United States of America v. Brame et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
ROBERT HAL BRAME,
Defendant.
Case No.: 88-cr-00956-DMS-1
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
REOPEN; DENYING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
REDUCE SENTENCE UNDER 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)
[ECF No. 164]
Pending before the Court is Defendant’s motion to reopen for good cause and motion
to reduce sentence pursuant to the First Step Act (“FSA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
(Mot., ECF No. 164.) Defendant is proceeding pro per. The Government did not respond
to the motions. For the following reasons, Defendant’s motion to reopen is granted and
motion to reduce sentence is denied without prejudice.
I. BACKGROUND
The background of this case has been summarized many times in the Court’s
previous orders denying Defendant’s motions to reduce his sentence. (ECF Nos. 100, 106,
143, 163.) On November 1, 1989, Defendant was sentenced to 600 months imprisonment
for two counts of armed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113, subdivisions (a)
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and (d), and two counts of felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1). On October, 25, 1991, Defendant was sentenced to 420
months imprisonment arising out of his convictions in Georgia in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia for armed bank robbery, carrying and using a
firearm and in relation to a crime of violence, and being a felon in possession of a firearm.
See United States v. Brame, No. 90-cr-376 (N.D. Ga.). That sentence was ordered to be
served consecutively to the 600-month sentence imposed by the sentencing court in this
case. Defendant requests that this Court reduce his 600-month sentence to 360 months,
and have that sentence run concurrently with his 420-month sentence from the Georgia
case. (Mot. 2.)
II. DISCUSSION
In general, a court may not modify a sentence of incarceration once it has been
imposed, unless expressly permitted by Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
or by statute. United States v. Penna, 319 F.3d 509, 511 (9th Cir. 2003). The FSA is such
a statute. See Pub L. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (2018). Among the criminal justice
reforms implemented by the FSA, Congress amended 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) to
allow a defendant to move a district court for compassionate release after exhausting
remedies with the Bureau of Prison (“BOP”).
The FSA allows a district court to modify a sentence and grant compassionate release
if it finds “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warrant such a reduction, the reduction
is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the United States Sentencing
Commission, and the reduction complies with the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a). See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). As the movant, Defendant bears the burden
of establishing that he is eligible for a sentence reduction. See United States v. Jones, 836
F.3d 896, 899 (8th Cir. 2016). One such relevant policy statement is U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13,
which may inform but does not bind a district court’s act of discretion for a defendant’s
motion to reduce sentence. See United States v. Aruda, 993 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2021).
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88-cr-00956-DMS-1
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A. Exhaustion of Administrative Rights
A defendant may seek compassionate relief from a court “after the defendant has
fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring
a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request
by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Put differently, administrative “[e]xhaustion occurs when the BOP
denies a defendant’s application or lets thirty days pass without responding to it.” United
States v. Mondaca, No. 89-cr-0655-DMS, 2020 WL 1029024, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 3,
2020) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Defendant does not argue that he
filed a request for compassionate release with the BOP; therefore, he has not satisfied
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s exhaustion requirement. Accordingly, the Court DENIES
Defendant’s motion for failure to exhaust all administrative remedies.
B. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons
Even if Defendant had satisfied the administrative exhaustion requirement, his
present case does not meet the requirements for compassionate release. Defendant is 71
years old, (Mot. 1); however, he does not allege that he “is experiencing a serious
deterioration in physical or mental health because of the aging process.” U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.13(b)(2). Nor does Defendant allege he is qualified for compassionate release
because of his medical or family circumstances, because he was a victim of abuse, or
because his case meets the criteria to qualify as an “Unusually Long Sentence.” Id. §
1B1.13(b)(1), (3)–(4), (6). Accordingly, Defendant has not established “extraordinary and
compelling reasons” consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission for a reduction in sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s motion to reopen is GRANTED, but his
motion to reduce sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) is DENIED without
prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Dated: February 23, 2026
_________________________________
Hon. Dana M. Sabraw
United States District Judge
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