lacked 	probative 	value, 	Commerce’s 	determination 	was
reasonable. 	See Peer Bearing, 32 CIT at 1314, 587 F. Supp. 2d at
1328.
Finally, 	Plaintiff 	argues 	that 	the 	PRC-wide 	rate 	is
punitive. 	Pl.’s 	Mem. 	10–11. 	The 	court 	disagrees. 	Plaintiff
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Court No. 13-00233 	Page 13
insists that Commerce failed to support Maoji’s rate increase from
6.68% in previous reviews to the present 216.01% rate applied here.
As 	discussed 	above, 	Maoji 	had 	previously 	qualified 	for 	separate
rate 	status, 	and 	subsequently 	lost 	it 	in 	this 	review, 	therefore
Maoji’s previous rate is irrelevant in the instant case. 	The court
finds that the 216.01% rate is supported by substantial evidence,
thus 	“an 	AFA 	dumping 	margin 	determined 	in 	accordance 	with 	the
statutory 	requirements 	is 	not 	a 	punitive 	measure.” 	KYD, 	Inc. 	v.
United States, 607 F.3d 760, 768 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Conclusion
For 	all 	the 	foregoing 	reasons, 	the 	court 	sustains
Commerce’s Final Results. 	Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the
agency record is denied.
/s/ Nicholas Tsoucalas
Nicholas Tsoucalas
Senior Judge
Dated: November 18, 2014
New York, New York
Case 1:13-cv-00251-NT Document 19 Filed 11/18/14 Page 13 of 13